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Authority NND 969000  
By WDB NARA Date: 1/23/77

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5913  
USMISSION USUN 162

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW  
 Retain class'n  Change/classify to  
 Declassify with concurrence of STAFF VLS  
E.O. 11956, 11958, 11961  
APPROVED by [Signature] Date: 3/14/98  
Withdrawal No. 111-31

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S E C R E T ANKARA 1571

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
SUBJECT: ABM - UK VIEWS

1. DENIS HEALEY EVIDENTLY CAME TO ANKARA WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK ROUGHLY TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA ABOUT US DECISION TO DEPLOY THIN ABM SYSTEM. HE CARRIED OUT THIS INTENTION IN LIVING COLOR IN BILATERAL SESSION WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA (BROADBENT, WARNKE AND CLEVELAND ALSO PRESENT), BEFORE MORNING SESSION OF NPG SEPT 28. SECDEF WITH EQUAL VIGOR COMPLAINED ABOUT OFFICIAL AND INSPIRED COMMENTS COMING OUT OF LONDON. LATER IN DAY, WHEN NPG TOOK UP ABM QUESTION, HEALEY SERVED AS CHIEF CROSS EXAMINER IN BRINGING OUT ISSUES OF LOGIC AND STRATEGY IN US DECISION, BUT COMPLAINED ONLY GENTLY ABOUT US DECISION HAVING BEEN MADE PRIOR TO NPG MEETING, AND SEEMED TO BE COLLECTING

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ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS RAISED BY HIS COLLEAGUES IN UK GOVERNMENT. NO OTHER COMPLAINTS WERE VOICED AT MEETING AND DEN TOOK, DUTCH MOD, STATED HE DISAGREED WITH HEALEY AND EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT EXTENT OF CONSULTATION.

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2. EARLY IN MORNING CONVERSATION, HEALEY REVEALINGLY SAID THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY GEORGE BROWN HAD VERY EARLY (IN A CONVERSATION WITH UNDER SECRETARY ROSTON) TAKEN "AN EMOTIONAL POSITION" ON CONSULTATION.

AND THAT HE HAD STUCK TO THAT POSITION. MCNAMARA SAID THERE WAS NO BASIS

FOR A CHARGE OF INADEQUATE CONSULTATION ON THOSE ASPECTS OF ABM QUESTION WHICH AFFECTED NATO. HE SAW NO EVIDENCE THAT NATO ALLIES WANTED TO BE CLOSELY CONSULTED AND THEREBY IDENTIFIED WITH DECISION ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED AGAINST CHINESE THREAT. HE TOLD HEALEY THAT PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO ABM DECISION COMING OUT OF LONDON MADE IT MUCH HARDER TO HELP UK ON DIFFICULT CURRENT BILATERAL ISSUES.

3. TO MCNAMARA'S COMMENT THAT ONLY NEGATIVE NOISES SEEMED TO BE COMING OUT OF LONDON, AND THAT OTHER NATO ALLIES HAD TAKEN US DECISION IN STRIDE, HEALEY REJOINED THAT EFFECTS OF DECISION WOULD BE A "SLOW FUZE" AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE MORE OBJECTION LATER. HE SAID IT WAS CERTAINLY TRUE IN LONDON THAT US DECISION TO DEPLOY ANY ABM (EVEN THOUGH EXPERTS MIGHT RECOGNIZE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THIN AND HEAVY, CHINESE AND RUSSIAN ORIENTATION) IS REGARDED AS A GRAVE NEW CHANGE IN THE SITUATION AND A FATEFUL NEW STAGE IN ARMS RACE. IF UK SUPPORT IS DESIRED, US MUST TAKE UK INTO ITS CONFIDENCE.

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4. HEALEY'S MAIN POINT OF SUBSTANCE WAS DOUBT THAT US ABM COULD ACCURATELY BE DESCRIBED AS ESSENTIALLY ANTI-CHINESE DEPLOYMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT MCNAMARA'S SPEECH MENTIONED ACCIDENTAL WAR AND PROTECTION OF MINUTEMAN AS OTHER MOTIVES. HEALEY ALSO REPEATED WHAT EMBASSY LONDON EARLIER REPORTED, THAT HE THOUGHT THAT PART OF SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH DEALING WITH CHINESE DEPLOYMENT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL LOGIC OF THE REST OF THE SPEECH, WITH WHICH HE BROADLY AGREED. HE THUS WAS NOT HIMSELF CONVINCED THAT THE DECISION ITSELF MADE SENSE.

5. SECRETARY MCNAMARA SAID THAT WAS A VIEW HEALEY WAS ENTITLED TO HOLD, BUT DECISION WAS THAT OF US TO MAKE, BUT IN ANY EVENT, HEALEY SHOULD NOT TELL US WE ARE NOT CONSULTING ON MATTER THAT AFFECTS RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS OR THAT ENGAGES RESPONSIBILITY

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OF NATO.

6. TO HEALEY'S POINT THAT THIS IS MAJOR TURN IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, MCNAMARA REJOINED THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT US DECISION HAS CHANGED RUSSIAN VIEWS. DISCUSSIONS AT GLASSBORO, AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, AND SECRETARY'S TALK WITH GROMYKO DID NOT SUPPORT NOTION THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY CHINESE-ORIENTED US ABM TO START NEW SPIRAL. THERE

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WAS EVEN LESS EVIDENCE THAT IT WOULD DISSUADE SOVIETS FROM DISCUSSING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. IN FACT, GROMYKO HAD TOLD SECRETARY IN NEW YORK THIS WEEK THAT AFTER SOVIET FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION BILATERAL TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT COULD WELL START.

7. IN REPLY TO HEALEY'S POINT

THAT LOGIC OF CHINESE ORIENTED ABM WAS DAMAGED BY PRESENCE IN THE PROGRAM OF SPRINT MISSILES DESIGNED TO PROTECT MINUTEMAN SITES, MCNAMARA REPLIED THAT ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT DEFINITELY DECIDED TO MAKE THAT PART OF INITIAL DEPLOYMENT.

8. TOWARD END OF CONVERSATION, SECDEF AND HEALEY DID AGREE THAT THERE WAS CLEARLY NO CASE FOR EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT OF ABM AGAINST THE RUSSIAN MISSILE THREAT, ANY MORE THAN THERE WAS IN THE US CASE. HEALEY SAID THAT THE US DECISION IN HIS OPINION SHOULD NOT AFFECT THAT CONCLUSION. HE SUGGESTED HOWEVER THAT AN "IRRATIONAL REACTION" TO THE US DEPLOYMENT MIGHT BE FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO SEEK NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. SECDEF SAID THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOVIET ABM, POSSESSION OF A SMALL NUCLEAR ARM MADE EVEN LESS SENSE THAN IT HAD PREVIOUSLY.

9. THERE WAS ONLY BRIEF REFERENCE IN THIS COLLOQUY TO EFFECT OF RUSSIAN ABMS ON VIABILITY OF UK (AND BY INFERENCE FRENCH) NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE ROLE. HEALEY ARGUED UK BELIEF THAT COMPARATIVELY SMALL OFFENSIVE FORCE WOULD STILL BE RELEVANT IF ONE ASSUMES (AS UK DOES)

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THAT ASSURED DESTRUCTION LEVEL REQUIRED FAR LESS THAN US ASSUMPTION ON POPULATION KILLED AND INDUSTRY DESTROYED. HEALEY ALSO MENTIONED ARGUMENT HE DEVELOPED MORE FULLY IN NPG MEETING-- THAT WE WERE DEMONSTRATING THAT EVEN GREAT POWER HAS TO REACT WITH MAJOR RESPONSE TO ADMITTEDLY SMALL AND UNSOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR THREAT BY SEMI-DEVELOPED COUNTRY. HEALEY SAYS THIS DEMONSTRATION MIGHT ENCOURAGE OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS IN THE BELIEF THAT A SMALL UNSOPHISTICATED THREAT COULD BE RELEVANT IN WORLD POLITICS AFTER ALL. SECDEF REJOINED THAT BY DEMONSTRATING WE COULD DEFEND EFFECTIVELY AGAINST SUCH A THREAT, WITH WHAT IS FOR US COMPARATIVELY SMALL EXPENDITURE, WE SHOW SUCH REACTION BY OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR STATES EVEN MORE IRRATIONAL THAN IT LOOKED BEFORE.

10. SECDEF HAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED THIS CABLE.

11. DEPARTMENT PASS OSD, AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY PARIS NATUS.

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