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for 9/11/00*

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

NO CONCURRENCE  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
3-20-2000

PARAMILITARY STUDY GROUP MEETING

AT THE PENTAGON

NINTH MEETING

3 MAY 1961

PRESENT

GENERAL TAYLOR  
MR. KENNEDY  
MR. DULLES  
ADMIRAL BURKE

MR. MoNAMARA  
GENERAL WHEELER  
GENERAL BONESTEEL  
MR. [REDACTED] 06  
COLONEL KINARD  
MR. KING  
COMMANDER MITCHELL  
LT COLONEL TARWATER

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(The following notes are a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.)

MR. [REDACTED]

06

The first person to appear before the Study Group was Mr. [REDACTED] who had been in charge of the counterintelligence for the Cuba operation. Mr. [REDACTED] explained in considerable detail the nature of the operation that he conducted. He stated that they knew in great detail about Castro's intelligence services. He then described the manner in which they screened potential recruits.

STATEMENT: We would run a personal history check on the people and then polygraph them. Following this we made a full-day psychological assessment of the individual to determine whether or not he could hold up under the potential rigors that he would face. This complete screening procedure was used with the first 120 recruits.

STATEMENT: We also created an intelligence and security agency from among the Cuban exiles. As we built this agency [REDACTED] We [REDACTED] in order to determine its character.

QUESTION: Do you believe that these agents talk when they are picked up by the enemy?

ANSWER: Yes. Any man can be made to talk today without the use of force and the Cubans also use force.

QUESTION: Was it difficult for the agents to operate in Cuba?

ANSWER: Yes. It's difficult to work in a police state.

QUESTION: How many penetrations did Castro make that you know of?

ANSWER: Two, [REDACTED]

QUESTION: What was the primary reason that led to the agents being caught?

ANSWER: The Cuban talks.

STATEMENT: I still have [REDACTED] highly trained Cuban counter-intelligence staff officers in Cuba and they have [REDACTED] agents

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reporting to them. We have this capability today and we are still continuing our collection efforts.

STATEMENT: During the week before the invasion we had information from 32 tactical commanders that they would defect. This raises the question as to why they didn't. I believe these are the reasons: (1) The invasion didn't last a week. (2) The fact that this was announced as a Cuban affair between Cubans may have given them pause. At any rate, I still feel that these 32 people are assets which we may call upon at some future date.

QUESTION: Is there a major effort by Castro to put agents in the United States at the present time?

ANSWER: With all the refugees coming in we can expect him to attempt to infiltrate agents. This is a normal procedure, to infiltrate agents with refugees. A tactic we can expect is to have Mr. Castro create phony resistance organizations in order to ferret out genuine resistance activities.

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At this point Mr. MR. [redacted] left and Mr. [redacted] appeared before the Group. Mr. [redacted] was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Section which was concerned with reports, research, economic support, foreign intelligence operations, debriefings, State Department liaison. 06

STATEMENT: When the project began we had over [redacted] agents in the Havana station. However, a number of these had to be weeded out because of past political connections. At any rate, by July of 1960 we had set up [redacted] WT sets. However, we were sort of overrun by the paramilitary people because they had a need for additional agents. Consequently, we turned over 15 of our [redacted] sets to the PM people. By the time of the invasion we had a number of penetrations. We had [redacted] the Communist Party, [redacted] student organizations, [redacted] the periphery of the Communist Party and [redacted] the 26 July Movement, as well as others. Up until the invasion these people kept in contact by wireless or by courier, and they were also trained in secret writing. 6(1)s)

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