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1. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE, AND KEY FIGURES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA (GOB), HAVE BEEN THINKING ON THE ISSUE OF WHERE TO GO BEYOND SJ-IV FOR SOME TIME AND HAVE DEVELOPED A PLAN TO MOVE SMOOTHLY INTO FUTURE STEADY STATE OPERATIONS. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE FIGHT IN COLOMBIA, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY FOCUSING SOLELY ON THE FUTURE OF AERIAL INTERDiction AND AIR SOVEREIGNITY OUTSIDE OF THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL COUNTRY TEAM (CT) STRATEGY. WE RECOMMEND

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EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THIS EFFORT TO INCLUDE THE FULL
ARRAY OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR COUNTERDRUG (CD)
OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA WHICH GO FAR BEYOND SJ-IV.
Indeed, we are focusing on military operation in general
as an adjunct to police operations; a necessary element
to create the condition for achievement of our CD goals
here.

3. We are engaged with the GOC on numerous CD and non
CD issues, many of which are not conducive to continuing
smooth relations. For example, our coffee and textile
policies could be a source of future friction, as could
drastic cuts in FMF and ESF. The SJIV CD effort is at
the other end of the spectrum. It has been increasingly
successful at building close cooperation with this
industrious, relatively wealthy nation, which is already
buying or considering cash purchases of US made
communications equipment, radars, and helicopters.
Cooperation between us and Colombia military personnel
has gone far toward building viable institutions

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supportive of continuing democracy here, as well as
continuing friendly relations with the USG. Colombia's
CD forces are already the best in the region, and we
must continue to nurture their very effective
counternarcotics capability. The drug war is all
important to Colombia, and the GOC intends to continue
the effort at the expense of its taxpayers.

4. While we don't have a formal document updating our
joint comprehensive CD plan, we do have a Colombian
radar plan in draft which should be released by the end
of April. Colombian overall thinking has matured in
frequent discussions with us. They are intent on
wresting influence from the narcos throughout the
country. They launched Operation Aguila in late July
1992 to complement SJIV and to militarily engage the
narcos' use of civil aviation. The

[Redacted]

Project was originally
scheduled to occur simultaneously with our radar
deployments in SJIV and the kickoff of Aguila, but
delays were caused by the U.S. contractor. They have
worked hard to improve their tactical reaction
capability. We see evidence they are ready to commit

n/a
MONEY TO DEVELOP NEW INITIATIVES. THEY ARE BUYING BLACKHAWKS. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR P&A DATA FOR PURCHASE OF MD-500'S AND UPGRADE OF THEIR AC-47'S. BOTH WILL BE CASH FMS CASES. THEY ARE PLANNING TO CAPITALIZE ON THE GREAT STRIDES IN TACTICAL CAPABILITY (WHICH WE PROVIDED) MADE IN THE SEARCH FOR PABLO ESCOBAR. THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOC AND USG, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE ESCOBAR TASK FORCE, IS TREMENDOUSLY SUCCESSFUL.

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POST-PABLO, THE GOC INTENDS TO EXPAND TASK FORCE OPERATIONS TO CALI AND THE NORTH COAST. CONTINUAL USG SUPPORT WILL BE CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN SHUTTING DOWN NARCO OPERATIONS. OUR PLANNING FOR TRANSITION INTO THE FUTURE TAKES COLOMBIAN CAPABILITIES INTO ACCOUNT. OUTLINING OUR PLAN, WE BELIEVE, WILL ANSWER MOST OF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REF.

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCINCLO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM/CC/CV/SCJ3/ IMMEDIATE
INFO JOINTSTAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
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COMDT/COGARD WASHDC PRIORITY
DEA WASHDC/UIPL/CD/ PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC/CANAS/ PRIORITY
USCINCLO NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
HQUSAF WASHDC PRIORITY
ANGRC ANDREWS AFB MD/CC/ PRIORITY
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5. WITHIN THIS EXPANDED CONTEXT, ABRIAL INTERDICTION AND

ENFORCEMENT OF COLOMBIAN AIR SOVEREIGNTY IS A DEFINITE
AREA OF EMPHASIS AND FUNDING COMMITMENT FOR THE GOC.
THE FIRST EXTENSION OF SJIV, IN DECEMBER 1992, WAS TO
SHOW WHETHER THERE WAS MERIT TO DETECTION AND MONITORING
(D&M) OPERATIONS USING RADAR AND OVERHEAD PLATFORMS IN
COLOMBIA.

5. THE EXPANDED JOINT PLANNING ASSISTANCE TEAM (JPAT) IN
COLOMBIA, WITH 45 TDY MILITARY PERSONNEL, IN CONJUNCTION
WITH MOUNTING THE RADAR ON TOWERS AND INCREASED SOUTHCOM
OVERHEAD PLATFORM ALLOCATIONS, PROVED THE CONCEPT
VALID. DURING THE SECOND PHASE (JAN-MAR), OUR
EFFECTIVENESS AT ENSURING END GAMES ON ACTIONABLE TRACKS
INCREASED FROM AN AVERAGE OF 30 PERCENT TO ABOUT 60
PERCENT, AND THE OVERALL NUMBER OF TRACKS DECREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY. WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED
BY THESE RESOURCES, WE ALSO STIMULATED GROUND OPERATIONS
IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA, SERIOUSLY DISRUPTING NARCO
OPERATIONS. IN TOTAL, COLOMBIAN FORCES WITH OUR SUPPORT
CAPTURED 14 AIRCRAFT, 1700 KILOS OF COCAINE AND BASE,
12,400 GALLONS OF PRECURSOR MATERIALS, AND DESTROYED
APPROXIMATELY 20 LABS, COSTING THE NARCOS WELL OVER USD
12 MILLION.

7. BUT THE REAL SUCCESS OF THESE OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA
HAS BEEN INSTITUTION BUILDING. THE COLOMBIAN AIR FORCE
(PAC) AND ANTINARCOTICS POLICE (DAN) NOW WORK
SIDE-BY-SIDE IN THE CENTRO DE NACIONAL VIGILANCIA
(CNV). AN ARMY OFFICER WILL SOON BE INCLUDED. THIS WAS
NOT EVEN CONCEivable SIX MONTHS AGO. TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND POLICE AND
OURSelves IN THE CNV IS NOW ROUTINE AND HAS RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (MOD) HAS ENDORSED AND PROMISED TO FIND WORK SPACE FOR THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THIS COOPERATION—A COMBINED US/COLOMBIAN CD OPERATIONS PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL DUBBED THE COMBINED PLANNING GROUP (CPG)

8. OUR CT PLAN IS TO CONTINUE BUILDING THIS INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION WHILE ENHANCING COLOMBIAN EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES. OUR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TO THE END OF SJIV PROVIDES TWO MAJOR GOALS: (1) TO TRANSITION TO COLOMBIA-ONLY OPERATIONS, AS US MILITARY CD FORCES COMPENSURATELY DECLINE, AND (2) TO ENHANCE US/GOC-JOINT CD OPERATIONS. THE TRANSITION GOAL IS PERHAPS MOST DIFFICULT. OUR SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES FOLLOW:

A. TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE MANPOWER SHORTFALLS OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD AT THE LETICIA AND ARARACUARA RADARS, WE ARE RESEARCHING THE POSSIBILITY OF COLOMBIA TAKING OVER AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF THE POSITIONS. WHILE WE CAN MAKE NO PROMISES, WE ARE QUITE HOPEFUL THIS WILL COME TO FRUITION. OVER THE LONGER TERM, POST-SJIV, WE ENVISION THE COLOMBIANS WILL BE ABLE TO PICK UP EVEN MORE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY AS THEY GAIN EXPERIENCE IN MAINTAINING THE RADARS.

B. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, OUR CPG HAS BEEN CHARTERED TO CONDUCT CD OPERATIONS PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT,

WORKING AS AN INTEGRATED TEAM WITH COLOMBIAN PLANNERS. WE MUST EXPLORE MANNING WITH SOUTHCOM, CONSIDERING THAT THIS CELL WILL HAVE TO BE MANNED WITH TDY MILITARY PERSONNEL, BUT AS COLOMBIAN PLANNING EXPERTISE INCREASES, US MANNING CAN BE REDUCED. WE ARE LOOKING AT
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COMDT/COGARD WASHDC PRIORITY
DEA WASHDC/OFI/OD// PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC/CANAS// PRIORITY
USCINCCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
HOUOSAF WASHDC PRIORITY
ANGRC ANDREWS AFB MD//CC// PRIORITY
HQNONRAD PETERSON AFB CO//J3//

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THREE OPTIONS:

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(1)
FULL JPAT-LEVEL OPERATIONS WHICH ENABLES CONTINUED D&M,
GROUND AND RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND PURSUIT OF VARIOUS
STAFF INITIATIVES ENHANCING CD OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS. THIS OPTION WILL INITIALLY REQUIRE 45
PEOPLE FOR 90 DAY PERIODS.

(2)
A REDUCED CELL FOCUSING ON D&M ONLY, WITH NO GROUND OR
RIVERINE SUPPORT. THIS OPTION WILL TAKE 23 PEOPLE.

(3)
A REDUCED CELL WHICH FOCUSES ONLY ON GROUND AND RIVER OPERATIONS WITHOUT ANY D&M SUPPORT. THIS OPTION REQUIRES 17 PEOPLE.

C. NUMEROUS INITIATIVES ARE UNDERWAY TO ENHANCE JOINT COLOMBIAN CD OPERATIONS.

(1) OUR NEXT CONOPS AIMS TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON THE NARCOS IN THE VALLE DEL CAUCA BY PROVIDING PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT THROUGH THE CPG.

(2) WE HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED COLOMBIAN MILITARY LEADERS WITH A CONCEPT OF DEVELOPING JOINT, FAST REACTION CD TEAMS USING FAC HELICOPTERS MATCHED WITH ARMY AND DANI GUN TEAMS. AS THIS CAPABILITY IS DEVELOPED, WE INTEND TO DO STRIKE AND DENIAL OPERATIONS IN LA GUAJIRA.

(3) WE ARE GOING TO GIVE MORE PRIORITY TO RIVERINE AND COASTAL OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT COLOMBIA, BUT PARTICULARLY FOCUSING ON LA GUAJIRA AND SAN ANDRES.

(4) WE MUST DILIGENCE PURSUE RESOLUTION OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS, E.G. CUSTOMS RELEASE OF FLIR TAPES TO THE GOC AND THE E-3 RIDER ISSUE.

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DEVELOPED WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM.

(6)

WE PROPOSE EXPLORING THE TRANSFER OF THE LETICIA AND ARARACUARA RADARS TO COLOMBIA, PROVIDING CORE EXPERTISE ON OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE AND A SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS FOR A YEAR. RIGHT NOW, THE GOC IS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF INHERITING THESE OLD RADARS PERMANENTLY, BUT THEY REMAIN A USEFUL DETERRENT TO THE NARCOS AND GIVE THE COLOMBIAN OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE. WITH OR WITHOUT THESE RADARS, THEY INTEND TO PURCHASE THEIR OWN WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR. [B1]

(7)

(8)

WE EXPECT AN COLOMBIAN DECISION ANY DAY ON THE PURCHASE OF FIVE BLACKHAWKS BASED ON THE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA PROVIDED EARLIER. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS, COLOMBIA HAS NIGHT VISION GOGGLE QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR PILOTS WHO ARE TRAINING NEW PILOTS IN NIGHT OPERATIONS, AND WE PROPOSE HAVING THE U.S.C SUPPLY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS FOR MOREFORMAL NVG TRAINING. THE RADARS AND NVG CAPABILITIES PROMISE TO HELP RESOLVE SOME OF THE SERIOUS

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SHORTFALLS FACING IN NIGHT REACTION CAPABILITY.

(9)

THERE APPEARS TO BE NEW RESOLVE TO ATTACK CORRUPTION, AT LEAST WHEN IT COMES TO THE ATTENTION OF POLICY MAKERS. DURING SJIV, WE IDENTIFIED A DAN MAJOR IN CALI WHO WAS SUPPORTING NARCO TRAFFICKING THROUGH THE AIRPORT. THE PROBLEM STOPPED WITHIN A DAY AFTER THE AMBASSADOR SHARED THE INFORMATION WITH THE MOD. COLOMBIAN AIRFORCE OFFICIALS THEMSELVES SUGGESTED WE FILE FALSE INFORMATION WITH OUR OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS, SO THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM COULD NOT TIP THE NARCOS ABOUT OUR CD OVERFLIGHTS. WE SIMILARLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE TOWER CONTROLLERS IN CALI. WHEN WE
STARTED THE JANUARY PHASE OF SJIV, CALI WAS A VERITABLE SAFEHAVEN. AFTER A CONCENTRATED EFFORT ATTACKING CORRUPTION, WE CAPTURED AT LEAST THREE AIRPLANES AND TRAFFICKERS THERE IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS.

COLOMBIA HAS RESEARCHED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MANDATORY AIRPORT OF ENTRY (AOES) AND WANTS TO DO SO. THE HOLD UP AT THE MOMENT IS MANNING FOR THE OPERATION. RELATIVE TO ITS POPULATION, COLOMBIA HAS A CONSIDERABLE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC CROSSING ITS BORDERS DAILY, SO THE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS AT THESE AIRPORTS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL.

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ENTRY AND EXIT CORRIDORS HAVE SIMILARLY BEEN EXPLORED AND ARE A LONG TERM GOAL. THIS INITIATIVE WHEN COUPLED WITH AOES WILL PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ENGAGING NARCO AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LAW. THE RADARS COMING ON LINE

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JUSE-00 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PM-02
P-01 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 FMP-00 /052W

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AND THESE LEGAL STEPS WILL ULTIMATELY BE THE TOOLS WITH

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WHICH COLOMBIA REGAINS SOVEREIGN CONTROL OF ITS AIRSPACE.

9. IN THE LONG TERM, THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY IS TRYING TO
RESOLVE ITS INABILITY TO ATTACK NARCOS AT NIGHT AND IN
REMOTE LOCATIONS.

(A)
THEY HAVE ASKED US TO CHECK AVAILABILITY OF D-MODEL
OV-10'S WHICH ARE NVG COMPATIBLE AND FLY AS FAST AS THE
TYPICAL NARCO AIRCRAFT. THEIR A-MODELS TOP OUT AT 170
KNOTS AND ARE FREQUENTLY OUT RUN BY THE NARCOS. THEY
INTEND TO MAKE MODIFY THEIR A-37'S FOR NVG OPERATIONS AS
WELL.

(B)
THEY HAVE ASKED MILGP TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL FOR A LOW
COST MODEL OF AN AC-130 GUNSHIP. THE ENVISIONED
AIRCRAFT WILL HAVE FLIR AND MINIGUNS BUT NOT THE COSTLY
HOWITZERS, ETC., ON U.S. MODELS.

(C)
THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF UPGRADING THEIR AC-47
GUNSHIPS WITH TURBOPROP ENGINES, EXTENDING THEIR LIFE
AND PERFORMANCE SO THEY CAN GO AFTER THE NARCOS IN THEIR
SAFEHAVENS, I.E., THE MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS.

(D)
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT MENTIONED ANYTHING ABOUT IT, A
FLIR-EQUIPPED, TRACK TO GROUND PLATFORM OF THEIR OWN
WOULD BE A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO

n/a
10. REFTEL RAISES POINTED CONCERNS ABOUT COLOMBIAN ABILITY TO AFFORD THEIR PROPOSED PROGRAMS. THE GOC AND MILITARY LEADERS DO NOT SHARE DETAILED FUNDING DATA WITH US, BUT MOST OF THEIR PURCHASES ARE CASH. OUR PROGRAMS SUPPLY LESS THAN SEVEN PERCENT OF THEIR MILITARY BUDGET, AND AFTER LONG-TERM OBSERVATION, WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THEIR FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY OR THAT THEY HAVE CONSIDERED LIFE CYCLE COST--NOT JUST INITIAL PURCHASE FOR ANY OF THIS EQUIPMENT. THEY ARE CAREFUL NOT TO BROACH SUBJECTS THEY CANNOT AFFORD.