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Authority NND 909000

By EE NARA Date 11/17/87

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# AIRGRAM

DEF 12-1 CHICON

INR-2

RM/R	REP	AF	ARA
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EUR	EA	NEA	CU
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L	FBO	AID	OCT
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Original to be Filed in \_\_\_\_\_ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

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CA-1148

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : BOMBAY, COLOMBO, DACCA, KABUL, KATHMANDU, MANILA, MOGADISCIO, PARIS, PRETORIA, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, SINGAPORE, TAIPEI, TANANARIVE, TEHRAN, WELLINGTON

INFO : CANBERRA, HONG KONG, LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, TOKYO, CINCINNATI, CINCINNATI; CINCINNATI-OSD FOR-3

FROM : Department of State DATE: **AUG 10 9 15 AM '67**

SUBJECT : Communist China's ICBM Flight Test Program

REF :

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

A growing body of evidence indicates that Communist China is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system capable of delivering nuclear payloads to targets within the continental United States. The first five to ten launches, which could begin during the second half of 1967, will probably impact within China's boundaries. Test firings of vehicles with ranges up to 6,000 nautical miles will ultimately be required to demonstrate the military feasibility of the system and could begin by 1969. The Chinese will probably refer to such firings as tests of a space booster.

The flight test program will probably be conducted from a new launch facility at the existing missile test rangehead at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu in North Central China (41°05' N., 100°15' E.). There is as yet no firm evidence concerning the directions in which the test firings will be launched, but many potential firing azimuths can be eliminated because of political-geographical considerations. The most likely direction of fire would be from the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu rangehead to the south and southwest on azimuths from 180° to 215° (see enclosed chart). The booster stage of missiles launched in this general direction would impact within China's borders while the upper stage and re-entry vehicle would pass over South Asia to impact in the Indian Ocean. (The upper stage of the missile would probably burn up in the earth's atmosphere after separating from the payload.) Burma or East Pakistan would lie beneath the flight path and

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FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by: INR/DDC/CS:DSimmons:snt

Drafting Date: 8-8-67

Phone No.: 3136

Contents and Classification Approved by: INR/DDC/CS:AMoyerJr

Clearances: (ALL IN SUBSTANCE) (2h) - Please see page 4 for Clearances

CSDFYLO-PBR

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eastern India would be overflowed if the launch azimuth were between  $210^{\circ}$  and  $215^{\circ}$ . There is little likelihood, however, that any part of the launch vehicle would impact in any of these countries.

The Chinese could also conduct their test firings along azimuths between  $90^{\circ}$  and  $125^{\circ}$  with resulting impact areas for the re-entry vehicle in the Pacific Ocean, although this is considered unlikely. On the other hand, the Chinese might attempt to put a relatively heavy satellite into orbit along such azimuths (particularly due east) at an early stage of the ICBM test program.

The Chinese will have to set up facilities to monitor the performance of the test vehicles, particularly along the re-entry segment of the missile flight. Land-based instrumentation and tracking sites are generally preferable, when available. Several French islands in the South Indian Ocean are well situated in relation to full-range Chinese ICBM impact areas. The Chinese may have talked to the French about using the Comoro Islands northwest of the Malagasy Republic (Paris please note). The greater probability is, however, that the Chinese will have to rely on missile range instrumentation (MRI) ships for monitoring their extended-range tests. It is likely that such vessels are now being readied. Their appearance on the high seas will signal the imminence of long-range ICBM flight testing.

Chinese MRIs would require port facilities within a reasonable distance of impact areas for such support functions as refueling, restocking of supplies, and transfer of flight test data back to China. Since the China mainland would be too remote, the Chinese must seek assistance from countries with port facilities in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan is a prime candidate for such a role because of its geographical location and its special relationship with Communist China. The ports of Karachi and Dacca would appear to be good bases for MRIs. Dacca would be especially desirable because of its direct air-flight connections with mainland China. The East African country of Tanzania is another possibility because of its nearness to a 6,000 nautical mile impact area from the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu rangehead. The Chinese are known to be engaged in certain development projects in mainland Tanzania and on the island of Zanzibar.

In addition to monitoring missile performance at both ends of long-range ICBM test firings, tracking the vehicle along its intermediate path is desirable. It is therefore possible that the Chinese may attempt to establish tracking facilities for this purpose. East Pakistan would appear to be well situated geographically to play such a role. Long-range firings of this kind also require reliable and instantaneous communications between the rangehead and the downrange instrumentation facilities. Because of the great distances involved, relay sites are needed. Again, Pakistan is probably in the most favorable position to provide such sites.

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### REQUIREMENTS

The Department would appreciate any information on this subject along the general lines indicated below:

1. Are there any indications that the Chinese have proposed or are about to propose an agreement with the host country involving support for an ICBM flight test program?
2. All possible details of the terms of any agreements between Communist China and any Asian or African country which could involve support for a Chinese ICBM flight test program. When was the agreement reached, when will it go into effect, and what is the precise form of support to be extended by the Asian or African country?
3. If the agreement permits the use of port facilities for the berthing, refueling, resupplying, or repairing of Chinese vessels, the following details should be furnished:
  - a. Port arrival and departure times; duration of stay; location while in port.
  - b. Names and identification numbers of ships.
  - c. Size and configuration of ship, including all possible information on visible antennas, large platforms, unusually shaped objects on deck, booms, nets; ground photographs and/or sketches when obtainable.
  - d. Cover stories used to explain presence in port.
  - e. Repairs, if any, made while in port.
  - f. Nature of supplies loaded on ships while in port.
  - g. Itinerary of ships once they leave port.
4. If the agreement provides for facilities within the host country to be manned by the Chinese, the following points should be reported on:
  - a. Alleged function of facility.
  - b. Precise location of installation, including coordinates if available.
  - c. Description in detail of facility, including number and size of buildings, unusual equipment, types of antennas and direction in which oriented; ground photographs and/or sketches where obtainable.

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d. Types, number, and operational frequencies of any communications equipment used at facility.

e. Any special security precautions taken to guard facility or bar the curious.

Reporting in response to this circular airgram should cite requirement No. C-DS7-53514.

RUSK

Enclosure:


Chart of possible launching azimuths

CLEARANCES: (all in substance)

INR/RAF:OLTroxel *dt*    INR/RNA:HJLiebesny *dt*    INR/RSF/SI:HWWolf *dt*    INR/RSF:FHPere *dt*  
INR/REA:FGreene *dt*    INR/REA:JJTaylor *dt*    INR/REU:FMaestroni *dt*    INR/RSB:KKerst *dt*  
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SCI:T Nesbitt *dt*    EUR/BMI:JHShullaw *dt*    ACDA:PSRochlin *dt*    NEA/INC:HBSchaffer *dt*  
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POSSIBLE CHINESE COMMUNIST ICBM FLIGHT TEST LAUNCH AZIMUTHS  
FROM SHUANG-CH'ENG-TZU RANGEHEAD

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