Washington D.C., February 15, 2009 –
Twenty years ago today, the commander of the Soviet Limited
Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge
out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which
lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and
Afghan lives.
As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian
historian,
General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, the National
Security Archive today posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org)
a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo
and diary notes published here in English for the first time. The
documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as
early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was
excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan
regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support
and legitimacy – a key problem even today for the current U.S. and
NATO-supported government in Kabul.
The Soviet documents show that ending the war
in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
called “the bleeding wound,” was among his highest priorities from
the moment he assumed power in 1985 – a point he made clear to
then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first
conversation on March 14, 1985. Already in 1985, according to the
documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging
from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle
on October 17, 1985.
But the road from Gorbachev’s decision to the
actual withdrawal was long and painful. The documents show the
Soviet leaders did not come up with an actual timetable until the
fall of 1987. Gorbachev made the public announcement on February
8, 1988, and the first troops started coming out in May 1988, with
complete withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Gorbachev himself, in
his recent book (Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku …
Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. (Moscow: Alpina Books 2006)),
cites at least two factors to explain why it took the reformers so
long to withdraw the troops. According to Gorbachev, the Cold War
frame held back the Soviet leaders from making more timely and
rational moves, because of fear of the international perception
that any such withdrawal would be a humiliating retreat. In
addition to saving face, the Soviet leaders kept trying against
all odds to ensure the existence of a stable and friendly
Afghanistan with some semblance of a national reconciliation
process in place before they left.
The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s
preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried
out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new
government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a
trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahadeen
opposition. The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders
through some kind of compromise with the two other most important
outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached
the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of
that aid. In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan,
which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United
States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its
feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and
planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after
the Soviet withdrawal.
Internally, the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan did everything possible to prevent or slow down the
Soviet withdrawal, putting pressure on the Soviet military and
government representatives to expand military operations against
the rebels.
Persistent pleading on the part of Najibullah
government as late as January 1989 created an uncharacteristic
split in the Soviet leadership, with Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze suggesting that the withdrawal should be slowed down
or some forces should remain to help protect the regime, while the
military leadership argued strongly in favor of a complete and
decisive withdrawal.
According to the American record,
Shevardnadze had already informed Secretary of State George Shultz
as early as September 1987 of the specific timetable for
withdrawal. But many senior officials did not believe the Soviet
assurances; in fact, deputy CIA director Robert Gates famously bet
a State Department diplomat on New Year’s Eve 1987 that Gorbachev
would make no withdrawal announcement until after the end of the
Reagan administration. Gates believed the Chinese saying about
the Soviet appetite for territory: “What the bear has eaten, he
never spits out” – and only in his memoirs did he admit he was
making “an intelligence forecast based on fortune cookie wisdom.”
(Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story
of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York:
Simon&Shuster, 1996, pp. 430-431). Of course, Gates’ hardline
views on Gorbachev would take over U.S. policy as the George H.W.
Bush administration came into office in January 1989.
By this time, however, the Soviet leaders
well realized that the goal of building socialism in Afghanistan
was illusory; and at the same time the goal of securing the
southern borders of the Soviet Union seemed to be still within
reach with the policy of national reconciliation of the Najibullah
government. So the troops came out completely by February 15,
1989. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, however, both superpowers
seemed to lose interest in what had been so recently the hottest
spot of the Cold War.
Najibullah would outlast Gorbachev’s tenure
in the Kremlin, but not by much: Within three years Najibullah
would be removed from power and brutally murdered, and Afghanistan
would plunge into the darkness of civil war and the coming to
power of the Taliban. Twenty years later, the other superpower
and its Cold War alliance are fighting a war in Afghanistan
against forces of darkness that were born among the fundamentalist
parts of mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet occupation. In such
a context, the language and the dilemmas in these 20-year-old
documents still provide some resonance today.
This posting is also a tribute to and a
commemoration of one of our long-standing partners in the pursuit
of opening secrets and writing the new truly international history
of the Cold War. General Alexander Lyakhovsky passed away from a
heart attack while standing on a Moscow Metro platform on February
3, 2009, less than two weeks before the 20th
anniversary of the end of the war in which he served as an
officer, and which he studied for many years as a scholar. He is
survived by his wife Tatyana and their children Vladimir and
Galina.
The National Security Archive mourns the
passing of our dear friend and partner, Alexander Antonovich. It
is fitting and proper that here we express our deepest
appreciation for his remarkable knowledge, his scholarly and
personal integrity, and his generosity both in expertise and the
documents that he always shared with us, while he educated us and
the world. His memory lives on in all of us who ever read his
work, heard him speak, or best of all, listened to him sing the
sad songs of the Afghan war.
-- Svetlana Savranskaya, director of Russia
programs, Thomas Blanton, executive director, National Security
Archive, and Malcolm Byrne, Deputy Director, National Security
Archive.
Documents:
Document 1. Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev's Conversation with
Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985
In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who
was installed by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev
underscored two main points: first that "the Soviet troops cannot
stay in Afghanistan forever," and second, that the Afghan
revolution was presently in its "national-democratic" stage,
whereas its socialist stage was only "a course of the future." He
also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime
to unite all the "progressive forces." In no uncertain terms,
Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and
that his government would have to rely on its own forces.
Document 2. Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, April 4, 1985
Chernyaev reflects on the “torrent of letters” about
Afghanistan received recently by the Central Committee and the
Pravda newspaper. They reflect the growing dissatisfaction of
the population with the drawn-out war and the consensus that the
troops should be withdrawn.
Document 3 Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, October 17, 1985.
At the Politburo
session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed
to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from citizens’
letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He also described his meeting with
Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we
will help you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted
Gorbachev’s negative reaction to the assessment of the situation
given by Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov.
Document 4. Politburo Session, June 26, 1986.
The Politburo
discusses the first results of Najibullah’s policy of national
reconciliation. Gorbachev emphasizes that the decision to
withdraw the troops is firm, but that the United States seems to
be a problem as far as the national reconciliation is concerned.
He proposes early withdrawals of portions of troops to give the
process a boost, and proposes to “pull the USA and Pakistan by
their tail” to encourage them to participate in it more actively.
Document 5 Politburo Session, November 13, 1986.
The first detailed
Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the
withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included
the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.
Document 6 Politburo Session, January 21, 1987
The Politburo
discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and
Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly
Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan. Shevardnadze’s report is very
blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation.
The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save
face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.
Document 7 Politburo Session, February 23, 1987
Gorbachev talks
about the need to withdraw while engaging the United States and
Pakistan in negotiations on the final settlement. He is willing
to meet with the Pakistani leader Zia ul Khaq, and maybe even
offer him some payoff. The Soviet leader also shows concern about
the Soviet reputation among non-aligned countries and national
liberation movements.
Document 8 Politburo Session, February 26, 1987
In his remarks to
the Politburo, General Secretary returns to the issue of the need
to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times. He
emphasizes the need to withdraw the troops, and at the same time
struggles with the explanation for the withdrawal, noting that “we
not going to open up the discussion about who is to blame now.”
Gromyko admits that it was a mistake to introduce the troops, but
notes that it was done after 11 requests from the Afghan
government.
Document 9 Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense
Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987
Criticism of the
Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and
analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there
are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense
Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987. This letter represents
the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the
military establishment. Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to
make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential
progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from
the Army in 1988.
Document 10 CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988
On May 10, 1988,
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a
“closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party members of
the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan. The letter presents the Central Committee analysis
of events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions in that country, the
problems and the difficulties the Soviet troops had to face in
carrying out their mission. In particular, the letter stated that
important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked when the
decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter
analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the
withdrawal of troops.
Document 11 Politburo Session January 24, 1989
This Politburo
session deals with the issue of the completion of the withdrawal
and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well as possible
future development of the situation there. The discussion shows
the split among the Soviet leadership with Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze arguing for leaving some personnel behind to help
protect the Najibullah regime or delaying the full withdrawal.
Document 12 Excerpt from Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav
Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamyati Shakha Masuda
(Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud), (Moscow,
2007), pp. 202-205
Document
13 Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in
Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989
On April 7, 1988,
USSR Defense Minister signed an order on withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan. In February 1989, the Defense Ministry prepared a
statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the
issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of
the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when
the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. The statement gave an
overview of Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet
interpretation of the reasons for providing internationalist
assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops there after the
repeated requests of the Afghan government. It criticized the
U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva
agreements, and thus destabilizing the situation in the country.
In an important acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used
to analyze Soviet actions in Afghanistan, they military explicitly
referred to “unfair and absurd” comparisons between the American
actions in Vietnam and the presence of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan.
Document
14. Official Chronology of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
with quotes from documents from the Archive of the Gorbachev
Foundation, Moscow.
Books By Alexander Lyakhovsky
Grazhdanin,Politik,Voin, Plamya
Afgana and Zacharovannye svobodoj
