

DRT
Feb 05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJ: Non-WMD Declaratory Policy for Iraq

- The attached briefing, an update of work done months ago, is a useful compendium of Iraq-related declaratory policy themes for selected key audiences.
- Please distribute it to those responsible for public affairs, public diplomacy and information operations.

Declaratory Policy on WMD

- In addition to developing themes for key audiences, we should address the following issues having to do with declaratory policy:
 - Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime
 - A possible ultimatum to be issued to the Iraqi regime prior to the start of hostilities.
 - Themes for a presidential speech on the eve of an Iraqi operation.

Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime:

- Fundamental fact is our publicly-announced policy of "regime change."
 - Saddam is likely to believe that he cannot physically survive regime change.
 - Unless we can, and are willing to, offer him some *credible* hope of comfortable survival, he may figure he has little to lose by using WMD, *once he believes his downfall is imminent.*
 - In any case, he may not be interested in exile, if that means living quietly under conditions of virtual house arrest.
- We should aim to delay Saddam's recognition of the *imminence* of his downfall for as long as possible.
 - Saddam appears to believe that he is good at political maneuvering, and that he can outmaneuver us, despite our intentions.
 - Thus, our goal should be to convince him that he has more time to maneuver than he actually does.
 - When the end comes, it must come quicker than he imagines.
- In addition, we should try to persuade those who would have to carry out his orders to use WMD not to do so.
 - Suggested themes are contained in the "Declaratory Policy" briefing.

- These themes are best conveyed privately, if channels can be identified.
- The more difficult part is to determine what to say publicly.
- We wish to portray our action as a *liberation* of Iraq from a tyrant – thus it is difficult to threaten retaliation against Iraqi society generally for actions taken by its oppressor.

[REDACTED]

- We can make general statements, as we did in the Gulf War and since. Without withdrawing NSA, we can imply that it would not apply in this case.
- U.S. “will not tolerate” WMD use. “The American people would demand the strongest possible response.” (President Bush to Saddam, 9 Jan 91)
- “...if any nation uses weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies, it may forfeit its protection from U.S. nuclear attack under the 1995 pledge [Statement of NSA by Secretary of State Christopher].” (Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control Policy, NSC staff, 1997)

[REDACTED]

- Message should be directed at Iraqi officialdom generally:
 - “Unless you are guilty of atrocities, you can survive the downfall of the Ba’athist regime and play a role in the new Iraq.”
 - Should we publish a (short) list of “wanted” criminals, in order to give hope to those not on the list?
- However, if WMD are used, all bets are off. In that case, we may decide that *no high official of the regime can be allowed to play a role in the new Iraq.*

- "Unless you can show that you tried to prevent WMD use, you are likely to be punished for complicity in the crimes of the Ba'athist regime."

Ultimatum

- At some point, we should announce that Saddam's opportunity to accept UNMOVIC has passed.
 - We would recount the entire history of Iraq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
 - We would conclude that that history shows that inspections can not be an effective means to enforce the disarmament provisions of UNSCR 687.
- At that point, or soon after, we could deliver an ultimatum:
 - Iraq must unconditionally commit itself to WMD disarmament and to the war on terrorism.
 - Iraq must turn over to U.S. control all al Qaida suspects in Iraq.
 - Iraq must extradite Yasin (suspect in first WTC bombing.)
 - Inspectors to be allowed in, with complete, unrestricted access, including:
 - Inspectors can order the destruction of any WMD facility, weapon, delivery means, etc.
 - Inspectors can interview Iraqi personnel outside Iraq (with their families also outside Iraq).
 - Inspectors to be accompanied by U.S. (and coalition?) troops to enforce these provisions.
- Iraq must comply with __ days.

Presidential Announcement

- Present: The Danger We Face:
 - Build on State of the Union and West Point speeches.
- Past: History shows that these dangers aren't just theoretical.

- History of Iraq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
- History of Iraq's use of WMD
- Future: A better future for the Iraqi people, and for the Middle East:
 - Wrong to assume that Iraq can't enjoy the benefits of democracy and progress.
 - Iraqi people want to throw off tyranny. They should have the opportunity to do so.
 - Highlight work already done by Iraqi opposition to plan for post-Saddam Iraq.
 - Statement of political principles by the opposition.
 - Commitment to territorial integrity of Iraq.
- Given its natural and human resources, no reason Iraq can't become an advanced society.

[REDACTED]