

## **Official Chronology of the withdrawal from Afghanistan**

March 14, 1985 – In the course of discussions with the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, B. Karmal, M.S. Gorbachev noted, "...if it is to stand on the account of Marxist-Leninist analysis, on the account of realism, [we] must acknowledge that there is much more work to be done in order to finish the main task: to ensure the irreversible character of the revolutionary process in Afghanistan. In significant measure it is linked to the ability to protect the revolutionary achievements. You understand that Soviet troops cannot remain in Afghanistan forever." (From the record of the discussion).

March 14, 1985 – In a discussion with the President of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, M.S. Gorbachev announced, "In principle we support the idea of political settlement of the Afghan problem and consider necessary and justifiable all that is done in line with the UN. The hopeful guarantees of a cessation of interference and aggression from the outside are a necessary condition for a settlement, and only then it would be possible to discuss the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan." (From the record of the discussion).

November 27, 1985 – M.S. Gorbachev gave a report "About the results of the high-level Soviet-American meeting in Geneva and the international situation" at the fourth session of eleventh convening of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In the report, it was said in part, "...the development of global events have approach such a line that particularly responsible solutions are required, that inaction or delay of action is criminal, as the question today is one of the protection of civilization and life itself. Here is why we believed and continue to believe it necessary to take all measures that will tear up the vicious circle of the arms race without missing any chance to bring back the course of events to the better. The issue today is to the utmost degree acute and definite: we must rise higher than narrow interests, realize the collective responsibility of all states in the face of the dangers that await the community of man at the threshold of the third millennium. We have been empowered precisely towards such an approach by the April Plenum of the CC in the implementation of foreign policy." Noting the meaning of meeting and negotiations in Paris, and especially in Geneva with the U.S. President, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: the course of the meeting was long and difficult: first of all, as a result of American policy serious obstacles were created on this course. The initiatives of the USSR evoked wide approval in the world and compelled Washington to maneuver. "Those who thought that their lines towards confrontation become determinant for international development... miscalculated." M.S. Gorbachev stated in detail the essence of the parties' positions in Geneva, the course of the negotiations, and their results. He noted that in the sphere of strategic arms, the parties must get used to parity and move towards a joint understanding that their level may be sufficient from the point of view of dependable defense. He touched upon the issue of regional conflicts, again highlighting that the USSR is for political resolution of these conflicts given an unconditional recognition of the inalienable right of peoples of the freedom of elections, and an independent choice of [their] path. In connection to the situation in Afghanistan, [he]

said, “the Soviet Union consistently advocates for a political resolution of the situation surrounding Afghanistan. We want the friendly Afghanistan, our neighbor, to be an independent nonaligned state and for the establishment of a regime of guaranteed noninterference in the affairs of Afghanistan. That will decide the issue of withdrawal of the Soviet troops from this country. The Soviet Union and the government of Afghanistan are entirely behind this.” The remaining balance of the meeting in Geneva was certainly positive. Of particular significance is a principal position signed into the Joint Soviet-American statement: an agreement about a continuation of high-level contacts. While speaking about the tasks for the near term, M.S. Gorbachev noted first of all the necessity of accelerating the speed of negotiations in Geneva about nuclear and space weapons, of closing off the path to militarization of space, and achieving a cessation of nuclear testing. He particularly dwelled on Europe, saying, “As never before, a task acutely stands [before us] to not tolerate the further heightening level of military confrontation. The European home is a common home, where geography and history tightly connected the fate of tens of countries and peoples. To protect their home, to make it better and safer, Europeans can only [do so] collectively, following the rational norms of international association and cooperation.” The basis for moving forward is [found in] the positions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It was also noted that the significance of developing relations with the countries of Asia, including China and Japan, with the countries of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In closing, M.S. Gorbachev highlighted the significance of the growing global cooperation on the resolution of global problems: environmental, energy-related, the gap in levels of development between the highly-developed capitalist and developing countries, and, of course, overcoming militarism. “We propose to the entire world, including to the world of capitalist states, a wide, long-lasting, comprehensive program of cooperation, considering these new opportunities, which were opened before humanity by an era of scientific-technological revolution.”

February 4, 1986 – M.S. Gorbachev gave an interview to the newspaper *Humanite*. During [the interview], he said, in part, “...the challenge of our time flows out from [the fact] that human civilization unfortunately created highly effective means of self-destruction. One doesn’t even have to commit some unprecedented stupid act or a crime to lead to the worst outcome. It is sufficient to do that which has been done for millennia—to rely on the weapons and military power in conducting international affairs, and to use force from time to time. Here [we] must break down these millennial traditions, [we] must strain to relinquish them. Otherwise the problem of the survival of humanity may turn out to be insoluble. In the nuclear century [we] mustn’t live—in any case, not for a long time—with the psychology, habits and rules of behavior of the Stone Age. Doesn’t such a drastic turn in international affairs, in foreign policy thinking and practice, represent a profoundly revolutionary task? In my opinion, this is exactly what it is.” Further characterizing the American SDI program, M.S. Gorbachev noted that its realization would lead to the violation of stability, to an increase of the risk of catastrophe. And contrary to the opinion of the US President, SDI would not signify a “disappearance” of nuclear weapons; conversely, it would hasten their perfection. “And the matter might reach [a level] where it becomes much more complex, where the situation would require that decisions would be transferred wholesale to computers, to

automatic devices. And by doing that we would make human civilization a hostage to machines, and therefore, technological defects and malfunctions.” There exist two concepts of ensuring security: first, by using military-technological means, their build-up and perfection; and second, by using a reduction of arms and disarmament. The USSR supports the second concept. While noting that since Geneva some signs of a restoration of détente are beginning to appear, that a change in the political atmosphere is felt, M.S. Gorbachev appealed for caution in evaluating [the situation]. For there has yet to be practical business the sphere of disarmament. Answering the question of a possibility of ending the war in Afghanistan, M.S. Gorbachev said, “We very much would like this and will, as much as it is in our power, achieve this.” Later, he noted that not everything depends on the USSR—there exist foreign powers interested in the spreading and continuation of the war, most of all, Pakistan and the U.S. (*Pravda*, February 8, 1986).

February 25, 1986. M.S. Gorbachev gave a political report of the CC of the CPSU at the twenty-seventh congress. In [the report], [he] touched upon the principal issues of the new thinking and the foreign policy course of the CPSU and USSR, which is based on [new thinking].

Separately dwelling on the issue of Afghanistan, M.S. Gorbachev said, “The USSR supports the efforts of that country in the direction of protecting its own sovereignty. We would like already in the nearest future to return the Soviet troops to their motherland, who are in Afghanistan at the request of its government. It was agreed with the Afghan party the terms of their phased withdrawal, as soon as political settlement can be reached that ensures the real cessation of and honestly guarantees a non-renewal of arms interference from the outside in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.” (*Pravda*, February 26, 1986).

July 28, 1986 – M.S. Gorbachev gave a presentation in Vladivostok to that city of the order of Lenin. The significant part of his speech was devoted to international problems, in part—the situation in the Asian-Pacific region. In this part of the world there are tens of countries. But the same dangers threaten them all. Militarization and an expansion of military threats are beginning to gather here at a dangerous rate. While formulating the platform of the USSR on the issues concerning the Asian-Pacific region, M.S. Gorbachev first of all dwelled upon the issue of bilateral relations with the countries of the region. He is ready to widen these relationships in all directions. Particularly important from this point of view are relations with China, on which much depends in global development. While noting that people in the USSR treat the course of the Chinese leadership toward modernization of the country with understanding and respect, M.S. Gorbachev came out for a deepening of thorough cooperation of the two countries. Later he noted the importance of the development of relations with the US on the basis of equal and identical security. “...We are for the inclusion of the Asian-Pacific region in the common process of creating a comprehensive system of international security...” Taking this into account, [some] proposals were drawn out: to take active and energetic measures regarding the settlement of regional conflicts. In this context it was announced the readiness of the USSR to remove seven regiments from Afghanistan by the end of 1986—one tank, two motorized-rifle, and three anti-aircraft [regiments] from their armaments. Also noted was some progress at the Geneva negotiations regarding

Afghanistan, that are conducted under the auspices of the special representative of the UN General Secretary. Further, placing a barrier in the way of nuclear proliferation and build-up in Asia and the Pacific Ocean was proposed—the USSR already pledged to not increase the number of medium-ranged missiles on the Asian part of its territory. It was proposed to begin negotiations about the reduction of activity by naval ships on the Pacific Ocean, of the utmost importance ships equipped with nuclear weapons. To resume negotiations on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. While attaching significance to the issue of reducing conventional weapons, M.S. Gorbachev expressed his willingness to discuss with PRC steps in the direction of proportionate reduction in the level of ground forces. It was announced simultaneously that the issue of withdrawal of a significant portion of Soviet troops from Mongolia was being considered. Finally, it was proposed to transfer to a practical level trust measures in the region, starting from measures regarding common naval security on the Pacific Ocean and the prevention of international terrorism as well. (*Pravda*, November 6, 1986).

November 11, 1986 – A statement by the USSR Ministry of Defense was published, which stated that, in accordance with the decision of the Soviet leadership, as was announced by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok, the withdrawal of six regiments of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has been completed. (*Pravda*, November 6, 1986).

November 21, 1986 – M.S. Gorbachev met with Indian journalists. Answering the question about the results of Reykjavik, he said, “All of our proposals remain in force. But we want to move ahead further. There is for this opportunity, [the proposals] opened up, the whole world saw it and the world wants it. Yet we are pulled backwards. We are pulled away from Reykjavik. The American administration in general forgot even what was said, and is rather trying to pretend that we talked about completely different things in Reykjavik. Our main task—of the Soviet Union, of the Soviet leadership, as we understand it—is to protect all the positives of Reykjavik. And to finish building the buildings that we laid the bricks for there.[“] Responding to the issue of Afghanistan, M.S. Gorbachev proclaimed, “We support a political settlement surrounding the issue of Afghanistan. The Afghan government shares this view as well. That which is done under the auspices of the UN—I have in mind the Cordovez mission, is a realistic process. It may be completed successfully and lead to a political settlement, if, of course, Pakistan and the United States of America support it. But for now we seek that Just [as] progress is appearing in the settlement, from their sides measures are being taken here to take disrupt it. Nevertheless, I think it will not be long before the issue of a political settlement of the situation surrounding Afghanistan will be resolved. It will signify simultaneously the resolution of the issue about the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.” (*Pravda*, November 24, 1986).

December 12, 1986 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the General Secretary of the CC of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Najib. While giving a speech at a lunch in his honor, he said, “The process of a political settlement around Afghanistan continues. Within [the process] there are malfunctions and idle turns too, but there also exists momentum that instills [in us] optimism. We hope that the good will of the parties

and the efforts of the personal representative of the UN General Secretary, Cordovez, make it possible to achieve in the near future mutual understanding and resolved agreements.” It was also noted that obstacles against the advancement of the process are being created by the American policy of neo-globalism (*Pravda*, December 13, 1986).

January 5-7, 1987 – The visit to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by E.A. Shevardnadze and A.F. Dobrinin in connection with the course toward national reconciliation announced by the leadership of the DRA, and the need to discuss the issues of Soviet-Afghan relations in this regard. (*Pravda*, January 8, 1987).

July 20, 1987 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the General Secretary of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Najib. The issues discussed were the advancement of the national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan, Kabul’s proposal to Pakistan and Iran on the normalization of bilateral relations, and the course of discussions of international aspects of the Afghan problem. M.S. Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union henceforth wants to see an independent, sovereign Afghanistan with a nonaligned government. How expensive it will be, which type government it will have, and what programs of development will be implemented will be decided by the Afghani people—this is their sovereign right. (*Pravda*, July 21, 1987).

February 2, 1988 – M.S. Gorbachev presented an announcement regarding Afghanistan. On the eve of the beginning of the regular round of Geneva negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan thanks to the personal representative of the UN General Secretary, the round that has a chance to become the final one. M.S. Gorbachev reported that the governments of the USSR and Afghanistan have agreed to establish the date to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops, May 15, 1988, and to complete their withdrawal over the course of ten months. The established dates originate from [the fact that] a signature of agreement about the settlement will take place no later than March 15, 1988, and that they will come into force, accordingly, after two months... When the Afghan knot is untied, it will have the deepest influence on other regional conflicts. If the arms race, which we so persistently strive to stop and have already somewhat achieved, is the insane race of humanity toward the abyss, then the regional conflicts are bleeding wounds capable of giving rise to a breeding ground of gangrene on the body of humanity. The earth has been literally ulcerated by such dangerous breeding grounds... Who wins [as a result of] these conflicts? No one, except weapons traders, various kinds of reactionary and expansionist circles, and those who have become used to warming [their] hands on the misfortune and troubles of the people. To bring the matter of the political settlement in Afghanistan to its completion will be an important breakthrough in the chain of regional conflicts. (*Pravda*. February 9, 1988).

March 3, 1988 – The Soviet government presented an announcement in connection to the difficulties in the course of negotiations in Geneva regarding the political settlement of the issues surrounding Afghanistan, which are being artificially created by the Pakistani and American parties. The scheduled term for signing an agreement by March 15 has been disrupted. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, p. 36).

April 7, 1988 – In Tashkent a meeting was held between M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah. As a result of the meeting, a joint statement was issued. The parties decided to continue the policy, which was jointly decided upon by them earlier, noted that now the final obstacles towards the conclusion of agreements were removed, and confirmed that in the case of a signing of [agreements] in the nearest term would make possible the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as had been proposed, beginning on May 15. The parties appealed for a restoration of the peace in Afghanistan and the formation of a coalition government and confirmed that all the issues of the further status and arrangement of their country must be independently decided by the Afghans themselves. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 8, pp. 1-2).

April 14, 1988 – In Geneva a package of documents was signed regarding the international aspects of the situation in Afghanistan: a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding the principles of mutual-relations, in part, non-interference, and the repudiation of intervention; a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan about the good-willed return of refugees; and a declaration regarding international guarantees, signed by E. Shevardnadze, G. Shultz, and others. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 8, pp. 2-10).

April 27, 1988 – An announcement by the Soviet government was published about the compliance of the Geneva agreements regarding Afghanistan. The announcement contains warnings against attempts to digress from that which is fixed in the agreement, which may only damage the business of the Afghan settlement. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 10, pp. 14-15).

May 15, 1988 – A joint Soviet-Afghan announcement was published that is devoted to the entry into force of the Geneva agreements regarding the political settlement of the foreign aspects of the Afghan problem. Valuing the agreements, and the work that went into their preparation highly, the parties highlight that the cessation of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is a key issue of the completion of the agreements. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 10, pp. 15-16).

June 4, 1988 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Najibullah. There occurred an exchange of opinions on the issues connected to the realization of agreements regarding Afghanistan and the development of bilateral relations. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 12, p. 6).

June 10, 1988 – A letter was published from E.A. Shevardnadze to Perez de Cuellar in connection with continuing violations from the side of Pakistan of the agreements regarding foreign aspects of the Afghan problem. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 12, pp. 7-8).

June 13, 1988 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Najibullah. Continued was the discussion on issues connected to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the other parties' completion of agreements regarding the foreign aspects of the Afghan problem. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, No. 12, pp. 6-7).

July 15-16, 1988 – In the course of talks at the brief meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, M.S. Gorbachev explained to them the principles of its persistent conditions [needed] to achieve an agreement with the US regarding nuclear-missile weaponry. “Information has reached us, he said, that sometimes you have some questions regarding our assessment of our past foreign policy: whether we are changing the entire foreign policy course of the Soviet Union, whether we reject everything that had been achieved in the past? So here I want to say: we do not place under doubt our foreign policy strategy, we appeal from the positions of socialism for peace and progress. It is a separate matter that in the realization of this course for a long time there were failures and mistakes. Not everything was done far away to confine the arms race. Having been drawn into it, we did not use our political means to the full extent. Yet capitalism was consciously following the course toward exhausting us completely in this race and continues to do so now. The long time spent on defense and serious fields was so great that we have found ourselves practically in last place among socialist countries in regard to standard of living—maybe not counting Vietnam and Mongolia. This is not good. The nation simply cannot continue to live this way. And to exploit its patience is politically intolerable.” Further, M.S. Gorbachev said that the foreign policy decisions were made without sufficient consideration, in secret. The issue of sending troops to Afghanistan was not discussed among our own leadership. He highlighted that from now on such a style is finished, and that, in part, on every foreign policy issue Moscow will keep the counsel of [its] allies. (G.H. Shakhnazarov. *Tsena Svobody*. pp. 126-127).

August 16, 1988. An announcement of the Soviet government was published regarding the issues of the Afghan settlement. In [the announcement], satisfaction was expressed about the progress in completion of the Geneva agreements, but at the same time regret [was expressed] in connection to [the fact] that not all participants of the agreements are behaving conscientiously toward their commitments—most of all, Pakistan. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 17, pp. 1-2).

September 20, 1988 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, M.H. Sharq. They discussed the problems concerning the process of political settlement entering a crucial, decisive stage. It was noted that success of the course towards national reconciliation signifies at the same time a strengthening of the position of Afghanistan as a neutral, non-aligned independent state and worthy member of the Non-Aligned Movement, living in unity with all of its neighbors. In this context, the dishonorable attitude towards the Geneva agreements by the parties of the US and Pakistan was noted. (*Pravda*, September 21, 1988).

November 3, 1988. The forty-third session of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, “The situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for international peace and security.” In the resolution, it was noted that the participants of the session are deeply worried about the situation in Afghanistan while recognizing “that a successful completion of a political settlement of the Afghan problem would have a beneficial influence on the international atmosphere and would serve as a stimulus for the resolution of other acute regional conflicts,” and that all sides are calling for the strict observance of the conditions of the agreements after April 14. In essence, the resolution is an act of

denunciation of the activity of Pakistan and the US, who continue to support one of the fighting parties, creating obstacles on the path of resolving the problem. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1988, No. 23, pp. 16-17).

December 6, 1988 – In coordination with the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Y.M. Vorontsov, arrived in Saudi Arabia to meet with a delegation of the Afghan opposition (“the alliance of seven”). The discussion was about giving further impulse to the settlement of the Afghan problem. In particular, [much] was made about the issue of returning Soviet servicemen to their motherland, who found themselves in the hands of the Afghan opposition. (*Pravda*, December 7, 1988).

December 7, 1988 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the UN General Secretary, Perez de Cuellar. The growing role of the UN in new conditions was noted. The future, M.S. Gorbachev said, is not connected to exclusive groups—of all types “the five”, “the seven”, or “the three” of states. And even not to regional unions, instead most of all [it will be connected] to the UN, especially as far as global problems are concerned. The issues connected to the resolution of regional problems were touched upon. While noting that in the Middle East, following signals sent by the UN, business for now is not moving forward—Israel is not reacting to the signals—M.S. Gorbachev said that without joint or parallel action with the US, business will not proceed. We have such an understanding. It is important that the US has [this understanding] as well. The difficulty of a settlement of the situation in Central America is that different standards are being used: one towards Afghanistan; another here. In so doing, [the standards] are coming not from common norms of noninterference, freedom of choice, instead [they are coming] from unilateral interests. But under this approach, you will not find an answer to the problems. To the point, even here the discussion continues about human rights, but again double standards are at work. When there is talk of individual events, there is a frightening sound, yet when there is talk about the rights of a whole nation, [they] are prepared to refuse [the nation its] rights. But in order to resolve the issues of human rights, a common standard is needed. For this there exist generally accepted principals, which are expounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (From the record of the talks).

February 5-6, 1989 – E.A. Shevardnadze completed a visit to Pakistan. As a result of the visit, a Soviet-Pakistani announcement was made, which, in part, touched upon the problems of Afghanistan and expressed the importance of a global resolution of existing problems there was highlighted, the effort to promote the formation of a government in Afghanistan, that must be formed by the efforts of the Afghans themselves, and would reflect their rights to decide their fate by themselves. The problems of returning Afghan refugees to their motherland were discussed. (*Pravda*, February 6, 1989).

February 5-6, 1989 – The First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Y.M. Vorontsov, was in Iran. During talks with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, discussed were the issues of implementing the inter-Afghan settlement after the



withdrawal of Soviet troops exclusively by peaceful means. (*Pravda*, February 16, 1989).

February 15, 1989 – The completion of withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (*Pravda*, February 16, 1989).

February 15, 1989 – An announcement of the Soviet government was published in connection to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. “We hope,” says the announcement, “that the Afghan people choose the path of peace and unity, as only this path will put an end to bloodshed and will contribute to the establishment of tranquility on the land of ancient Afghanistan.” (*Pravda*, February 18, 1989).

February 16-17, 1989 – The First Deputy Minister of International Affairs, Y.M. Vorontsov, visited India. Discussed were the questions connected to the situation in Afghanistan and the necessity to protect the settlement of inter-Afghan problems by Afghans themselves, by peaceful political means. (*Pravda*, February 18, 1989).

March 8, 1989 – An announcement was published of the spokesman of the USSR MFA in connection to the formation of a “transitional government” by Afghan opposition. In the announcement, it is pointed out that there exists one legal government in Kabul and that the path of the peaceful, negotiated through compromise and inter-Afghan dialogue, is the only reasonable alternative to war in Afghanistan. (*Pravda*, March 8, 1989).

March 12, 1989 – An announcement of the Soviet government was published in connection to the escalation in foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. “The Soviet government firmly underscores that all responsibility for the potentially heavy consequences of a continuance of war in Afghanistan lies with those whose shortsighted policies contribute to the continuation of inter-Afghan strife and are pursuing expansionary aims in the relations with [their] neighboring country. (*Pravda*, March 12, 1989).

May 7, 1989 – An announcement of the USSR MFA was published in connection to the deployed Pakistani soldiers reading for new aggressive activity against the Afghan cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar, and the maneuvers of American sponsors of Pakistan. In the announcement, a warning was given about the potentially heavy consequences of new aggressive activity in Pakistan. (*Bulletin of the USSR MFA*, 1989, No. 10, pp. 19-20).

May 23, 1989 – M.S. Gorbachev sent a letter to the King of Morocco, Hassan II, in connection to the opening high-level special all-Arab conference. In the letter is highlighted that, taking into account the changes in the global atmosphere, more beneficial conditions are rising for the convening of a representative international conference regarding a Middle-Eastern settlement. For success in the matter of a settlement, a united Arab voice is especially important. Also touched upon in the letter

was the necessity to support a settlement of the conflicts in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and to unblock the situation in Afghanistan. (*Izvestiya*, May 25, 1989).

December 24, 1989 – The Second Congress of the People’s Deputies of the USSR adopted [the following] decrees: “Regarding the political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact in 1939,” in which [it] decisively denounced the simultaneous signing of protocols about the partitioning of “spheres of influence” and declared them invalid from the moment of their signing; “Regarding the political evaluation of the decision about sending troops to Afghanistan in December 1979”, which deserves a political and moral denunciation. (*Pravda*, December 26, 1989).

January 16, 1990 – M.S. Gorbachev met with the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, who was arriving to take part in the “Global forum regarding the environment and development in the aims of survival.” M.S. Gorbachev again touched upon the decision support of the USSR for the actions of this unique global organization, which at present is particularly needed for the global community. In his turn, he expressed his hope for solidarity and support of *perestroika* with the parties of the UN. Discussed were the Namibian and Afghani problems, the situation in Eastern Europe, and the development of Soviet-American relations. Perez de Cuellar specially singled out the importance of M.S. Gorbachev’s presentation in December 1988. (*Pravda*, January 17, 1990).

[The Chronology compiled by Anatoly S. Chernyaev,  
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