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DRT  
Feb 05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Iraqi Inspections/UN Strategy

Though much of the public debate on Iraq focuses on UN inspections, the essential issue and key U.S. goal is not inspections but disarmament of Iraq. WMD is the heart of the problem posed by Saddam. The U.S. cannot rely on a UN inspections regime to eliminate Iraqi WMD capabilities. The proposed UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is even weaker than its predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was not strong enough for the job.

The centerpiece of U.S. policy should be UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, which states: "Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of [all WMD]." This states the disarmament goal categorically.

The U.S. should quickly establish its public position that the requirement is disarmament, not inspections as such. We should do this before Iraq reaches an agreement with the UN on deploying UNMOVIC. A disarmament mechanism should ensure the elimination of Iraq's WMD capabilities, despite the skillful denial and deception programs of the Saddam Hussein regime. It should also incorporate the lessons of UNSCOM:

- Even intrusive inspections over several years missed significant parts of the Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.
- Unilateral intelligence capability is required to complement inspections.
- Counterintelligence capability is required to deal with Iraqi attempts to penetrate and deceive inspection teams.
- There should be linkage between inspections and enforcement.



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- And the past few years since inspections ended, Saddam has been able to improve his technological capabilities: not only WMD, but also his ability to conceal it.

This approach is, indeed, directed by [REDACTED], which directs the USG to ensure that "no inspection regime is put in place that cannot guarantee the verifiable elimination of Iraq's WMD." The worst outcome for the U.S. of a renewed UN inspections regime would be a protracted and period of inconclusive inspections.

The U.S. should publicly advocate new conditions for disarming the Iraqi regime's WMD that are in line with the original language of UNSCR 687. A new inspection team should have:

- an American in the lead;
- access to any place in Iraq, to anything (including information and data) and anyone in Iraq, all in a timeframe determined by the inspectors;
- intelligence-sharing;
- authority to impound equipment or shut down facilities;
- unrestricted overflight rights for fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including UAVs; and
- bases in northern, southern and central Iraq in order to decrease Iraqi reaction time to short-notice inspection opportunities.

We need to stay one step ahead of the negotiations between Iraq and the UN. Their next meeting is scheduled for 30-31 May 2002. Therefore, this issue should come to the Principals Committee as soon as possible.

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