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State (USIA)

TDR 4-6-60

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STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
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Date: MAR 23 2000

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MR. PHILLIPS

2/7/00, hhh

(The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made).

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DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS
DOCUMENT BY THE
STATE DEPARTMENT
DATE 2/7/00

STATEMENT: I would appreciate your comments on the two paragraphs we intend to include in our report on propaganda.

MR. PHILLIPS: There are only two comments generally. I feel that (1) They give the idea that the propaganda effort was much smaller than it was, and a much more restricted one. (2) They certainly intimate that propaganda activities were carried out without being coordinated with the rest of the U.S. Government. I feel that this is not correct. After the project was approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960, we analyzed our problem. We realized that we had a very tough audience to face because we had to convince the very lowest classes. Consequently, we knew that our major effort had to be in medium wave broadcasts so they could be picked up on the smallest radio sets. Following our original analysis of our problem, on 23 March, I had my first meeting with Mr. Henry Loomis of the Voice of America to discuss broadcasting to Cuba. The general understanding that developed at that meeting was that we faced a problem where we had to create propaganda which at times would have to descend to the level of Castro's propaganda in order to be effective. Furthermore, the propaganda would have to be presented by Cubans, rather than by people who worked for the Voice of America. Consequently, it was our understanding that the prime responsibility for broadcasts concerning the Cuban operation was ours rather than USIA's. During this time coordination was carried on however, and we did receive support from USIA. In the fall of 1960, as our radio Swan became more and more tactical, I suggested to Mr. Loomis that the Voice of America begin broadcasting on medium

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
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waves so all of the people could hear. He stated at the time that he felt we should continue with the existing arrangement, and this was mutually agreed. On the morning of the break of relations with Cuba I once again contacted Mr. Loomis and suggested that in order to present a calm U.S. viewpoint to the people of Cuba, they might again think about broadcasting in medium wave bands. A short time after, Mr. Loomis called and told me there had been a meeting on the subject and they felt that we should continue to carry the ball as far as broadcasting to Cuba. This decision was accepted. Our regular stations throughout the area



Also, we were producing, and are still producing in Miami, programs on tapes made by Cuban exiles which are air expressed to about 40 stations in five countries around the Caribbean. Since in these countries the big stations usually simultaneously broadcast both medium and short wave, many of these programs can also be heard in Cuba. So, what it boils down to is that on the morning after D-Day, a person in Cuba could have picked up, by utilizing both medium and short wave, literally dozens of radio stations which were bringing in news of what was happening. Specifically, however, we had radio Swan as our principal, tactical station. However, in actuality this was simply the center of a series of satellite stations which were helping us. We had WGES in Miami, a very powerful medium wave station. We had a medium wave station in Key West, and we broadcast from a series of other stations from countries all around the Caribbean. Immediately before D-Day we were broadcasting a

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total of 18 hours a day regular broadcasting to Cuba and 16 hours a day of short wave broadcasting. This is a total of 34 hours a day immediately before D-Day. Now this does not reflect our unusual operations. For instance, within the country [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and they carried on a clandestine broadcasting operation utilizing the dormant channels of TV sets in Havana. This was carried on for several months right up to D-Day. On D-Day and immediately thereafter we stepped up our broadcasting until we were broadcasting 55 hours a day on medium wave and 26 hours a day on short wave for a total of 81 hours a day during D-Day and immediately thereafter. Once again this does not represent the clandestine stations, and so on, that we used. As a part of our propaganda effort aside from the political and military, we recruited and trained and infiltrated small provocateur teams. We sent in some [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and so on. These people were trained, they carried printing presses, radios, etc. in with them. They successfully published a clandestine newspaper in Havana, and a [REDACTED] carried out the only really successful political action that occurred in Havana before D-Day, which was a student strike. It was effective enough to force the government to close the schools before the year was out. Also, during this time we carried on a leaflet campaign. We ran a total of 23 missions; 16 were straight propaganda drops and 7 were combined with supply drops. In any event, we hit some 44 targets. In several cases we dropped these leaflets because they were requested by radio from our teams inside. Also during this time we had the responsibility for carrying on anti-Castro propaganda throughout Latin America. We published three weekly newspapers, one of them a Spanish language weekly, [REDACTED] in the world.

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