

DOBRYNIN: I think I will clarify the situation, because I see the right wing and left wing views beginning to argue. I think the situation was simple to understand from the American point of view. We on the political side--by the "political side," I mean the Foreign Ministry--really knew very little. We knew very little about what was going on in our military thinking.

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Did they have long-range planning in the military or not? What kind of weaponry we were preparing? [Indicating Kondrashov:] Well, he knows, because he was working in the KGB, and the KGB knew everything. But there was no way for ordinary--I say ordinary--channels, working in the Foreign Ministry, to know what was going on? So, the situation was really a little bit like what Tarasenko said it was. He speaks for the Foreign Ministry. Georgy Kornienko knew a little bit more, because he was in this famous "Five." But even he didn't know everything, because he didn't have any secrets from me, and when we discussed things, I felt that he was on a rather shaky ground: he knew a little bit more; but still, in the grand scheme of things, he did not know much.

When I came back from Washington and saw friends in the KGB and General Staff, I began to learn some things. But this was just piece by piece; things were not well-connected in my mind. So I would return to Washington a little bit enlightened, but not on a great scale. I was enlightened on this particular sphere, or on that particular sphere--so that when I discussed things with you, I would try to learn from you. This was the situation. There was no system. It was as our Generals said. It was a closed society. Five, six men--who knows? And the whole Ministry--the Foreign Ministry, I mean--knew nothing--except when we participated directly in formulating negotiation strategy. We had a very good team in Geneva, and in other places. We worked very closely together--military, diplomats, and KGB people. It was a very good team. But they weren't working together within their own society, so to speak. The military did not always tell us all the whole all the story. Maybe they didn't know themselves--I mean, our participants in the negotiations. Or maybe there was some military discipline preventing it.

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Perhaps they didn't want to go too far, because, after all, it was only planning.

Military planning in Russia was top secret. It's unbelievable: in your country, it's a loose cannon. You discuss all these military things, rightly or wrongly. And ultimately you yourself don't know what you are talking about. [Laughter.] But it made an impression on us, I should say, because we tried to understand what you were talking about. We still believed in you. We had a much higher opinion of you at that time, by the way, than you did of yourselves. [Laughter.]

So, what Generals Detinov and Starodubov said was quite right. At the later stages, I had a chance to be a little bit more involved on the military side. I had several chance to speak with the Minister. But this was just because I happened to know the fellow. For most of the period, the military did not know me, the ambassador, personally. They did not know how to talk with me. This was the situation. There is always an eagerness among the diplomats to know what we were up to; but it was very difficult for us to know.

It was also difficult for you. When I would go to the negotiations with you, Cy, or with Zbig, I would have an instruction from Moscow: "Do not compromise on this issue; merely inform the Americans of our position on this issue," and so forth. There was no indication of what we were really interested in. They even asked me sometimes to find things out from you. When I asked you questions, they were my questions; they were not Gromyko's questions. I was trying to find out what was going on. It was very difficult for us diplomats. I repeat what Tarasenko said: his is the voice of despair of the time. We were not dumb diplomats, but it is a difficult profession if you try very hard.

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We were trying very hard. But the military people developed our positions. One day they tried to explain to Mr. Gromyko--in the very beginning, of course--how missiles fly without a propeller. [Laughter.] I was present when one of our fellows explained it to him. Then, of course, he knew. I graduated from Moscow Aviation Institute, and I had very good connections with the Yakovlev Design Bureau when I was still ambassador; so it was easy for me to understand it. But most of our foreign policy people knew nothing.

We did not even know the names of our own weapons. We used your names. We have been speaking of *Backfire*. By the way, why is it *Backfire* and not *Forwardfire*? [Laughter.] We did not know. But we used the Western name. I never saw a *Backfire*, actually. Or rather, I saw one photo later in an American magazine. [Laughter.] But I once tried to ask Gromyko why they couldn't take our diplomats who really involved in the negotiations to some factory, or to some airfield, just to see what kind of bombers existed, in what form, so that we would know what we were talking about? It was impossible. It was a top secret. Why? Viktor recalled how many years later on we called it the Tu-22 instead of the *Backfire*. Tu-22M--this is what we called the modernized version. But at the time, we never knew what it was. Everyone just called it "*Backfire*." We didn't know how to say that in Russian, so always in my telegrams I only used the word *Backfire*. I didn't use a single Russian name for bombs or missiles or planes. They were secret. So this was the mentality. And little by little began, subconsciously, to think that you really knew more than we, because we used your terminology, we use your designations for our missiles. All of this was because there was a great gap between the military and the diplomats--a gap in communications, not a disagreement. What

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could I or others tell Detinov? "Look here, this particular missile should be prohibited"? Or, "This missile should be accepted as equivalent to that one, in a ratio of one to five"? What kind of argument could I have against what he said?

The military had good intentions. General Grechko also had very good intentions. But he was against giving up anything, because he learned his lessons from the Second World War. That's why it was difficult.

The Commission of Five did a great service to us. When I became a Secretary of the Party, I participated in these kinds of discussions. It was [first name?] Sokolov at that time; myself from the Party; a fellow named [first name?] Kryuchkov; and somebody else. An interesting discussion was going on, too. But the military just impressed on us that they had all the knowledge. Our job was to talk about what kind of relations we wanted to have with the Carter administration. I know you have a system that is much better than ours; but at that time we didn't have any education in military things. None at all. No one attempted to educate the Foreign Ministry on military matters--except, perhaps, on a friendly basis, one-on-one. I would go to someone, and he would tell me what I needed to know, but he would say, "Please don't tell anyone that I told you." This was the situation. It made things very difficult.

That's why we now have this disagreement. They are trying to convince you that they had a nice plan, and Sergei said there was no planning at all. Actually, if you accept my explanation, the truth was in between.