Excerpt from Minutes No. 187 of CC CPSU Politburo Session from May 16, 1990.

On the directives for talks with the US Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow on May 16-19, 1990.

2. Approve the directives for negotiations between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs with the US Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow on May 16-19, 1990 (attached).

Secretary of the CC
On the directives for negotiations with the US Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow on May 16-19th, 1990.

The significance of the upcoming talks with US Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow is determined by the fact that they will be the last important stage in the preparation for the Soviet-American summit.

It must be noted that recently opponents of the Soviet-American dialogue’s constructive development are trying to use the situation in the Soviet Baltic States in order to impair the achieved level of relations. At the same time, in the US leadership and society a realistic understanding of the importance of relations with the USSR prevails. The Administration maintains the line to conduct a constructive summit.

As the focus of the political conversation with Baker it is expedient to put forth the thesis that Soviet-American relations should be considered by both countries as a joint asset that must be protected from attempts to gain unilateral advantage. The world stands before a very real opportunity to reshape international relations and bring them to a qualitatively new level of broad cooperation, demilitarization, and partnership based on legitimate interests. Momentary temptations to exploit the situation for unilateral gains risk negating these possibilities.

The negotiations with Baker should focus primarily on specific issues whose solutions are key to ensuring further positive development of relations between the USSR and the USA. The main task is to prepare the principal provisions of a Soviet-American treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, to be coordinated during the summit.

At the meeting with James Baker in Bonn we were able to make some progress in the US’ position on a number of outstanding issues of the future treaty. Our additional positions have been worked out in order to move toward an agreement.

In order to give a positive impetus to the work in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons we mean to propose that the coordination of both Sides’ top-level statement of intentions regarding the future reductions in strategic offensive weapons be prepared in the main part before the meeting.

During the talks with Baker we expect to agree as much as possible on the questions of nuclear testing, chemical weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, chemical weapons and missile technology, as well as other relevant issues.

Bearing in mind the fundamental importance of Soviet-American understanding on the issues of conventional armed forces for reaching an agreement at the Vienna talks, as well as to further advance the pan-European process, we will need to come to an agreement with Baker on a compromise solution on aviation and the formalization of the Ottawa agreement on Soviet and American manpower in Europe.
From the regional conflict issues we will emphasize the broadening areas of agreement regarding the Afghan and Middle East settlement, paving the way for a constructive discussion of this topic at the summit.

Considering the meeting of the “six players” in Bonn, we are to conduct a detailed discussion with the Secretary of State, covering the entire complex of issues that are of interest to us in relation to the process of building German unity.

We should expound to Baker our concept for the final settlement with Germany. Verify that the approach to the settlement should be an integrated package approach. The “six players” should develop and adopt a single, coherent document that would cover all external aspects of the settlement. This document, if not in form then in substance, in its content, should be comparable to a peace treaty. It would be signed by all of the “six players” and subject to ratification.

Note that the formation of a single German state can be realized only after the external conditions of the unification are determined, as the other European states have the right to a timely guarantee that indeed only peace will emanate from the new Germany.

Suggest that in our view the practical realization of agreements regarding external conditions for unification may require more time than the process of actual unification of the two German states set for this particular period of transition.

Express the view that the cessation of four-way rights and responsibilities should be only one of the constituent elements of the final peace settlement and be its crowning aspect.

Once again emphasize that it would be politically and psychologically unacceptable for us to see a united Germany in NATO. We cannot agree to the destruction of the balance of power and stability in Europe that would inevitably result from this step. This would create a dangerous military-strategic situation for us.

We see the path to finding solutions acceptable to everyone in the accelerated construction of new pan-European security structures. The first practical step in this direction could be the creation of a European Center for the Prevention of the Threat of War, based in Germany.

During the transition period and until the formation of pan-European security structures we have to find solutions that would fully take into account the interests of the Soviet Union and other countries. The four powers’ troops should remain in Germany until the end of transitional period.

At the Vienna talks on the joint armed forces, speak in favor of reaching an agreement on restricting the armed forces of united Germany. These restrictions should, however, be confirmed also in the final document on the German settlement.

State that the Soviet Union has consistently held to a principal policy of increasing Soviet-American cooperation in German affairs, both within the framework of the “two plus four” mechanism and in the context of preparation for the CSCE summit; and, if necessary, on a bilateral basis. Today such cooperation is relevant more than ever. We expect that it will reach a
qualitatively new level as the result of talks between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush in Washington.

It seems appropriate to conduct the discussion of bilateral issues from the premise that the increase and diversification of bilateral contacts and cooperation, as well as their stable and progressive development, is an important factor of the stability of Soviet-American relations in general. In this regard, the summit in Washington, during which a number of new Soviet-American intergovernmental agreements are scheduled to be signed, is expected to be marked with the strengthening and improvement of the legal infrastructure of bilateral ties. These developments will represent a considerable move forward in the matter of bilateral cooperation, including trade and economic cooperation.

We mean to review with the US Secretary of State the state of affairs with preparations for the signing of documents in Washington on bilateral cooperation and to determine at what level they will be signed.

When discussing transnational issues we plan to emphasize the fact that not only the success of international cooperation but the resolution of vital issues facing our countries (ecology, the war on terror and drugs, dangerous diseases, etc.) will depend on the concurrence of the USSR and USA’s actions on these matters.

We intend to conduct a serious conversation with Baker regarding the political significance of the trade and economic spheres of our relations, and on the need for the Administration to decide not only in words but in actions on its relations with the reforming, truly changing Soviet Union. Emphasize that we anticipate the Administration’s political support on major joint projects, which would enable us to bring the material basis to the new level of our cooperation.

The discussion of humanitarian issues will be focused on securing their new role as a positive factor in Soviet-American relations.

We also intend to discuss the main organizational aspects of the USSR President’s state visit to the US.

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May 15, 1990
DIRECTIVES

for negotiations with the US Secretary of State James Baker on May 16-19, 1990

On May 16-19th, 1990, the US Secretary of State James Baker will visit the USSR in what will be the last major political event in the Soviet-American dialogue before the summit.

The talks with the Secretary of State will take place in an environment where opponents of the Soviet-American dialogue’s constructive development are trying to use the situation in the Soviet Baltic States in order to impair the effective realization of the summit and in general to hinder the progressive course of the USSR-US dialogue. At the same time, in the US leadership and society a realistic understanding of the importance of relations with the USSR and value of the positive elements accrued in this sphere prevails. The Bush Administration maintains the line to conduct a constructive summit.

As the focus of the political conversation with the Secretary of State it is expedient to put forth the thesis that the current level of Soviet-American understanding and cooperation should be considered a joint asset that must be protected from attempts to gain unilateral advantage. In a practical sense we should stress the consolidation of positive moments in our relations with the United States, the progress on concrete issues that have to be worked through and coordinated before the summit. Bring the Secretary of State’s attention to the broad political context and the need in the current complex period for both sides to show a high level of responsibility in their actions.

When discussing issues related to the Lithuanian problems, proceed from the decision of the III Congress of the USSR People’s Deputies, which considered the resolutions of Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet from March 10-12, 1990, as illegal and suspended them; as well as the subsequent decrees by the USSR President, his address to the people and Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR; the Soviet government’s statements; M.S. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov’s address to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers from April 14, 1990.

State that the Soviet side more than anyone is interested in resolving the situation in Lithuania by means of a political dialogue, based on heeding the USSR Constitution and law, which defines the procedures for a Union republic’s secession from the Union. This is the Soviet’s Union’s internal affair.

Note that attempts to exert external pressure on the Soviet Union, and the threat of use of discriminatory measures against the Soviet Union are counterproductive, they will not contribute to a political dialogue between the Union bodies of state power and the Lithuanian leaders. Such measures, if adopted, would not work towards a settlement but against it, and would encourage extremist, separatist forces.

Say that the Soviet side is closely monitoring the US Administration’s reaction in this matter, and sees its realistic approach to the complex situation around Lithuania and the Soviet Baltic States in general.
**Disarmament**

Bearing in mind the importance of an agreement in this sphere to ensure the effectiveness of the summit, as well as the limited amount of time left until the summit, it would be expedient to discuss disarmament issues with a focus on maximal progress towards an agreement.

**Negotiations on the Nuclear and Space Arms.** The forthcoming talks with the US Secretary of State James Baker will be the last full-scale negotiations before the start of the Soviet-American summit in May-June of 1990. For all intents and purposes they will be decisive from the point of view of realizing the two sides’ previously stated intentions to prepare an agreement, which is being worked out in Vienna right now, on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, to be initialed by the USSR and US leaders during the meeting from May 30-June 3rd.

In order to realize this goal, a number of major unresolved issues should be coordinated at the meeting of Ministers in mid-May, 1990.

The outcomes on these questions could consist of the following.

**On the ALCM and SLCM.** Use the positions stated in the letter of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the US Secretary of State from May 11, 1990, for guidelines.

If the American side agrees to the entire package on ALCM and SLCM, the Soviet side will be prepared to move toward a solution on the issue of non-nuclear ALCM “Tacit Rainbow” on the following basis. In the context of an American agreement to the range of 600 km for long-range ALCM, with an exception for the existing type of American non-nuclear ALCM “Tacit Rainbow,” which has a range greater than 600 km but which would not be included in the number of ALCM limited by the agreement. State that the Soviet side could make this exception if there is an understanding that the range of these missiles would not exceed 800 km, that they will be deployed only on non-modern heavy bombers, converted for non-nuclear arms, as well as on one type of aircraft, not related to the heavy bomber category, and there would be no modernization of this ALCM and it would not be transferred to third countries. At the same time the Soviet side reserves the right to possess the same type of weapons with the same restrictions.

**On mobile ICBM launchers.**

1) Restricted areas would be established in the area of 5 square kilometers.
2) On-site inspections would be conducted only within limited areas, as well as at service points.
3) Deployment sites with the area of 120 thousand square kilometers would be established (this figure is the average between the American proposal of 90 thousand square kilometers for the deployment area and our proposal of 160 thousand square kilometers for such an area).
4) A notification schedule for regular movements would not be established.
No restriction would be established on the number of rocket launchers located outside the restricted areas, as well as the duration of their presence there.

**On the phasing of strategic offensive weapons reductions.** Offer the Americans to coordinate an agreement, to be included in the text of the treaty, on a three-stage reduction of the two sides’ strategic offensive weapons. The reductions would take place over a 7 year period with stages of three, two and two years. Experts should be assigned to coordinate during the meeting the intermediate levels for carriers, the total number of warheads on all strategic offensive weapons, including the total number of warheads on ICBM and SLBM (The text of areas of agreement in the question of reduction stages and intermediate levels, Supplement 1).

**On heavy ICBM.** In the context of stages of the two sides’ strategic offensive weapons reductions we should give assurances, such as a unilateral statement by the head of the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms that during the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, heavy ICBM would be reduced to the level of 154 ICBM proportionally during all reduction stages of ballistic missiles.

If the American side raises the question of insufficiency of the Soviet side’s statements regarding the proportional reduction of heavy ICBM during the agreed upon Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons reduction stages, and offers to include sublevels on such missiles and their warheads in the text of the developing treaty—give our consent, with the condition that the American side will provide such sublevels for heavy bombers supplied with long-range ALCM.

**On the joint statement regarding future negotiations on strategic offensive weapons reductions and strategic stability.** Use as guidelines the negotiation instructions by the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs with US Secretary of State James Baker from April 4-6, 1990 in Washington (offer to coordinate the text of the joint statement at the summit of USSR and US leaders). Draw the US Secretary of State’s attention to the need to accelerate the preparation of such a document.

Express our agreement with the considerations expounded by James Baker in April 1990 in Washington, regarding the fact that subsequent negotiations should be devoted to the development of an agreement on strategic nuclear forces.

**On the Tu-22M ("Backfire").** If the American side raises the question of these medium bombers, use as guidelines the approved instructions for negotiations between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs with the US Secretary of State James Baker from April 4-6, 1990.

Confirm that this medium bomber, as was stated, is included by the Soviet side as an item for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.

**On the questions of anti-ballistic missile defense and space.** Use as guidelines the approved instructions for negotiations between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affair with the US Secretary of State James Baker in Washington from April 4-6, 1990.

In relation to the US Secretary of State’s proposal set forth at the meeting in Washington on April 4-6th, 1990, on concluding a stand-alone agreement on defense and space, not associated
with the ABM Treaty of 1972, and also his proposal “to demonstrate the operation of the measures of predictability” in the context of an agreement on defense and space, proceed from the position that the proposals are unacceptable to the Soviet side.

State that during the negotiations in Wyoming in September, 1989, the two sides agreed on a solution to issues of anti-ballistic missile defense and space. Both sides in a joint statement by the Ministers agreed that the approach offered by the Soviet side offers a way to reach and realize an agreement on strategic offensive weapons without reaching an agreement on defense and space.

State that the Soviet side is in favor of agreements being observed by both sides.

Emphasize that the strategic offensive weapons treaty can be effective only when both sides are in compliance with the ABM treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. Offer the US side to make a joint statement about this. If the American side shies away from such a statement, say that the USSR will make this statement unilaterally during the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

On the issue of positioning strategic offensive weapons on the territory of third countries, use as guidelines the approved instructions for negotiations between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affair with the US Secretary of State James Baker in Washington from April 4-6, 1990.

On the sublevel for mobile-based ICBM warheads. Express our readiness to establish a ceiling of 1200 units for mobile-based ICBM warheads in the context of settling the entire complex of questions on the ALCM and SLCM.

On rail mobile ICBM. Use as guidelines the position expounded in the letter from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the US Secretary of State from May 11, 1990.

On the liquidation of warheads to the level of 600 units. Emphasize that we consider it necessary that in the process of reductions not only the carriers, but the warheads themselves, their bodies would have to be physically destroyed. If necessary, argue our position from experience with the INF Treaty.

On the number of warheads that will be listed as future types of ballistic missiles. Offer to negotiate an agreement on this issue (the text of areas of agreement, Supplement 2).

The question of non-circumvention of the strategic offensive weapons treaty should be decided on the following basis:

1. The sides would exchange messages regarding the existing collaboration obligations in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons with their allies, or on the absence of such obligations. The US would have to report the presence (or absence) of the obligations not only in relation to England. We are considering the American side’s statement on the “forms of collaboration, existing at the time of signing the present agreement” with England, but additional explanations are necessary whether the collaboration in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons is limited to the sale of the “Trident-III” weapons systems (Supplement 3).
2. Confirm our unilateral statement that the USSR considers non-transmission of strategic offensive weapons to third countries as part non-circumvention of strategic offensive weapons treaty (this position does not apply to existing obligations).

3. Give our consent to the following formulation of article XIII:
   “In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this contract, each party will not accept any international obligations that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall consult in compliance with Article XII of the present Agreement to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to obligations of cooperation existing at the date of signing between one of the parties and a state not party to this Agreement.”

The Standing Consultative Commission. On the question regarding our Krasnoyarsk radar systems confirm our position that it will be dismantled to the ground in 1990-1991. Say that at the next Standing Consultative Commission session we will transfer to the Americans a schedule of dismantling works for this station.

Suggest a visit by Soviet specialists to the American radar station in Greenland and by American specialists to the Soviet radar station in the Pechora region in June-July 1990. Proceed from the fact that the question of visiting other US and Soviet radar stations would be revisited later. Specific questions about mutual visits could be addressed through the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Personnel.

1. Suggest to Baker that Soviet and American experts should immediately start formulating for the Treaty the Ottawa agreements on limiting the number of personnel of Soviet and American ground troops and air forces based in Europe, but outside national borders, as it was outlined in the agreed upon statement by Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Give the Americans our draft agreement (Supplement 4). Ask Baker whether this agreement could be signed during the summit meeting in May-June, 1990.

   Regarding the ratification of this agreement, proceed from the fact that we are interested in the immediate transfer of this agreement for ratification by the supreme legislative bodies of the USSR and US. At the same time, we would postpone ratification until the conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces, so the two documents would be ratified at the same time. The agreement on the reduction of personnel of Soviet and American troops could be attached as a component to the Treaty on conventional forces.

2. Emphasize the need to work out an agreement; such as through a “two plus four” formula, or a bilateral Soviet-American statement, or a four-party statement by the USSR, US, GDR and FRG on restricting united Germany’s weapons and number of personnel. Proceed from the position that this is a key issue, arising from the special responsibility of the four victorious powers according to Potsdam agreements. If such an agreement is worked out, we would be prepared to move to the next stage of negotiations on the question of limiting the number of WTO and NATO troops in Central Europe.

3. If the Americans by way of amendment of the Ottawa agreements raise the issue of transferring to the second stage of negotiations the question of limiting the American
troops to 30 thousand people in other parts of Europe besides Central Europe, proceed from the position that in this case it would be possible for us to return to the proposals set forth by M.S. Gorbachev in his conversation with Baker on February 9, 1990. Namely: reduce Soviet and American ground troops and air forces on foreign territories in Europe to the level of 195 or 225 thousand people. Emphasize also that we would go along with such a change of the agreement if an agreement is reached for a joint statement on restricting united Germany’s weapons and number of personnel.

4. Suggest to the Americans to conduct an experimental bilateral exchange of 1-2 trial inspections, the object of which would be the Soviet and American troops and air forces stationed in Central Europe and subject to restrictions according to the Ottawa agreement. Suggest to the American side that personnel as well as weapons restricted through the agreement should be the objects of inspection. This exchange of inspections could be conducted, for example, in the second half of 1990. A bilateral exchange of corresponding information would precede such an exchange of inspections. The inspections would be conducted in specifically designated areas where ground troops are stationed, and at one of the air force bases located outside national borders of both states in Europe.

5. Aviation. Ask Baker about the American side’s view of our proposal to create equal levels (up to 500 units) for Soviet and American combat aircraft based outside national borders in Europe. If he responds negatively, inquire what solution the Americans envision for the problem of aviation, on which the Vienna negotiations have come to a deadlock.

Confirm our position regarding the establishment of equal thresholds for the front/tactical aircraft and medium bombers (4700 units) for each of the unions. Maintain our position that naval aviation is not subject of these negotiations according to the mandate of the Vienna negotiations.

At the same time, state that we would be ready to re-classify the majority of combat-training aircraft into training, i.e. to disarm the combat training aircraft (aircraft types will be listed separately). The disarmament would be done in stages over … years from the time of the treaty’s ratification.

The remaining combat-training aircraft (aircraft types will be listed separately), carrying weapons (a total of 500 such aircraft) would be included in the overall ceiling on combat aircraft of the front/tactical air force and medium bombers, which would be increased to 5200 units for each union.

Note that we are ready to exchange information on combat-training aircraft and their inspection on sites within the overall quota.

As a compromise, offer to transfer the resolution of the issues with anti-aircraft defense interceptor aircraft to the second stage of negotiations.

Option. Tell Baker that we will carefully study his statements made at the meeting in Moscow regarding the feasibility of moving all questions related to limiting and reducing air
forces to the second stage of negotiations. In practical terms, this question has to be discussed with the allied countries, with NATO and the WTO respectively.

Tanks and Armored Combat Vehicles.

1) In order to agree on a mutually acceptable definition of a battle tank, offer the American side to include the following parameters into the definition:
   a. The weight of tracked tanks—not less than 11 (dry weight) and 13 (combat weight) metric tons;
   b. The weight of wheeled tanks—not less than 16 (dry weight) and 14 (combat weight) metric tons. An alternate position for further negotiations is not less than 17 (dry weight) and 19 (combat weight) metric tons;

2) Within the framework of a compromise solution on the armored combat vehicles parameters, we could agree to the following solution:
   a. Overall level of armored combat vehicles—30 thousand units;
   b. Level for infantry combat vehicles and heavy weapon combat vehicles—18-20 thousand units;
   c. Level for heavy weapon combat vehicles—1-2 thousand units;
   d. Minimal weight for heavy weapon combat vehicles 4.5 (dry weight) and 6-7 (combat weight) metric tons.

Procedures for liquidating arms. State that the procedures we proposed to liquidate the arms and military equipment limited by the treaty and provide for their destruction and conversion for non-military purposes of a part of the liquidated arms to be further used for peaceful purposes. The agreed upon liquidation procedures have to preclude the recovery of liquidated weapons as combat units.

Explain that due to the large amounts of planned reductions in arms and military equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a part of the liquidated arms (no more than ….. percent) may, prior to its complete liquidation, be deactivated and temporarily stored under international supervision. Their complete liquidation (destruction and conversion for non-military purposes) would be carried out over the period of 1-3 years.

Discuss with the Americans the possibility of cooperation in the development and application of optimal technologies to deactivate, convert for non-military purposes, and liquidate the reduced arms. Such technologies should be economically feasible and should minimize environmental pollution. In the context of cooperation in this field, joint Soviet-American enterprises could be created, which would be for-profit and could work on the process of converting arms for peaceful purposes, as well handling the task of rationally using the parts and materials remaining after liquidation.

Regional division. Consolidate at the meeting with Baker the mutual understanding of regional division prevailing at the Vienna negotiations, which touches upon the so-called “extended” region of Central Europe, including the Baltic Military District (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Kaliningrad region).

In this “extended” region equal limits would be set for the arms limited by the treaty in regular units and in warehouses on the territories of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
the Baltic Military District, the Belorussian Military District, the Carpathian Military District, the FRG, France, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Within these broad limits, equal sublevels for arms and technology would be set for regular units in NATO and the WTO.

To sustain this regional division, which is advantageous to us, we could agree to the following compromise regarding the so-called flank areas.

1) Agree with the NATO proposal not to transfer more than 5 percent of the arms and technology limited by the treaty from the region of “extended” Central Europe and the rear area to these flank areas. At the same time, relocation into one of the flank states would be permitted in amounts not exceeding 1/3 of the 5 percent of arms allowed for relocation.

2) Stipulate for NATO’s counter agreement to include the Kiev Military District into the “extended” Central Europe or into the rear areas.

**Negotiations on confidence-building measures and security in Europe.**

1) Note that the new set of confidence-building measures, which is to be developed at the negotiations, should be a qualitatively new step in comparison with the previously reached agreements in Stockholm.

   The key problem in the Vienna negotiations is the coverage of the naval and air forces under confidence-building measures. The progress of the negotiations depends to a large extent on the resolution of this issue.

   Offer the American side a phased solution to this complex issue. The first step would be to come to an agreement to include information on naval forces in the annual exchange of information on the armed forces; to expand the information on components of naval and air forces participating in joint military activities with ground troops, as well as the development of measures for notification of amphibious, helicopter-borne, and air operations and monitoring.

2) Draw attention to our earlier proposal for the establishment of a Center for the Reduction of the Threat of War in Europe.

   Emphasize that this idea’s realization would be important not only for the improvement of the political climate in Europe, but also for the future creation of pan-European security and cooperation structures.

3) In general express our support for Sweden’s proposal to exchange information on programs and plans to develop the armed forces in the sphere of confidence-building measures. Proceed from the fact that this information would be provided for the following calendar year and include information on the planned change of the size and structure of ground, naval, and air forces; their principal subordinate command; relocations; deployment programs of major types of weapons and military technology; and plans to build militarily significant objects in the zones where confidence-building measures are in effect.

   Suggest that information about changes in force development should be presented in the course of the regular annual exchange of information on the armed forces.

4) State that the Soviet Union proceeds from the need to develop and sign at the summit that is coming up at the end of the year a sound document that would contain considerable measures for confidence and security, which would cover military activity on land, air
and sea. The areas in which an outline of agreement is forming could also become elements of such a document, for example the exchange of statistical information on the armed forces, arms and military budgets; the expansion of content of annual military activity plans; the improvement of monitoring conditions; the improvement of control methods; and the creation of a system of operational communications and a consultation mechanism.

**Battlefield nuclear weapons.** Emphasize that in the situation where the talks in Vienna have come to a real prospect of arriving at a preliminary agreement already this year, we believe it would be possible to start negotiations on battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe in the very near future.

Draw the US Secretary of State’s attention to the unilateral cuts the Soviet Union carries out in artillery missile and air components of such weapons, as well as the USSR’s expressed readiness to make further unilateral reductions of its battlefield nuclear missiles in Europe in the event of an agreement to start such negotiations.

Note that the USSR’s willingness to discuss at the level of nuclear powers’ experts the question of what stands behind the concept of “minimum deterrence” and what defines the limit beyond which the potential of nuclear retaliation becomes a potential attack. This reflects the Soviet Union’s determination to move towards the liquidation of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe in a phased manner, taking into account the Western partners’ views and without dramatizing the differences between the WTO and NATO countries on the role of nuclear weapons in security enforcement.

Note that we understand the resolutions adopted by NATO countries in Brussels to mean that NATO in principle agrees to negotiations on battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. Emphasize that the rapid development of the situation in Europe requires that the discussion of this problem begin as soon as possible. In this regard, offer the following schedule of work to Baker.

In the near future, for example, in the spring-summer of 1990, hold a series of informal consultations with Soviet and American diplomatic, military and scientific experts on the question of what the first stage of battlefield nuclear weapons reductions might be like.

In the summer-fall of this year hold official consultations between the USSR and US with the possible addition of other interested states. A mandate of the forthcoming negotiations and the composition of participants would be developed.

After the signing of the agreement in Vienna on conventional armed forces in Europe, open full-scale negotiations on this issue.

State that such a schedule is a compromise and takes into account the considerations of the US and other NATO countries and corresponds to mutual interests, including in the light of the German issues.

Tell the US Secretary of State that an agreement on battlefield nuclear weapons could include the following main elements:
Area of application: Europe, the first stage—Central Europe (from the WTO side: GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland; from the NATO side: FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg);

Subject: battlefield nuclear land-based guided missile systems, nuclear mines and land mines, nuclear artillery and aircraft-carriers, including their nuclear components;

The main content of a possible agreement at the first stage of the talks: withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons from the specified zone to the national borders, including nuclear artillery projectiles, nuclear air bombs, nuclear warheads for air and ground-based missiles, nuclear mines and land mines; the liquidation of ground-based missiles with a range up to 500 km and launchers based in this zone; a ban on deploying the tactical air force nuclear weapons aircraft carriers (with the option to refit them so they would not be capable of using nuclear arms).

Within the framework of the negotiations’ first stage, alongside addressing the question of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe, it is necessary to ensure a sustained stability in the European zone in general, for example, by the parties’ obligation not to build up ground and air based battlefield nuclear weapons on the territory of European countries outside of Central Europe, and the obligation not to build up sea-based battlefield nuclear weapons in the waters adjacent to Europe.

Within the framework of the negotiations, the question of nuclear warheads liquidation procedures and the corresponding measures of control should also be examined.

In order to develop a preliminary decision on battlefield nuclear weapons it may be possible to use the “two plus four” negotiating forum. At this forum in particular a decision could be made to withdraw all nuclear means from the GDR and FRG’s territories.

Nuclear testing. Express the Soviet side’s satisfaction with the fact that at the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva the coordination of protocols on control with the Treaties from 1974 and 1976 is nearing completion. The protocols will be ready for signing at the summit in May-June, 1990, in Washington. Suggest that the delegations in Geneva initial these protocols for the summit.

Note that the successful completion of the first phase of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear testing offers an opportunity to move forward to the goal, stated by both sides, of a complete ban on nuclear testing. In this regard, offer James Baker to prepare for adoption at the summit a draft joint statement that would contain the specific dates for the beginning of the second phase of negotiations between the USSR and the US on further limitations on nuclear testing, as stipulated in the agreement reached by the two countries in September 1987, confirmed at a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow in February, 1990. For our part, offer September, 1990, as a possible date to continue the negotiations.

Chemical weapons.

1) Proceed from the fact that it is necessary to include into a bilateral agreement the obligations of the USSR and US to stop the production of chemical weapons from the time the bilateral agreement comes into effect, and not resume such production during
the entire time when this agreement is in effect (i.e. until the multilateral convention
on banning and destroying chemical weapons comes into effect).

Proceed from the fact that for the purposes of this agreement, the production of
chemical weapons should be understood as the production of any chemicals for the
use in chemical weapons in the aggregate of over 10 tons per year, as well as
equipment of munitions and devices specifically designed to use chemical weapons in
amounts exceeding 10 tons per year in the weight of the chemicals. At the same time,
the process of ceasing production should not prevent the use of facilities for chemical
weapons production from being used to manufacture products for the national
economy, under the appropriate supervision if necessary. These positions could be
reflected in the protocol on inspections, to be agreed upon after the treaty is signed.

State that the USSR would be prepared to start destroying its stockpile of
chemical weapons within the framework of a bilateral agreement in 1992, reaching
the level of 500 tons in weight of chemical agents by 2002.

In paragraph 5 of section IV of the draft agreement propose to add a provision
stating that information provided within 30 days after the agreement comes into effect
would include not only any changes to the location of storage facilities for chemical
weapons, but also information on changes in other data exchanged on December 29,
1989.

Inform the American side in detail on the content of the draft for the state
program for destruction of chemical weapons, presented to the USSR Supreme
Soviet. Also state that the schedule for implementing the program to destroy the
Soviet Union’ chemical weapons could be clarified by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Transfer the information necessary for the implementation of specific areas of
cooperation to destroy stockpiles of yperite and lewisite in the USSR, including the
exact composition of these agents (Supplement 5).

State that within the framework of a multilateral convention, in the 8 years of its
validity period, the USSR and US’ chemical weapons stockpile should be reduced to
500 tons in the weight of chemical agents. Also state that the Soviet side would agree
to maintain the 500 tons in the weight of chemical agents until all states, potential
possessors of chemical weapons, join the convention, with the understanding that all
participants of the Geneva talks will not oppose this decision and it will not prevent
the conclusion of the convention.

Do not object to holding a short extra round of Soviet-American consultations in
late May in New York to finalize the bilateral agreement.

Do not object if the agreement to hold challenge inspections is not documented in
a bilateral agreement, but in a special additional protocol to the Wyoming
memorandum.

2) Confirm the positive assessment of the memorandum of understanding on bilateral
experiment control and data exchange, signed in Wyoming on September 23, 1989.

State that the Soviet Union would be ready to exchange data on the location of 2
percent of undisclosed chemical weapons stockpiles at the XVI round of bilateral
consultations, subject to reaching a principal agreement that a bilateral agreement
would include a regular exchange of information on the change in data declared in the
first stage of the Wyoming memorandum.
3) Direct Baker’s attention to the fact that the US delegation still does not have instructions to seek resolutions for major unresolved issues at the multilateral negotiations.

Confirm our proposal that the USSR and US Presidents issue a joint appeal to the negotiators to finish developing the text for the convention in the next year or two. Such an address could also be made at the forthcoming summit. It could also include a proposal to hold a special meeting of the Conference for disarmament at the level of ministers of foreign affairs at the final stages of working out the text in order to overcome the last obstacles to the convention.

Work toward reaching an agreement at the meeting to start parallel work in the USSR and the US with a wide range of countries to encourage them to make a statement about their intentions to become members of the convention, preferably founding members.

Offer to conduct an exchange of opinions on the possible content of WTO and NATO’s statements on the intentions of member states to become original parties to the convention. At the same time work towards ensuring that the content of these individual statements was identical or corresponded on major elements.

**Biological weapons.** Confirm our positive assessment of the bilateral consultations that have started in this sphere. State that we intend to work towards removing as far as possible the existing concerns before the third review conference of the Convention on the Biological Weapons Ban (September 1991). Offer Baker to give a joint order to the delegations at the bilateral consultations to prepare a draft of an agreement between the Soviet and American governments on confidence-building measures and increased transparency with regard to this convention in the fall of 1990, to be signed at the meeting between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State.

Do not object to having the latest consultations on the issues of banning biological weapons take place within the framework of the second part of the XVI round of bilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons.

**Nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles and missile technology.** Work to develop and agree upon a text for a joint statement on the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles and missile technology, which could be adopted at the end of the Soviet-American summit.

[...]