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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
DECEMBER 2-3, 1989
MALTA

BOOK II

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By _____ NARA, Date _____

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Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

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REGIONAL DIALOGUE

I. BACKGROUND

- U.S.-Soviet regional dialogue has intensified over past two years, paralleling improved bilateral relations.
- Cycle of experts talks held last summer on Africa, Middle East, East Asia/Pacific, Central America, Afghanistan; issues discussed in detail in Wyoming.
- Each region has its own dynamic, which is shaped by indigenous factors as well as U.S. and Soviet relationships with relevant parties in the area.

II. AREAS OF FOCUS

- Top U.S. issue is Central America; we want Moscow to pressure Havana and East Bloc to cut off arms to area, and to urge Managua to halt support for FMLN and hold fair elections in February.
- Soviets will have Afghanistan at top of their agenda.

III. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS

- Improved Soviet behavior in parts of Third World stems from recognition their foreign policy overextended and from compelling domestic resource demands.
- Soviets seek to project image of cooperation to improve ties with moderate regional players and reduce regional conflicts as points of U.S.-Soviet contention.
- But Soviets also want to preserve traditional relationships with key allies (Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, North Korea, Syria, Ethiopia), while seeking to limit costs of military/economic aid.

IV. U.S. GOALS

- Test Soviet "new thinking" and readiness to engage constructively on Third World regional conflicts.
- Over longer term, replace East-West competition in regional conflicts with U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts to achieve peaceful, balanced settlements.
- Current U.S. concern: "new thinking" not being translated into new policies; e.g. little evidence that Moscow has really pressed Nicaragua or Cuba; large arms flows to clients such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia continue.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

I. BACKGROUND

- Sandinistas had hoped peace process would lead to demobilization of resistance, enable them to strengthen hold on power. Instead, demobilization is delayed and civic opposition (UNO) headed by Violeta de Chamorro is ahead in polls for February 1990 presidential elections.
- Nicaragua did not renew cease-fire agreement, has accelerated military operations against resistance.
- End of ceasefire will interfere with opposition organizing in rural areas and may set stage for cancelling elections.
- In El Salvador FMLN has broken off talks with government of President Cristiani, launched offensive.
- Sandinistas and FMLN may be adopting bellicose attitude now in order to appear more conciliatory once significant concessions are made to them.

II. SOVIET ROLE

- Soviets seek respectability, economic aid for Nicaragua while maintaining political/military relationships with Sandinistas, albeit at low profile.
- Soviets claim to have suspended arms shipments to Nicaragua, said they would try to persuade Nicaragua to end support to FMLN.
- Soviets have called for U.S., USSR to act as guarantors of regional disarmament agreement.
- We have rejected acting as co-guarantors of regional disarmament formula. Peace process created by Central Americans is underway and includes disarmament.

III. AREAS OF FOCUS

- We want Soviets to pressure Sandinistas to comply with Esquipulas commitments, end support to FMLN.
- We are deeply troubled by continued shipments of Soviet bloc arms to Nicaragua, as well as Nicaraguan and Cuban aid to FMLN -- such as recently uncovered at Honduras-Nicaragua border.
- Secretary Baker wrote Shevardnadze on October 30 relating dissatisfaction with unforthcoming Soviet response to his earlier expression of concern about this incident.

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I. SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

- Despite evidence of strains in Soviet-Cuban relations, Cuba remains most expensive Soviet client, receiving estimated \$5.5 billion in economic and military assistance from Moscow annually.
- Soviets maintain military and intelligence presence including 2600-2900-man force (the so-called "brigade") since 1962. Brigade is symbol of Soviet support for Cuba and source of U.S.-Cuban tension.

II. INTRODUCTION OF MIG-29s IN CUBA

- Soviets have recently begun delivery of squadron (12 aircraft) of advanced MIG-29 fighter jets.
- Although MIG-29 does not significantly enhance Cuba's offensive capabilities, it represents significant increase in Cuba's air defense system.
- We raised concerns in early 1988 about potential MIG-29 deliveries to Cuba, but Soviet MFA officials professed ignorance about matter.
- We have no evidence that model received by Cuba is equipped to carry nuclear weapons.
- We have had exchanges with Soviets about deployment of offensive weapons in Cuba in 1962: Missile Crisis; 1970: nuclear-powered/equipped submarines; 1978: MIG-23s; 1981-82: advanced MIG-23s.
- Soviets consistently provided assurances that no nuclear weapons would be placed in Cuba.
- Secretary Baker's October 30 letter to Shevardnadze said MIG-29 delivery raises "serious concern about Soviet compliance" with 1962 agreement. We have sought assurances that MIG-29s delivered to Cuba are not now and would not ever be equipped for nuclear weapons.

III. SOVIET COMPLICITY IN CUBAN BEHAVIOR

- USSR support for Castro regime facilitates Cuban repression at home and spread of subversion and instability in Central America and beyond.
- Cuba continues extensive support for anti-democratic forces and insurgencies in Western Hemisphere; Castro cracked down hard on dissidents in 1989.
- Moscow wants improved U.S.-Cuban ties, in part to ease financial burden; we insist on change in Cuban behavior.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

I. U.S. POLICY

- A Europe that is whole and free is the guiding principle of U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe. Our vision includes free, open elections and market economies.
- In pursuit of their reforms, the countries of Eastern Europe must adhere to letter and spirit of CSCE agreements. These include provision for open borders, respect for the rights of the individual, openness in internal and external affairs, and free exchange of people, information and ideas.
- The U.S. differentiates in its relations among countries of Eastern Europe. Differentiation is based on each country's progress toward genuine and institutionalized reform.

II. CURRENT CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

- The U.S. does not consider change in Eastern Europe to be security threat to Soviet Union.
- Reforms in Eastern Europe leading to open political participation and strengthened economies -- encouraged by perestroika and glasnost -- are in the interest of the U.S. and the USSR, and in the interest of stability.
- The U.S. supports goal of reunified Germany, achieved in peace and freedom on basis of self-determination, and integrated within democratic European community of nations.
- Foundation for reconciliation of German people is common adherence to Western values of freedom, democracy and economic liberty.
- The U.S. seeks to foster peaceful political change in Eastern Europe ending the postwar division of Europe.
- To this end, the U.S. encourages Western economic and political support for reforming countries of Eastern Europe. Efforts to assist Poland and Hungary are designed to help these countries pursue difficult structural economic reforms and support their transition to democracy.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

I. BACKGROUND

- Krenz became the new GDR leader on October 18; on November 8 a new Politburo and new Premier (Hans Modrow) were announced.
- The new leadership is moving towards reform; on November 9 it announced virtually free travel and emigration for East Germans.
- However, whether they will move on free, multiparty elections remains to be seen.

II. AREAS OF FOCUS

- Events in GDR are moving at an accelerated pace, and we hope the GDR leadership will continue moving towards broader reform.

III. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS

- Moscow has urged the GDR to reform, and intelligence reports indicate Gorbachev talked with Krenz as early as August about the need for Honecker to step down.
- In the event of dramatic political deterioration, Moscow would be likely to take action -- directly or indirectly -- to restore order and to protect their assets and installations in GDR.

IV. U.S. GOALS

- We will continue to stress that we seek no unilateral advantage and do not want instability. We will use our influence to promote peaceful change and are confident FRG will do likewise.
- We are committed to self-determination, but will press no blueprint or timetable of our own.
- We emphasize that the U.S. hopes to see the GDR enact genuine reform, is prepared to expand relations if such reform occurs, and does not wish to see GDR in turmoil.

OVERVIEW OF SOVIET DOMESTIC SITUATION

I. POLITICAL REFORM MOVES QUICKLY

- Gorbachev's position remains strong; he continues to take every opportunity to remove or neutralize opponents.
- In its second session which began in September, Supreme Soviet continued to act like a genuine, empowered deliberative body. In grappling with some of Soviet Union's fundamental problems, it is:
 - considering legislation on property, taxation, banking and currency, private enterprises and cooperative ventures, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of press and emigration; and
 - exercising freely its prerogative to amend legislation by the executive.
- Upcoming republic elections will further strengthen institutionalization of democratization.

II. REPUBLIC AFFAIRS

- On nationalities issues, Gorbachev must strike balance between satisfying nationalist demands and keeping USSR intact. He appears prepared to concede large measure of autonomy to non-Russian ethnic groups, but not to preside over disintegration of Soviet state.
 - In Baltics, after summer showdown between proponents of independence and Moscow, sides may be headed toward constitutional crisis on local versus national powers and, ultimately, secession.
 - Ancient ethnic enmity between Christian Armenia and Moslem Azerbaijan has created serious civil disorder. Gorbachev has sent troops to area but has been reluctant to use force.

III. REFORMS STILL FACE SERIOUS OBSTACLES

- Rapid pace of change has prompted concern and even alarm among important sectors of power structure.
- Sluggish economy has begun to erode slightly Gorbachev's popular support, although not to a degree presenting an immediate challenge.
- Failure to make good on promises used to quell last summer's unrest in coal mines has led to new strikes with prospect of continued, chronic labor unrest.

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I. BACKGROUND

- Round IV began November 9. NATO has tabled three proposals since talks began in March. West plans to table draft treaty text early in current round.
- Warsaw Pact's proposals have generally followed the West's and in some respects are similar.
- East accepted principle of equal ceiling and, in particular, West's tank, armored troop carrier and combat helicopter ceilings.
- President Bush has stated goal of completing an accord within 6-12 months; USSR has agreed with this.

II. AREAS OF FOCUS

- U.S. urging allies and East to maintain rapid work pace.
- Most difficult immediate issues are definition of what aircraft to include and limits on manpower.
- East uses mission, rather than actual capability, as criterion for inclusion of aircraft. They exclude thousands of their aircraft as "defensive," even though these clearly have "strike" (ground support) capabilities. East includes all NATO aircraft as "offensive."
- East seeks overall manpower limit as well as ceiling on all stationed manpower in Europe. As only Soviets have stationed troops in Eastern Europe, this would limit them alone while constraining five NATO members with stationed troops.

III. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS

- Soviet willingness to reduce forces in Europe stems from need to redirect resources to civilian economy and desire to win political favor from Western and Eastern publics.

IV. U.S. GOALS

- To redress conventional force imbalance, to enhance stability and create more secure military situation:
- To reduce Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe and thereby encourage more democratic, liberal Eastern European regimes.