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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEF 12-1 CHNCOM
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AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, DJAKARTA, HONG KONG, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, NEW DELHI, PHNOM PENH, RANGOON, SAIGON, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN, TOKYO, VIENTIANNE, WELLINGTON, CINCPAC (POLAD), CINCEUR (POLAD), CINCNELM (POLAD)

Jul 2 9 38 AM '64

FROM : Department of State-USIA-Department of Defense

SUBJECT : Status of Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation

REF JUL : CA-5497, November 17, 1962
CA-715, July 19, 1963

I. BACKGROUND:

1. An inter-departmental program to minimize the psychological impact of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation was initiated in the fall of 1962. The Department's CA-5497 of November 17, 1962, set forth the basic concept of the program, including the public position and rationale to be taken by U.S. officials in the predetonation period.

2. The Department's CA-715 of July 19, 1963, set forth revised guidelines for discussing this subject, as well as up-to-date intelligence estimates of Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities. This paper included guidance which U.S. officials could use in general discussion of this subject, as well as specific statements concerning what a Chinese Communist detonation does not mean and what it may mean. It also outlined a comprehensive Educative Program prepared by the Department of Defense geared to explain to selected audiences in private the wide range of subjects from the basics to the complexities of nuclear development.

3. During the past year, basic indoctrination material was sent to selected posts to be used in the Educative Program. Where local conditions were considered appropriate programs were

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: M - RHWhite:fjm 6/26/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: M - William J. Jordan

Clearances: S/AL-Amb. Thompson P-Mr. Lisle INR-Mr. Evans NEA-Mr. Lee FE-Mr. [unclear]
DOD/ISA-Mr. Carroll S/P-Mr. Johnson USIA-Mr. Anderson SOV-Mr. Cathrie
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(clearances in draft)

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were carried out by certain posts which included the use of printed material, visual aids, and qualified lecturers.

II. Chinese Communist and Soviet References to Subject During the Past Year

During the past year several references have been made to Chinese Communist nuclear capability and intentions from both Chinese Communist and Soviet sources. In view of the conflicting nature of these references, they are listed chronologically in Attachment "A" to this Airgram.

III. Current Estimate of Communist Nuclear Capability

Our estimate of prospects for development of Chinese Communist nuclear capability remains as set forth in CA-715: i.e., that a test could occur at any time, but that it may not occur until late 1964 or early 1965. (FYI: This estimate may be reviewed in course of summer, but as of this date it still considered valid.)

IV. Coordinated Information Policy by NATO Countries

Steps currently being taken to arrange coordinated information policy of this subject by NATO countries. Guidelines will follow same general principles set forth in CA's under reference. They will probably be developed in NATO Political Advisers Committee in near future. In this connection, Embassy London represented at meeting on May 7, 1964, at British Foreign Office at which were present representatives of Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand High Commissions to discuss overt and covert programs re Chinese nuclear tests. Meeting reflected degree of coordination that has already taken place between governments involved as evidenced by similarity themes used, regardless of where they were prepared.

V. Action Requested

Now that interdepartmental program has been in effect two years along broad lines, interested Washington agencies wish receive specific information on following subjects:

1. To what extent is there general public awareness of this subject?
2. Are there any strata of society, either geographic or social, in area of responsibility that are unaware of possibility of Chinese Communist nuclear detonation?

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3. What is attitude of local officials on necessity general awareness this subject?
4. What is the attitude likely to be among informed elements?
5. What additional material does post require to meet the responsibility of this program effectively?

In view of necessity for a high degree of coordination, Chiefs of Mission, in consultation with their country teams, are requested to review this general subject at earliest convenience and submit brief answers to foregoing questions together with any other comments on the subject.

Attachment:

RUSK

A.

Group 3.

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(ATTACHMENT A)

Chen I Japanese TV Interview - May 7, 1964

Hashimoto: This is my last question. China has already expressed its intention of arming the country with nuclear weapons in the future. I would like to know whether the nuclear armament of China has already entered a concrete stage. What do you think of relations between nuclear armament and world peace?

Chen: We are always of the opinion that the fate of a people is controlled by the people, not by new weapons or nuclear weapons. We firmly advocate complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. Several big powers monopolize nuclear weapons and continue to carry out nuclear blackmail.

For the security of our country and the interests of world peace, we have to have our own nuclear force. Talking about nuclear experiments, it is not a very difficult piece of knowledge to attain. I believe that if China does its utmost, there will be a day when China possesses nuclear weapons.

Some people are worried that Chinese possession of nuclear weapons will constitute a threat. This is being overcautious, because China is a socialist country. In the past, China never invaded any other country. China does not and will not invade other countries. China does not map out its foreign policy according to the possession of nuclear weapons. The CPR foreign policy is formulated on the basis of the interests of Chinese people, of the people of all socialist countries, of the working class, and the oppressed of the world, and of all peace-loving people. China opposes imperialism and colonialism and safeguards world peace. This is the starting point of Chinese foreign policy.

Karachi Domestic Service in English 0215 GMT 4 May 1964--B

(Text) Chinese Vice Premier Marshal Chen I said China has now attained a level of technology where it is not difficult for it to make nuclear weapons. He told a news conference of Pakistani and foreign journalists in Peking yesterday that an explosion is likely to be made when preparatory work has been completed. Marshal Chen I said China would like to catch up with whatever level of nuclear technology the advanced

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countries have obtained, even though it may take 10, 20, or 30 years.

3. Mao Tse-tung, 30 Jan 64 (pub 21 Feb 64)
Interview w/FrenchDel., Paris-Presse-L'Intransigeant

Mao then got back to the subject of the atom bomb: "I know that you are ahead of us in that respect. But we too shall have our own bomb. It is a means of power. That doesn't mean we're going to use it. But there are two large countries that intend to lead the world without consulting anyone else. Have they consulted General de Gaulle? The Moscow Treaty is a fraud. Those two countries must not come and sh on our heads." The interpreter was dumbfounded at this use of slang, wondering at first if he indeed had to translate literally, but Mao told him to go ahead, and added: "That may shock you, but it's the truth."

Chou En-lai, 20 Dec 63
Cairo Press Conf (Mena, OUO)

(Excerpt) Cairo--CPR Premier Chou En-lai tonight stated that he has no knowledge of the reports which say that the CPR will explode an atomic device (jihazan nawawiyan) within one year. Chou En-lai said this at a press conference he held in Cairo on the conclusion of UAR visit which lasted one week.

CHEN I, Interview w/Paris Combat
Bdcst 14 Dec 63, Belgrade IS

(Text) Paris--In an interview with the correspondent of the Paris COMBAT, CPR Foreign Minister Chen I has given very vague answers on whether China intends to build its own atom bomb. Chen I primarily said that China does not feel the necessity of having its own nuclear weapons for they are not going to feed the hungry. "If the nuclear powers agree to ban and destroy nuclear weapons, China will be first to rejoice in it and welcome this decision."

Having censured the Moscow test-ban treaty as "treachery of the nuclear powers, which legalized their nuclear monopoly," Chen I stressed that China "has a right to create its nuclear weapons."

Chen I also evaded the question whether China would shortly manufacture

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atomic weapons: "I can say that the Chinese are not more stupid than others. That done by the United States and others is feasible for us also. In our age nuclear weapons are no longer a secret."

In this interview, Chen I also pleaded for the development of the CPR's trade and economic relations with "all the countries wishing to maintain friendly relations with it."

Chen I, Interview w/John Dixon
(no date) published in Wash Post 8 Dec 63

Dixon asked why Peking is developing its own atomic weapons without Soviet help, "in view of Soviet assurances about the defense of China against foreign aggressors."

Said Chen, "In the first place, what is this Soviet assurance worth? If tomorrow we say to you Australians that we will make ourselves responsible for the defense of Australia, what value would you place upon it? How can any one nation say it will defend another?"

"This sort of promise is easy to make, but ... worthless. Soviet protection is worth nothing to us."

He went on to say: "Atomic weapons are in use by other powers, so, therefore, we need atomic weapons for our defense. We will not be party to the triparty (U.S.-Britain-Soviet) treaty banning atomic tests. In fact, we regard this treaty as a form of blackmail applied against us."

"It is not binding on its members. Any member can give three months' notice and begin tests again. It is merely a plot to prevent China from acquiring her own means of defense."

"It may be 10, 15 or 20 years before China can solve the technical problems involved in making atomic weapons but however long it takes, we will do it!"

"We make a counterproposal to the Big Three now to destroy all atomic weapons. Go further and prohibit their manufacture and call a world meeting to discuss this."

Chen I, 28 Oct 63
Peking, Interview w/Jap reporters-Tokyo KYODO-28th

(Text) Peking, 28 October--Communist Chinese Vice Premier Chen I told Japanese reporters today that China will be able to conduct atomic bomb tests, probably within the next several years. Chen I, who is also foreign minister, was speaking at a press conference held at the State

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(ATTACHMENT A)

Council for Japanese newsman now visiting Peking---

As for the nuclear arming of China, Vice Premier Chen I said that his country is now lagging far behind other industrial nations. Consequently, it may take China several years to conduct A-bomb testing and many more years to start mass production of such bombs, he said, but he emphasized that China will eventually test an A-bomb. He stated, however, that the possession of an A-bomb will not affect China's foreign policies. With or without A-bombs, China will not kneel before the United States, he said.

As the technical level of the nation's industry heightens, it will be inevitable that China will conduct A-bomb testing, he said. A-bombs, missiles, supersonic aircraft--all these are reflective of the technical level of a nation's industry, he said. China will have to resolve this issue within the next several years; otherwise, it will degenerate into a second-class or third-class nation, he said.

He went on to say that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev once stated that the manufacture of A-weapons costs much money, so China in the end may have no money to make trousers with. But in my view, China will have to manufacture the most modern weapons with or without trousers, Chen I said.

CPR Govt Stmt 1 Sep 63 to Sovt Govt Stmt of 21 Aug
relying to CPR Govt Stmt 15 Aug 63

The real point is that the Soviet leaders hold that China should not and must not manufacture nuclear weapons, and that only the few nuclear powers, and particularly U.S. imperialism, the enemy of the people of the whole world, are entitled to the continued production of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet statement asserts that China can rely on the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and need not manufacture them itself; that if it tries to manufacture them it will result in a great strain on China's economy.

Should or should not China itself master the means of resisting U.S. nuclear blackmail? True, if the Soviet leaders really practised proletarian internationalism it might not be necessary for China to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. But it is equally true that if

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the Soviet leaders really practised proletarian internationalism, they would have no reason whatever for obstructing China from manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Is not China very poor and backward? Yes, it is. The Soviet leaders say, how can the Chinese be qualified to manufacture nuclear weapons when they eat watery soup out of a common bowl and do not even have trousers to wear? The Soviet leaders are perhaps too hasty in deriding China for its backwardness. They may or may not have judged right. But in any case, and even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists.

Kuo Mo-jo, 24 Aug 63
Banquet, Korean Academy of Sciences

The imperialists and modern revisionists have banded together. They believe that by doing this they will be able forever to monopolize nuclear weapons and can always carry out the policy of nuclear blackmail. However their dreams can never be realized. The tide of revolution of the people of the world cannot be obstructed by any force. The development of science, technology, and economic construction of the real socialist countries cannot be obstructed or strangled by any force. Any secret knowledge in science and technology definitely cannot be monopolized for long by the imperialists and modern revisionists.

The Chinese people and Chinese scientists are confident in their ability to make a fresh start through their own efforts and to bring their own science and technology close to and catch up with the most advanced level of the world to smash completely the imperialist and modern revisionist blockade in (space?), science, and technology, and, in the near future, especially their nuclear monopoly.

1. CPR Govt Stmt, 15 Aug 63
On USSR 3 Aug Stmt

The Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on 15 October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September.

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On 25 August 1962, two days before the United States and Britain put forward their draft treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government notified China that U.S. Secretary of State Rusk had proposed an agreement stipulating that, firstly, the nuclear powers should undertake to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to nonnuclear countries, and that, secondly, the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing them, from seeking them from the nuclear powers or from accepting technical information concerning their manufacture. The Soviet Government gave an affirmative reply to this proposal of Rusk's.

CPR Govt Stmt, 15 Aug 63
On USSR 3 Aug Stmt

The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the Soviet Government, on 3 September 1962, 20 October 1962, and 6 June 1963, stating that it was a matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons.

We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism, and that we would issue statements to make our position known.

In view of all the above, China has long ceased to place any hope in the Soviet leaders in developing its own nuclear strength to resist the U.S. nuclear threats.

11. Chu Tzu-chi, 16 Aug 63
Del to Anti-A-Bomb Conference, Hiroshima

(Text) Tokyo, 16 August--A member of the Communist Chinese delegation to the Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, held

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in Hiroshima early this month, declared yesterday that Communist China's possession of nuclear weapons represented the "minimum right" of his country and that no one could interfere in the matter. Chu Tzu-chi, spokesman for the Chinese group, said, however, that Communist China absolutely would not threaten other countries with the use of nuclear weapons.

Chu met with a KYODO reporter at his quarters in the Diamond Hotel in Tokyo last night on the eve of the Communist Chinese delegation's departure for home. He noted that SHAKAI SHIMPO, organ of the Japan Socialist Party, had recently quoted Chao Kuo-chiang, a member of the Chinese delegation, as saying that Communist China would not possess nuclear weapons for five or six years. Chu claimed that the paper had not reported the truth. He said that Chao had not indicated the time. Chu added that he could not say when Communist China would come into possession of nuclear weapons.

2. Kuo Mo-jo, 26 Jul 63
Rally, 10th Anniv Korean War

As we know, it was precisely under conditions where U.S. imperialism had monopoly of atomic weapons that the Chinese and Korean people won their victory in the war against U.S. aggression. This fully proves that new technology is by no means the determining factor in war. Furthermore, no new technology is so advanced as to be beyond us. It can by no means remain for long a monopoly of a small number of people and a small number of countries. In fact, the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons was broken long ago. It will not be long now until the attempt to control the destiny of the people by a small number of countries with their monopoly of weapons will be thwarted. (Stormy applause) It is our firm conviction that any new technology that can be mastered by imperialism can definitely be mastered by our revolutionary people. (Prolonged applause)

3. July 30

Peking media carry Khrushchev statements opposing partial test ban; NCNA cites Harriman's report that Khrushchev said it would be long time before CPR would have important nuclear capability.

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