


# APPENDIX 7

## Who Will Govern Iraq? Rodman Memo, August 15, 2002

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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

SUBJECT: Who Will Govern Iraq? (S)

(S) The State Department has proposed a Transitional Civil Authority (TCA) led by the United States, to govern Iraq once Saddam is gone. The premise is that (1) the Iraqi opposition is too divided to fill the vacuum and (2) the U.S. will want to control what happens with Iraqi WMD.

(S) My concern is that this occupation government may unintentionally prolong the vacuum in Iraq and enable the wrong people to fill it.

Historical Analogies




(S) Historical analogies have been invoked, especially a comparison to the recent experience in Afghanistan and the model of occupied Germany after WWII.

(S) In Afghanistan, the Bonn process succeeded in working out an accord among the competing groups, making possible an Interim Authority. This clearly differs from Afghanistan, in that:

- Afghans on the ground (i.e., the Northern Alliance) played a major role in their country's liberation that is likely in Iraq.
- Iraqi opposition groups have much further to go before they are capable of a provisional government.

(S) This is what leads some in the USG to study the allied occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII. The theory is that only we can fill the vacuum. But this analogy, too, is flawed:

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This Defense Department memo argues for working out a transitional government. It invokes the history of France in World War I and the "Bonn process" and argues against creating a government

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- We will have nowhere near the total control in Iraq that we had in Germany and Japan.
- There is already a lively Iraqi opposition, which, despite its current disunity, will be essential for adding legitimacy to a U.S. military action.
- (S) A more interesting analogy is with postwar France:
  - FDR and Churchill planned an Allied Military Government for France, the same as for Germany. They did not take deGaulle seriously; only after millions turned out to greet him on his return after D-Day did they conclude that he represented Free France as he claimed.
  - Had an occupation government been imposed on France, the Communists – who dominated the Resistance – would have taken over the countryside while the allies sat in Paris imagining that they were running the country. Meanwhile, the occupation government would have neutered the Gaullists.
  - As it happened, deGaulle in power (1944-46) built up his own movement as a counterweight to the Communists and neutralized them.

#### The Iraq Case

- (S) While Iraq has no deGaulle, the French experience seems to me more instructive than that of Germany and Japan:
  - There are bad guys all over Iraq – radical Shia, Communists, Wahhabis, al-Qaeda – who will strive to fill the political vacuum.
  - An occupation government will only delay the process of unifying the moderate forces.
  - The best hope for filling the vacuum is to prepare Iraqis to do it.
- (S) Thus, I see Afghanistan as the model to be emulated, even if the Iraqis are not yet ready for their Bonn process. We should accelerate the process of unifying the opposition – more or less the six organizations that were represented in Washington on 9-10 August – into a coherent political force:

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- First, they should agree on a common program.
- Using our considerable leverage, we should then press them to form an umbrella group, with the aim of setting up a Provisional Government in the near term.
- The sooner they work out their mutual relations and allocate power among themselves, the better.
- The U.S. has enough leverage to reach firm understandings with this umbrella group or Provisional Government on issues that concern us (e.g., oil; WMD; relations with Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan; Kurdish autonomy).

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