MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

May 28, 1990

Subject: Press Fact Sheets for the Summit

Attached are draft press fact sheets on agreements to be signed and joint statements to be issued at the summit meeting with President Gorbachev. They are interagency cleared.

Although the fact sheets are not marked as classified, they should be treated as CONFIDENTIAL until approved in final form by the White House for release. In cases where texts are still being negotiated with the Soviets, we have tried to predict the result and drafted the fact sheets on that basis. The fact sheets may, however, require revisions as final texts of the agreements or statements emerge.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.
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(Note: this list is CONFIDENTIAL and not intended for public release.)

PROPOSED LIST OF AGREEMENTS FOR THE SUMMIT

I. AGREEMENTS AND JOINT STATEMENTS

- PNET/TBT Verification Protocols
- Bilateral Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
- Long-term Grains Agreement
- Maritime Boundary Agreement
- Maritime Transportation Agreement
- Customs Cooperation Agreement
- Cultural Centers Agreement
- Agreement on Expansion of Undergraduate University Exchanges
- Ocean Studies Agreement
- Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement
- Joint Statement on Nonproliferation
- Joint Statement on Environment
- Joint Statement of Intent to Establish Beringian International Heritage Park
- Joint Statement on Nuclear Reactor Operational Safety
- Joint Statement on International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

II. AGREEMENTS THAT COULD BE SIGNED OR ANNOUNCED IF POLITICAL DECISION MADE

- Commercial Agreement
- Joint Statement on Nickel Certification

III. AGREEMENTS AND JOINT STATEMENTS NOT YET FULLY NEGOTIATED

- Expanded Civil Aviation Agreement
- Tourism Agreement
- Memorandum of Understanding on Increased Circulation of "America" Magazine
- Joint Statement on START
- Joint Statement on Future Strategic Negotiations
- Joint Statement on Open Skies
- Joint Statement on Bering Sea Fisheries
- Joint Statement on Opening of Consulates in Kiev and New York
- Joint Statement on Space Cooperation
TTBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS

BACKGROUND

- 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) lacked effective verification provisions and were never ratified.
- In some cases, questions about Soviet compliance with TTBT's 150 kiloton (kt) limit could not be resolved due to inadequate verification procedures.
  -- U.S. no longer conducts PNEs; Soviets have not conducted PNEs recently, but to date have sought to preserve right to do so in the future.
- Once TTBT and PNET protocols are signed, they will be submitted together to Senate for its advice and consent to ratification of the two Treaties.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS

- Protocols detail verifying party rights in monitoring compliance with the 150 kt limit on yields of nuclear explosions and procedures for verification activities.
- U.S. and Soviet Union each have right to employ hydrodynamic yield measurement (U.S.-preferred method) on all nuclear explosions with anticipated yields above 50 kt and on-site inspection on all nuclear explosions with expected yields above 35 kt. In addition, in TTBT, sides also have right to in-country seismic monitoring on all tests above 50 kt.
- Special provisions are designed to improve confidence in monitoring unusual cases, such as nuclear explosions involving multiple explosions or non-standard geometries.
- TTBT protocol establishes a joint commission to serve as forum for discussion of verification and compliance issues related to TTBT, mirroring commission established by PNET.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Bilateral CW destruction agreement is significant step toward achieving multilateral CW convention that would ban development, production and use of chemical weapons, and eliminate all stocks on global basis by earliest possible date.

- In September 1989, as part of initiative to accelerate talks on global CW ban, President proposed destruction of U.S. and Soviet stockpiles down to about 20% of current U.S. level.

- In February 1990, sides agreed in principle to destroy stocks to equal low levels and to have agreement ready for summit. Major provisions were agreed at May 1990 ministerial.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Sides agree to cooperate regarding destruction of CW, including matters related to environmentally-safe methods of destruction.

- Upon entry into force, sides agree to end all CW production.

- Sides to begin destruction of stocks by end of 1992.
  -- Destruction of 50% of existing CW stocks by end of 1999.
  -- Stocks to be reduced to 5000 agent tons by end of 2002.

- Each party's residual stocks will be located in no more than eight facilities; each party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory.

- When multilateral CW convention enters into force, sides agree to further reduce their CW stocks to 500 agent tons within eight years after that convention enters into force.
  -- Sides propose special conference at end of eighth year to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient for reduction to zero over subsequent two years.

- Destruction of chemical weapons will be monitored through systematic on-site inspection.
LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Current 2 1/4-year extension of 1983 Long-Term Grains Agreement, which requires USSR to buy nine million tons of grain from U.S. annually, expires December 31.
- Negotiations on new agreement began in December 1989.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- New agreement to take effect January 1, 1991.
- Soviets required to buy minimum of 10 million metric tons of grain from U.S. annually (up from nine million metric tons), including:
  -- at least four million metric tons of wheat;
  -- four million metric tons of feed grains (corn, barley or sorghum);
  -- two million additional metric tons of either wheat, feed grains or soybeans/soymeal, with soy measures counted double for purposes of quantity.
- Soviets may buy up to 14 million metric tons annually (up from 12 million metric tons) without prior consultation with U.S. Department of Agriculture.
U.S.-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Agreement, which concludes nine years of negotiations, resolves differences concerning depiction of maritime boundary in North Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean.

- Agreement represents very favorable outcome in terms of U.S. strategic and resource interests:
  -- it removes significant potential source of dispute between U.S. and USSR;
  -- fisheries enforcement disputes and harassment of U.S. oil companies should no longer arise;
  -- it resolves differences regarding jurisdiction over fishing and oil/gas, enabling resource development to go forward in previously disputed areas; and
  -- it places about 70% of Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and gives U.S. an extra 13,200 square nautical miles as compared with the most favorable equidistant line.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Parties agree that the line described as the "western limit" in 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention Ceding Alaska is maritime boundary along its entire length.

- Further, agreement contains innovative provisions to ensure that all areas within 200 miles of either coast fall under resource jurisdiction of one or the other party:
  -- USSR transfers to U.S. jurisdiction in three "special areas" within 200 miles of Soviet coast, beyond 200 miles of U.S. coast, and on U.S. side of maritime boundary.
  -- U.S. transfers to USSR jurisdiction in one "special area" within 200 miles of U.S. coast, beyond 200 miles of Soviet coast, and on Soviet side of maritime boundary.
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Bilateral Maritime Transportation Agreement concludes discussions begun in December 1985.
- It normalizes and introduces principle of nondiscrimination to U.S.-Soviet maritime relations.
- It facilitates further development of U.S.-Soviet bilateral and international trade by providing for easier movement of goods between the two countries.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement commits both parties to eliminate discriminatory treatment, although it permits Soviet shippers to pay Soviet carriers in rubles as interim measure.
- Agreement contains no provisions for cargo-sharing, but does require Soviets to charter U.S.-flag carriers for Soviet government-controlled bulk cargoes whenever U.S. carriers are available on terms and conditions equal to or better than those offered by non-U.S. carriers.
  -- U.S. carriers wishing to participate in bilateral bulk trade are encouraged to inform Soviets of their interest, time availability and price.
- Agreement establishes forecast mechanism to trigger consultations on U.S. liner trade.
  -- Agreement goes into effect following conclusion of first joint forecast, expected to take place within a few months of signature.
- It grants two-day reciprocal notification access to 42 U.S. and 42 Soviet ports.
- Soviet-flag vessels are permitted to re-enter U.S. cross-trades, subject to Soviet assurances with regard to past Soviet predatory rate practices.
CUSTOMS COOPERATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND
- Agreement negotiated by U.S. and Soviet customs services.
- Concrete example of enhanced cooperation between U.S. and USSR in combatting narcotics trafficking and abuse, facilitated by January 1989 Memorandum of Understanding.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT
- Agreement provides for mutual assistance between customs services of U.S. and USSR.
- Agreement provides basis for cooperative activity in deterring and detecting narcotics trafficking.
- Agreement designed to strengthen cooperative measures which the two services typically undertake.
- Agreement provides formal basis for cooperation in areas of customs law enforcement assistance, export control and commercial fraud.
CULTURAL CENTERS AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Establishment of U.S. cultural center in Moscow has been long-standing U.S. policy objective.
- Reciprocal centers will deepen mutual understanding between our countries and strengthen bilateral relations.
  -- U.S. operates cultural centers in more than 100 countries.
  -- USSR has signed cultural center agreements with other Western countries, including FRG, UK, France and Italy.
- Bilateral Program of Cooperation (1989-1990), signed at 1988 Moscow summit, includes agreement to conduct negotiations on bilateral agreement to establish reciprocal cultural centers.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Centers, constituted as non-diplomatic, non-profit institutions, will be opened in Washington and Moscow.
- Center Directors and one Deputy Director for each side to have diplomatic titles and be accredited by their governments to their respective Embassies; with this exception, Center personnel, properties and papers will not have diplomatic status.
- Centers will carry out variety of functions, e.g. operating libraries; sponsoring seminars, films and performances; and providing student counseling and language instruction.
- Public guaranteed free, unrestricted access to centers.
- U.S. center in Moscow has right to use rubles to cover domestic operating expenses.
- Occupancy and opening dates to be determined by mutual agreement on basis of reciprocity.
- Agreement to take effect after exchange of notes confirming each side has completed domestic measures required for implementation.
AGREEMENT ON EXPANSION ON UNDERGRADUATE UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES

BACKGROUND

At Malta meeting, President Bush proposed that both countries undertake to expand undergraduate university exchanges by 1000 students in each direction.

U.S. and USSR have signed general agreement on expanding university exchanges, will work out implementing details later.

Sides have agreed to phased increase in undergraduate university exchanges beginning in academic year 1991-1992.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT


Increase targeted numbers to 1500 each way by 1995-96, subject to availability of funds.

Mix of private and USG funding (arrangements to be determined) to cover costs of Soviet participants in U.S.; USSR to cover all in-country costs for Americans.

Participants on both sides to be chosen on basis of academic excellence and language proficiency.

Participants would pursue full-time academic work in variety of disciplines. Preferred length of students' participation would be one year, though shorter periods would be considered.
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Bilateral marine science cooperation under the agreement lapsed following 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Since 1987, both countries have been exploring means for resuming cooperation.

1988 U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies identified areas of common interest, forming basis of new Ocean Studies Agreement.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Provides for broad range of oceanographic research cooperation, use of port facilities in each other's countries, and far-reaching scientific exchanges.
- Intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions are included.
- Results of joint studies will be published openly.
- Shared use of research vessels will result in substantial savings for both sides.
OCEAN STUDIES AGREEMENT

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PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND


- Important new addition is annex on protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), which conforms with new regulations and laws developed in both countries in last few years.

- Cooperation on civilian nuclear reactor safety, begun in 1998, will enable both countries to benefit from lessons of 1986 Chernobyl accident and provide vehicle for joint research on health and environmental effects of Chernobyl.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement provides substantial cooperation in several fields of atomic energy research, including fundamental properties of matter, magnetic fusion and civilian nuclear safety.

- Sides will explore proposals for renewing cooperation on safety of liquid metal reactors and management of hazardous and radioactive waste.

- Other fields of cooperation may be added by mutual consent.

- Joint Committee will convene each year, alternately in U.S. and USSR, to oversee implementation of cooperative programs.
JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION

BACKGROUND

- Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed at February ministerial to produce summit statement on non-proliferation. Sides exchanged drafts at April ministerial and developed joint text at May ministerial.

- Statement builds on series of U.S.-Soviet bilaterals, during which areas of common ground were identified.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement contains preamble which expresses sides' common concern, declares their willingness to work closely together and with other nations to develop and implement concrete measures against proliferation, and calls on other nations to join in this effort.

- Statement also details specific concerns sides have identified and measures they are undertaking regarding nuclear, missile and chemical weapons non-proliferation.

  -- On nuclear non-proliferation, sides focus on importance of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

  -- On missiles, sides focus on support for the objectives of guidelines of Missile Technology Control Regime, and call on other nations to observe MTCR.

  -- On chemical weapons, sides declare a multilateral convention to be the best long-term solution, undertake to expedite those negotiations, and note progress on bilateral confidence-building measures.

  -- Sides express support for regional dialogue on proliferation problems in Middle East (nuclear, missiles and CW), South Asia (nuclear, missiles) and Southern Africa (nuclear).
BACKGROUND
o At Wyoming ministerial, U.S. explored Soviet interest in cooperation focused on long-term environmental and pollution monitoring.

o Soviets reacted favorably in subsequent ministerials, and both sides have since probed various approaches to such cooperation.

o USG is considering concrete approaches to U.S.-Soviet environmental monitoring cooperation.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT
o Statement notes concern over global environment and commitment to international obligations, role of UN mechanisms, and cooperation in environmental protection and study of global change. Statement:

-- renews offer of U.S. venue for international conference on climate change framework convention;

-- highlights open exchange of data and coordination of environmental monitoring systems and research; and

-- notes intent to establish an international park in region of Bering Strait by end of 1991.
JOINT STATEMENT OF INTENT TO ESTABLISH BERINGIAN HERITAGE INTERNATIONAL PARK

BACKGROUND

- Purpose is to advance bilateral cooperation in conserving and protecting natural and cultural heritage of Beringian region, a shared heritage of American and Soviet peoples.
- Project will be implemented by U.S. National Park Service and USSR State Committee for the Protection of the Environment.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- The U.S.-USSR Joint Report is endorsed as framework for establishing an international park by end of 1991.
  -- Sides will negotiate protocol under Environmental Agreement to establish the park.
- Bering Land Bridge National Reserve will be initial companion site to be linked with a Soviet protected area on Chukotskiy Peninsula.
- Sides will undertake a number of cooperative activities to help advance planning and establishment of new Soviet protected area on Chukotskiy Peninsula.

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JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR REACTOR OPERATIONAL SAFETY INITIATIVE

BACKGROUND

- In September 1989, Energy Secretary Watkins proposed that U.S. and USSR cooperate to improve operational safety at civilian nuclear power reactors.

- This initiative would enhance ongoing cooperation in civilian nuclear reactor safety under a Memorandum of Cooperation signed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy on April 26, 1988, the second anniversary of Chernobyl reactor incident.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Initiative emphasizes improvements in several areas of nuclear power reactor operational safety: operating instructions, personnel training, plant management and operational controls.

  -- These areas were chosen in light of lessons U.S. learned about improving nuclear power plant operations in wake of Three Mile Island accident in March 1979.

  -- An Executive Steering Committee, jointly chaired by U.S. and USSR, will oversee activities of three expert groups addressing these areas.

- Main U.S. participants are Department of Energy and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations; Soviet side is represented by several organizations under Ministry of Nuclear Power and Industry.
JOINT STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL THERMONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR (ITER)

BACKGROUND

- ITER is a four-party (U.S., USSR, Japan and EC) project to develop controlled fusion energy for peaceful purposes.
- ITER was proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at 1985 summit. Cooperation began in 1988.
- ITER is based on compatibility of fusion programs of the four parties and value of maximizing resources through international collaboration.
- Parties have agreed only to initial design phase; they are reviewing domestic fusion programs and beginning exploratory talks on whether to continue to engineering design stage.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement notes progress since 1985 and endorses international efforts aimed at promoting further progress in field of thermonuclear fusion.
COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- At Malta President proposed targeting June summit for completion of MFN commercial agreement, provided that Soviets approve and implement new emigration legislation.

- New emigration legislation passed first reading in Supreme Soviet in November.
  -- Second Supreme Soviet reading, which would codify the law, was set for May 31. No serious opposition has appeared, but press of other business could delay final passage.
  -- We have emphasized to Soviets at all levels importance of expeditious passage.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement breaks much new ground in commercial agreements with Soviets. Specifically, it:
  -- provides improved market access, for example, by prohibiting adoption of standards which are discriminatory or designed to protect domestic production;
  -- facilitates business by establishing expedited accreditation procedure for commercial offices; allowing offices to hire directly local and third-country employees on mutually agreed terms; permitting access to all advertising media; and allowing companies to engage and serve as agents and to conduct market studies; and
  -- offers strong intellectual property rights protections by reaffirming commitments to Paris Convention and Universal Copyright Convention; obligating adherence to Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; providing copyright protection for computer programs and data bases and protection for sound recordings; providing product and process patent protection for virtually all areas of technology; and providing comprehensive coverage of trade secrets.

- Soviets have reaffirmed their commitment, once they receive MFN and USG lending restrictions (Stevenson and Byrd amendments) are lifted, to resume lend-lease repayments.
JOINT STATEMENT ON NICKEL CERTIFICATION

BACKGROUND

- Cuban Assets Control Regulations prohibit import into U.S. of Cuban-origin products, including nickel.
- Under these regulations, U.S. has prohibited import of nickel from USSR due to Soviet refusal to certify that it was produced there (rather than in Cuba, a nickel exporter to USSR).
- Since 1986, Treasury Department has been negotiating way to permit Soviet nickel imports to U.S.
- USSR recently agreed to exchange of letters on this issue certifying that the nickel which it will export to U.S. will be of Soviet origin.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement welcomes exchange of letters, which sets out procedures for issuance of certificates attesting that nickel exported from USSR to U.S. is of Soviet origin, as sign of improving U.S.-Soviet commercial relations.
EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- 1966 Civil Air Transport Services Agreement, as amended, allows service by only two airlines (Pan Am and Aeroflot) between Moscow, Leningrad, Washington and New York.

- At Wyoming ministerial, Secretary Baker proposed expanding agreement to include more airlines to more destinations.

- After three rounds of talks, sides agreed to quadruple number of flights to total of 14 cities.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Total passenger and cargo flights per side would increase from 7.6 Boeing-727 equivalents/week to 15.1 immediately; to 42 on April 1, 1991; to 58 on April 1, 1992.

- U.S. airlines could increase services to Moscow and Leningrad; they would gain new rights over North Atlantic to Kiev, Riga, Minsk, Tbilisi, and over Pacific to Magadan, Khabarovsk.

- Soviet airlines could increase services to New York and Washington; they would gain new rights over Atlantic to Chicago, Miami (with onward service to South America) and over Pacific to Anchorage, San Francisco.

- Each side could designate up to seven airlines to serve the other, with no more than two passenger airlines per side serving a city pair.

- Charter article would be added guaranteeing each side annual approval of 100 charter flights over Atlantic, within certain national constraints, and positive consideration of charter flight requests over Pacific.

- Soviet airlines would retain unrestricted rights to sell tickets in U.S.; until Soviet currency becomes convertible for purchase of air transportation. U.S. airlines could only sell tickets in USSR for hard currency.

-- To ensure U.S. sales access to Soviet citizens in absence of ruble convertibility, Soviet airlines would sell ruble tickets on U.S. airlines equal to an agreed percentage of our airlines' round-trip capacity, and remit the profits to U.S. airlines in hard currency.
TOURISM AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

- Tourism agreement emphasizes growing importance of U.S. and USSR place on economic and cultural benefits of tourism.
  - U.S. received 56,818 visitors from USSR in 1989, 86% more than in 1988.

- Agreement recognizes mutual interest in establishing long-term cooperation in field of tourism on basis of mutual benefit.

- It establishes rules and procedures for facilitating business, allowing U.S. tourism industry to take advantage of opportunities created by ongoing decentralization of Soviet tourism industry.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

- Agreement permits tourism service providers of U.S. and USSR to operate commercial offices and acquire or provide services on the better of MFN or national treatment basis, subject to national regulations governing foreign missions.
  - U.S. firms, for first time, would gain right to sell tourism services in USSR on commercial basis.

- Agreement allows official tourism promotion offices to be established and operated in other country subject to all applicable laws.

- Agreement also provides for exchange of information on new requirements for doing business that may enter into force in the future in U.S. and USSR.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO INCREASE CIRCULATION OF "AMERICA" AND "SOVIET LIFE" MAGAZINES

BACKGROUND


-- Circulation was to increase reciprocally in phases from 60,000 to 80,000 copies in 1989, reaching 120,000 by 1991.

o At February 1990 U.S.-USSR information talks, sides agreed in principle to raise circulation ceilings for both magazines to 250,000 copies in 1991 and to eliminate ceilings thereafter.

TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

o Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) amends 1989-1991 Program of Cooperation under General Exchanges Agreement.

o MOU provides for increased circulation of "America" and "Soviet Life" magazines up to 250,000 copies in 1991.

o Distribution of both magazines after 1991 to be governed solely by demand.

o Each side may print commercial advertising and distribute unsold copies of its magazine at official premises, cultural centers and exhibitions under its sponsorship.
JOINT STATEMENT ON START

BACKGROUND

- START goal: effectively verifiable agreement that reduces risk of war and achieves greater stability at lower levels of strategic offensive nuclear forces.

- At Malta President Bush proposed targeting June summit for resolution of all remaining substantive issues necessary to complete START Treaty.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Joint statement will note major substantive agreements previously reached, as well as new understandings achieved in Geneva, at ministerial meetings and at summit itself.

- Major elements include:
  -- 1600 delivery vehicles, 6000 warheads;
  -- Sublimits of 4900 ballistic missile warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs, (__) warheads on mobile ICBMs;
  -- Cut Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight 50% to level sides will not exceed;
  -- ALCM and heavy bomber counting rules and 600-km. ALCM range threshold;
  -- Verification provisions for the Treaty; and
  -- Handle nuclear SLCMs and Soviet Backfire bomber in politically binding declarations.
    - Neither side's deployed nuclear SLCMs to exceed 880.
    - Backfire not to be intercontinental-capable, to be limited to total of 400, and to be covered in CFE.

- Separate statement will address principles for START follow-on negotiations.
JOINT STATEMENT ON FUTURE STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS

BACKGROUND

- U.S. agreed at February ministerial that U.S. and USSR should begin to explore issues for future strategic negotiations.

- Joint draft statement was first developed at Moscow ministerial in May.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Building on results of current negotiations, U.S. and USSR agree to pursue talks on strategic systems, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces.

- To attain this goal, sides agree to series of steps:
  - Following signing of START treaty, sides will hold consultations to discuss future talks.
  - Negotiations themselves will begin without delay following entry into force of Treaty.

- Principal objectives of negotiations will be to reduce risk of war, especially nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability. Reductions would not be pursued per se, but would inevitably result from further stabilizing measures.

  Enhancing strategic stability, sides agree, should include emphasis on removing first-strike incentives, reducing concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and showing preference for more survivable systems.

  -- Measures to achieve these goals will include steps to reduce concentration of warheads on ballistic missile forces. Sides agree to begin by considering ban on MIRVed mobile ICBMs.

  -- Confidence-building and predictability measures will also be pursued as part of future talks.

  Within context of talks on enhancing strategic stability, sides will discuss relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms as it affects strategic stability.

- Sides also agree to continue active negotiations in defense and space area, with goal of creating a vehicle for pursuing cooperative transition to balance of strategic offensive and defensive forces.
JOINT STATEMENT ON OPEN SKIES

BACKGROUND

- President Bush proposed in May 1989 that the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations negotiate an Open Skies agreement.

- Open Skies designed to enhance mutual openness and transparency through opening of national airspace to reciprocal overflights on agreed and equitable basis.

- Two rounds of Open Skies negotiations have been held so far in Ottawa (February 12-28) and Budapest (April 23-May 10).

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- U.S. and USSR noted that Open Skies concept will make important contribution to openness and confidence-building and to new structure of European security.

- Joint statement addresses key principles of Open Skies regime:
  - Maximum openness: all territory of participating states would be subject to overflights by aircraft of observing country; there would be restrictions on flights only for safety reasons.

  - Effective observation: a wide range of sensors with sufficient accuracy to distinguish, for example, a tank from a tractor, would be permitted.

    This would allow for real transparency, including observation day and night in any kind of weather.

  - Equity and reciprocity: all participants would have access to sensors with capabilities within range permitted by Treaty; participants would be responsible for information they gather. Number of overflights would allow for equitable territorial coverage.
JOINT STATEMENT ON BERING SEA FISHERIES

BACKGROUND

- Unregulated fishing has in past few years severely disrupted fish stocks in central Bering Sea "donut," the area beyond U.S. and Soviet 200-mile zones.

  -- Such unregulated fishing accounts for more than one-third of total annual catch of pollock in Bering Sea.

  -- Extensive nature of this unregulated fishery threatens these pollock stocks, and in turn ecological balance of Bering Sea.

- U.S. negotiators have been cooperating with Soviets and others during past two years to seek ways to mitigate this unregulated fishery.

  -- Soviets have agreed in principle to adopt multilateral approach to address this problem.

TERMS OF THE STATEMENT

- Statement draws world attention to importance U.S. and USSR attach to this problem.

- It will serve as touchstone for effort to mount multilateral management and conservation scheme for central Bering Sea.
JOINT STATEMENT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK

BACKGROUND

- President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev announced on July 3, 1974, that U.S. and USSR would establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York.


- Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev decided at 1985 Geneva summit to reestablish consulates.

- Decentralization of political and economic power in USSR make establishment of Kiev Consulate General desirable.

  -- Ukraine contains one-fifth of Soviet population and industry.

  -- Millions of Americans trace origins to area; thousands travel there each year.

TERMS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES GENERAL

- Agreement to establish consulates, to be implemented by exchange of notes, provides both sides with equal rights.

  -- This is in accordance with U.S. law (FY-90-91 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act), which requires that Soviet and U.S. consulates operate under reciprocal conditions.

- Consulates will not open their doors for some months. Soviets must rebuild buildings they own in New York while U.S. must still locate suitable properties in Kiev.

  -- USSR will not be allowed to occupy its New York facilities until U.S. has suitable properties in Kiev.

- However, small advance teams may begin to operate in both cities as early as this summer.
JOINT STATEMENT ON SPACE COOPERATION

BACKGROUND

(To be provided)