

## CPSU CC

### **On the draft resolution of the CPSU CC “On Directives to the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American consultations on issues of banning bacteriological and toxin weapons”**

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The USSR defense ministry received the draft resolution of the CPSU CC “On directives to the USSR delegation at Soviet-American consultations on questions of banning bacteriological and toxin weapons” prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sent as signed by the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs comrade V. P.Karpov, who chairs the Intergovernmental Commission for conducting work and studying questions connected with the fulfillment by the USSR of its obligations as a participant in the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. (Outgoing No. 2/upovr January 5, 1990)

The document specified had not been studied beforehand with the USSR Defense Ministry on a routine working basis. And information concerning the activity of relevant institutions of the USSR Defense Ministry had not been requested by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Along with the development and specification of positions concerning the system of control and confidence building measures, the circulated draft resolution contains suggestions which radically contradict statements previously made at the government level.

It is proposed “to express a readiness for an exchange with the USA on a confidential basis of information about stockpiles of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and sites for its production which each side had in possession prior to 1975 when the Convention came into force, as well as about implemented measures on the elimination or transition to peaceful purposes of all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery listed in Article 1 of the Convention.”

This proposal contradicts the USSR official statements to the effect that the Soviet Union has never worked on nor produced nor possessed stockpiles of biological weapons.

Should there arise a question about the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979, it is recommended to “confine ourselves to a statement that at the present time an investigation is underway of accusations prompted by the anthrax outbreak and put forward by the USA which claims the USSR violates the Convention,” also to “keep in

mind that indeed an accident took place at the facility of Scientific Research Institute (NII) of Microbiology of the USSR Defense Ministry in Sverdlovsk...”

A possibility is also mentioned to share information about the accident with the American side at the end of the investigation.

This interpretation of the 1979 events has no real basis to support it. There were no explosions and accidents at the facility of the USSR Defense Ministry, and a check-up of the engineering systems initiated at that period revealed no malfunctions. The emergency anti-epidemic commission in 1979 arrived at a conclusion about the food origin of this outbreak, and at the present time there exists no new information or circumstances that would force a doubt about the correctness of the conclusions.

In the opinion of the USSR Defense Ministry, such proposals made by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs may discredit our state on the international level and provoke unpredictable actions of the population inside the country.

Evaluating the ongoing situation, it is necessary to take into account that the document has been reproduced in 15 copies and sent to various addressees.

In this connection, the USSR Defense Ministry addressed the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs with suggestions to urgently recall the draft resolution of the CPSU CC, not to further revise the official documents concerning the compliance of the USSR with the 1972 Convention, as well as not to raise the question about the visit by American experts to the facility of the USSR Defense Ministry in Sverdlovsk until the mechanisms of control over compliance with the mentioned international agreement are worked through.

Besides, there is concern that representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when receiving certain information on special problems at various intergovernmental meetings, may in some cases without approval broaden the circle of informed people who must not receive this kind of information without authorization.

I suggest this question be examined at the CPSU CC Politburo committee chaired by comrade L. M. Zaikov

*[signed]*

D. Yazov

“10” January, 1990

- Epidemic analysis confirmed the natural origin of this outbreak;
- 44<sup>th</sup> NII of the USSR Defense Ministry deals with questions of military epidemiology, including decontamination of military equipment in contaminated areas; the facility conducts no work on the development of biological weapons;