MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army Country Profile (ACP) -- Colombia (CMF), ATC-RD-2600-063-90

1. (CMF) This document provides information on the Colombian ground, counterintelligence, and security forces. It discusses ground forces' mission, composition, disposition, tactics, training, logistics, capabilities, and equipment. This document provides an evaluation of counterintelligence factors of relevance to US contingency planners and tactical force commanders.

2. (CMF) The ground forces of Colombia total about 107,000 officers and enlisted men. Although the stated mission of the Colombian ground forces is defense of the national territory, constitute the primary mission and will likely remain the primary mission into the 1990s.

3. (U) The ACP is produced in five parts. Part One is disseminated with a cover sheet and end spine for insertion into a view binder notebook. Tabs that identify the five parts are provided for inclusion in the notebook. Comments on the content and utility of this intelligence publication should be addressed to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: AIIAT--G, Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-5085.

JAMES L. SOLOMON
Colonel, MI
Commanding

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JAMES J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, MI
Commanding
Ground Forces
Department of the Army
United States Army Intelligence Agency
United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

Army Country Profile--Colombia, Part I (CNF)

Publication date: July 1990
Information cutoff date: 31 December 1989

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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Preface (U)

(U) The Army Country Profile Program (ACP) provides intelligence on a selected country and is produced in five parts, each relating a specific area of intelligence information. The ACP replaces the Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) that was produced prior to fiscal year 1990. A compilation of five parts of finished intelligence designed to support tactical commanders and contingency planners, the ACP is useful both for real-world situations and tactical training. Part I of the product will be disseminated with a cover sheet, end spine, commander's memorandum, and tab sheets that will identify each part. Commands may receive a Part II or Part III prior to Part I. In that event, file the part received in a three-ring binder; the other parts will be sent out as soon as completed.

(U) Part I, Ground Forces, describes the ground forces components in the various armed forces of the country; Part II, Intelligence and Security, discusses the counterintelligence situation of the country and how this situation would effect US deployment in the country; Part III, Military Geography, addresses specific characteristics and factors of military geography; Part IV, Medical Intelligence, analyzes the environment and health factors that affect the country and that may influence US military operations; and Part V, Psychological Operations, provides psychological profile information on the country's military forces.

(U) This study, ACP—Colombia, is produced as a joint effort by the 467th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic); Dr. John A. Jackson, Jr., Latin American Branch, Regional Division, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC) (Part I); and Mr. Mike Berrey, Counterintelligence and Terrorism Division, USAITAC (Part II).

(U) Other than normal exchange with other agencies at the working level, this document has not been coordinated outside the USAITAC. Interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of the USAITAC and may be subject to modification in the light of subsequent information.

(U) Address all comments to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: AAATF, Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-5085. Requests for copies of this document or for changes in distribution requirements should be coordinated as directed in AR 381-19, Intelligence Dissemination and Product Support, February 1988.
Summary (U)

(U) The political landscape in Colombia is beset by violence from three insurgent groups, narcotics traffickers, and paramilitary death squads. The government has shown new determination in tackling these threats in recent years. Economic growth continues amid this strife, although at a slower rate. Seventy to 80 percent of the refined cocaine destined for the US is shipped from Colombia. Higher narcotics consumption rates in Colombia are also feeding violence, crime, and corruption in society. The Armed Forces and National Police are exerting larger roles in combating this violence.

[Secret]

(U) The Colombian Army, as the largest service in the Armed Forces, has increased its personnel to approximately 108,000 in 1989 with plans to expand to 125,000 in the next decade. Unit training has been centralized at division level to expedite recruits to maneuver battalions that are waging the fight against the National Liberation Army, the Popular Liberation Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Medellin and Cali drug cartels. The Army has lately assumed a larger role in counternarcotics campaigns, formerly the province of the National Police. Although the Colombian Army would be a weak force in a high-intensity conflict and a marginal one in mid-intensity conflicts, this force is becoming increasingly proficient in fighting low-intensity conflicts. The Colombian Army relies heavily on the US and Western Europe for training, doctrine, tactics, and equipment.

[Secret]

(U) Although the Colombian National Police's primary mission is general law enforcement, it has become increasingly efficient in counternarcotics. They have recently formed units to complement the Colombian Army's counterguerrilla companies to establish a formidable force against both insurgencies and the drug cartels. The National Police are receiving better training, communications gear, and aircraft to improve their capabilities.

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<td>Admiral</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
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<td>marine infantry battalion</td>
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<td>battalion</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>BRIC1</td>
<td>20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade</td>
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<td>CAEM</td>
<td>General Officer Course</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Special Armed Corps aka Elite Corps</td>
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<td>(Cuerpo Armado Especial)</td>
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<td>CEM</td>
<td>General Staff Course</td>
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<td>CEMO</td>
<td>Military Operations/Strategy Course</td>
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<td>commanding general/counterguerrilla</td>
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<td>Strategic Intelligence Course</td>
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)
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D

D-2  Armed Forces Joint General Staff Intelligence Section
(Departamento de Inteligencia del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas)

DAN  Directorate of Antinarcotics

DAS  Department of Administrative Security
(Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad)

DDB  Department of Defense Bulletin

DEA  Drug Enforcement Agency

DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency

DK  Denmark

direct support

E

E-2  National Army Intelligence Section
(Departamento de Inteligencia del Ejercito Nacional)

ELN  National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional)

EMA-2  Air Force Intelligence Section
(Departamento de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Area de Colombia)

EMAVI  Military Aviation School (Escuela Militar de Aviacion)

EPL  Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion)

F

F-2  National Police Intelligence Division
(Division de Investigacion Policia, Judicial, y Estadistica Criminal)

FAC  Colombian Air Force

FARC  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionario de Colombia)

FN  Fabrique Nationale

FR  France

G

GDP  gross domestic product

GEN  General

H

HRTF  (Colombian) Hostage Rescue Task Force

HUMINT  Human Intelligence
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)
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I

IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INDUMIL Military Industries (Industrias Militares)
INF  infantry
I&S  intelligence and security services

J

JIN  National Intelligence Board (Junta de Inteligencia Nacional)
JUCO Communist Party Youth Organization (Juventud Comunista)

K

kg  kilogram

L

LAW  light antitank weapon
LT  Lieutenant
LTC Lieutenant Colonel

M

M-2  Navy Intelligence Section
      (Departamento de Inteligencia de la Armada Nacional)
M-19 19th of April Movement (Movimiento de 19 Abril)
MAJ  Major
MFO  Multinational Force Operation
MG  Major General/machinegun
MH  military household
mm  millimeter
MOD  Minister of National Defense

N

NCO  noncommissioned officer
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)
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<td>operations and maintenance</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
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<td>PFC</td>
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Certain islands of the Archipelago de San Andrés y Providencia (12°00'N, 81°30'W) and the Islas de los Genoveses (9°00'N, 81°30'W) belonging to Colombia are not shown on this map.

(U) Area of Interest Map—Colombia

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Chapter 1: Recent Significant Events (U)

1-1. (U) Political

a. (U) The political future of Colombia continues to be clouded by the violent activities of guerrillas, drug traffickers, and paramilitary death squads. A major guerrilla movement, the 19th of April Movement (M-19), has negotiated a peace agreement with the government, while the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionario de Colombia—FARC) may enter into negotiations with Colombian President Barco's regime, the success of which is questionable based on the failures of such talks in previous years.

b. (U) The government of Colombia has attempted to reduce terrorism and subversion by strengthening the legal system and providing guarantees of security and economic incentives for magistrates and judicial employees. In addition, the Colombian Government hopes its increased support to the Armed Forces will improve military combat capabilities against guerrilla forces and assist the police against the drug traffickers. These new counterinsurgency efforts, however, may be futile in the absence of a cohesive strategy addressing the complete spectrum of military, political, economic, and social objectives.

1-2. (U) Economic

a. (U) Although the violence associated with guerrillas, drug traffickers, and paramilitary death squads continues to affect the social and political fabric of Colombia, prospects for economic growth in the near term are relatively good. Responding to guidance from the international financial community, the Colombian Government is attempting to control inflation by keeping a tight lid on wages. Consumption and investment in 1989 have been encouraged by Colombian commercial banks providing US$1.7 billion in new capital to the business community. The 1988 public sector deficit was smaller than expected. Acknowledging the Colombian Government's efforts to stabilize the economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank approved a new loan to finance the country's macroeconomic plan for 1989 to 1990.

b. (U) An economic slowdown in the second half of 1988, driven by a poor coffee crop and reduced oil production, caused the Colombian gross domestic product (GDP) to decrease from 5.3 percent in 1987 to 4.2 percent in 1988. Although agriculture grew by 3.6 percent in 1988, food supplies were augmented by imports. Coffee export
quotas were increased at the end of 1988, but poor weather diminished yields in the 1988 to 1989 crop year. In 1988 mineral production increased, but crude oil production fell because of guerrilla attacks on pipelines. Manufacturing growth slowed in 1988, and urban construction declined sharply.

c. (U) Exports in 1988 were affected by the decline in oil production. A 16-percent increase in imports reduced the trade surplus and also contributed to a modest deterioration of the current account. On balance, however, the economy of Colombia appears to be relatively stable.

1-3. (U) Social

a. (U) Violence has become a way of life in Colombia. Drug and politically related violence is compounded by crime engendered by rapid social change, extensive poverty, and high unemployment. Between January 1988 and March 1989, 21,000 homicides were reported.

b. (U) In recent years, organized crime syndicates have escalated the level of violence in Colombia. Paid assassins (sicarios) are hired by drug lords to murder and intimidate government authorities. This narcoterrorism has virtually paralyzed the nation's judicial system.

c. (U) For the first time, Colombia is experiencing a drug problem among the nation's youth. Since 1980 widespread use and addiction to busuca, a cheap and powerful form of cocaine, has plagued city youths.

d. (U) Socially, some bright spots in this country of 31 million include:

- A better economy than many other Latin American countries
- A 45-percent increase in funding under the National Development Plan for rural road, water, and land redistribution projects
- The discovery of a vaccine for malaria by Colombia's scientists
- An accord with the M-19 guerrilla faction announced by the government in March 1989.

1-4. (U) Drugs

a. (U) Seventy to 80 percent of the refined cocaine available in the US is shipped from Colombia. The Medellin Cartel, Colombia's principal cocaine producer, earns US$2 to 4 billion per year. With their tremendous wealth, the drug traffickers have succeeded in penetrating and corrupting nearly every important national institution.

b. (U) The police forces, military establishment, legislative bodies, key government ministries (such as the Colombia Ministry of Justice and Foreign Affairs), and the news media have all been corrupted to some degree by the drug traffickers. Those who cannot be bought or intimidated are often targeted for assassination.

c. (U) Since 1984, one Minister of Justice, one Attorney General, more than 50 judges, one presidential candidate, and at least a dozen journalists have been murdered. More than 3,000 military and police personnel have been killed or wounded fighting the narcotics traffickers. In their war against the government, the drug traffickers have entered into alliances with the guerrillas to enforce their will on opponents. For example, M-19's takeover of the Palace of Justice in November 1985 is believed to have been supported by the drug cartels.

d. (U) These alliances, however, are often temporary and uneasy. In some areas the narcotics dealers and guerrillas are at deadly odds, mainly because of economic conflicts. In this battle over the drug trade, the traffickers have been retaliating against guerrillas, killing innocent peasants accused by the traffickers of being members of such groups as the Union Patriotica, the political arm of the FARC.
e. (SBU) In August 1989, the assassination of Senator Luis Carlos Galan, the leading candidate in the 1990 presidential elections, prompted Colombian President Virgilio (Barco) Vargas to declare war on the drug cartels. Barco issued tough executive orders providing for the extradition of drug lords to the US, the seizure of their property and money, sanctions against the front men for the cartels, protection of the national judiciary, and detention of drug offenders at the discretion of the Council of Ministers. Barco's actions indicate a more aggressive and intensive governmental response to the drug cartels' influence. The drug cartels are reacting to this "war" with assassinations and bombings, and by diversifying their operations into Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. The indicators imply that the drug war will continue to escalate in scope, intensity, and violence. The US is supporting Barco's actions with material aid, support, and technical assistance.

(f) (SBU) In August 1989, US President George Bush responded to a request by Colombian President Barco by agreeing to supply $65 million in military aid in the fight against the drug cartels.

(g) (SBU) By mid-November 1989, the drug cartels appeared to have selected civilian and institutional targets. Bus and airline bombings were directed toward the civilian population to increase fear and subsequent pressure to reduce the government's interdiction of the drug trade and extradition of narcotraffickers to the US for trial.

(h) (SBU) Until the late 1980s, the Colombian Government had been reluctant to use the Army in anticocaine operations for fear of the corrupting influence of wealthy drug gangs. President Barco, under domestic and international pressure to curb the power of the Medellin Cartel, reportedly overruled the military leadership after recognizing that corruption and fear has paralyzed the police's antidrug campaign.
Chapter 2: Armed Forces Overview (U)

2-1. (U) Mission of the Armed Forces

a. (SC-ANC) Army

b. (NAV) Navy

c. (AF) Air Force

2-2. (U) Military Manpower and Mobilization

a. (U) Personnel Subject to Military Service

(1) (SC-R) Military service is compulsory for males between 18 and 49 years of age who are physically qualified. Females are not subject to military service. All males are required to register in the year following their 17th birthday. As of 1989, 8,492,315 males were between the ages of 15 and 49. Of that number, 5,774,084 were fit for military service and an additional 356,161 males reach military age each year. The conscription system is administered by three recruitment and reserve directorates, one for each service. The term of conscription varies from 12 to 24 months depending on the need of the service. The system of draft exemptions has tended to favor middle and upper income males and, therefore, is an inequitable draw on lower income males (see table 2-1).
(2) (C/NF) Several problems confront the military. Many of the conscripts are illiterate and unfamiliar with machinery. Individuals can volunteer for certain technical positions in the Air Force and Navy. While the Armed Forces experience no problems with discipline, loyalty, or morale, conscripts are not paid well compared to civilians. As a result, reenlistment rates are low.

Table 2-1. (U) Total Military Personnel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>100,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy *</td>
<td>6,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force *</td>
<td>7,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>119,694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*not ground forces

(3) (U) The Colombian Army recruiting directorate consists of five staff sections: an administrative service unit, the regular recruiting zones, one special recruiting zone, and two special districts. The mission of the directorate is to plan, direct, and control recruiting and to execute mobilization plans.

(4) (C/NF) Since the Army is the largest service, recruits have more opportunities for promotion; however, about half of the manpower consists of conscripts who have no interest in a career. Volunteers who serve the 2-year obligation of a conscript are then eligible to reenlist for 1 year for the lowest noncommissioned officer (NCO) rank and 3 years for the higher noncommissioned officer ranks.

(5) (C/NF) Noncommissioned officers in the Army are either recruited directly from the civilian sector or from conscripts in their last year of obligated service. Officers are primarily selected from the military academy. In addition, individuals in the civilian sector who possess professional and technical skills are commissioned into the noncombatant branches.

b. (U) Number of Active Duty and Active/Inactive Reserves

(1) (S/NF) Army. The Army has a total strength of 100,590 (3,596 officers, 452 Alferces [third-year academy cadets], 986 cadets, 12,114 noncommissioned officers, and 83,442 enlisted personnel) and constitute 84 percent of the total forces. In addition, the Army has approximately 4,500 civilian support personnel.

(2) (C/NF) Army Reserve. All discharged military personnel and those listed on the national military register who have not been exempted are considered to be in the reserves. The reserve is only a manpower pool. It does not have organized units and does not conduct training.

(a) (C/NF) The reserves are divided into a first and second class.

-1- (C/NF) First class reservists are cadets in military schools who have finished their first year of studies, students of secondary schools, Colombians who present proof of prior service in the armed forces of a country with whom Colombia has a standing agreement, and males between 18 and 50 years of age who have served in the Colombian military.

-2- (C/NF) Second class reservists are male citizens between 18 and 50 years of age who have not served in the Colombian military.

(b) (C/NF) The two classes of reservists are further divided into three echelons.

-1- (C/NF) The first echelon are first and second class reservists from 18 to 30 years of age.

-2- (C/NF) The second echelon, referred to as National Guards, are from 31 to 40 years of age.

-3- (C/NF) The third echelon, called Territorial Guards, are 41 to 50 years of age.

(c) (C/NF) The reserve obligation extends only to age 50, except for retired regular officers who must remain in the reserves until age
65. The reserve system for all three military services is administered by the Army's Recruitment and Mobilization Service Branch. This agency's primary emphasis is to establish complete records by category and location for all reservists since it lacks the funds, personnel, and technical capability to develop an effective reserve system.

(3) (U) Navy Reserves

(a) (C/FR) The naval reserve has about 170 officers, 7,060 petty officers, 4,140 cadets, and 4,500 recruits. The Marine Corps has about 24,700 reserve soldiers. No formal reserve training program exists except for the Merchant Marine Course at the Naval Academy. Graduates of this course serve as reserve naval officers. The Navy has no organized reserve units.

(b) (U) After 2 years of active duty, all naval personnel receive their libreta militar, a document that is proof of fulfillment of obligated military service. Colombian law requires the bearer of this document to remain in reserve status until age 55.

(4) (C/FR) Air Force Reserves. The Air Force has a total of 2,025 reservists (545 officers and 1,480 NCOs). All discharged personnel technically become members of the national reserve and would be a valuable asset since most of them occupy civilian positions related to their military specialties. The Air Force has commissioned some pilots as standby reserve second lieutenants who would be available for duty as transport pilots in an emergency.

c. (U) National Mobilization Capabilities

(1) (C/FR)

Table 2-2. (U) Army Mobilization Capacity Estimates


(2) (U) Navy Mobilization

(a) (U)

(b) (U)
2-3. (U) Order of Battle

a. (U) National Military Organization

(1) (S/P/VC) The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Colombian Armed Forces, which consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the National Police. The President exercises military authority through the Minister of National Defense, traditionally, a senior active Army general. The Minister of National Defense, in practice, exercises both operational and administrative control over the three service branches and the National Police. This power differs from the practice prevailing in most Latin American countries in which this office is purely administrative.

(2) (S/P/VC) The Army, Navy, and Air Force are separate services under a single commander of the Armed Forces, which is subordinate to the Minister of National Defense. He supervises the Armed Forces general staff, which consists of each major service branch and a staff.

(3) (U/FR) The Commander of the Armed Forces advises the Minister and the President on general defense matters, joint military operations, and military plans, programs, and budgets. The service commanders and the National Police commander, in turn, are subordinate to the Minister of National Defense and the Commander of the Armed Forces and are all located in Bogota. These organizations are similar to the US model.

(4) (S/P/VC) The Supreme Council of National Defense, composed of the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance and the
Commander of the Armed Forces, acts in an advisory capacity to the President and the Minister of National Defense. The Chief of the Combined General Staff acts as secretary to this council.

(5) (UNCLASSIFIED/NC) Another consultative organ is the High Military Council, which consists of the Armed Forces Commander; the Chief of the Combined General Staff; the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Military Institutes Brigade; the Director of the Staff College; and the Director of the Division of Military Industries (see figure 2-1).

b. (U) Navy

(1) (U) Command. The Commander of the Navy, who is directly subordinate to the Commander of the Armed Forces, exercises overall control of the Navy and is primarily concerned with policy matters. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Naval Infantry (Marine Corps) are subordinate to the Navy Commander. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for operational and administrative functions. He exercises direct authority over the operating forces, naval bases, stations, posts, and training headquarters from naval headquarters in Bogota. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has only staff supervision over most Marine Corps operational units.

(2) (U) Operational Forces. Operational forces are divided into four elements: the Atlantic Naval Force, the Southern Naval Force, the Pacific Naval Force, and the Eastern Riverine Force. The Atlantic Command is the most important operational command in the Colombian Navy. The Commander, Atlantic Naval Force controls all Navy vessels and Marine Corps units in the Atlantic, the Pacific (except for units assigned directly to Buenaventura Naval Base and others), and on the interior rivers in the northern two-thirds of Colombia. The Southern Naval Force, consisting of small craft, is responsible for internal security in the Amazon Basin portion of Colombia. The Pacific Naval Force consists of units assigned to the naval facilities at Buenaventura, Tumaco, Bahia Solano, and Bahia Malaga on the Pacific Coast (see figure 2-2). The Eastern Riverine Force consists of units assigned to the naval station at Puerto Careno on the Orinoco River border with Venezuela. Also, a joint command, the San Andres and Providencia Specified Command in the San Andres Archipelago, is operationally subordinate to the Atlantic Command.

(3) (U) Logistics and Equipment. The Navy's logistics system is computerized, but spare parts are virtually nonexistent. All parts are in short supply. Needed parts are frequently not stocked in sufficient quantities, a factor contributing to the low rate of operational readiness of the fleet. The condition of most ships is only fair because of maintenance deficiencies resulting from inadequate funding. Training facilities lack the necessary equipment to teach machinery repair. Table 2-4 lists the major vessels in the Colombian Navy.

Table 2-4. (U) Inventory of Major Naval Vessels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Non-Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FF (frigate)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFL (corvette)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS (submarine)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM (midget submarine)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG (patrol combatant)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Patrol-River/Roadstead Craft</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary/Fleet Support</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard/Service Craft</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) (U) Marine Corps Command. The Marine Corps is a major command within the Navy, and the Marine Corps commandant reports directly to the Navy Commander. The Marine Corps' mission is base security, commando operations, and internal security. The Corps depends on the Navy for budget support but has separate personnel and logistics (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the Marine Corps).

(5) (U) Naval Air Arm

(a) (U) The Navy trains pilots in two Piper Cherokee and one Aero Commander aircraft at a naval flight school in Cartagena. The aircraft and pilots available in Cartagena are used for limited sea rescue searches and VIP transport (see table 2-5 for naval aircraft).
Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 29
Table 2-5. (U) Inventory of Naval Aviation Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Home Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aero Commander</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cartagena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Cherokee</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cartagena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Navajo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cartagena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BO.105 Helicopters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cartagena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The operational and support commands are directly subordinate to the respective base commanders, but because of the small size of the Air Force, its commander exerts daily control over the bases and groups, leaving little initiative to the local commanders.

(1) (U) **Individual Training**

(a) (U) The Military Aviation School (Escuela Militar de Aviación—EMAVI), located at Marco Fidel Suarez Air Base in Cali, is the Air Force academy and serves as the center for basic pilot training. A personnel staff and a functional staff serve under the Academy commander. Within the personnel staff are representatives from the budget office, chaplain, legal office, base security, and public relations. The functional staff includes positions EMAVI-1 through -5 corresponding to personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and psychological operations. The operating groups, beneath the two staffs and subordinate to the Academy commander, include instruction (academy management), flight training, technical (aircraft maintenance and supply), aviation infantry (security police function), and support.

(b) (U) Table 2-6 lists the total number of aircraft in the Colombian Air Force and their principal base.

Table 2-6. (U) Aircraft Inventory of the Colombian Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Air Command No.1</td>
<td>Mirage 5, Kifir, T-37C</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>German Olano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AC-47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(Palanquero)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Air Command No. 2</td>
<td>PA-31, AT-33A, RC-33A</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Luis F. Gomez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Air Command No. 3</td>
<td>Beech B-80, PA-23, PA-32, A-37B</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ernesto Cortisso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Air Support Command</td>
<td>UH-1H, OH-6A, OH-13, U-6A, Cessna 210, Cessna 206, Cessna 402, Bell 205-AI, UH-1B, Hughes 300, Hughes 500</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Luis F. Pinto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Air Transport Command</td>
<td>C-47, Cessna 404, C-54, Arava, C-130, PA-23, PA-31, PA-32, Cessna 210, Cessna 401, Cessna 421</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Eldorado International (Bogota)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-6. (U) Aircraft Inventory of the Colombian Air Force, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Principal Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Aviation</td>
<td>Cessna 402, C-90,</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Marco Fidel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>Boeing 707, Beech B-80, Merlin IV,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Suarez (Cali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fokker F-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Material Command</td>
<td>T-34, T-41, Cessna 310</td>
<td></td>
<td>Madrid Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Air Group</td>
<td>C-47, U-6A, Bell 412</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(Bogota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tres Esquinas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Base (Tres Esquinas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>233</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIA—Air Order of Battle

(c) (S/NF) The Air Force is not fully capable of defending against a coordinated attack from a neighboring country. The Air Force has no early warning or ground controlled-intercept system and no forward air control system. Supply is a weakness in the operational readiness of some aircraft. Aircraft maintenance is barely adequate, and helicopter readiness is low. Close air support to ground units is restricted because of a shortage of ammunition and a lack of forward air controllers.

d. (S/NF) Army. The Army is the largest service in the Colombian Armed Forces. The Army Commander, headquartered in Bogota, directs and controls the major tactical units and specialized troops. Chapter 3 details the Army's mission, organization, strength, and capabilities.

e. (U) Overall Capabilities of the Armed Forces

(1) (S/NF/NC) The armed forces of Colombia are increasing their numbers and capabilities. Their goal is a 125,000-man army and expanded air force, police, and riverine forces. However, inadequacies of the security forces persist.

2-10
2-4. (U) Role of the Armed Forces in Government

(U) The Colombian Armed Forces have historically remained apolitical and have not played a dominant role in Colombian national politics. This condition is caused by an ethic of professionalism engendered by Colombian military leaders. Since the 19th century, the constitution has imposed constraints upon political activity by the military. A longstanding antimilitary attitude has permeated all levels of public opinion. Lack of a significant external military threat to Colombian sovereignty focuses the mission of the Colombian forces on internal security.

2-5. (U) Foreign Forces

(C) No foreign military forces are stationed in Colombia.
Chapter 3: Ground Forces (U)

3-1. (U) Mission

a. (S/NF) Stated.

b. (S/NF) Mission Analysis.

3-2. (U) Composition

a. (U) National-level Army Organization

   (1) (S/NF)
brigades (the 10th, 13th, and the 21st Logistics Support Brigades) or is simply a convenient terminology or administrative structure for major units in the Bogota area, directly subordinate to Army headquarters. Both the 10th and the 13th Brigades are termed "independent brigades" in Colombian Army documents. The 19th Brigade is the Corps of Cadets in the military academy.

b. Major Commands. The structure of the Colombian Army is similar to the US Army. An infantry division, composed of three brigades, disseminates letters of instruction and strategic policy guidance from Army headquarters in Bogota and is involved in the initial stages of tactical operations. An infantry brigade, composed of three infantry battalions, combat support, and combat service support battalions, is the primary tactical operations center.

c. (U) Combat Units

(1) The Army's largest tactical units are administratively created at the division level, but the bulk of the maneuver/deployments are accomplished at brigade and battalion levels. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 display a list of units and relative strength.

Table 3-1. (U) List of Colombian Ground Force Units (battalion-size and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Divisions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Brigades</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Battalions</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Infantry</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Infantry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Cavalry</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Cavalry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Light Reconnaissance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Engineer</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2. (U) Strength of Major Tactical Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Tactical Units</th>
<th>Average Strength Per Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions (4)</td>
<td>24,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigades (14)</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions (66)</td>
<td>1,100 tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain Infantry (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Infantry (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Infantry (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Cavalry (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Cavalry (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transportable Light Reconnaissance (1)</td>
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<td>Battalions (23)</td>
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<td>Mechanized Cavalry (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service (1)</td>
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<td>Air Transportable Service (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction (1)</td>
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<td>Engineers (2)</td>
<td>850</td>
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<td>Supply (1)</td>
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<td>Maintenance (1)</td>
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Quartermaster (1)
Transportation (1)
School Battalions (9)

Army Troops
Training Brigade (1) no further information

Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Bde 500
Intelligence Battalions (4) 125
Construction Engineer Battalion 400
Infantry Battalion with MFO Sinai 600

(2) (U) Infantry

(a) (U) Division

-1- (S/P) Brigade Organization.
The Colombian Army has infantry brigades, a
mechanized infantry brigade, an engineering bri-
gade, and a logistics brigade.

-1- (S/P) Infantry Brigade. An
infantry brigade is composed of three infantry
maneuver battalions, one mechanized cavalry group,
one artillery battalion, one military police battalion,
one engineer battalion, and one service battalion.
Each brigade also contains a counterinsurgency
battalion that is composed of volunteers. These
volunteers are soldiers who have completed their
2-year conscription and are immediately processed
into the reserves. The following brigade discussions
are arranged by their divisional subordination where
information is available. (An infantry brigade basic
organization is also shown in figure 3-6.)

-2- (S/P) 4th Infantry Brigade.
This brigade, subordinate to the 1st Infantry
Division, is responsible for counterinsurgency and
civic action operations for the Departments of
Antioquia and Cordoba in northern Colombia. The
4th Brigade has conducted counternarcotics cam-
panions in the Medellin area since mid-1988.

-3- (S/P) 11th Infantry Brigade.
On 1 January 1987, the 11th Operational Command
became the 11th Brigade of the 1st Division, located
in Monteria, Cordoba Department. Currently, a
Special Operations Command is operating in the
Putumayo Department, composed mostly of units
from the 3d Brigade and the Engineer Battalion of
the Army. The heaviest concentration of battalion-
size units and the most extensive operations are in
the area of the Medio Magdalena (middle Magda-
lena River Valley), the northwest sector of the
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☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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department of Antioquia, and the departments of Meta, Caqueta, Atracua, and Putumayo. Although some units have been moved to the border with Venezuela, deployment of military forces remains primarily for internal security.

-4- (U) 1st Infantry Brigade.
Public order and counterinsurgency operations are the primary missions for the 1st Infantry Brigade in western Boyaca Department. This brigade maintains a forward command post in Puerto Boyaca where the 2d and 3d Infantry Battalions are engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

-5- (U) 5th Infantry Brigade.
The 5th Infantry Brigade is responsible for Norte de Santander Department and the northern area of Santander Department. This brigade provides security for Barrancabermeja, the oil capital of Colombia, and protects the border with Venezuela.

-6- (U) 14th Brigade. The 14th Brigade was activated in May 1983 with the main mission of counterinsurgency operations in the guerrilla-infested Magdalena Medio region. The responsibility for this area of operations had previously been divided among the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades, each of which provided an infantry battalion to the 14th Brigade.

-7- (U) 3d Infantry Brigade.
The primary missions of this brigade are public order and counterinsurgency operations in Valle de Cauca, Cauca, Narino, and Putumayo Departments. Elements of all battalions except engineer and service assets are engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Putumayo Department. The Engineer Battalion is doing construction projects, medical assistance, and military band support in Putumayo, while the military police battalion provides security in the City of Cali. The 3d Brigade has deployed a forward command post to Putumayo to control tactical operations in that area.

-8- (U) 6th Infantry Brigade.
The 6th Brigade is primarily responsible for the Tolima Department southwest of Bogota.

-9- (U) 8th Infantry Brigade.
This brigade is responsible for the departments of Caldas, Quindio, southern Choco, Risaralda, and northern Valle de Cauca. The brigade's major effort is in civic action projects in southern Choco where they have built five health posts and a school.

-10- (U) 9th Infantry Brigade.
This brigade maintains a forward tactical command post in Tres Esquinas, Cauca Department, to direct counterguerrilla operations. The FARC and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de
Liberacion Nacional–ELN) are active in this brigade's area.

-11- (S/P) 12th Infantry Brigade. This brigade's primary mission is civic action to eliminate support to insurgent groups in Cauca Department. The 12th Brigade no longer has a combat role and concentrates on education, recreation, health, and public service projects. In addition to military personnel, civilian technicians and professionals from government ministries attached to the brigade provide expertise in key areas.

(c) (S/P) Battalion. An infantry battalion organization is composed of a headquarters company, three infantry companies, a training company, and a service company. A tactical battalion organization is shown in Figure 3-7.

-1- (S/P) The 2d Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The 2d Mechanized Infantry Brigade is responsible for defending the northern tip of Colombia and its northeast frontier with Venezuela from the ELN insurgent group. This brigade is composed of the 4th Mechanized Infantry Battalion in Narino, the 6th Infantry Battalion in Cordoba, the 6th Mechanized Infantry Battalion in Cartagena, and the 2d Mechanized Cavalry Group in Rondon, as well as combat support and combat service support in the area.

-2- (S/P) The 10th Airborne Brigade. The 10th Airborne Brigade is the Army's strategic reserve. Its battalions are often sent to Bogota and other large cities, in addition to being sent to rural areas to reinforce counterguerrilla operations. This brigade covers the northern Tolima Department and southern Cundinamarca Department. Currently, a large part of the brigade is on long-term deployment, conducting counterinsurgency operations.

-3- (S/P) Rural Special Forces – (Hinos Almeida). The Rural Special Forces are trained in counterguerrilla and counterterrorist operations and operate primarily in Cauca. Unit personnel are airborne qualified, and the majority are rangers.

d. (U) Artillery and Air Defense

(1) (U) The 5th Artillery Battalion, Galan, has reorganized into a counterguerrilla force of two anti-guerrilla batteries, two field artillery batteries, and a headquarters/services battery. The Army also has five other artillery battalions throughout the country.

(2) (S/P) The mission of the Army's only air defense battalion, the 2d Air Defense Artillery Battalion, is to provide security against vandalism and sabotage to the Ecopetrol oil refining facilities. This battalion consists of four firing batteries and a training battery. The battalion trains its own recruits in three cycles each year.

e. (U) Combat Support Units

(1) (U) The 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade. The 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade is headquartered in Bogota and is composed of a headquarters section, an analysis section, a counterintelligence section, an administrative support section, a special operations section, and a psychological operations section. This brigade also has intelligence battalions in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Bucaramanga, and a counterintelligence battalion in Bogota. It supervises the Armed Forces Intelligence School (see training section in this chapter) in Bogota. Also, four companies provide the human intelligence assets for the brigade (figure 3-8).

(2) (U) Engineers

(a) (S/P) The Operational Command for the Development of La Guajira is an umbrella organization for engineer units assisting the La Guajira Department in water, road building, and other civic action projects.

(b) (S/P) The 10th Engineer Maintenance Battalion (Jose Acevedo y Gomez) is the Army's direct support (DS) engineer facility for supply and third- and fourth-echelon maintenance. This unit was involved in organizing and training three engineer battalions activated in 1983. In addition to training, supply, and maintenance responsibilities, this battalion has well-digging and asphalt capabilities in five well-digging units. It
Figure 3-7. (U) Tactical Battalion Organization

Figure 3-8. (U) 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade

* These intelligence battalions are attached to each respective Army division.
also has bridging and heavy construction equipment and sends contact teams to engineer units throughout the country.

(c) The 3d Construction Engineer Battalion (Codazzi) consists of three engineer companies and a headquarters/service company. This unit conducts medical assistance and military band support in addition to its normal civic action duties.

(d) The 12th Construction Engineer Battalion (Caborio Mejia) is the centerpiece of the 12th Infantry Brigade and is responsible for constructing roads, sewers, bridges, airstrips, schools, and health centers. It also supplies potable water.

f. Combat Service Support

Units. The 21st Logistics Support Brigade controls the logistics support elements of the Colombian Army. This brigade consists of transportation, supply, maintenance, and quartermaster battalions scattered throughout Bogota.

3-3. (U) Disposition

a. (U) Class of Ground Units and Strength. Table 3-2 presents the average strength of the major tactical units of the Colombian Army.

b. (U) Patterns of Deployment and Location. Although some units normally are in the field in operations against guerrilla bands, Colombian military units are assigned to fixed garrisons in populated areas throughout the country. Special operational commands (Comandos Operativos) are formed to combat rural guerrilla elements. Units are attached and detached to the operational commands as required. A 12th Operational Command was redesignated in March 1985 as the Army's 12th Brigade. The brigade area of operations coincides with the Caqueta Department boundaries. The unit's mission is fighting the narco-insurgents while building regional schools and roads. The unit provides basic education and health care in an area where few government services are available. Caqueta is a coca-producing area, heavily infiltrated with drug traffickers. The new brigade routinely supports the National Police in antinarcotics operations against small coca-paste labs and in airfield denial operations. The brigade headquarters remains at the departmental capital, Florencia. As resources become available, similar units will be created in other regions of high guerrilla activity (see figure 3-9 for a ground forces disposition map and table 3-3 for ground force installations).

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<td>Army HQs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bogota National Army HQs</td>
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<td>Santa Marta HQ and Barracks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bucaramanga HQ and BKS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Infantry Division</td>
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<td>Cali HQ and Barracks</td>
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Page(s) 44
• Develop training programs for counter-guerrilla battalions

• Develop combat intelligence training programs for tactical units

• Develop combat operations plans that will permit the Army to begin and maintain the initiative in the battle against guerrilla, terrorist, criminal, and narco-trafficking

• Develop a logistical support plan aimed primarily at maneuver units to allow them to
  -- Develop training programs without limitations in critical material and equipment, especially munitions and field rations
  -- Develop communications down to squad level
  -- Develop combat operations with sufficient air and land mobility assets
  -- Reach a level of self-sufficiency in combat operations at company and battalion level in the areas of munitions, field rations, and combat equipment
  -- Provide counterguerrilla battalions with the arms and equipment necessary to achieve maximum combat power, mobility, and shock action
  -- Increase the number of instructors for each division.

3-7. (U) Logistics

a. (U) Budget

(1) (CD) The budget for the Colombian military is approved and controlled by the national government. Procurement of new weapons and equipment must be approved by the national government. The budget projections are submitted 2 years in advance. Once the budget is approved, the Budget Act must be issued prior to 20 November of each year and the Liquidation Decree must be issued before 20 December each year.

(2) (CD) Although amounts allocated for national defense and security for the 1988 budget have increased, the ratio of funds allocated to operations and maintenance (O&M) to actual troop strength has declined steadily. Since 1980, the O&M to troop strength ratio declined by 50 percent in US dollars. Troop effectiveness will suffer if personnel increases are not accompanied by corresponding O&M increases.

b. (CD) Rations. The Colombian military derives most of its rations from active farms on installations. The military establishes close relationships with the surrounding communities, and the unit trades services and equipment for private use in return for provisions.

c. (U) Ordnance

(1) (CD) Colombia’s annual capacity to produce material for its Army is estimated as follows: 40,000 small arms, 1,200 metric tons of small-arms ammunition, and 600 tons of larger caliber rounds. In addition, a production capability exists for antitank (AT) mines and dynamite.

(2) (CD) Colombia has a modest military development capability and has designed a new 9mm submachinegun designated the SIM-1. It uses the old San Cristobal and US M-1 carbines for conversion. The new submachinegun fires at 600
rounds per minute (rpm) using the inertia system and has a 30-round magazine; the SIM-1 weighs 3 kilograms and has an expanding metal frame stock. Industriales Militares (INDUMIL) is doing the major conversion at its General Jose Maria Cordoba plant in Soacha and has already converted 1,000 carbines to submachineguns for the National Police. Another 2,500 carbines are to be converted by 1990. INDUMIL considers the SIM-1 unsuitable for counterguerrilla operations. Conversions cost under US$100 for each weapon, and sale price of the SIM-1 is almost US$600. INDUMIL also has the capability to rebuild or modify the HKG-3 assault rifle with parts support from West Germany.

(3) (U) An effort to establish a facility to manufacture automatic military assault rifles began in late 1983. In 1984, there were indications that Ministry of National Defense officials had reduced their plans to provide for an assembly rather than a full production plant, and discussion of a full production facility was postponed.

d. (U) Foreign Procurement

(1) (U) Colombia is dependent upon foreign purchases for most of its arms and equipment; the US, Israel, and Western Europe are the principal suppliers. The Colombian Ministry of National Defense is interested in arms deals that involve a purchase of weapons and the final assembly from kits but not full manufacture. INDUMIL is in the market for 70,000 to 110,000 automatic rifles and kits and has the ultimate goal of outfitting all ground forces. The rifles under consideration are the 5.56mm Belgian Fabrique Nationale (FN) FN-C, the Swiss SIG, the Austrian STEYR, the Israeli GALIL, and the US M-16A2. Negotiations for outright purchase of rifles and kits to be assembled in Colombia will then be instituted by INDUMIL with the selected company.

(2) (U) In May 1984, Colombia purchased 9,000 GALIL 7.62mm automatic rifles from Israel. All of the GALIL rifles will be manufactured in Israel. This purchase was part of a US$50 million defense loan accord negotiated between the Colombian Government and Israel.

e. (U) Medical

(1) (U) The Army Medical Service (AMS) is commanded by the Chief of Health and is subordinate to the Logistics Department of Army headquarters. Each of the Army's tactical brigades and the Military Institutes Brigade are supported by a medical unit consisting of about 40 personnel. These units operate a dispensary or health clinic. Each combat battalion is supported by a medical unit consisting of a physician, an NCO, three to four soldiers or medics, and, occasionally, a dentist. This unit provides health care and trains personnel in first aid, preventive medicine, evacuation, and resuscitation.

(2) (U) The Armed Forces medical logistic system can meet normal peacetime requirements but cannot support mobilization or even extended field operations. Deficiencies include shortages of funds, lack of storage facilities for stockpiling, a poor distribution system, poor material maintenance capability, and rudimentary supply planning. The Army purchases expendables on an annual basis, if money is available. Brigade and battalion headquarters requisition supplies on a quarterly basis from AMS headquarters. Each battalion has limited emergency funds to purchase drugs on the local market that are not available from the army stockpile. Casualty evacuation is the responsibility of the next echelon. Each base medical unit is assigned an ambulance for evacuation of patients to larger facilities. The Director of Health of the Colombian Air Force maintains control over aeromedical evacuation. Helicopters are used to evacuate personnel to more distant locations.

(3) (U) The Central Military Hospital in Bogota is the principal military hospital and one of the best in Colombia. This hospital can handle most acute medical cases. Other recommended hospitals are the National Police hospital in Bogota and the Naval Hospital in Cartagena.

f. (U) Maintenance and Repair

(1) (U) Maintenance and repair of vehicles are difficult because procurement of spare parts and resupply is a major problem. Lack of funds and a functional procurement system continually hampers maintaining sufficient parts.
needed for repairs and normal maintenance. Vehicles are deadlined for months at a time because of the unavailability of repair parts. Cannibalization of several vehicles or pieces of equipment is done out of absolute necessity. Since there is a lack of organization for resupply, the units in the field remain in a state of disrepair until new methods can be implemented.

(2) (U) The Colombian Army provides inadequate training for maintenance personnel. The number of trained maintenance personnel is dwarfed by the number of personnel required to fulfill the mission. These trained maintenance battalion personnel are unable to perform their assigned duties because of the lack of tools, spare parts, training manuals, and lubrication orders. Personnel cannot retrieve vehicles disabled in the field since the maintenance battalion does not possess or maintain recovery vehicles.

g. (U) Civilian Defense Installations

(1) (U) INDUMIL, founded in 1954, has as its basic mission the formulation of general Colombian Government policies concerning the import, manufacture, and sale of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Within that context, INDUMIL operates manufacturing plants to produce weapons and related material for the Colombian Armed Forces. INDUMIL's 1984 operating budget was 4,150 billion pesos. The firm operates three well-equipped manufacturing plants that were designed by European firms and located in the Bogota area. INDUMIL has 31 retail outlets with a total work force of over 1,300 personnel. Current manufacturing capability is as follows:

- Fabrica General Jose Maria Cordoba, established in 1955 at Soacha, manufactures shotguns and small arms ammunition.

- Fabrica Antonio Ricaurt, established in 1963 at Sibate, manufactures military and industrial explosives. Approximately 70,000 metric tons have been produced over a 17-year period. A new nitroglycerin plant was opened in the fall of 1982 and is possibly tied to production of double-base propellants.

- Fabrica Santa Barbara, established in 1955 at Sogamosa, has the capability for metal casting and laminating. Its products include ammunition casings; projectiles for mortars and field artillery; castings for railroad, auto, and mining equipment parts; and agricultural implements.

(2) (U) Future development plans include a recovery production plant, a microcasting plant for small-arms parts, a new detonating cord manufacturing facility, and a new military explosives production complex. The latter facility would be used to produce nitrocellulose propellants, ammonium nitrate and TNT explosives, and nitric acids. This project would increase the proportion of national components in its ammunition from 60 to 90 percent and enable INDUMIL to meet the increased demand for industrial explosives required by the Cerrejon coal mining project. When the Cerrejon project reaches full capacity, demand for explosives is expected to increase from 4,000 tons to 45,000 tons per year.

3-8. (U) Capabilities

a. (U) High-intensity Conflict

Colombia has never been involved in a high-intensity conflict, and the Armed Forces would lose the war in this conflict environment. The Colombian Army does not have any capability to fight in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment. If the Army were confronted by an invasion from a modern, well-equipped force, this service would require foreign assistance. Even with outside assistance, the Army would have difficulty contributing in such a conflict. This vulnerability is primarily because of the limited supply of major weapons systems and nuclear, biological, and chemical equipment.

b. (U) Mid-intensity Conflict

(1) (U) The Army is incapable of fighting a mid-intensity conflict of any duration and would ultimately lose such a conflict. The Army would provide a moderately effective defense against attacking forces of neighboring countries, except in the remote border regions with
Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil in the short term. The lack of armor and helicopter assets would lead to defeat. The Army is incapable of supporting extended operations without foreign assistance. While there is a border dispute with Venezuela over the offshore zones near La Guajira, negotiations are in progress, and the possibility of a mid-intensity conflict is extremely remote. The Colombian Army, however, adjusted its training to include conventional warfare, but it is neither adequately trained nor equipped for sustained field combat and could provide only a delaying action against a conventional attack by a modern force. Weaknesses include obsolescent material and shortages of NCOs and communications, transport, and field equipment. The Army has a weak logistic system, is heavily dependent on foreign purchases for most of its arms and equipment, and lacks qualified technicians in its maintenance program.

(2) (U) Readiness is uneven because each battalion must constantly employ one or two of its companies in recruit training and administrative duties. Some units with inadequate motorized transport are deployed to isolated areas. These weaknesses and limitations are aggravated by the rugged terrain in which the Army must operate. With outside logistic support, Colombia has furnished battalion-size units for international peace-keeping missions during UN operations in the Korean war, in the Gaza Strip from 1958 to 1959, and as part of the Multinational Force Operation (MFO) in the Sinai since 1982. The Army’s strengths are its combat experience and its professional officer corps.

c. (U) Low-intensity Conflict

(1) (U) Since the 1960s, intensified internal security training and substantial experience in operations against insurgents and narcotics traffickers have improved the Army’s ability to fight in a low-intensity conflict. Since the massacre at the Ministry of Justice Building in 1985, the Army has increased its campaign against insurgent groups and the narcotics traffickers. The assassination of the presidential candidate, Senator Luis Galan, resulted in a renewed campaign against these domestic threats.

(2) (U) Training and doctrine directives from GEN Nelson (Mejia) Henao, and the receipt of US equipment, yielded dramatic gains. By October 1989, the Army identified one counter-guerrilla company per division and one per brigade as its counternarcotics reaction forces.

(3) (U) The 2d and 4th Infantry Divisions launched counterguerrilla campaigns against the National Liberation Army and the Revolutionary Army of Colombia, respectively, using combined airborne and ground infantry operations, helicopter support to remote regions, and increased communications to disrupt guerrilla sanctuaries. These campaigns have resulted in a considerably higher casualty rate among the guerrillas than Army personnel. In addition, the 4th Brigade utilized urban search and destroy tactics along with a successful psychological operations campaign to disrupt narcotics assassination teams in Medellin. Although total success has been elusive, dramatic improvement is evident in the Army’s current low-intensity conflict.

3-9. (U) Key Personalities

a. GEN Oscar (Botero) Restrepo, Minister of National Defense. GEN Botero, Minister of National Defense (MOD) since July 1989, evinces the qualities of a well-trained and experienced career officer whose exceptional leadership capabilities have been recognized by the Army high command and intelligence community. Botero is extremely anti-Communist and pro-US and believes that the US should take stronger stands against Cuba and for the Nicaraguan Contras. He has been selected to hold such prestigious posts as Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Joint Staff (1980), the Presidential Military Household (1982), and Commander of the 5th Division in Bogota (1983). He has also served as Inspector General of the Army (1984), Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (1985 to 1986), Commander of the Army (1986 to 1988), and Commander of the Armed Forces (1988 to 1989).

b. GEN Nelson (Mejia) Henao, Commanding General of the Armed Forces. As the Commanding General of the Armed Forces since July 1989, GEN Mejia is expected to bring the
same aggressiveness and insistence on retraining basic military skills that he had applied to the Army. He is strongly anti-Communist and a supporter of democracy in Colombia, but is critical of Colombian civilian bureaucracy. Mejia has good relations with President Barco. Other positions he has held include Military Attaché to Argentina, director of the military academy, Commander of the 5th Brigade (Bucaramanga), and Chief of the Joint Staff.

c. (U) Major General (MG) Jesus Armando (Arias) Cabrales, Commander of the Army. MG Arias is considered a strategic thinker and planner. Although he was the officer in charge of operations during the Palace of Justice takeover by the M-19 in 1985, this appointment reflects government support and is a testament to his abilities. As Army commander, his first priority is to train 14 counterguerrilla units throughout the country. He is expected to achieve as much as his predecessor GEN Mejia in promoting training and professionalism. He is nationalistic, believes in the democratic process, and has a favorable attitude toward neighboring Latin American countries.

3-10. (U) Uniforms, Rank, Insignia, and Decorations

a. (U) Uniforms

(1) (U) Combat dress for enlisted and officer personnel consists of olive-drab camouflage uniforms with a black belt and is similar to US Army battle fatigue. A matching hat and standard black army combat boots are also worn.

(2) (U) Normal duty uniforms are khaki with a black belt. A black hat and standard black boots are worn.

(3) (U) Enlisted and officer personnel dress uniforms are green with a green shirt and a black tie. The hat is black and the standard army-shined black shoes are worn. Officers wear a full-
dress uniform of a tunic, dark trousers, a black tie, and the standard army-shined black shoes.

b. (U) Rank and Insignia. The rank structure in the Colombian Army, including both officers and enlisted personnel, consists of 17 grades, which are listed in table 3-4 along with their US Army equivalents (see figure 3-10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colombian Army</th>
<th>US Army Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragonenate</td>
<td>Basic Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldado Distinguido</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Segundo</td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Primero</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargento Segundo</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargento Vice</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primero Sargent</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargento Mayor</td>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subtiente</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teniente</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitan</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teniente Coronel</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teniente General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED

c. (U) Decorations. The following decorations indicate merit and ability and are not listed in order of importance. These decorations include the

- Cross of Boyaca
- Order of San Carlos
Figure 3-10. (U) Colombian Army Insignia
- Order of Military Merit Antonio Marino
- Order of Military Merit
- Antonio Ricaurte Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Military Merit Jose Maria de Cordoba
- Naval Merit Almirante Padilla
- Air Force Cross
- Military Order Trece de Junio As Knight
- Distinguished Public Service
- Service Medals-15, 20, 25, 30 Years

- Air Force Cross of Aeronautical Merit
- Special Medal of the Interamerican Defense College
- Rafael Reyes Medal
- Santa Barbara Medal
- Ayacucho Medal
- Star of the Public Order
- Francisco Jose de Caldas Meda
- General Rafael Reyes Medal
Chapter 4: Paramilitary Forces (U)

4-1. (U) Mission

(U) The mission of the Colombian National Police (CNP) is to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, safeguard human rights, and cooperate with the judicial branch in investigating civil crimes. The police force maintains law and order in most urban areas but is incapable of preventing terrorist attacks. The CNP can only marginally cope with existing insurgency in many rural areas. The police have primary responsibility for combating the narcotics trade. The CNP have cooperated with the military to counter the insurgents and narcotraffickers with limited success. In a national emergency, the police would be placed under military control. ACP-Colombia, Part II discusses the Department of Administrative Security (DAS)—the US Federal Bureau of Investigation equivalent.

4-2. (U) Composition

a. (U) Background

(1) (U) The CNP is subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense and consists of nine units: Police Services Branch; Personnel and Training; Administrative Branch; General Planning Staff; Inspector General’s Staff; Office of Public Relations; and three military academies. Police assignments are divided into departments relating to the principal political divisions within the country and are then further subdivided into districts, stations, substations, and police posts. The police posts usually consist of three to six men and are located in small towns and villages. Personnel in the CNP have ranks similar to military ranks and are classified as either officers, NCOs, or agents.

(2) (U) The CNP also have three specialized forces: the Carabineros, a service-oriented rural corps; the Grenaderos—this group is paramilitary in nature and provides logistic support for army counterinsurgency activities; and the Control Police (Policía de Control), the largest of the specialized forces. These three forces are trained in riot control and located in major cities. The Control Police have more than 600 men assigned to Bogota and over 150 personnel assigned to each of the 12 other major cities.

b. (U) Paramilitary Forces

(1) (C/NF) Antinarcotic Agencies. Since 1980, antinarcotics has reached parity with law enforcement as the primary responsibility of the CNP. The CNP are deployed into 23 geographic departments and 4 intendancies and can maintain
law and order in most urban areas. However, they are unable to prevent terrorist attacks and have only marginal capability to cope with insurgency in many rural areas. In late 1986, the Antinarcotics Directorate (DAN) was created and is commanded by a police general officer. The Special Antinarcotics Unit (SANU) is the operational arm of the DAN and is considered one of the best of its antinarcotics units in Latin America. Currently, the police air wing (Special Air Police—SAPOL) has a total of 43 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to accomplish its mission. Police, stationed in about half of the cities and villages, have both mounted and canine patrols.

(2) (C/FR) The Directorate of Antinarcotics. Supervision of all antinarcotics activities of the CNP is the main responsibility of the DAN. This organization has approximately 2,200 men and encompasses the SAPOL.

(a) (C/FR) The SAPOL provides airlift to all of the DAN and has a total strength of 356 personnel, including 73 officers. SAPOL also has 33 civilian contractors—5 pilots and 28 technicians. SAPOL’s 27 helicopters and 16 fixed-wing aircraft operate out of 4 bases. They have historically maintained an availability rate near 80 percent, which compares favorably with any modern air force.

(b) (C/FR) The 22-man intelligence staff performs collection, analysis, and counterintelligence functions. This intelligence staff cooperates closely with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and assists with special projects such as the annual crop survey. The DAN intelligence staff has direct control of 14 intelligence collection groups of five men each.

(c) (C/FR) The operation staff controls 15 tactical field operation companies. Each tactical company is composed of approximately 110 men and 4 officers. The antinarcotics field companies are generally led by intelligent, aggressive officers, but few of these officers have any paramilitary tactical training. The individual troops are superbly conditioned and well disciplined but have very little basic combat training. Most are deficient in marksmanship, tactical movement, land navigation, first aid, and airmobile operations.

4-3. (U) Disposition

(C/FR) The CNP are deployed in all 23 geographic departments and 4 intendancies. Figure 4-1 shows the location of CNP District Headquarters.

4-4. (U) Personnel Strength

a. (C/FR) The CNP has a total strength of approximately 89,000 personnel in 1989 and plans to expand the force to 105,000 personnel by the end of 1990.

b. (C/FR) On 15 January 1990 the second special counterguerrilla (CG) operations command of the CNP was created with operational responsibility for southern Cesar, northern Santander, Norte de Santander, and Bolivar Departments. The command headquarters is located in Aguaicha in Cesar Department. This unit consists of 300 troops selected from the CNP to include the Cuerpo Elite (Elite Counterterrorist/Counternarcotics Corps). This command deploys in three company-size units with transportation furnished by police ground or helicopter support; and has the authority to mount and execute counterguerrilla operations independent of CNP headquarters in Bogota. It coordinates all actions with the Colombian Army 1st Infantry Division in Santa Marta. This command complements the first one created in Cartago, Valle de Cauca Department. The creation of this command makes it easier for more active deployment of battalion-size units in concert with the Colombian Army against the insurgents and narcotraffickers.

c. (C/FR) A key advantage of these CNP counterguerrilla commands is that this mission arises from lack of manpower in the Army to perform the mission. The government can expand the number of troops on the CNP rolls without increasing the size of the Armed Forces and the ensuing public furor over such a move.

d. (C/FR) The troops of the 2d CG collocated with the 3d Antinarcotics Company in
Figure 4-1. (U) National Police District Headquarters
Aguachica and the 1st CG, which are within an hour of the antinarcotics company in Tula, represent a formidable force in this area of operations (see figure 4-2).

4-5. (U) Doctrine and Tactics

The doctrine and tactics taught and used by the CNP closely parallel the US Army model. Basic and advanced infantry training, patrolling, and air mobile operations are promoted as key tactical elements in the CNP's increasing counternarcotics role.

4-6. (U) Training

The CNP NCO School, Escuela de Suboficiales Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada, located on the western edge of Sabate, offers two types of courses. Each course graduates its students as second corporals (cabo segundos). One 6-month course is open to outstanding policemen with between 3 and 7 years of service. The other course lasts a year and is open to any applicant with a high school diploma. Both student groups must complete academic, physical, and medical examinations prior to acceptance (see figure 4-3).

4-7. (U) Capabilities

The CNP have dramatically increased their counternarcotics capability with additional manpower, training, equipment, and communications gear. They have also formed specialized units. The CNP has at least 5 special units, some with as many as 1,000 personnel. The CNP exercised an instrumental role in the elimination of Medellin Cartel leader Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha in December 1989. Key intelligence leads, strategic roadblocks, and tactical deployment resulted in Gacha's isolation and demise. The SAPOC of the CNP is newer and better maintained than the Colombian Air Force. Police helicopters have been instrumental in numerous counternarcotics campaigns.
4-8. (U) Key Personalities

(NF) Brigadier General (BG) Antonio (Gomez) Padilla is the director of the CNP. He has been quite aggressive in campaigns against the Medellin drug cartel; these campaigns have yielded big successes in recent years. He served as Colombian police attaché in Panama from 1980 to 1981. His education includes a Masters Degree in Education Administration from the Federal University in Brasilia, and he may also have an advanced degree in technical administration from the Superior School of Public Administration in Bogota.
Chapter 5: Ground Forces of Other Services--Marine Corps (U)

5-1. (U) Mission

Additionally, the Marines provide coastal security, oil-pipeline security, antismuggling activity, and the maintenance of public order. One battalion and a company of Colombian Army soldiers are committed to the islands of San Andres and Providencia. Colombian Marine detachments of 10 men each are stationed at Serramilla, Serrana, Bolivar, and Albuquerque. The Marine Special Forces are assigned the mission of providing hydrographic reconnaissance surveys, beach clearance, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antismuggling operations, demolition raids, and land reconnaissance.

5-2. (U) Composition

The Commander of the Marine Corps is subordinate to the Commander of the Navy and exercises staff supervision over Marine Corps operational units. The Marines, as of May 1988, are composed of 170 officers, 870 NCOs, and 4,660 enlisted personnel. These personnel are organized into one brigade consisting of three independent rifle battalions, three dependent battalions, a training battalion, and a special warfare and amphibious commando unit (see disposition map in figure 3-9 and table 5-1).

5-3. (U) Disposition

a. (CONF)

b. (CONF)

c. (CONF)
d. (SDF) The command of the COLMAR Riverine Force is still being contested by the Army and the Navy. As of November 1989, the Commander of the Navy had not succeeded in taking total control of the Riverine Forces. He has control of administrative and logistical affairs and partial operational control on the Magdalena and Putumayo Rivers. The Army has maintained control of all other riverine operational areas. The infighting between the Army and Navy is not as severe a detriment as it may seem because the Army possesses the communications capability and the operational knowledge necessary for the Riverine mission. Since the Navy does not currently have these capabilities, it is appropriate for the Army to maintain operational supervision and tasking for the Riverine Forces.

e. (SDF) The Navy has centralized command of the Riverine Forces under a lieutenant colonel, and a staff of four personnel, headquartered in Bogota. The Eastern Headquarters is in Puerto Caren and is responsible for units in Arauca, Puerto Caren, Puerto Inirida, San Jose del Guaviare, and Puerto Lopez. The Central and Western Headquarters is in Barrancabermeja and controls units that operate on the Magdalena River. The commander of Naval Forces, South, based in Puerto Leguizamo, controls units in Leticia and Puerto Leguizamo. Headquarters in Barrancabermeja and Puerto Caren reports to Bogota, but Naval Forces, South, acts independently.

f. (SDF) Each riverine combat element of the Colombian Marine Riverine Forces is composed of 1 officer, 5 NCOs, and 15 marines. These elements are intended to have one 17-foot unarmored, armed launch and four 13-foot unarmored, armed launches. In addition, a naval armored mothership is also assigned during deployments. The forces in the fluvial order of battle do not possess adequate strength to accomplish the riverine elements' mission. More river patrol boats, river gun boats, riverine 5-boat elements, and motherships are needed. However, the mothership's 9-month construction and deployment time is encouraging.

g. (SDF) The 1st Marine Corps Infantry Brigade is the most important maneuver element in the service. This brigade consists of five marine infantry battalions, a training battalion, and a special forces group of Marine infantry.

h. (SDF) The 1st Marine Battalion is located on San Andres Island with two platoons of A Company located in southern Providencia Island.
are selected for NCO ranks attend amphibious warfare school for 6 months. Proficiency in the unit is good in squad tactics. Coordination at the company and battalion levels is lacking because of too few proper training areas.

n. (SECRET) The 2d Marine Brigade and its subordinate elements are a paper organization, similar to the Colombian Army's 15th brigade, awaiting money, personnel, and equipment to make it a reality.

5-4. (U) Personnel Strength

(U) The Marine Corps has a strength of approximately 5,700 active personnel with a reserve component of approximately 25,000 soldiers. The 7 infantry battalions have an average of 450 privates, 55 NCOs, and 11 officers per battalion. The Marine Special Forces include approximately 150 troops, 20 NCOs, and 10 officers. However, because of a lack of strong NCO leadership training and abilities, the Marine Corps officers exercise direct leadership roles.

5-5. (U) Tactics

(U) The Marine Special Forces use tactics derived from US Special Warfare techniques. These tactics tend to utilize squads divided into four elements. The 4 elements are composed of a base element of 2 to 4 people, an assault element of 2 to 3 personnel, a support element of 2 to 4 men, and a security element of 2 to 3. These four elements are formed into a wedge patrol. When under fire, the base element returns fire, the assault element moves to the flank, the security element covers the rear, and the support element moves as needed. These tactics are not utilized with adequate versatility and control, resulting in limited movement against the enemy. Lack of NCO leadership and adequate training time are key difficulties encountered by the Colombian Marine Corps adoption of US tactics.
5-6. (U) Training

a. (C/FR) Marine recruits receive a 70-week course of instruction divided between basic training, counterguerrilla warfare, riverine warfare, and amphibious warfare at Covenas, Tumaco, and Puerto Leguizamo. Riverine warfare and amphibious training sections make up the difference in the length of the course of instruction offered to the Marines and the one offered to the Army. Basic training includes military orientation, weapons familiarization, and small unit tactics. The counterguerrilla warfare course includes attacks on guerrilla strongholds. The riverine segment emphasizes boat handling, communications, ambush tactics, and water survival.

b. (C/FR) Special warfare training is conducted in Cartagena, consisting of 16 weeks of open-circuit scuba, small arms, demolitions, field craft, unit tactics, and physical conditioning. Advanced Special Forces training includes ranger training, closed-circuit scuba, and parachute training. All career personnel (officers and enlisted) attend the Army's Lanceros School at Melgar. NCO training is very limited. NCOs are selected during their last 2 years of enlistment and are given minimal leadership courses.

c. (C/FR) A major initiative in the overhaul of training is the consolidation of all recruit training in one centralized, secure location, rather than the current three centers, to emphasize riverine operations.

5-7. (U) Logistics

(C/FR) Lack of funds, lack of an adequate logistic system, and shortage of spare parts contribute to a low level of materiel readiness. Short-term actions against a poorly organized enemy are not impaired, but long-term actions against a well-organized enemy will cause the Marine Corps' logistic capabilities to break down.

5-8. (U) Capabilities

a. (SFR) Dispersal of mobilized Marine Corps units will be impaired by a shortage of funds, vehicles, communications equipment, and spare parts.

b. (SFR) There are allegations that some Marine Corps officer have been compromised by narcotraffickers.

c. (SFR) Current capabilities of the Marine Corps are restricted. The Marines are effective, however, in providing security for the bases and, to a lesser extent, the petroleum pipelines. Amphibious capabilities and counterinsurgency needs are adequate on a short-term, local basis.

5-9. (U) Key Personalities

a. (U) Vice Admiral Jose Edgar Garay Rubio, Commander of the Navy. Commander of the Navy since November 1989, Admiral Garay is considered competent and intelligent. He has extensive submarine experience and served as Submarine Flotilla Commander from 1978 to 1979. He has also had experience in operations and finance. Prior to his current assignment, Admiral Garay served as Commander of the Naval Forces Atlantic from 1984 to 1986, Inspector General from 1986 to 1988, and as Chief of Naval Operations from 1988 to 1989. He is anti-Communist and pro-West, but not necessarily pro-US. He believes in civilian democratic government and supports the Barco administration.

b. (C/FR) Rear Admiral Roberto Serrano Avila, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Since Admiral Serrano assumed his current position in July 1989, he has become disillusioned with the readiness of the Marine Corps. Dynamic, outspoken, and success-oriented, he is considered one of the nation's finest naval officers and one of the few with an enlisted background.
Admiral Serrano has ambitious plans for the service and is expected to get more deeply involved in the counternarcotics effort, especially in the riverine campaign. He is anti-Communist and pro-US and respects democratic values more than institutions. Admiral Serrano will hold the commandant position until the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps, COL Octavio (Gnecco) Iglesias, completes his promotion course and is promoted to brigadier general in December 1990. Prior to his current assignment, Admiral Serrano was Commander of the San Andres and Providencia Specified Command.

Table 5-1. (U) Disposition of Colombian Marine Corps
Chapter 6: Ground Forces Reserves (U)

6-1. (U) Composition

(U) Refer to the Army reserve section in chapter 2 for discussion of the classes of military reservists, potential size of the structure, and individual obligations.

6-2. (U) Training

(U) At present, no planned active duty or familiarization training is received by reserve members of the Army and Marine Corps.

6-3. (U) Capabilities and Weaknesses

a. (U) No program exists for continued training of reserve forces, and reserve personnel do not receive familiarization training with new weapons systems.

b. (CIAF) Expansion of active forces by the call up of reserve army troops would be severely limited by shortages of officers, NCOs, and technicians. Materiel shortages in the Army are particularly acute in field artillery, modern air defense weapons, and certain types of ammunition and motor transport.

6-4. (U) Equipment

(U) Reserve Army and Marine personnel constitute a manpower pool only and there are no organized units. No equipment is provided for reserve forces use.
Chapter 7: Weapons and Equipment (U)

7-1. (U) General Discussion

a. (S/R) Equipment Condition.
Colombian Army weapons and equipment are non-standardized and generally of foreign origin. Much of the heavy and medium equipment (with the exception of artillery) is of World War II vintage, supplied by the US. COLAR equipment is in generally fair condition, but the COLAR logistics and maintenance system will not support extended, intense military operation of weapons other than small arms. Light antitank weapons (LAWs) have had very high failure rates in recent test firings and are believed to be unreliable. COLAR weapons include rifles (Israeli GALIL standard), machineguns, mortars, light artillery, light armor, and antitank rifles and rockets.

b. (S/R) Foreign Assistance.
Exclusive of assistance received from the US, Israel has been the predominant provider of foreign military assistance to Colombia for the past 5 years. Major ground force weapons purchases from Israel in this period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Value ($US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>60,000 GALIL 7.62mm rifles, 160 tons of grenades, small arms ammunition and mortars</td>
<td>Cost: US$5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Communications equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>EAGLE EYE 40mm air defense system with electronics upgrade</td>
<td>Cost: US$6.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>NIMROD antitank system (2 batteries of 3 launchers with 6 missiles per launcher, including training in Israel)</td>
<td>Cost: US$13 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost: US$18 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. (S/F) Small Arms. The standard weapon for infantry units is the Israeli GALIL 7.62mm assault rifle. COLAR still has some units using G3A3 7.62mm assault rifles made in Germany, but the G3A3 is being phased out. Submachineguns include the US-made M-3 and Thompson .45 caliber models, the German MP5 9mm model and the Danish Madsen 9mm model. The machinegun inventory includes the US-made Browning .30-caliber model and the M2 .50 caliber model; there is also a 7.62mm heavy machinegun that is very effective. The predominant pistol is the .38-caliber model, followed by the 9mm and .45-caliber models, respectively.

d. (S/F) Infantry Antitank Weapons. The Colombian Army has a limited antitank capability, relying on the US-made 66mm M72 LAW. The LAW is effective against armored personnel carriers (APC) and fortifications but is marginal against main battle tanks.

e. (S/F) Mortars. The Army’s inventory of mortars includes the US-made 60mm and 81mm and the French produced Brandt 81mm models.

f. (S/F) Air Defense Weapons. Key air defense weapons in the Colombian inventory include the US-made .50-caliber machinegun, the 37mm ADA gun and the 40mm ADA gun. These weapons also serve as additions to the M113A1 APC.

g. (S/F) Artillery. The primary artillery piece for the Colombian Army is the US-made 105mm howitzer along with old 75mm pack howitzers of Czechoslovakian (CZ) manufacture.

h. (U) Armored Combat Vehicles. The main vehicles in the Colombian inventory include the Brazilian-made Uruçu EE-11 APC, the US-made M113A1 APC, and the Brazilian-manufactured Cascavel EE-9 armored reconnaissance carrier (ARC).

i. (U) Special Purpose and Support Vehicles. The Colombian ground and paramilitary forces have a large number of trucks, jeeps, and other special-purpose vehicles manufactured primarily in the US and Western Europe but obtaining accurate numbers in this category is extremely difficult because of the fluid counterinsurgency and counternarcotics campaign.

(j) (S/F) Airborne Capabilities. In 1988 Colombia upgraded airborne capability with the purchase of 623 new T10 parachutes to supplement the approximately 1,000 parachutes on hand that are in poor condition. In December 1989, Argentina donated three Pucara aircraft to the counternarcotics effort in Colombia, but NATO support packages are required for full capability.

7-2. (U) Weapons and Equipment Inventory

Table 7-1. (U) Weapons and Equipment Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item (country of manufacture)</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Small Arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinegun, M2 (US)</td>
<td>.50 cal</td>
<td>346</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machinegun, Browning (US)</td>
<td>.30 cal</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, HVY (NFI)</td>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachinegun M3 (US)</td>
<td>.45 cal</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachinegun MP5 (Federal Republic)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Germany [FRG])
Submachinegun Madsen (Denmark)
Submachinegun Thompson (US)
Rifle G3A4 assault (FRG)
Rifle G3A3 assault (FRG)
Rifle G3SG1 sniper (FRG)
Pistol (US)
Pistol (US)
Pistol (US)

b. Mortars
Mortar (US)
Mortar (US)
Mortar, Brandt (France)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
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<td>9mm</td>
<td>910</td>
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<td>9mm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 cal</td>
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<td>7.62mm</td>
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<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW (US)</td>
<td>66mm</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher (US)</td>
<td>3.5 inches</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifles (NFI)(US)</td>
<td>106mm</td>
<td>69</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, Pack (CZ)</td>
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g. Special Purpose and Support Vehicles

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<td>3/4-ton truck, NFI</td>
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<td>2 1/2-ton truck, NFI</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-ton truck, NFI</td>
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7-3. (U) Projected Changes in Inventory

(U) COLAR is currently in the final phases of acquiring two major weapons systems from Israel.

7-3
control capabilities that it provides to the air defense artillery battalion.

b. (SECRET) NIMROD. The second system is the NIMROD antitank missile system, composed of a launcher, a fire control center, the munitions, and a laser designator for missile guidance. The range of the missile is 26 kilometers. COLAR has one 4-tube launcher mounted on an M115 five-quarter-ton truck and eight systems of this variety were ordered. This equipment will be assigned to La Popa and Galan Battalions. Operator/crew training is being conducted in Israel. The deal apparently does not include a support/spare parts package. The NIMROD system will give COLAR a long-range antitank capability to complement current tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) weapons.
Chapter 8: Intelligence Gaps (U)

(U) Chapter 3, Ground Forces

Paragraph 3-6b. Specific information is lacking about the training courses at the NCO academy. This information would give a more complete picture of NCO training requirements.

Paragraph 3-7. Information is lacking on the current fuel requirements for the Colombian Ground Forces and what entity provides it. These data are crucial for predicting the readiness of the armed forces.

Paragraph 3-10c. Information is lacking on requirements to receive decorations. Although a list of decorations is provided, length of service, combat/non-combat experience and other factors are needed to fulfill this shortfall.

(U) Chapter 4, Paramilitary Forces

Paragraph 4-5. Information is sketchy on the latest doctrine and tactics used by the CNP in the counternarcotics campaign. Data should be available to fill this key gap in the current increase in manpower and missions accorded to the CNP.

Paragraph 4-6. Information is incomplete on the training courses for both enlisted men and officers as well as key centers and schools for the CNP. These data are valuable for understanding the increased missions, tactics, and professionalism required for the counternarcotics and law enforcement roles.

Paragraph 4-7. Information is lacking on the logistics support agencies for rations, fuel, ordnance, medical services, and transportation for the CNP. These data are necessary for tracking support for the paramilitary role of this police force.

Paragraph 4-10. Information is lacking on the uniforms, rank, and insignia for the CNP. Data are required to not only describe the uniforms but to note any similarities with the Army.

(U) Chapter 5, Ground Forces of Other Services--Marine Corps

Paragraph 5-2. Information is unavailable for the 3d Marine Infantry Battalion and its subordinate units and the prospects for making the 2d Marine Brigade a reality. These data would provide a more complete order-of-battle information for the Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR).

Paragraph 5-10. Information is lacking on the uniforms, rank, and insignia for the COLMAR. These data are required not only to describe the uniforms but to note any similarities with the Navy.
(U) Chapter 7, Weapons and Equipment

Paragraph 7-2. Information is incomplete on the Colombian Ground Force equipment. Data would provide an updated equipment list for ground and military forces to keep up with the expansion of the force structure to meet insurgent and narcotrafficer threats.
Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):
  - It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.
  - Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
  - Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
  - Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 69-77

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1 Sep 93
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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (2)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

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Part II

Counterintelligence and Security
Department of the Army
United States Army Intelligence Agency
United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

Army Country Profile--Colombia, Part II (C/NF)

Publication date:
Information cutoff date: 31 December 1989

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Summary (U)

(SAF/WN) Colombia's intelligence and security service is divided among three different organizations: the Ministry of National Defense (MOD), the Colombian National Police (CNP), and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS). The military intelligence services and the 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade are subordinate to the MOD; the CNP has dramatically expanded their mission and force structure to combat the narcotrafficker threat to the nation; and the DAS is the primary civilian security service, equivalent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, which shares the responsibility for domestic intelligence with the Army and the CNP.

(SAF/WN) Other intelligence and security service units include the Military Household, a semi-autonomous unit that has the responsibility of protecting the President and his family, and the Hostage Rescue Task Force, which is a multiservice military organization tasked with the rescue of hostages as a result of terrorist actions. Although the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea maintain embassies in Colombia, the signals intelligence and imagery intelligence threat to US interests are low.

(UNF) Colombia has a tradition of democratic civilian governments and efficient management of the national economy amid a history of politically related violence. Although the external threat to Colombia is minimal, the domestic threats from insurgent groups and narcotrafficker cartels have become more violent and protracted.

(UNF) The Colombian Government is increasing security to protect US personnel and interests during the campaign against narcotrafficking. Training and security assistance are the primary US military support roles to the Colombian ground forces and the CNP. US troops would be deployed to Colombia only at the request of the Colombian Government. Such troops may be an augmentation to a UN or Organization of American States task force.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

B
BRICI  20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade
       (Brigada Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia)

C
CAE    Special Armed Corps (Cuerpo Armado Especial)
CNP    Colombian National Police
COLAF  Colombian Air Force
COLAR  Colombian Army
COLNAV Colombian Navy
CSTC   Colombian Workers Trade Union Confederation
       (Confederacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia)

D
D-2    Armed Forces Joint General Staff Intelligence Section
       (Departamento de Inteligencia del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas)
DAN    Directorate of Antinarcotics
DAS    Department of Administrative Security
       (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad)
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
DDB    Department of Defense Bulletin

E
E-2    National Army Intelligence Section
       (Departamento de Inteligencia del Ejercito Nacional)
ELINT  Electronic Intelligence
ELN    National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional)
EMA-2  Air Force Intelligence Section (Departamento de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Area de
       Colombia)
EPL    Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion)

F
F-2    National Police Intelligence Division (Division de Investigacion Policia, Judicial, y
       Estadistica Criminal)
FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
       (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionario de Colombia)
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

H

HRTF (Colombian) Hostage Rescue Task Force
HUMINT Human Intelligence

I

IMINT Imagery Intelligence
I&SS Intelligence and security services

J

JIN National Intelligence Board (Junta de Inteligencia Nacional)
JUCO Communist Party Youth Organization (Juventud Comunista)

M

M-2 Navy Intelligence Section (Departamento de Inteligencia de la Armada Nacional)
M-19 19th of April Movement (Movimiento de 19 Abril)
MH military household

O

OAS Organization of American States

P

PCC Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano)
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC People's Republic of China
PSS Personal Security Service
PSYOPS psychological operations

R

RIPOL international radio net

S

SG security group
SIGINT Signals Intelligence

U

UP Patriotic Union (Union Patriota)
List of Place Names (U)
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NOTE: The reverse side of this page is blank.
Chapter 9: Colombia's Intelligence and Security Services (U)

9-1. (U) Structure and Mission

a. (U) Colombia's intelligence and security apparatus is divided among three different organizations: the Ministry of National Defense, the Colombian National Police (CNP), and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS). All military intelligence services, including the intelligence directorate of the CNP, are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. The DAS shares with the Army and CNP the responsibility for domestic intelligence. The DAS is a semi-autonomous organization under the jurisdiction of the President. The DAS collects, investigates, and acts on information related to national security. The DAS is equivalent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in that it is chartered to collect intelligence, protect citizens, maintain public order, and provide the general national security (see figures 9-1 and 9-2).

b. (SU) The CNP, a volunteer force with more than 39,000 members, constitutes the uniformed civilian service of the Colombian Armed Forces. It is headquartered in Bogota, with departmental headquarters and subordinate districts located throughout the country. The CNP Director is a general officer subordinate to the Minister of National Defense. The police are placed under military control for joint operations and during periods of national emergency. The CNP is responsible for law enforcement and is functionally organized by mission into specialties ranging from antiguerrilla to railway police. The service has three specialized forces: the Carabineros, a service-oriented rural corps; the Grenaderos, a counterinsurgency corps; and designated riot control units stationed in major cities. The CNP became the principal drug enforcement agency in 1980.

9-2. (U) Intelligence and Security Services

a. (U) Military

1. (SU) The National Intelligence Board (Junta de Inteligencia Nacional—JIN) is composed of the military intelligence chiefs, the CNP Intelligence Chief, and the Chief of the DAS. This board is reportedly paralleled by similar regional boards throughout the country. The JIN is responsible to the Minister of National Defense and is
nominally supervised by the National Security Council, a cabinet-level council including the President. JIN representatives reportedly exchange information routinely and meet weekly to disseminate intelligence, update requirements, and coordinate activities.

(2) The Armed Forces Joint General Staff Intelligence Section (D-2) (Departamento de Inteligencia del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas) is responsible for supervising all Colombian military intelligence services. The D-2 plans, coordinates, produces, and disseminates intelligence among the three military services. The D-2 also collects external intelligence, as it is responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence pertinent to countries that are considered strategically important to Colombia. These countries include Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras.

(3) The National Army Intelligence Section (E-2) (Departamento de Inteligencia del Ejercito Nacional) is the principal military
Figure 9-2. (U) Organization of the Administrative Department of Security
organization responsible for intelligence collection and analysis for the Colombian Army. In addition to counterintelligence, the E-2 is responsible for countersubversion, cryptography, fingerprint identification, and military and civilian security.

(4) (U) The Air Force Intelligence Section (EMA-2) (Departamento de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Aérea de Colombia) is responsible for providing aerial surveillance of coastal and border regions to detect contraband and illegal arms shipments. The EMA-2 also provides security to Air Force personnel and materiel.

(5) (U) The Navy Intelligence Section (M-2) (Departamento de Inteligencia de la Armada Nacional) controls contraband and arms entering Colombia from port areas of neighboring countries. The M-2 also monitors the social and political activities in Colombian ports.

(6) (U) The 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade

(a) The Colombian Army's (COLAR) 20th Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade (Brigada Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia—BRICI) consists of four intelligence battalions, one in support of each COLAR division. Each intelligence battalion has three collection companies, one in support of each brigade in the division. The BRICI has one counterintelligence battalion.

(b) (U) Authorized personnel strength for the BRICI is 83 officers, 312 noncommissioned officers (NCO), 95 enlisted personnel, and 350 civilians. Each collection company has 3 officers, 9 NCOs, and 15 civilians. The COLAR intelligence school is a subordinate unit of the 20th BRICI. The school is authorized 12 officers, 16 NCOs, and 7 civilians. The school staff is augmented with one petty officer from the Colombian Navy (COLNAV), two officers from the Colombian Air Force (COLAF), and one officer and one NCO from the CNP.

(c) (U) The 20th BRICI is fundamentally designed for covert operations. All personnel work undercover and in civilian clothes. The intelligence battalion commanders maintain contact only with the division commanders and the division S-2s.

b. (U) Colombian National Police

(1) (U) The National Police Intelligence Division. The National Police Intelligence Division (F-2) (División de Investigación Policia, Judicial, y Estadística Criminal) shares responsibility for intelligence on internal security with DAS and military intelligence branches.

(2) (U) Directorate of Antinarcotics

(a) The Directorate of Antinarcotics (DAN) is commanded by a brigadier general, a colonel as deputy, and a small headquarters staff. Prior to the August 1989 Colombian narcotics campaign, the DAN received approximately US$9.5 million in training and materiel from the US each year. All staff functions (intelligence, administration and logistics, and operations) are conducted by a 64-man staff (see chapter 3 for additional information).

(b) The intelligence staff performs collection, analysis, and counterintelligence functions with 22 men. The intelligence staff cooperates closely with the US embassy. The DAN intelligence staff has direct control of 14 intelligence collection groups of 5 men each. These are located in Bogota, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Valledupar, Santa Marta, Medellin, Armenia, Cali, Buenaventura, Florencia, Leticia, San Andres, Apartado, and Tumaco.

(c) The DAN logistics staff performs all logistic, administrative, and personnel functions. They also have communications responsibility for one international radio net (RIPOL) as well as national-level tactical nets with field units. Logistics continues to be a major shortcoming of the DAN as it is the least prestigious and least efficient of staff functions.

(d) The operations staff controls 15 tactical field companies, develops plans for field operations such as lab raids, and directs eradication efforts. Each tactical company consists of approximately 100 men and 4 officers—the majority of whom are high-caliber national service con-
national zones under the command of a major, are located in Santa Marta, Rio Hacha, Uribe, Valledupar, Turbo, Apartado, Villavicencio, San Jose del Guaviare, Miraflorres, Florencia, Puerto Asis, Pasto, Popayan, Tulua, and La Florida (see figure 9-3).

(3) (U) The Elite Corps. The Special Armed Corps (Cuerpo Armado EsPECIAL—CAE) of the CNP was established on 19 April 1989 and is more commonly referred to as the Elite Corps. The group was originally formed with 250 qualified policemen and given the responsibility for combatting the armed elements of the drug cartels. The CAE has been expanded to approximately 1,000 members. The CAE was responsible for the December 1989 operation that resulted in the death of Medellin Cartel kingpin Jose GonzaI Rodriguez Gacha.

c. (U) Department of Administrative Security

(1) (S/NF) The DAS is the primary civilian security service that investigates offenses against the security of the state and other crimes of national importance. It also controls immigration and movement of aliens within Colombia. DAS internal functions include suppressing subversion, surveilling foreign officials and visitors, investigating crimes against the public administration, and controlling foreign residents.

(2) (U) According to open source reporting, DAS Director General Maza announced the reorganization of the DAS in May 1987 and created security, antiterrorist, and antieexplosives special commands as well as intelligence centers in Cali, Cucuta, Medellin, and Bogota. The Intelligence Directorate of the DAS is responsible for political, social, and economic strategies that the guerrillas target.

(3) (S/NF) The Division of Protection of the DAS protects all persons designated by the Colombian Government, including the President. Although the DAS is tasked with providing all official protective services, the demand outpaces the agency's capabilities. As a result, the CNP also provides a large share of VIP protective services. The DAS was constitutionally respon-

sible for providing the inner ring for presidential protection until 1982 when then-President Bentacur assigned this function to the Military Household (MH).

(4) (S/NF) Security detail principals (dignitaries) have refused to let protective operations interfere with their lifestyle or convenience and, therefore, have had a negative effect on the DAS's Personal Security Service (PSS).

(5) (S/NF) While the DAS is a major producer of intelligence, the Division of Protection created its own intelligence section in the fall of 1989. The Division of Protection is barely functional because its office was nearly destroyed in the December 1989 bombing of DAS headquarters. This division provides little formal intelligence or terrorist surveillance information regarding government officials.

d. (U) Other Intelligence and Security Services

(1) (S/NF) In mid-January 1990 the Ministry of National Defense created a new personal protection unit. The 81-man unit was created as a direct response to the attempted assassination of Minister of National Defense Manuel Jaime (Guerrero) Paz. The unit is designed to provide bodyguards and security to the Minister, his family, and other high-ranking officials under his command. The unit includes 1 officer as unit commander, 27 NCOs acting as bodyguards, 16 police agents, and 7 civilian drivers. A 15-man element of this unit was observed by US embassy personnel, who described the unit's performance as poor.

(2) (U) The MH, a semi-autonomous unit based at the Presidential Palace, is responsible for protecting the President and his wife, children, and grandchildren. The MH consists of two main units: presidential aides (majors from the Army, Air Force, CNP, and a lieutenant commander from the Navy) and the security group (SG) that actually protects the President. The MH commander is an Army colonel, and his deputy is an Army lieutenant colonel. They closely supervise the SG and also function as aides. The deputy supervises the three-man Presidential Protection Intelligence Unit.
(3) (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) Personnel from all three services are simply assigned to the SG. While there is no selection process, approximately a third of them have received formal protection training. The Presidential Protection Intelligence Unit is currently limited to an investigative role and has been quite successful in carrying out censuses and background investigations on the neighborhoods near the presidential residence.

(4) (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) The Colombian Hostage Rescue Task Force (HRTF) is a multiservice military organization tasked with rescuing hostages taken as a result of terrorist actions. The unit is composed of 51 enlisted and NCO personnel and 13 officers. The breakdown consists of one element (15 NCO and 3 officers) from the Colombian Army, one from the Air Force, one from the Navy, and one from the CNP. The unit is under the command of an Army major with an Army captain as the executive officer, with a dual chain of command. The HRTF responds to the Armed Forces Commander; however, during a crisis involving hostage taking the HRTF then comes under the Joint Command and directly under the Minister of Defense. The unit is highly trained and can conduct day or night operations in any of the country’s urban environments. The HRTF is equipped with numerous vehicles that are used for both troop deployment and operations. One HRTF truck serves as a photography lab, and another serves as an audio/video surveillance post.

(5) (SECRET/NOFORN) Relationship Among Intelligence and Security Services. Liaison relationships among the various Colombian intelligence services are reportedly not good. The DAS, CNP, and the military are reluctant to share intelligence information and resources. Interservice rivalries and problems involving competition for scarce resources have led to accusations of ineptitude and corruption, with one service attempting to undermine the others.

9-3. (U) Key Personalities

a. (SECRET/NOFORN) GEN Miguel (Maza) Marquez has been Chief of the DAS since 1985. GEN Maza has had an extensive intelligence career in law enforcement. Intelligence assignments include Chief of Intelligence, Cauca Police Department, 1961-62; Chief of Intelligence, Barranquilla Police, 1964-66; Chief, F-2, CNP Headquarters, Bogota, 1979-80; CNP Attaché to Peru, 1980; Chief, F-2, CNP Headquarters, 1983; Chief, DAS, 1985 to present. GEN Maza has been described as a no-nonsense commander with a strong background in police work and intelligence. He is apolitical, by nature a deeply conservative individual, and a law-and-order ideologue. He is pro-US and responsive to US personnel.

b. (CONFIDENTIAL) BG Antonio (Gomez) Padilla is the Director of the CNP. BG Gomez received a Masters Degree in Education Administration from the Federal University in Brasilia and attended the Investigators Course at the International Police Academy in Washington, DC. He also reportedly has an advanced degree from the Superior School of Public Administration in Technical Administration. He served as the CNP Attaché in Panama from 1980 to 1981.

c. (SECRET/NOFORN) BG Hernando Camilo (Zuniga) Chaparro has been the Chief, Armed Forces Joint General Staff Intelligence, since December 1988. His civilian education background is in law and political science. International training and education include the Military Intelligence Course and the Command General Staff Course from the US Army School of the Americas. He was the Assistant Army Attaché to the US from 1983 to 1984 and was simultaneously a student at the Inter-American Defense College at Ft. McNair, Washington, DC. BG Zuniga has the possibility for future promotions and higher-level assignments. His current position is considered the counterpart to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. He is very pro-US and extremely interested in intelligence exchanges with the US.

d. (SECRET/NOFORN) COL Luis (Urbina) Sanchez has been the Chief, Army Intelligence, since December 1988. COL Urbina is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) counterpart. He has been described as pro-US, anticommunist, and a Colombian nationalist in general terms. He is non-partisan in domestic political affairs. COL Urbina
has an outstanding military reputation and is well respected by subordinates, peers, and superiors. He was selected for his current position by Armed Forces Commander GEN Mejia. COL Urbina is a deep thinker who puts policies into practice and has been characterized as upright with strong morals and ethics. His wife, Martha Claudia Trujillo Restrepo de Urbina, is the second cousin to the current Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Julio Londono. COL Urbina and his wife are also related to former Colombian Government ministers and local politicians; however, both steadfastly refuse to use family connections to promote his career. COL Urbina has been described as an intelligent and mission-oriented perfectionist, who grasps concepts quickly and is very direct. He also possesses excellent oral and written communications skills. COL Urbina was selected for brigade command and will depart for this position in the near future. His designated replacement is COL Gil, Commander of the Intelligence Brigade. COL Gil has 20 years of experience in intelligence. COL Urbina holds COL Gil in high regard and believes that his experience in intelligence will have a positive effect on Colombian Army Intelligence.

9-4. (U) Foreign Services

a. (U) Communist Countries

(1) (S/NF) General. No military technicians or advisors from communist countries are presently in Colombia, and no Colombian personnel have traveled to communist countries to receive military training.

(2) (S/NF) Soviet Union. As of June 1988 Soviet representation in Colombia consists of 67 diplomatic, staff, journalism, and trade representatives. The Soviets are known to have had contact with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) through its parent organization, the Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista Colombiano--PCC). The Soviets support the PCC with funds, travel, and training in return for support of the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence. Soviet front groups in Colombia include the Colombia Peace Council, the Communist Party Youth Organization (Juventud Comunista--JUCO), and the Colombian Workers Trade Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia--CSTC).

(3) (U) People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations with Colombia in 1981 with an official representation of approximately 20 members. The PRC mission in Bogota covers Central America and Andean regional affairs. Chinese propaganda reaches Colombia through Radio Peking and through lecture tours, sports teams sponsorship, and cultural exchange activities sponsored through the Chinese-Colombo Friendship organization that was formed in 1978.

(4) (S/NI) People's Republic of China. Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1981 because of Cuban training of 19th of April Movement (M-19) guerrillas; however, certain segments of the Colombian Government favor restored recognition of Cuba. Cuba continues to exert influence on Colombian guerrilla groups, especially the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional--ELN). Castro, who takes immense pride in being an internationalist revolutionary, will continue to provide support and assistance to any Colombian insurgent group that seeks his guidance.

(5) (S/NI) People's Republic of China. The Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been attempting to gain the official recognition of Colombia since the mid-1980s.

(6) (U) North Korea. In August 1983 the North Korean Government sent a three-man delegation to Colombia to attend a meeting of the PCC. This delegation reportedly made attempts to establish ties with the Liberal Party. They left behind 30 boxes of communist propaganda. Also, several cultural organizations are suspected of acting as North Korean front organizations located in Colombia under the guise of cultural programs and exchanges. The Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Reunification of Korea and the Colombian-Korean Institute for Cultural Programs and Exchanges are two such organizations. Colombia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established diplomatic
relations at the ambassadorial level in October 1988.

(7) (S/NOD/NC/WN) Nicaragua. Official Sandinista presence in Colombia is maintained through its embassy in Bogota. The diplomatic representation is small, as Colombia is not considered by the Nicaraguans to be a priority country. The embassy consists of the ambassador, a counselor, two secretaries, one unidentified individual, one domestic, and one journalist with the Nicaraguan News Agency. None of the embassy personnel is a known or suspected intelligence officer.

(8) (S/NOD/NC/WN) Threat to US. The signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) hostile intelligence collection threat to US interests in Colombia appears to be a low to medium one primarily from Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan sources. The Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas may collect SIGINT against the US and Colombia from sites in Cuba and Nicaragua, embassies and commercial activities in Panama, a variety of seaborne platforms, Cubana and Aeroflot planes, and Soviet electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites. Soviet IMINT satellites may collect data at virtually any overpass of Colombia.

b. (U) Regional

(1) (S/NOD/NC/WN) Colombia maintains intelligence liaison relationships with its hemispheric neighbors and has initiated a series of bilateral agreements with them. The intelligence agreements with Venezuela appear to be valid on the surface; however, the Venezuelans are reluctant to share intelligence with Colombia for operational security reasons.

(2) (S/NOD/NC/WN) Venezuelan intelligence is quite active in Colombia. Venezuelan Directorate of Military Intelligence personnel assigned to Colombia report on the internal situation—the opposition, subversion, insurgency, and narcotics problems—rather than focusing on the Colombian Government as previously directed. The Venezuelans consider Colombia's deteriorating domestic situation of paramount importance to security of their common border.

(3) (S/NOD/NC/WN) The intelligence relationship between Colombia and the US is improving as the Barco Administration continues its anti-drug campaign. General Zuniga was extremely impressed with the Central America Joint Intelligence Team when he toured the facility and was interested in obtaining similar support for Colombia.
Chapter 10: Counterintelligence Situation (U)

10-1. (U) Operational Environment—Background

a. (U) Colombia has an established tradition of civilian government and regular free elections. Two major political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, have dominated Colombian politics since the republic was formed in the early 1800s. Leftist parties, including the Communist Party of Colombia, have rarely obtained more than a few percentage points of total votes cast. In mid-1985, the pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia established the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica—UP) as its political party.

b. (U) Colombia has had a history of politically related violence during the 20th century. From 1948 to 1957 the Colombian civil war, known as La Violencia, claimed between 250,000 and 300,000 lives. National political dominance fueled this civil strife between the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties. Hostilities ceased when the Alternacion y Paridad Accord was adopted. This agreement created a political system whereby all elected offices were distributed equally between the parties with the office of President alternating between the Liberal and Conservative banner every term. While peace was restored, the power brokers provided few avenues for political access for the growing lower and middle classes. This political arrangement also created an environment conducive to the birth and growth of communist insurgencies. Colombia currently has 4 recognized insurgent groups with an estimated 8,500 to 9,500 armed guerrillas.

c. (U) Colombia is confronting numerous domestic threats as President Barco completes his term. Although the M-19 has agreed to abandon the armed struggle and join in the political process to achieve change, the other Colombian insurgencies remain active. Moreover, Colombia faces an almost insurmountable threat from numerous organizations involved in illicit narcotics production and exportation. The Medellin and Cali cartels, as well as other related subgroups, have successfully intimidated the judiciary and have made allies in other branches of the Colombian Government.

d. (Fmr) President Barco’s toughest task has been maintaining the will to sustain the struggle against the narcotraffickers despite violence, threats, offers of negotiation, and opposition politics. Barco has been able to maintain an adequate
level of public support for his counternarcotics campaign. As the Colombians grow tired of the violence, this support could decline with the advent of Colombian presidential election scheduled for May 1990.

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e. (Conf) In February 1990, President Barco invited the presidents of the US, Bolivia, and Peru to Cartagena, Colombia, to participate in the Andean Drug Summit. While the summit can be considered a success, the sensitivities of the Latin American presidents were obvious. President Alan (Garcia) Perez of Peru threatened not to attend following the US military operation JUST CAUSE in December 1989; President (Paz) Zamora of Bolivia wanted the summit to focus on the economic implications of the drug trade; and President Barco and his government were publicly offended by the US decision to station US naval vessels off the Colombian coast.

10-2. (U) Threat

a. (U) Domestic

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(1) (Secret) The threat to US personnel and facilities in Colombia stems from narcotraffickers and guerrilla groups; the threat remains serious. Although the majority of terrorist and insurgent attacks are conducted against the economic infrastructure and Colombian Government, military, and police facilities, attacks against US interests continue. Approximately 90 percent of all anti-US terrorist attacks from 1985 to 1989 were directed against US business interests, primarily petroleum companies. Most of these attacks were low-level harassment bombings not designed to inflict casualties.

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(2) (Secret) The Colombian Government is currently confronting threats on several domestic fronts. The existence of well-organized and ideologically committed guerrilla groups has plagued the Colombian Government in varying degrees since the early 1960s. The FARC presents the most direct threat to the Government, as it is the oldest and strongest of the groups. The FARC has its original leaders and this group has developed the Patriotic Union as its own legitimate political party. The M-19, known for spectacular urban terrorist actions, has a negotiated peace agreement with the government. The settlement provided for disarming the group under Socialist International supervision and reintegrating the M-19 into Colombian politics in exchange for a constitutional reform bill. The ELN has been the most active group recently while the FARC and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion—EPL) have agreed to negotiate with the Colombian Government. Nothing indicates that these groups are willing to genuinely join the peace process.

b. (Conf) External. The external threat to Colombia is minimal. Colombia and Venezuela have not reached a settlement regarding the disputed offshore and possibly oil-rich boundary area in the Gulf of Venezuela. Although both countries deploy important elements of forces along their common border, neither one wishes to alter the status quo, and they maintain a dialogue about mutual problems in the area. Nicaraguan claims to the San Andres and Providencia Islands, long claimed and controlled by Colombia, are another potential threat. Colombia fears that the Sandinista government may forcibly occupy these islands.

10-3. (U) Outlook and Trends

a. (U) Current Environment

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(1) (Secret) Colombia is currently engaged in a major counternarcotics campaign against the Medellin drug cartel following the August 1989 assassination of presidential candidate Senator Galan. The traffickers have carried out indiscriminate public bombings designed to weaken public support for President Barco's drug crackdown.

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(2) (Secret) The US responded to the heightened insurgent and narcotics threat with an immediate infusion of $65 million of assistance and $161 million of Export-Import Bank guarantees for Colombian military purchases. The drug cartels can be expected to increase their level of attacks against US interests as they perceive US actions...
support President Barco's counternarcotics campaign.

(3) (U) The Colombian Government will take increased security measures to protect US military activity associated with assistance delivery and mobile training teams.

(4) (U) Colombian military and security are not institutionally corrupt; however, some individuals are suspect.

b. (U) Expected Environment in the Event of US Deployment

(1) (U) Large-scale deployment of US troops to Colombia would likely be at the invitation of the host government and such deployment may augment a UN or Organization of American States security force. Under such circumstances, a majority of leaders in Colombia, especially in the military and public security arenas, would be amenable to and would coordinate US military deployment.

(2) (U) In the event of a complete breakdown of military and security control, US forces would be subject to hostile actions by the Colombian insurgents alone or be augmented by regular or "volunteer" Cuban, Nicaraguan, or other Latin American leftist combatants or narcotraffickers. The threat becomes more critical in light of the sophisticated Sandinista, Cuban, and indigenous insurgent capabilities that would be intensified against US deployment. The insurgents and narcotraffickers have demonstrated the ability to infiltrate and penetrate government services and installations, monitor and exploit COLAR communications, and conduct successful psychological operations against the COLAR and other government objectives.

(3) (U) The Colombian intelligence and security services (I&SS), like the Armed Forces, are generally pro-US and would likely support and cooperate with the US military. They would probably pool their resources, provide assessments, augment physical security, form the cadre and guides for aerial support for tactical intelligence, and implement available human intelligence (HUMINT) and SIGINT collection responsive to US needs. Nonetheless, subversive penetration of the Colombian I&SS would threaten US personnel and plans. US military officials would have to apply a unilateral system to test and validate Colombian I&SS personnel and other local nationals involved with US forces. Compartmentation must be maintained without losing the respect and cooperation of key Colombian officials. US on-site training and guidance would be required for both short- and long-term intelligence and security objectives.
Chapter 11: Intelligence Gaps (U)

(U) Chapter 9. Colombia's Intelligence and Security Services

(U/SCI) Paragraph 9-2. Continuous information is needed on the organization, capabilities, and leadership of the various I&SS to the lowest operational level. Particulars are needed on the structure and nature of the Colombian intelligence exchange and cooperation with other countries. Biographic and institutional assessments are required to evaluate the further cooperation and contribution the Colombian services would provide to deployed US forces amid political chaos, imminent victory by the insurgency, or invasion by hostile forces.

(U/SCI) Paragraph 9-4. Detailed information is needed on the intelligence presence and activities of hostile or friendly nations within Colombia. Continuous information is needed on the status of infiltrations or penetrations of the various I&SS organizations.

(U) Chapter 10. Counterintelligence Situation

(U) Paragraphs 10-1, 10-2, and 10-3. Continuous information is required on the military, political, economic, sociological, and foreign relations factors that impact on the viability of the Barco and future elected governments the degree of cooperation among subversive groups and the extent of internal opposition.

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