

TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

SYSTEM II
91353

SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

WASHINGTON

December 1987

10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290) on
Arms Control Positions for US-USSR Summit (S)

The President has approved the instructions for the during the
Summit as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD-290). (S)

Due to the sensitivity of this NSDD, no copies of this document
should be made. It is further directed that a record of all
those to whom this document is given should be maintained by the
office of each addressee.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Colin L. Powell
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
NSDD- 290

10

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on OADR

Declassified/Released on 5/1/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

START. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the START portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of Heads of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reduction achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text worked out in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 600 warheads, 1500 warheads on 14 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule; and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight which will thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

- (a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.
- (b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 1500 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1, B-52, BEAR-H and BLACKJACK bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Other heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including BACKFIRE, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing how many ALCMs shall be attributed to future heavy bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs.

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.
7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.
8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party." (S)

Ballistic Missile Warhead Sublimitation Counting Rule Issue.
 The Soviet Union has indicated that it may be prepared to consider a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. However, it has further indicated that rather than the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 100 which we seek, it would prefer to raise that sublimit to 50% or 510. Before we can consider accepting such a proposal, it is essential that we have a clear agreement with the Soviet side concerning:

- an acceptable definition to be applied to air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in START (i.e., that only nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 1500 kilometers would be included in the Treaty's limit);
- the counting rules applied to such ALCMs; and
- the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by the START Treaty. (S)

Should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept (1) a definition of ALCMs to be covered by START as only nuclear-armed ALCMs of a range greater than 1500 kilometers, (2) a counting rule for such ALCMs generally along the lines specified in item (b) above, and (3) the counting rule for the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles as specified in item (c) above, I am prepared to consider additional flexibility with respect to the U.S. position on these sublimits as yet not agreed. (TS)

With respect to the ALCM counting rule, if needed, and in the context of reaching agreement on the general approach outlined in (b) above, I am prepared to increase the number of ALCMs attributed to each bomber to 8 in order to reach agreement on this critical point. (TS)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENSE & SPACE. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the Defense & Space portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to defense and space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva first to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement." (S)

Further Elements. Should the Soviet side press for the inclusion of additional "instructions" in the Defense & Space area, the U.S. side should pursue the inclusion of the following language in the agreed statement:

"In pursuing a Joint Draft Treaty Text, the negotiators should build upon the following elements:

- (a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty;
- (b) after that period of time both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 6 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the Treaty;
- (c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and
- (d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the sides meet regularly:
 1. to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defense programs; and,
 2. to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. (S)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET