This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960.
A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. **Objective**: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. **Summary Outline**: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

   a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the
Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard
intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the
opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontroversial chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. **Cover**: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2,000,000.

5. **Budget**: It is anticipated that approximately $4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not
reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900,000 with the balance of $3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.
THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

   a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

   b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.
c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.

A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.
1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e., purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Velazquez have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.
3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. *Avance*, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has *El Mundo*, another Cuban daily. *Diario de La Marina*, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print *Avance* weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.
# Financial Annex

## I. Political Action

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<tr>
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<th>FY-1960</th>
<th>FY-1961</th>
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<tr>
<td>Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities</td>
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## II. Propaganda

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<td>Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of transmitters)</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
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<td>Press and Publications</td>
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## III. Paramilitary

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<td>In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training</td>
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## IV. Intelligence Collection

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**Totals**

|         | 900,000 | 3,500,000 |

*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.*