

S4



ClassNet

Cable Archive Retrieval System (CARS) v2.0  
"Our mission is to meet the information needs of our customers  
and the United States Government."

- ▶ Bureau of Administration
- ▶ Intranet Central (INet)
- ▶ InfoAccess home

2002ISLAMA09489 - SECRET

SECRET PTO3103

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 09489 01 OF 04 131405Z  
ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CEA-01	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00
	DOEE-00	NOTE-00	WHA-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-00
	VCE-00	AC-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	DHS-00	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	EPAE-00
	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00

/012W

-----07A05A 131406Z /38

P 131407Z NOV 02  
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3583  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
 AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
 AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
 AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
 AMCONSUL DUBAI  
 AMCONSUL KARACHI  
 CIA WASHDC  
 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 09489 01 OF 04 131405Z  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 009489  
LONDON FOR GOLDRICH

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER  
DATE/CASE ID: 30 SEP 2009 200704080

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2022  
 TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, PK  
 SUBJECT: S/P AMBASSADOR HAASS' CALL ON [REDACTED]

B1

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR NANCY J. POWELL FOR REASON 1.5B/D

1. (S) BEGIN SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S ARMY IS TOTALLY COMMITTED  
 TO OUR SHARED GOAL OF ELIMINATING TERRORISM, [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] ASSURED S/P AMBASSADOR RICHARD

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

HAASS ON OCTOBER 31, BUT HAS A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE BEST MEANS TO ACHIEVE IT. THE US TENDED TO PURSUE SHORT-TERM TACTICAL OBJECTIVES AT THE EXPENSE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC GOALS, WHILE THE PAKISTAN ARMY'S PREFERRED APPROACH WAS TO BUILD ACCESS AND LONG-TERM TIES TO LOCAL PEOPLE AND LEADERS.

[REDACTED] ASSERTED THAT THERE WERE NO AL QAEDA SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN AND COMPLAINED THAT OPERATIONS BASED ON BAD INFORMATION HAD PRODUCED NEGLIGIBLE RESULTS AND ALIENATED THE NWFP,S PASHTUNS. ON KASHMIR, HAASS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENDING INFILTRATION, BUT [REDACTED] WARNED THE US NOT TO PUSH PAKISTAN TOO FAR ON KASHMIR. [REDACTED] URGED THE US TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY [REDACTED]

B1

B1

END SUMMARY

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 09489 01 OF 04 131405Z  
THE LIMITS OF TOTAL SUPPORT  
-----

2. (C) [REDACTED] ADVISED AMBASSADOR HAASS THAT ARMY HQ HAD "GONE THE WHOLE HOG" TO SUPPORT THE US-LED WAR ON TERRORISM. THE ARMY HAD NO SYMPATHY FOR AL QAEDA -- [REDACTED]

B1

B1

[REDACTED] UNDERLINED THAT PAKISTAN,S MILITARY WAS IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE US ON "ENDS," BUT DIFFERED WITH US IN THE "MEANS OR METHODS" TO ACHIEVE THEM. WE NEEDED TO RECONCILE THIS DIFFERENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED GOALS, HE SAID, SPECIFYING THAT THE PAKISTAN ARMY APPROACH WAS TO ADDRESS LONG-TERM CONCERNS.

3. (S) [REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT PAKISTAN ARMY HAD RESPONDED TO ALL US REQUIREMENTS, [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAD FACED CONSTRAINTS, [REDACTED] IT HAD REMAINED COMMITTED TO CT OPERATIONS. [REDACTED]

OPERATING IN THE FATA  
-----

4. (C) US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN CREATED A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PAKISTAN ARMY TO ENTER "NO-GO  
SECRET

PAGE 04 ISLAMA 09489 01 OF 04 131405Z  
AREAS" IN THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) WHERE IT COULD NOT PREVIOUSLY OPERATE. THE ARMY HAD PROACTIVELY BEGUN TO OPERATE IN THE FATA, USING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ROAD BUILDING AS LEVERS TO GAIN ACCESS AND WIN OVER THE INHABITANTS. DURING THE TORA BORA OPERATION, THE ARMY HAD DEPLOYED ALONG THE BORDER OPPOSITE TORA BORA WITH LOCAL LEADERS' COOPERATION. [REDACTED]

B1

AT THAT TIME THE

TRIBES WERE OVERAWED BY US FIREPOWER ACROSS THE BORDER AND HAD ALLOWED THE PAKISTAN ARMY TO OPERATE FREELY. THAT WINDOW HAD CLOSED, [ ] NOTED WITHOUT ELABORATION.

B1

5. (C) THE ARMY HAD "SHOWED NO RESERVATIONS, TAKEN RISKS AND IGNORED THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE," SAID [ ] THIS HAD "ALIENATED OUR OWN PEOPLE," HE STRESSED. THE ARMY NEEDED FULL COOPERATION FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE TRIBAL AREAS IN ORDER TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY. THE FUTURE NEED WAS TO [ ] BRING SECURITY, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE AREA. AT PRESENT, THE ARMY NEEDED TO EMPLOY A 130MM GUN TO GAIN FIREPOWER SUPERIORITY OVER THE TRIBES, [ ] MAINTAINED.

B1

B1

6. (C) THERE WAS CONFLICT BETWEEN MALIKS (TRIBAL LEADERS) AND MULLAHS (RELIGIOUS LEADERS) IN THE NWFP AND FATA, SAID [ ] THE MULLAHS WERE AL QAEDA SYMPATHIZERS, BUT EVEN THEY COULD

B1

SECRET

SECRET

PTO3107

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 09489 02 OF 04 131405Z  
ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CEA-01	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-00
	VCE-00	AC-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	DHS-00	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/012W

-----07A065 131406Z /38

P 131407Z NOV 02  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3584  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
AMCONSUL DUBAI  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
CIA WASHDC  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 09489 02 OF 04 131405Z  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 009489

LONDON FOR GOLDRICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2022

TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, PK

SUBJECT: S/P AMBASSADOR HAASS' CALL ON [REDACTED]


NOT SHELTER AL QAEDA FOR MORE THAN A DAY OR TWO. AL QAEDA PRESENCE IN THE AREA WAS LIMITED TO TRANSIT; IT CONTROLLED NO PART OF THE FATA. IF AL QAEDA MOVED INTO PAKISTAN, HE ASSERTED, THE NWFP'S PEOPLE WOULD REPORT THEM. AL SHIBH HAD BEEN CAUGHT BASED UPON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOCALS, [REDACTED]

INTEL AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES  
-----


7. (C) [REDACTED] SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT AL QAEDA PRESENCE IN NWFP OR FATA. IF THE US HAD OTHER INFORMATION, IT SHOULD PROVIDE "SPECIFIC INFORMATION" SO THAT THE ARMY WOULD QUICKLY ACT ON IT: GENERAL INFORMATION WAS NOT USEFUL. [REDACTED] ONE OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS IN THE BORDER AREA, [REDACTED] WAS A NATIVE OF THE FATA AND HAD GONE THERE TO CHECK ON US-PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE AND MEDIA REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS AL QAEDA IN PARTS OF THE FATA. HE HAD FOUND NONE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO HAD TOURED AREAS FROM MALAKAND TO CHITRAL  
SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 09489 02 OF 04 131405Z  
DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAD ALSO FOUND NO TRACE OF AL QAEDA. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT US PERSONNEL WERE NOT WELCOMED IN FATA AND THE MMA WOULD EXPLOIT ANY US PRESENCE.



B1



DESPITE THESE "MINIMAL PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES" WE HAD EXPERIENCED TREMENDOUS JOINT SUCCESS: SEVERAL MAIN AL QAEDA LEADERS HAD BEEN KILLED; ABU ZUBAIDA AND BIN AL SHIBH HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN PAKISTAN;

12. (C) AMBASSADOR HAASS INFORMED THAT THE US WELL UNDERSTOOD FROM ITS OWN EXPERIENCE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO FIGHT TERRORISM -- EVEN WITHIN A SINGLE GOVERNMENT. THE US AND PAKISTAN HAD THE ADDED CHALLENGE OF

SECRET

SECRET

PTQ0843

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 09489 03 OF 04 131406Z ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CEA-01	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-00
	VCE-00	AC-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	DHS-00	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/012W					

-----07A078 131406Z /38

P 131407Z NOV 02  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3585  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLASSIFIED

AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
AMCONSUL DUBAI  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
CIA WASHDC  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 09489 03 OF 04 131406Z  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 009489

LONDON FOR GOLDRICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2022


TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, PK

SUBJECT: S/P AMBASSADOR HAASS' CALL ON [REDACTED]

B1

REBUILDING THE HABITS OF WORKING TOGETHER, BUT THIS WOULD  
COME WITH TIME AND MINOR DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE WORKED OUT.  
THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A NOTABLE DIFFERENCE IN THE US AND  
PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE US BELIEVED THAT  
AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN HAD BEEN PUSHED OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND  
AL QAEDA,S CORE WAS IN PAKISTAN TODAY. WE FELT THE SCALE OF  
THE CHALLENGE WAS LARGER THAN [REDACTED] BELIEVED. AL QAEDA HAD  
RECONSTITUTED AND POSED A THREAT WAS AS LARGE AS IT HAD BEEN  
ON SEPTEMBER 10. THE AL QAEDA PRESENCE IN PAKISTAN WAS THE  
SINGLE LARGEST CONCENTRATION ANYWHERE AND WOULD BE DIFFICULT  
TO DEAL WITH AS ITS DECENTRALIZED NATURE HELPS STYMIE  
DECISIVE VICTORY.

B1



B1

INDIA-PAKISTAN  
-----

14. (C) HAASS TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE WAS PLEASED ABOUT THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT OF TROOP PULLBACKS FROM THE BORDER AS  
DE-ESCALATION WOULD FREE RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO SEALING  
THE AFGHAN BORDER AND COUNTER-TERRORISM. IT APPEARED THAT  
INDIA WANTED TO RENEW CONTACTS BUT CONTINUING INFILTRATION

B1

WAS A BARRIER TO PROGRESS. THE US BELIEVED THAT INFILTRATION WAS CONTINUING. STOPPING IT WOULD HELP PAKISTAN'S CAUSE WITH THE US AND WITH INDIA. INFILTRATION HURTS PAKISTAN,S FRIENDS' EFFORTS TO HELP IT.

15. (C) [ ] AGREED THAT KASHMIR WAS THE "ISSUE BEDEVILING OUR RELATIONS," BUT PAKISTAN'S KASHMIR POSITION WAS "BASED ON JUSTICE," HE SAID, "KASHMIR SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAKISTAN." THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE WOULD NOT AGREE TO MAKE THE LOC THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. KASHMIR HAD COST MUSHARRAF A LOT, AS HAD HIS DECISION TO HELP THE CT COALITION. MUSHARRAF'S DETRACTORS [ ] HAD HIT HIM ON BOTH KASHMIR AND AFGHANISTAN. INDIA HAD TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AFTER 9/11 -- [ ] DID NOT BEGRUDGE THEM THEIR

B1

B1

SECRET

PAGE 04 ISLAMA 09489 03 OF 04 131406Z

EFFORT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. [ ]

[ ]

16. (C) HAASS REPLIED THAT HE PERCEIVED AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN AND SURROUNDING KASHMIR. INDIA SEEMED TO REALIZE THAT LACK OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CREATED SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY AND A BETTER CONTEXT FOR DIPLOMACY WAS NOW BEING CREATED. HAASS SAID THAT BOTH IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMACY WERE KEY TO MOVING FORWARD ON KASHMIR. [ ]

B1

[ ]

HELP WANTED  
-----

17. (C) [ ] MADE A PLEA FOR THE US TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

B1

SECRET

SECRET

PTO3199

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 09489 04 OF 04 131422Z  
ACTION SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	CEA-01	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	EB-00	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00
	FRB-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	ITC-01	L-00
	VCE-00	AC-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OMB-01	DHS-00	OPIC-01	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	SCT-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00
	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/012W					

-----07A356 131422Z /45

P 131407Z NOV 02  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3586  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
AMCONSUL DUBAI  
AMCONSUL KARACHI  
CIA WASHDC  
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 09489 04 OF 04 131422Z  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 009489

LONDON FOR GOLDRICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2022  
TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, PK  
SUBJECT: S/P AMBASSADOR HAASS' CALL ON [REDACTED]

B1

CAPABILITY. PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE SAME  
CAPABILITY BEING PROVIDED TO INDIA. [REDACTED] PROPOSED THAT IT  
MIGHT BE AN EXCELLENT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, AS IF THE  
TWO SIDES COULD SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING ACROSS THE BORDER IT  
WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCONSTRUING WHAT THE OTHER  
SIDE WAS DOING. HAASS UNDERTOOK TO INVESTIGATE THE  
POSSIBILITIES ON SURVEILLANCE [REDACTED] WITH OSD.

B1

B1

18. (U) THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY S/P.  
POWELL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

2002ISLAMA09489 - SECRET