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B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)PAGE 01 STATE 158711 140126Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

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SOURCE: KODAKB.014002

DRAFTED BY: SA/PAB:SMYOUNG:CLP -- 09/13/01 7-6711

APPROVED BY: D:THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

D:TCYNKIN SA:CROCCA S/CT:FTAYLOR (SUBS) S/ES:CARODLEY

S/ES-O:VCRITES

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 158711

NODIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/21

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PK, US

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S MEETING WITH GENERAL
MAHMUD: ACTIONS AND SUPPORT EXPECTED OF PAKISTAN IN FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM

REF: (A) STATE 157813, (B) ISLAMABAD 5087

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RICHARD ARMITAGE; REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).

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1. (U) 09/13/01, 12:00 PM, DEPUTY SECRETARY'S OFFICE

2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE

A/S CHRISTINA ROCCA

S/CT FRANK TAYLOR

SA/PAB DIRECTOR YOUNG

PAKISTAN

DIRECTOR GENERAL MAHMUD AHMED
AMBASSADOR LODHI
DCM AKRAM

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3. (S) SUMMARY: DURING A BUSINESSLIKE MEETING SEPTEMBER 13 WITH PAKISTAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF MAHMUD, DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE LAID OUT SPECIFIC REQUESTS WE ARE MAKING OF THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT FOR LOGISTICAL, TECHNICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. MR. ARMITAGE PASSED THE POINTS OVER IN A NONPAPER, ASKING THAT MAHMUD CONVEY THEM TO HIS PRESIDENT PROMPTLY. MAHMUD ASSURED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THAT PAKISTAN WAS WITH THE U.S. IN THIS FIGHT. WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THESE WELCOME SENTIMENTS, MR. ARMITAGE INDICATED WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF, WHO THE SECRETARY HOPES TO CALL IN THE NEXT SEVERAL HOURS. WHEN MAHMUD ASKED ABOUT SETTING UP MECHANISMS BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARIES TO

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PROCEED WITH SUCH COOPERATION, MR. ARMITAGE SAID WE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THAT, INCLUDING THROUGH JCS CHANNELS, ONCE PAKISTAN HAS OFFICIALLY RESPONDED TO TODAY'S DEMARCHE. ACTION REQUEST: AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DOUBLE TRACK THIS MESSAGE WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF, WORKING OFF THE NONPAPER IN PARA. 4. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

4. (S) DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE MET ON SEPTEMBER 13 WITH PAKISTANI INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (ISI-D) DIRECTOR GENERAL MAHMUD AHMED. AMBASSADOR LODHI AND DCM AKRAM ATTENDED, AS DID SA A/S ROCCA, S/CT DIRECTOR TAYLOR AND SA/PAB DIRECTOR YOUNG.

5. (S) MR. ARMITAGE BEGAN BY REPRISING HIS MESSAGE FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY TO MAHMUD (REF A) ABOUT THE NEED FOR EXTRAORDINARY ACTION IN THIS PERILOUS TIME AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN'S STEPPING UP TO U.S. REQUESTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF'S COMMENTS TO AMBASSADOR CHAMBERLIN IN THEIR RECENT MEETING (REF B), AS WELL AS THE POSITIVE PUBLIC REMARKS BY MUSHARRAF IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. HE

REVIEWED OUR ENCOURAGING MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL EFFORTS THUS FAR TO BUILD AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION, UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN'S JOINING AS A FULL PARTNER IN THIS PROCESS. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT CHOICE FOR PAKISTAN, HE REPEATED, AND WITH THAT FOREWARNING, READ THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH WERE PASSED OVER TO GENERAL

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6. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF NONPAPER: SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND SUPPORT TO ADDRESS TERRORIST ATTACKS

-- STOP AL QAIDA OPERATIVES AT YOUR BORDER, INTERCEPT ARMS SHIPMENTS THROUGH PAKISTAN AND END ALL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR BIN LADIN;

-- PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH BLANKET OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING RIGHTS TO CONDUCT ALL NECESSARY MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS;

-- PROVIDE AS NEEDED TERRITORIAL ACCESS TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND OTHER PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT ALL NECESSARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS OF TERRORISM OR THOSE THAT HARBOR THEM, INCLUDING USE OF PAKISTAN'S NAVAL PORTS, AIRBASES AND STRATEGIC LOCATIONS ON BORDERS;

-- PROVIDE THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY WITH INTELLIGENCE,

[REDACTED] INFORMATION, TO HELP PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST ACTS PERPETRATED AGAINST THE U.S., ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES;

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-- CONTINUE TO PUBLICLY CONDEMN THE TERRORIST ACTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND ANY OTHER TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE U.S. OR ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES,

[REDACTED]

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-- CUT OFF ALL SHIPMENTS OF FUEL TO THE TALIBAN AND ANY
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OTHER ITEMS AND RECRUITS, INCLUDING VOLUNTEERS EN ROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN, THAT CAN BE USED IN A MILITARY OFFENSIVE CAPACITY OR TO ABET THE TERRORIST THREAT;

-- SHOULD THE EVIDENCE STRONGLY IMPLICATE USAMA BIN-LADIN AND THE AL QAIDA NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN AND SHOULD AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN CONTINUE TO HARBOR HIM AND THIS NETWORK, PAKISTAN WILL BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT, END SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN AND ASSIST US IN THE FOREMENTIONED WAYS TO DESTROY USAMA

7. (S) REPEATING HIS EARLIIR STATEMENT THAT THE NOOSE WAS TIGHTENING AROUND BIN LADIN'S AND AL QAIDA'S NECK, MR. ARMITAGE SAID THIS INVOLVES NOT ONLY AFGHANISTAN, BUT WOULD ENCOMPASS TERRORIST GROUPS ELSEWHERE. HE NOTED PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION THAT AMERICANS WERE RESPONDING TO TUESDAY'S ATTACKS WITH UNYIELDING ANGER, AND ALSO NOTED WITH REGRET THAT THIS HAS SOMETIMES MANIFESTED ITSELF IN UGLY ATTACKS AGAINST MUSLIMS AND OTHERS IN THE U.S.

8. (S) MAHMUD RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT PAKISTAN'S POSITION WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. IT STOOD WITH THE U.S. AGAINST THIS EVIL, WHICH HE INSISTED WAS NOT MUSLIM BEHAVIOR. ANYONE WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST HAS RENOUNCED ISLAM AND MUST BE HUNTED DOWN. HE PROMISED TO PASS THE U.S. MESSAGE PROMPTLY TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT WANT TO APPROACH THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) FOR STATEMENTS OF
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SUPPORT SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING COLLECTED FROM THE EU, NATO AND THE G-8. QATAR WAS CURRENTLY THE CHAIRMAN OF THIS ORGANIZATION, AND MIGHT BE APPROACHED. THE U.S. COULD ALSO TALK WITH THE OIC SECRETARIAT.

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9. (S) MAHMUD THEN TOOK NOTE OF ATTACKS AGAINST PAKISTANIS AND OTHERS IN THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF TUESDAY'S

ATTACK, AND ASKED THE USG TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH INCIDENTS. MR. ARMITAGE TOOK THIS ISSUE VERY SERIOUSLY, AND NOTED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH HAD JUST BEEN ON CNN TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING SUCH SENSELESS CLASHES.

10. (S) NOTING THAT HE HAD MET EARLIER THAT MORNING WITH JCS DEPUTY GENERAL ABIZAIID IN THE PENTAGON, MAHMUD ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SOME SORT OF MILITARY CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM SET UP TO FACILITATE PAKISTANI COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. MR. ARMITAGE SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GENERAL ABIZAIID AND UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STEP. HE INDICATED THAT ONCE WE HAD RECEIVED PAKISTAN'S FORMAL APPROVAL TO OUR NONPAPER, WE WOULD QUICKLY TURN TO THAT PROBLEM. HE URGED A RAPID RESPONSE FROM ISLAMABAD, NOTING

THAT HE WAS GOING TO ASK AMBASSADOR CHAMBERLIN TO FOLLOW UP- WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF ASAP. UNCLASSIFIED

11. (S)

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY [REDACTED] INSISTED THAT
THE USG WOULD NEED THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN'S ANSWER
BEFORE WE COULD MOVE FURTHER.
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