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INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE
MALABO POUCH

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FOLLOWING SECTO 20004 DTD DEC 11, 1987 SENT ACTION
STATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:
QUOTE:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTO 20004

OPCENTER: PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS (IMMEDIATE)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
T/SGS: NATO, NAC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 12/11 NAC BRIEFING ON
WASHINGTON SUMMIT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POSTS SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON FOLLOWING ACCOUNT
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OF SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 11 REPORT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC

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IS)FPC/CDR Data

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COUNCIL IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

3. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY THANKING SECRETARY GENERAL CARRINGTON AND FOREIGN MINISTER POOS FOR THEIR INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL TO NATO POSTS). IN THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT HAD SET THE PACE -- LOTS OF SUBSTANCE AND ALMOST NO SMALL TALK. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INF TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY HAD GONE STRAIGHT FROM THAT TO A "SLEEVES-UP" MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THE TWO SIDES HAD WORKED ON START AND ABM TREATY ISSUES LITERALLY UP TO THE LAST MINUTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD FIVE WORKING SESSIONS, ALL VERY SUBSTANTIVE. THE FOUR-PART AGENDA WAS FULLY COVERED. THE SUPPORT WORK WAS ORGANIZED IN THE WAY THAT HAD PROVEN PRODUCTIVE IN EARLIER MEETINGS: A SMALL CENTRAL GROUP CHAIRED BY THE TWO MINISTERS, WITH TWO WORKING GROUPS: ONE ON ARMS CONTROL, CHAIRED BY AMB. NITZE AND MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV (CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF) AND ONE ON OTHER ISSUES (HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL), CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH.

HUMAN RIGHTS

5. HUMAN RIGHTS IS AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA. THE PRESIDENT STARTED IN ON IT AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS FIRST MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THE WORKING GROUP SPENT TWELVE HOURS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO PUSH HARD BUT TO AVOID RAISING THE PUBLIC PROFILE OF PARTICULAR
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CASES. WE FIND THAT GETS BETTER RESULTS. GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE APPRECIATED THIS APPROACH.

6. WE ARE INCREASINGLY SEEING SOVIET READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. OUR DISCUSSION HAS BECOME SYSTEMATIZED. WE TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING: NAMES, LISTS OF CASES, SOVIET LAWS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY ON A TWO-WAY BASIS; WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT.

7. WE ARE GETTING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET
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BOTTOM LINE APPROACH. FOR INSTANCE, PAST SERVICE IN THE KGB, NO MATTER HOW LONG AGO, WILL ALWAYS BE A NEGATIVE CRITERION IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO APPLY THE STANDARD OF RESTRICTING EMIGRATION OF THOSE WITH ACCESS TO "STATE SECRETS" IN A VERY UNJUSTIFIABLE WAY. WHILE WE SEE CONTINUED PROGRESS ON GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION, WE SEE ONLY MODEST INCREASES IN JEWISH EMIGRATION.

8. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THOUGH MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. WE ARE ALERT TO THE DANGER THAT ESTABLISHING A GOOD PROCESS IS NOT ENOUGH; WHAT COUNTS IS THE SUBSTANCE. THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT HAS ONE SENTENCE ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS EXCHANGES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SUBJECT OF U.S./SOVIET DIALOGUE HAS BEEN SO ACKNOWLEDGED, DIRECTLY AND OPENLY.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9. SINCE THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT MANY LEVELS. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ, AND SOME TEN HOURS IN THE WORKING GROUP.
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THIS WAS THE MOST PROBING, REALISTIC, AND CANDID REGIONAL DIALOGUE SO FAR. WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

. AFGHANISTAN

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10. THERE WAS THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE SHALL SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND. THE PRESIDENT REASSURED GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE AT GENEVA. BASICALLY, EVERYTHING HAS BEEN AGREED EXCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THEY HAVE LINKED THIS TO THE IDEA THAT THERE MUST FIRST BE "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION." WE TOLD THEM THIS IS UNREALISTIC. WITH UP TO A THIRD OF THE POPULATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AND WITH THE FREEDOM

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FIGHTERS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT REGIME, THIS SORT OF CONDITION IS A WAY OF SAYING THERE WILL NOT BE A WITHDRAWAL.

11. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" IS NOT AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS. IF SO, THIS WILL REMOVE THE LINKAGE THAT HAS BLOCKED THEIR WITHDRAWAL. WE WILL BE WATCHING IN GENEVA TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1988.

. IRAN/IRAQ

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12. THIS WEEK, FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ SAID THAT "IRAQ ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS." THIS IS
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UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS. BUT IRAN CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A DELIBERATE STRATEGY ON THEIR PART, AND THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT FACT. WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO START WORK ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO PUT TEETH INTO RES. 598, AND TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PUBLICLY VISIBLE. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DO THE SAME. THE SOVIETS KEPT PUSHING US FOR A UN FORCE IN THE GULF -- AN IDEA WITHOUT A CONCEPT, AS THE SECRETARY HAS TOLD THE NAC EARLIER.

13. THERE WERE INTERESTING AND WORTHWHILE DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE BILATERAL AREA.

ARMS CONTROL

. INF TREATY

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14. THE SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY WAS THE PUBLIC HIGHLIGHT OF THE SUMMIT. THE TREATY IS A MOST IMPRESSIVE DOCUMENT. IT IS THE RESULT OF COHESION, STRENGTH, AND CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. IT NOT ONLY REDUCES NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT DOES SO ASYMMETRICALLY. IT REPRESENTS A

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BIPARTISAN ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE U.S., SINCE NATO'S 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN DURING A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION. THE AGREEMENT ALSO SETS NEW STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION, GOING BEYOND THE BREAKTHROUGHS OF THE STOCKHOLM CODE AGREEMENT AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR FURTHER BREAKTHROUGHS IN START.

. START
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15. A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS WAS MADE. WE CAN NOW SEE THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT. IT IS TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT A START TREATY IS PROBABLE, BUT IT IS NOW CLEARLY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ONE.

16. AT REYKJAVIK IN 1986, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD BUILT ON THEIR EARLIER GOAL OF A FIFTY PER CENT REDUCTION BY AGREEING TO A CEILING OF 6000 WARHEADS ON 1600 DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEY ALSO AGREED ON A BOMBER COUNTING RULE. SUBSEQUENTLY, A REDUCTION TO 1540 WARHEADS OF 154 HEAVY MISSILES WAS AGREED.

17. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE SIDES NAILED DOWN AN EARLIER, MORE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT WOULD BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PER CENT, AND THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD THEN EXCEED THE REDUCED LEVEL. MOREOVER, THE SIDES AGREED ON A CEILING OF 4900 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS WITHIN THE OVERALL 6000 CEILING. THE REMAINING WARHEADS WOULD BE ON SLOWER-FLYING BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES.

18. THE TWO SIDES DID NOT AGREE ON MOBILE MISSILES, BUT THE U.S. HAS SAID THAT IT IS READY TO ALLOW THEM IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. MOBILE MISSILES ADD TO STABILITY. THE SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO LIMITING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCMs), OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL 1600/6000 LIMITS. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED SOME TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SLCM VERIFICATION; IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. THE U.S. APPROACH AT REYKJAVIK WAS FOR THE SIDES SIMPLY TO DECLARE THEIR SLCM PROGRAMS, RATHER THAN TO INCLUDE IN A TREATY LIMITS THAT COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED.

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19. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL SINCE THEY GIVE MEANING TO THE CENTRAL NUMERICAL LIMITS. THE SIDES AGREED ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES. TOGETHER WITH THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE FROM REYKJAVIK, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE. HOW TO COUNT AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WAS DISCUSSED BUT NOT RESOLVED.

20. BUILDING ON INF, THERE WERE MAJOR ADVANCES IN START VERIFICATION. THE JOINT STATEMENT LISTS EIGHT ELEMENTS:

- . - EXTENSIVE DATA EXCHANGES;
- . - BASELINE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THESE DATA;
- . - ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS;
- . - CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF LOCATIONS WHERE LIMITED SYSTEMS ARE OR HAVE BEEN;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS OF LOCATIONS WHERE A SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, STORAGE, PRODUCTION, OR REPAIR COULD BE OCCURRING;
- . - BAN ON CONCEALMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION; AND
- . - MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, INCLUDING ON-DEMAND OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT BASES.

21. OUR INF EXPERIENCE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE THEIR WORK CUT OUT FOR THEM TO TRANSLATE THESE PRINCIPLES INTO MUTUALLY-AGREED TREATY LANGUAGE.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

22. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF D&S AND ABM
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TREATY ISSUES. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY DISAGREE WITH SCL,

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AND CALLED IT A WASTE OF MONEY. WE COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INVESTING SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES IN ITS OWN EQUIVALENT TO THE SDI PROGRAM. IN THE END, THE SIDES AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THE U.S. PROGRAM.

23. THE SIDES TURNED TO CONSIDERING WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE MIGHT BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABM TREATY. THE FORMULATION AGREED IS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

24. THIS FORMULATION STATES THAT THE SIDES CAN CARRY OUT RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED. THIS MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IT SAYS. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC EXPERIMENTS AS IT IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE IS SOME CONTENTION OVER PRECISELY WHAT THAT SIGNIFIES.

25. THE SIDES AGREE ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, BUT NOT ON THE LENGTH OF THAT PERIOD. THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL CONVICTION IS THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED.

26. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT AT THE END OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, EITHER SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. THUS, IF A SIDE WISHES TO DEPLOY DEFENSES AT THAT TIME, IT IS FREE AND CLEAR TO DO SO.

27. WITH THE PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THE COMMITMENT TO A FIFTY PER CENT START CUT, AND THE NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES ON O&S ISSUES, THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAS TAKEN US A GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD. THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS
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TO HAVE A NEW TREATY COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT NEXT YEAR. AS WITH INF, THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO GET RESULTS BY THOROUGHNESS, PATIENCE, AND RESOLVE. IF A TREATY DOES NOT MEET THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, OR IS NOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, HE WILL NOT SIGN IT.

. OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES
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28. HEADWAY WAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THERE WILL BE
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AN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIMENTS THAT WILL HELP REACH AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES ESSENTIAL TO MOVE FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES, AND WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS.

. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

29. THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING VERY HARD ON CW. WE SHARED CONCERNS ON CW PROLIFERATION, AND THE FACT THAT THE GENERAL CONSTRAINT AGAINST THE USE OF CW HAS BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. VERIFICATION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT.

30. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE MUST THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. A CW BAN IS NOT WORTH CONCLUDING UNLESS THERE IS A LOT OF INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION AND VAST NUMBERS OF STATES PARTIES. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL, FOR INSTANCE, TO HAVE A CSCE-WIDE CW BAN.

. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

31. THE U.S. AND USSR AGREED CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
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IS A VERY IMPORTANT TASK. AT WASHINGTON, THE U.S. MADE THE POINT THAT IT COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THIS ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY. MOST OF THE FORCES ON OUR SIDE WERE ALLIED, NOT AMERICAN. WE RAISED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE QUESTION LINKED TO A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS TALKED FREELY OF THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THEY TRIED TO APPLY THIS PRINCIPLE TO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS; WE FIRMLY REJECTED THAT.

32. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE CAN BE CONCLUDED EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE SECONDED CARRINGTON'S EARLIER COMMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT CLEARLY MAKES SENSE TO FOCUS ON REDUCING ITEMS LIKE TANKS

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AND ARTILLERY RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE MBFR APPROACH.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

33. THE SECRETARY LISTED SEVERAL KEY POINTS FOR U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS THAT HE HAD HIGHLIGHTED IN HIS TOAST AT THE LUNCHEON HE HAD GIVEN FOR GORBACHEV:

. - THE RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE BURDEN OF LEADERSHIP EACH COUNTRY BEARS, AND UNIQUE BECAUSE OF THE NEED IN THE NUCLEAR ERA TO ENGAGE EACH OTHER DESPITE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES.

. - THE RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE, DUE TO CONTRASTING PHILOSOPHIES, POLITICAL

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SYSTEMS, AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.

. - WE MUST BE REALISTIC, AVOIDING EXTREMES EITHER OF HOSTILITY OR EUPHORIA THROUGH THE INEVITABLE UPS AND DOWNS. HE NOTED TO THE NAC THAT, SUCCESSFUL AS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAD BEEN, THE ADMINISTRATION IS DELIBERATELY BEING LESS EUPHORIC THAN ANYONE ELSE.

. - WE MUST SPEAK WITH CLARITY AND CANDOR ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES. THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- A CONCERN ALSO REFLECTED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND THE EC DECEMBER 5 SUMMIT STATEMENT. THE U.S. WILL ALSO SPEAK CANDIDLY ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

. - IT IS ESSENTIAL TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. THE WORLD WILL BE VASTLY DIFFERENT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS. WE MUST NOT FACE THE PAST AND BACK INTO THE FUTURE.

. - OPENNESS TO IDEAS, INFORMATION, AND CONTACTS IS THE KEY TO FUTURE SUCCESS. THE INF TREATY'S UNPRECEDENTED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE AN EXAMPLE OF THE POWERFUL PULL OF OPENNESS.

34. MUCH IS HAPPENING ACROSS THE RANGE OF THE
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U.S./SOVIET AGENDA. IT IS TOO SOON TO TELL WHETHER THIS PREFIGURES A PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW IT DEALS WITH THE WORLD. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WEST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES WHILE REMEMBERING THAT IT MUST DO SO FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. IF THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT LOOK TO ITS OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT WILL DESERVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DERELICTION.

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35. NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH, CONTAINED IN THE 1967 HARMEL REPORT, REMAINS VALID: STAY STRONG AND REALISTIC, WHILE SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT.

KEEL UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

NOTE: POUCH ADDRESSEES PROTECTED BY OC/T

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