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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 180785

THE FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION ALDAC MOSCOW BEIRUT  
KABUL LENINGRAD INFO SECRETARY DTD JUNE 4

QUOTE  
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 180785 TOSEC 110480

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: MOSCOW SUMMIT BRIEFING MATERIALS

REF: LONDON 12146 (NOTAL)

1. C -ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ACTION REQUEST: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO DRAW AS APPROPRIATE FROM TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL ON THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MOSCOW SUMMIT (MAY 29-JUNE 2).
3. DEPARTMENT IS MOUNTING AN INTENSIVE GLOBAL EFFORT TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS TO HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, THE FOLLOWING BRIEFINGS HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED:  
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EUR: THE PRESIDENT BRIEFED PM THATCHER IN LONDON ON JUNE 3; THE SECRETARY BRIEFED THE NATO ALLIES IN BRUSSELS ON JUNE 2; AMB. NITZE IS BRIEFING THE NATO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON ON JUNE 6; DAS SIMONS IS BRIEFING THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS AND THE EAST EUROPEANS (SEPARATELY) ON JUNE 6 IN THE DEPARTMENT.

EAP: THE PRESIDENT BRIEFED JAPANESE PM TAKESHITA IN

IS/FPC/CDR *Slyva* Date: *12/9/96*

MR Cases Only: \_\_\_\_\_  
EO Citations \_\_\_\_\_

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*EGP*



LONDON ON JUNE 3; SECRETARY CARLUCCI BRIEFED THE JAPANESE FM IN TOKYO ON JUNE 2 AND IS SCHEDULED TO BRIEF HIGH LEVEL KOREAN OFFICIALS IN SEOUL O/A JUNE 6; AMB. ROWNY WILL BRIEF THE CHINESE IN BEIJING O/A JUNE 6 AND THE AUSTRALIANS IN CANBERRA O/A JUNE 9; U/S ARMACOST WILL BRIEF CHINESE FM QIAN IN NEW YORK ON JUNE 6; DR. SIGUR WILL BRIEF THE ASEANS AND THE ROK-JAPANESE-AUSTRALIANS IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 6.

NEA: THE SECRETARY WILL BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV DURING HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP THIS WEEK; U/S ARMACOST WILL BRIEF THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 7 AND EITHER PM GANDHI IN NEW YORK OR THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR IN THE DEPARTMENT THE WEEK OF JUNE 6; DAS DJEREJIAN WILL BRIEF THE SAUDIS (SEPARATELY) AND OTHER NEA AMBASSADORS IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 6.

ARA: AMB. KAMPELMAN AND A/S ABRAMS WILL BRIEF ARA AMBASSADORS IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 6; U/S ARMACOST WILL BRIEF MEXICAN PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID IN NEW YORK ON JUNE 9.

AF: DR. CROCKER BRIEFED THE AFRICAN AMBASSADORS AND THE  
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SOUTH AFRICAN CHARGE (SEPARATELY) IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 3.

IO: U/A ARMACOST WILL BRIEF SYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NEW YORK ON JUNE 6.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW DEMONSTRATED THE NEW INTENSITY OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

-- THREE CURRENTS MOVED THIS SUMMIT ALONG.

-- THE FIRST WAS CHANGE. THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT FERMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT SHOWED.

-- THE SUBJECT OF CHANGE -- WHAT TO DO, HOW TO DO IT, WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- WAS ON EVERYONE'S MIND, FROM GORBACHEV TO THE REFUSENIKS.

-- THE SOVIETS INCREASINGLY WILL FOCUS ON THE PARTY CONFERENCE LATER THIS MONTH, AND WHAT THAT MEANS FOR THE PACE AND SCOPE OF RESTRUCTURING, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND

SECRET

OPENNESS.

--, IT'S EASY TO GET CAPTIVATED BY THE HOPE THAT THIS SENSE OF CHANGE IS GENERATING. THAT LEADS TO THE SECOND THEME -- CONSISTENCY ABOUT OUR INTERESTS AND HOW WE PURSUE THEM.

-- AS AN EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS TRIED HARD TO GET US TO AGREE THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAD REACHED A NEW SORT OF PLANE -- ONE WHERE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO A LOT OF CONFIDENTIAL  
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ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES OF THE SORT WHICH CHARACTERIZED DETENTE.

-- WE HAD TO BRING THE SOVIETS BACK DOWN TO EARTH.

O WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED A GOOD DEAL AND WERE MORE THAN READY TO KEEP ON WORKING;

O BUT WE WERE NOT GOING TO GO BACK TO THE KIND OF VAGUE CONCEPTS WE HAD SEEN IN THE 1970S THAT WERE SUBJECT TO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS AND COULD RESULT IN MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND RECRIMINATIONS.

O IT WAS MORE IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TO STICK TO REALISM, AND TO THE CONCRETE STEPS WE WERE TAKING TOWARD A MORE SUSTAINABLE RELATIONSHIP.

-- THE THIRD CURRENT WAS CONTINUITY.

-- BEFORE GOING TO GENEVA IN 1985 AND AGAIN BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK, THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO CREATE A DURABLE PROCESS FOR DEALING WITH US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES -- A FRAMEWORK THAT HE COULD PASS ON TO HIS SUCCESSOR.

-- THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IS ANOTHER STRONG STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL.

O WE HAVE A POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN PLACE THAT IS REALISTIC AND SOLID ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH BOTH THE GOOD AND THE BAD IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

O IT WAS CLEAR IN MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING  
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TO JOIN US IN THE EFFORT TO TAKE THE DIALOGUE AS FAR AS IT CAN GO IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

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O AS SPELLED OUT IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE SUMMIT, WE HAVE A VERY BROAD AND DETAILED WORK PROGRAM THAT WILL GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE COMMITMENT TO KEEP DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS.

-- SO THE MOSCOW SUMMIT SHOWED THE VALUE OF THE COURSE WE HAVE FOLLOWED.

-- THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE IN FAR BETTER SHAPE THAN IN 1981, AND ARGUABLY BETTER THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.

-- THIS POSES A TOUGH CHALLENGE, BECAUSE OUR DIFFERENCES ARE STILL VERY REAL; THE DANGER OF CONFLICT IS STILL OUT THERE.

-- BUT IF WE ARE REALISTIC AND CREATIVE IN OUR DIPLOMACY, WE CAN CONTINUE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN WAYS THAT WILL SERVE ALL OF US WELL IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

#### ARRANGEMENTS/ATMOSPHERICS

-- DURING THE COURSE OF FOUR OFFICIAL MEETINGS, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV SPENT EIGHT HOURS TOGETHER; TWO OF THEIR MEETINGS WERE ONE-ON-ONES.

-- THE SECRETARY HAD TWO SIDE SESSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE OF ABOUT AN HOUR EACH.

-- IN ADDITION, WE HAD WORKING GROUPS SPANNING OUR ENTIRE AGENDA: HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AFFAIRS AND THE FULL RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS.

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-- THE EXTENSIVE FINAL STATEMENT ISSUED WEDNESDAY GIVES A GOOD FLAVOR OF THE BREADTH AND DETAIL OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

-- THE MOOD THROUGHOUT WAS GOOD. THESE ARE TWO MEN WHO OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS HAVE COME TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER'S MEASURE AND HOW BEST TO ORGANIZE THEIR WORK.

O GORBACHEV WAS ON THE WHOLE A GRACIOUS HOST. THE CONVERSATIONS, WHILE FRANK AT TIMES, REFLECTED THE MUTUAL RESPECT WHICH BOTH MEN SEEM TO HAVE FOR ONE ANOTHER, AND THE IMPORTANCE THEY BOTH ATTACH TO THE RELATIONSHIP THEY HAVE DEVELOPED.

-- THE PUBLIC ASPECTS OF THE VISIT WERE A GREAT SUCCESS. WE WERE PARTICULARLY HAPPY TO EXPOSE THE



PRESIDENT TO A BROAD CROSS-SECTION OF SOVIET SOCIETY:  
STUDENTS, INTELLECTUALS, DISSIDENTS/REFUSENIKS, AND --  
QUITE LITERALLY -- THE SOVIET MAN IN THE STREET.

-- DEFENSE SECRETARY CARLUCCI MET TWICE WITH DEFENSE  
MINISTER YAZOV. AT THE FIRST MEETING, WHICH INCLUDED  
LUNCHEON, YAZOV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV.

-- THE DISCUSSIONS WERE FRANK, BUSINESS-LIKE AND COVERED  
MILITARY DOCTRINE, ARMS CONTROL DYNAMICS, POSSIBLE  
STRATEGIC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, MILITARY ATTACHE  
ACTIVITIES, REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY  
CONTROL.

-- REGARDING FUTURE VISITS, YAZOV SAID AKHROMEYEV  
ACCEPTED ADMIRAL CROWE'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S.  
JULY 6-11. YAZOV INVITED CARLUCCI TO COME TO THE SOVIET  
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UNION IN THE FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST. CARLUCCI ACCEPTED.

HUMAN RIGHTS

-- WE DIDN'T SET OUT TO MAKE MOSCOW THE HUMAN RIGHTS  
SUMMIT.

-- BUT CIRCUMSTANCES -- THE VIENNA CSCE END-GAME, THE  
PUBLICATION OF "THESES" FOR THE 17TH CPSU CONFERENCE,  
RECENT SOVIET MOVES IN THIS AREA -- GAVE IT A HIGH  
PROFILE.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME REMARKABLE THINGS ARE HAPPENING  
IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. SOME OF THE "THESES" BEING  
CIRCULATED, - ON GUARANTEES OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY,  
ON ASSURANCES OF THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND DEMONSTRATE --  
ARE THE KINDS OF THINGS WE HAVE FELT FOR YEARS WOULD BE  
MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS DOING THESE THINGS FOR THEIR  
OWN GOOD. BUT THEY ARE NO LESS INTERESTING FOR THAT.

-- GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WAS COMMITTED TO  
MOVING FORWARD WITH PERESTROIKA AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO  
SEE GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION AFFECT ALL SPHERES OF  
SOVIET LIFE.

-- IN CONCRETE TERMS, THE SUMMIT SEEMS TO HAVE ALREADY  
HAD SOME EFFECT.

O WE RAISED A NUMBER OF SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS THAT LEAD TO  
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND WERE TOLD THAT LEGISLATION  
MAY SOON BE ENACTED WHICH WILL REPEAL LAWS USED TO DENY



FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRACTICE OF RELIGION, AND RELAX EMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS.

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O WE ALSO RAISED INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS CASES IN WHICH THE U.S. IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED, INCLUDING EMIGRATION CASES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND WERE TOLD THAT PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THESE CASES WILL CONTINUE. UNFORTUNATELY, TEN HELSINKI MONITORS REMAIN IMPRISONED.

-- AS ALWAYS, THE PROOF IS IN THE RESULTS. BUT WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY WHAT WE HEARD AND SAW IN MOSCOW.

ECONOMICS

-- GORBACHEV RAISED THE ISSUE OF BARRIERS TO EXPANDED ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CALLING THEM RELICS OF THE COLD WAR.

-- WE AGREED THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS OUGHT TO INCREASE, BUT REAFFIRMED THE CONNECTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL AS OUR COMMITMENT TO CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT THE KEY WAS TO DEAL WITH THE BASES OF MISTRUST. IF GREATER TRUST WERE ESTABLISHED, THE POSTURES AND RESTRICTIONS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES. GORBACHEV SAID HE WELCOMED THAT APPROACH.

BILATERAL AFFAIRS

-- WE HAVE WORKED HARD ON BILATERAL TOPICS. WE HAVE MADE REAL PROGRESS, AND HAVE REACHED AGREEMENTS WHEN THE SUBSTANCE HAS JUSTIFIED CONCLUDING THEM.

-- THIS APPROACH HAS PROVEN TO BOTH SIDES THAT WE CAN GET RESULTS THAT ARE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL; RESULTS FOUNDED ON RECIPROCITY AND THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE.

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-- OUR EFFORTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT:

O AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY;

O A NEW COMPREHENSIVE FISHERIES AGREEMENT;



O TWO AGREEMENTS UNDER THE COAST GUARD -- MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND RADIO NAVIGATION -- BOTH AFFECTING THE NORTHERN PACIFIC;

O A THREE YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM UNDER THE GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THROUGH WHICH WE WILL NEGOTIATE OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD TO ESTABLISH CULTURAL/INFORMATION CENTERS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES;

O AN AMENDMENT TO THE ANNEX TO THE APRIL 1987 AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE PROVIDING FOR THE PLACING OF INSTRUMENTS ON EACH OTHER'S SPACE FLIGHTS AND THE EXCHANGE OF RESULTS OF NATIONAL STUDIES FOR UNMANNED SPACE EXPLORATION, INCLUDING TO THE MOON AND MARS.

-- THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV AGREED TO EXPAND DRAMATICALLY OUR PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS WITH A NEW PROGRAM OF EXCHANGES FOR AMERICAN AND SOVIET HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS.

-- WE ALSO HAVE UNDERWAY NEGOTIATION OF NEW AGREEMENTS ON BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, ON MARITIME SHIPPING, AND ON DELIMITING OUR PACIFIC MARITIME BOUNDARY.

-- WE HAVE AGREED TO CONTINUE WORK TOWARDS OPENING CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

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-- THE SOVIETS MADE A NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS WHICH WE'LL BE LOOKING AT. OUR CONTACTS WILL CONTINUE, AND WE AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT ANNUAL MEETING OF OUR BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION IN THE SPRING OF 1989.

NST

-- THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD A GOOD EXCHANGE ON START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE, AND OUR EXPERTS WORKED PRACTICALLY AROUND THE CLOCK.

-- IN THE START DISCUSSIONS, WE FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON ALCM ISSUES AND ON HOW WE WOULD VERIFY LIMITS ON MOBILE ICBMS, SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED. THIS PAID OFF IN SOME

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS.

-- ON ALCMS, WE AGREED ON SOME RULES FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, FOR CONVERTING BOMBERS FROM NUCLEAR TO OTHER USES, AND FOR COUNTING BOMBERS AND WARHEADS.

-- WE CONTINUE TO DISAGREE ON SOME IMPORTANT ALCM

SECRET

ISSUES, HOWEVER, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS TO ATTRIBUTE TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ALCMS, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO COUNT BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AGAINST THE LIMIT OF 1600 DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND THE RANGE ABOVE WHICH ALCMS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO START LIMITS.

-- WE LAID OUT FOR THE SOVIETS IN SOME DETAIL OUR PROPOSED APPROACH FOR VERIFYING DEPLOYED MOBILE ICBMS, AND THEY AGREED TO A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF IT.

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-- THIS IS A GOOD START ON THE MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION PROBLEM, BUT OTHER ASPECTS STILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED--IN PARTICULAR, MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ILLEGAL, COVERT MOBILE ICBMS AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO DEAL WITH NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE MISSILES.

-- THE EXPERTS GROUP PREPARED PAPERS RECORDING THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS AND MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION, AND THESE PAPERS WERE REFERRED TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA.

-- OUR EXPERTS ALSO PREPARED LISTS OF KEY ELEMENTS YET TO BE RESOLVED IN THESE TWO AREAS; THESE LISTS WERE GIVEN TO THE SOVIETS AND ALSO TO OUR GENEVA DELEGATION.

-- SO WE HAVE MOVED FORWARD IN THESE TWO AREAS, BUT HARD WORK REMAINS.

-- WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE OTHER MAJOR START ISSUES -- INCLUDING THE ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT, HEAVY ICBMS AND SLCMS -- BUT MADE NO HEADWAY ON THESE.

-- IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA, WE REVIEWED THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BUILDING ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

-- OUR REVIEW COVERED THE NEED IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT TO PROTECT SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHTS, THE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THE

RIGHT OF THE SIDES TO DECIDE THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION AFTER THE NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD, AND THE QUESTION OF ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD.

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-- ON THE FIRST TWO, WE REITERATED COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WE HAD MADE TWO WEEKS AGO FOR BUILDING ON SOVIET SUGGESTIONS.

-- REGARDING ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD, WE DISCUSSED OUR PROPOSAL THAT NEITHER SIDE OBJECT TO THE OTHER'S SPACE-BASED SENSORS.

-- WE DID NOT MAKE ANY REAL PROGRESS ON THESE SUBJECTS.

-- WE ALSO CONTINUED TO STRESS THE NEED TO CORRECT SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE COULD SIGN NO NEW TREATY IN THE STRATEGIC AREA WHILE THEIR VIOLATIONS CONTINUE, AND WE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF REDRESSING THESE VIOLATIONS PRIOR TO THE ABM TREATY REVIEW, WHICH IS REQUIRED TO BEGIN BY OCTOBER.

-- THE MESSAGE THUS REMAINS THE SAME IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE AREA: WE ARE MOVING FORWARD STEP-BY-STEP; WE ARE DETERMINED TO REACH GOOD AGREEMENTS, BUT WE STILL HAVE A HARD ROAD AHEAD OF US.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- NUCLEAR TESTING SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING A PATTERN OF SUCCESSES. MOSCOW CONTINUED THIS PATTERN.

-- FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AND SECRETARY SHULTZ SIGNED THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE) AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV PRESENT.

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-- THE AGREEMENT FULFILLS THE GOAL SET AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT TO DESIGN JOINT EXPERIMENTS IN WHICH NEW TOOLS FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION MEASUREMENTS COULD BE EXAMINED BY BOTH SIDES.

-- THE AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE JVE LATER THIS SUMMER.

-- WE ARE ALSO CLOSE TO COMPLETION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

-- WE HOPE TO COMPLETE THE PROTOCOL TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY SHORTLY AFTER THE JVE IS CONDUCTED, AND THEN SUBMIT BOTH TREATIES FOR RATIFICATION THIS FALL.

-- THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED IN MOSCOW ALSO GIVES A

SENSE OF THE DISTANCE WE'VE TRAVELED ON THESE ISSUES.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE WORK ALREADY UNDERWAY ON THE JVE WE HAVE REACHED NEW LEVELS OF ON-SITE PRESENCE FOR VERIFICATION: EACH OF US HAS MORE THAN 50 PEOPLE AT THE OTHER'S TEST SITE, AND BY THE TIME THE JVE IS CONDUCTED THAT NUMBER WILL RISE TO 90.

-- IN CONTRAST, NO FOREIGNER (INCLUDING EAST EUROPEAN) HAD PREVIOUSLY SET FOOT ON THE SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SITE.

-- THIS SHOWS WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH THE BENEFIT OF A CLEAR OBJECTIVE (ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION) AND A LOT OF HARD WORK.

LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENT

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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ALL ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHES. THE SOVIETS, AFTER INITIAL JOCKEYING, AGREED TO BREAK THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE OUT OF THE DRAFT START TREATY TO MAKE IT A STAND-ALONE AGREEMENT.

-- EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHES WILL BE NOTIFIED TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN ADVANCE. THE GENERAL LAUNCH AREA AND IMPACT AREA OR AREAS WILL BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS.

-- THIS IS A MODEST BUT USEFUL STEP; IT FILLS GAPS IN THE 1971/72 LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENTS, AND ENSURES THERE WILL BE NO CONFUSION OR MISINTERPRETATION ABOUT A LAUNCH.

BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE GROWING PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, ESPECIALLY IN VOLATILE REGIONS -- MISSILES LARGELY WITHIN THE RANGES OF

THOSE WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED NOW TO START DESTROYING.

-- THEY SEEMED TO SHARE THIS CONCERN AND WE AGREED TO HOLD EXPLORATORY TALKS IN SEPTEMBER TO EXCHANGE IDEAS AND INFORMATION ABOUT HOW TO COPE WITH THIS GROWING PROBLEM.

VIENNA CSCE MEETING

-- CSCE RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION AT THIS SUMMIT THAN AT ANY PREVIOUS U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT.

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-- WE REITERATED TO THE SOVIETS THAT FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING COULD BE WRAPPED UP. SECRETARY SHULTZ SUGGESTED TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE THESES FOR THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE PROVIDED A GOOD PLATFORM FOR SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA.

-- THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THEY SHOWED NO INTEREST IN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED DRAFT TEXT.

-- THEY SAID THAT FIRST IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES TO LAY OUT THEIR NATIONAL POSITIONS IN THE VIENNA TASK FORCES. THEY REITERATED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED DRAFT SHOULD BE CHANGED ONLY MINIMALLY.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

-- GORBACHEV PRESSED FOR U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS (CST) WHICH WE COULD LATER SELL TO OUR RESPECTIVE ALLIES.

-- HE ALLEGED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT U.S. - SOVIET AGREEMENT IN GENEVA HAD SOLVED THE MANDATE PROBLEM.

-- IN FACT, AFTER DISCUSSION IN GENEVA BY SENIOR EXPERTS OF A POSSIBLE FORMULA TO DEAL WITH DUAL-CAPABLE SYSTEMS, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED TO REFER THIS APPROACH TO VIENNA FOR CONSIDERATION. THE SOVIET EXPERT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON DUAL-CAPABLE LANGUAGE.

-- DURING A WORKING GROUP AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THE SOVIETS PURSUED THE DUAL CAPABLE PROBLEM, RESURFACING THE LANGUAGE SEEN EARLIER.

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O WE SUGGESTED THEY CONSIDER HANDLING THEIR DUAL-CAPABLE CONCERNS VIA A UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

-- GORBACHEV ALSO PRESENTED HIS "THREE STAGE" INITIATIVE OF MAY 30, BUT SOVIET EXPERTS DID NOT FOLLOW UP ON IT.

-- WE MADE THREE STRONG POINTS IN RESPONSE:



O MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS ARE AMONG 23 NATIONS, NOT TWO.

O MANDATE CAN ONLY BE PART OF A BALANCED VIENNA OUTCOME.

O CST NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AUTONOMOUS FROM CSCE.

-- DESPITE DISCUSSION AT ALL LEVELS, NO OPENINGS WERE FOUND FOR NEGOTIATORS TO EXPLOIT IN VIENNA.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

-- WE ALSO REVIEWED THE STATE OF THE GENEVA CW NEGOTIATIONS TO SEE WHERE OUR NEXT BILATERAL TALKS IN JULY MIGHT HELP ADVANCE THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS.

-- AS ALWAYS, WE INJECTED A SENSE OF REALISM WHILE PUSHING FOR PRACTICAL STEPS IN SUCH AREAS AS CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION OF NON-CW PRODUCTION IN COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIES.

-- WE ALSO AGREED TO DEVELOP A JOINT PAPER ON THE ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKS AND CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

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#### NAVAL ACTIVITIES

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN PROPOSED CONSULTATIONS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WE SAID WE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS ON THE AGENDA.

-- SOVIETS CAN RAISE NAVAL ISSUES IN MEETINGS ON THE INCIDENTS-AT-SEA AGREEMENT AND DURING

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS.

-- BUT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT FORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

-- WE'LL KEEP REPEATING THIS TO THE SOVIETS. WE SEE NO ARMS CONTROL PROBLEM IN THE NAVAL AREA.

-- GIVEN THE GEOSTRATEGIC REALITIES, ANY NAVAL LIMITS WOULD BE OVERWHELMINGLY ONE-SIDED AND TO THE DECIDED DISADVANTAGE OF THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

OVERVIEW:

SECRET

-- THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV REVIEWED ALL THE MAJOR REGIONAL ISSUES IN THEIR FINAL MEETING, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHERN AFRICA, IRAN-IRAQ, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, ETHIOPIA, CAMBODIA, THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

-- THE MINISTERS AND EXPERTS ALSO DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES IN GREATER DETAIL IN SIDE MEETINGS DURING THE SUMMIT.

-- OUR EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL ISSUES HAVE GOTTEN MORE  
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SERIOUS OVER THE PAST YEAR, AS INDICATED BY THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN AND OUR INCREASINGLY USEFUL CONSULTATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY SAW GROWING POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION IN RELIEVING REGIONAL TENSIONS. BUT IN MOST CASES THEY DID NOT SHOW ANY MORE WILLINGNESS TO PROVE IT ON THE GROUND THAN IN THE PAST.

-- THE PRESIDENT IN FACT TOOK THEM TO TASK ON THIS, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE TEST OF OUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY ON REGIONAL ISSUES WOULD BE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD SUCH PLACES AS ANGOLA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, WHERE THEIR ARMS SUPPLIES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT REPRESSIVE REGIMES.

AFGHANISTAN:

-- BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHERVARDNADZE RAISED AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WAS CLEARLY MUCH ON THEIR MIND.

O THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ATTACKS ON THEIR DEPARTING TROOPS, AND, WHILE THEY DIDN'T ACCUSE US OF VIOLATING THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THEY COMPLAINED ABOUT THE PAKISTANIS.

O THEY REPEATED RECENT PUBLIC HINTS THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO REEVALUATED THEIR TIMETABLE IF THE ATTACKS CONTINUE.

O THE SOVIET GAME SEEMS TO BE TO PUT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN, WHICH WAS TO BE EXPECTED.

O THE U.S. SIDE MADE CLEAR ITS SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN'S  
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O WE REMINDED THEM THAT WE HAD EARLIER PROPOSED AN ARMS SUPPLY MORATORIUM WHICH THEY HAD REJECTED, FORCING US TO ADOPT OUR POSITION ON POSITIVE SYMMETRY.

O BUT THE PRESIDENT COMMENDED GORBACHEV FOR HIS DECISION TO WITHDRAW IN THE FIRST PLACE, MAKING CLEAR WE -- AND THE WORLD -- EXPECTED TO SEE THAT HAPPEN.

SOUTHERN AFRICA:

-- THIS WAS PROBABLY THE MOST PRODUCTIVE AREA OF DISCUSSION, WITH GOOD EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR LEADERS AS WELL AS A/S CROCKER AND HIS COUNTERPART DEFORMIN ADAMISHIN.

-- THESE EXCHANGES INDICATE THERE IS IMPORTANT COMMON GROUND ON SOME ASPECTS OF A NAMIBIA-ANGOLA SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE NECESSITY FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE UNDER UNSCR 435.

-- THE TWO SIDES NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT MOMENTUM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN RECENT MONTHS, AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THAT MOMENTUM.

-- THE U.S. AND USSR INDICATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHING SEPTEMBER 29, 1988 - THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 435 - AS A TARGET DATE FOR GETTING THE DIRECTLY INVOLVED PARTIES TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

-- ON THE ISSUE OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ANGOLA, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR RECOGNIZED THE REALITY THAT THERE IS AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM IN ANGOLA THAT MUST BE RESOLVED POLITICALLY, NOT MILITARILY.

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-- THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BEST BE RESOLVED ONCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND CUBAN WITHDRAWALS ARE AGREED, AND IT SEEKS AN END TO ALL EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA IN THIS CONTEXT.

-- THE U.S. REMAINS CONVINCED THE INTERNAL ANGOLAN QUESTION MUST BE ADDRESSED IN PARALLEL WITH THE OTHER ISSUES TO AVOID AN IMPASSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND RESOLVE THE CONTINUING INDIRECT U.S.-SOVIET ROLE IN ANGOLA'S AFFAIRS.

-- THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY PRESSED THESE THEMES IN THEIR EXCHANGES WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE.

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-- BOTH SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE EXPERTS' CONSULTATIONS.

THE MIDDLE EAST:

-- IN KEEPING WITH OUR DECISION TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE SOVIETS AS WE PURSUE THE U.S. PEACE PLAN, BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST IN MOSCOW AND NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME USEFUL DISCUSSION.

-- BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE RECENT RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE REGION.

-- WHILE THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INDICATE SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO FASHION A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION, IT WAS CLEAR THAT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN WHEN WE GET DOWN TO OPERATIONAL DETAILS.

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-- THE SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT RECENT SUGGESTIONS THAT THEY HAVE ALTERED THEIR POSITION ON KEY ISSUES LIKE THE ROLE OF A CONFERENCE AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ARE ILLUSORY.

-- GORBACHEV CONFIRMED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON A CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE MORE THAN JUST AN "UMBRELLA."

-- WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH AS WE PROCEED, FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO THE REGION.

IRAN-IRAQ:

-- THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO PURSUIT OF AN EARLY END TO THE WAR THROUGH THE UN. WE CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO WORK WITH US TOWARD A SECOND RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- GORBACHEV CONFIRMED HE HAS NOTHING AGAINST WORKING ON A SECOND RESOLUTION, BUT IN THE NEXT BREATH MADE CLEAR HE HAS NO STOMACH FOR PUSHING IRAN.

-- IT'S CLEAR THE SPECTRE OF IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALIST POTSTIRRING IN HIS CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND OF IRANIAN COMPLICATION OF HIS AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAW IS A FACTOR.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- GORBACHEV REPEATED HIS OFFER TO CUT OFF EVERYTHING BUT SMALL ARMS TO NICARAGUA. IF WE WOULD DO THE SAME

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ELSEWHERE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. BUT HE DID SO ALMOST IN PASSING AND GAVE NO IMPRESSION HE WAS REALLY INTERESTED IN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE.

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-- THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA THEY WOULD SUSPEND ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE SANDINISTAS NOW THAT CONGRESS HAD CUT OFF ARMS TO THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE.

-- THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN OVER THE SANDINISTAS' FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROMISES MADE TO THE OAS TO SECURE SOMOZA'S FALL, AND OVER THE INORDINATE MILITARY BUILD-UP MADE POSSIBLE BY SOVIET ARMS.

-- THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SANDINISTA REPRESSION HINDERED EFFECTIVE U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

CAMBODIA:

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THE VIETNAMESE TROOP DECISION WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT THAT IT APPEARED TO SIGNAL AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE ITS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS.

-- WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO PROMOTE PROMPT AND COMPLETE VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA.

-- THEY PUSHED FOR SIHANOUK-HUN SEN TALKS; WE FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO TALK WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK.

-- DURING THE PRESIDENT'S LAST MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, WE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTING KHMER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION UNDER THE PRINCE.

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KOREA:

-- WHILE THE SOVIETS SEEM TO SHARE OUR CONCERN FOR STABILITY AND REDUCED TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA, PARTICULARLY AS WE APPROACH THE OLYMPICS THIS SEPTEMBER, ONCE AGAIN ON PARTICULARS OUR VIEWPOINTS DIVERGED.

-- THE SOVIETS DEFENDED NORTH KOREAN POSITIONS ON



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NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND AGAIN DISPUTED PYONGYANG'S CULPABILITY FOR THE KAL AIRPLANE TERRORIST BOMBING LAST NOVEMBER.

-- WE URGED THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON PYONGYANG WITH REGARD TO SECURITY FOR THE SEOUL OLYMPICS. THEY SAID THEY HAD, IN FACT, BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE NORTH KOREANS, BUT HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC.

-- WE REITERATED SEOUL'S INTENTION TO RESUME A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH AND HIGHLIGHTED THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AT WORK IN THE SOUTH.

ETHIOPIA:

-- THE PRESIDENT SAW COOPERATION IN ENDING THE FAMINE AND WORKING TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA AS AN IMPORTANT TEST OF U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EFFORTS.

-- WHILE AGREEING ON THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS THERE, GORBACHEV SEEMED TO BE RELUCTANT TO PRESS THE MENGISTU GOVERNMENT TOWARD THIS END.

DOCUMENTS

-- A LOT HAS BEEN SAID AND WRITTEN ABOUT DOCUMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THIS SUMMIT.

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-- BEFORE THE SUMMIT, WE EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF ISSUING TWO DOCUMENTS IN MOSCOW: AN OMNIBUS STATEMENT OF THE SORT RELEASED IN WASHINGTON; AND A SEPARATE DOCUMENT FOCUSED ON STRATEGIC ARMS.

-- IT BECAME CLEAR THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED ONLY IF WE WOULD AGREE TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON THE ABM TREATY IN THE SECOND DOCUMENT.

-- THAT APPEARED TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO MASK OUR DIFFERENCES ON THAT ISSUE AND WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED IN MOSCOW, WE WERE TALKING ONLY ABOUT ONE DOCUMENT.

-- IN MOSCOW, GORBACHEV SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT INCLUDE LANGUAGE EMPHASIZING THE EXPANSION AND GROWING UTILITY OF OUR POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

-- THE PRESIDENT SAID HE LIKED THE IDEA. BUT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSED WORDING INCLUDED VAGUE LANGUAGE ON

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PRINCIPLES AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WHICH WE WERE CONVINCED WOULD BE A PRESCRIPTION FOR MISUNDERSTANDING AND DISAPPOINTMENT--AS SIMILAR LANGUAGE HAD BEEN IN THE SEVENTIES.

-- WITH THE PRESIDENT'S BACKING WE PROPOSED ALTERNATE LANGUAGE WHICH REFLECTED THE MORE REALISTIC, RESULT-ORIENTED APPROACH THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD DEVELOPED SINCE GENEVA.

-- GORBACHEV'S NEGOTIATORS ACCEPTED OUR LANGUAGE WITHOUT CONFIDENTIAL  
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CHANGE, SO WE WERE SURPRISED WHEN HE CAME BACK TO IT--AND EVEN MORE SO WHEN HE WENT PUBLIC ABOUT IT.

-- GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED. BUT HE MAY NOW UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT NOT REPEATING THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST.

-- IF THE RESULT IS GREATER REALISM IN MOSCOW ON THESE QUESTIONS, THAT'S ALL TO THE GOOD.

NEXT STEPS

-- WE WENT TO MOSCOW TO WORK AND WE ACCOMPLISHED A LOT.

-- BUT WE ALSO WANTED TO GENERATE NEW MOMENTUM FOR THE REMAINING MONTHS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, AND WE ACCOMPLISHED THAT AS WELL.

-- GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDANDZE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE EXPLICIT THAT THEY WANT TO DO AS MUCH AS THEY CAN WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION.

-- GORBACHEV REPEATED THE POINT THAT HE WISHED IT WERE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE PRESIDENT'S TERM OF OFFICE BECAUSE WE HAD LEARNED TO WORK SO PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER.

-- THAT WAS PARTLY FOR EFFECT, BUT WE HAD THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS STILL BELIEVE THAT SOMETHING WITH THIS PRESIDENT'S NAME ON IT WILL LAST.

-- NEITHER SIDE COMMITTED TO A FIFTH SUMMIT, BUT WE DID NOT EXCLUDE IT, EITHER.

-- IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PACE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO BE INTENSE:

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O OUR NST DELEGATION GETS BACK TO WORK JULY 12.

O OUR NUCLEAR TESTING DELEGATION IS CONTINUING ITS WORK IN GENEVA TO IMPLEMENT THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AGREEMENT AND TO PRODUCE PROTOCOLS TO THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATIES.

O OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS WILL CONTINUE TO MEET OVER THE SUMMER, WITH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST HIGH ON THE AGENDA.

O WE HAVE ARRANGED AN AMBITIOUS WORK PROGRAM IN THE BILATERAL FIELD TO CARRY OUT AGREEMENTS REACHED IN MOSCOW AND BRING OTHER NEGOTIATIONS (E.G., ON OUR MARITIME BOUNDARY) TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

-- THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP: ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS OF LEGAL AND OTHER EXPERTS ARE SCHEDULED OVER THE SUMMER; THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING IS ENTERING A CRITICAL PHASE; INDIVIDUAL CASES ARE BEING ACTIVELY DISCUSSED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

-- THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED RAPIDLY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS; THE MOSCOW SUMMIT SUPPLIED ADDITIONAL MOMENTUM.

END TALKING POINTS.

5. MOSCOW, BEIRUT, KABUL, LENINGRAD - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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