Trilateralism and Beyond

Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma during and after the Cold War

Edited by Robert A. Wampler

Kent State University Press

July 6, 2012

The National Security Archive is pleased to announce the publication of a new study that sheds light on the history of a critical Cold War flashpoint.

"A groundbreaking book on a vital and timely topic, one that gives a valuable historical perspective on the recurrent crisis on the Korean peninsula." - Charles K. Armstrong, Director, Center for Korean Research, Columbia University

President George H.W. Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea shake hands across the table during an expanded bilateral meeting in the Jiphyon Room of the Blue House, Seoul, Korea, January 6, 1992. This meeting took place against the backdrop of encouraging advances on the Korean Peninsula, marked by a more cooperative stance by Pyongyang on relations with South Korea and on opening up its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. (Courtesy George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)

The fall of the Berlin Wall more than two decades ago brought an end to the Cold War for most of the world. But the legacy of that era remains unresolved on the divided Korean peninsula, which still presents a clear danger for the United States and its allies. Two triangular alliances-one comprised of the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and the other of Russia, China, and North Korea-lie at the heart of the security challenge and all efforts to pursue a final peace treaty.

Trilateralism and Beyond brings together a collection of essays by leading American, South Korean, and Japanese scholars that probe the historical dynamics formed and driven by the Korean security dilemma. Drawing on newly declassified documents secured by the National Security Archive's Korea Project, along with new archival resources in China and former Warsaw Pact countries, the contributors examine the critical relationships between the two triangular security relationships that pivot on the Korean peninsula. As Editor Robert A. Wampler says in his introduction:

"Taken together, these chapters provide a multifaceted analysis of the complex historical dynamics at the heart of the Korean security dilemma. The picture they draw is of broadening circles of relationships, starting at the central U.S.-South Korea security relationship and widening out to include Japan, then China and Russia and the perpetually enigmatic and maddening North Korea, whose actions have added several layers of complexity to Churchill's famous description of Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." With their multiple perspectives on the common history of Korean peninsula diplomacy, the chapters provide what can be seen as a series of overlay maps that, when placed together, illuminate the linkages, goals, and assumptions regarding the two Koreas driving policy in the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. While there can be no real map to the future, a better understanding of the route by which the Korean security dilemma has reached its current state and an appreciation of the lessons to be learned from this history would seem critical, if not essential, for addressing this challenge in the years to come."

Dr Wampler will host a panel discussion on the book with several of the contributors at the Woodrow Wilson Center International Center for Scholars (see information in "Event" tab).

Below is the Preface to Trilateralism and Beyond by Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University. A selection of declassified documents that illustrate a number of the themes addressed by the authors in this book can be found at the "Documents" tab.

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Foreword by Akira Iriye

[Copyright 2012 The National Security Archive Fund, Inc.]

President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung, the White House, July 2, 1999. Kim, who owed his life to U.S. intervention with the South Korean government on two occasions, pursued his 'Sunshine Policy' of expanded engagement with North Korea while the U.S. sought to build on the 1994 Framework Agreement to end Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, linking the promise of diplomatic and trade relations to North Korea's commitment to accelerate the dismantling of its nuclear program and to halt its missile program. (Courtesy William J. Clinton Presidential Library)

The National Security Archive has been a pioneer among scholarly communities in its persistent and successful efforts to gain access to governmental documents and its sponsorship of international research projects in which declassified material forms the basis of historical inquiry. The present volume is a product of such a project, this time focusing on U.S. relations with the two Koreas. The Archive's Korea Project brought together some of the world's leading specialists, and their papers have been revised for publication. It is easy to see from the six essays included in this volume how important it is to have access to as much public record-of all countries-as possible and also why a historical perspective is a prerequisite to understanding contemporary issues.

The essays examine how the two Koreas, Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union (Russia) dealt with one another in the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first. Of these six countries, North Korea is perhaps unique in that, as Sergey Radchenko notes in his essay, its "policies, grievances, and demands . . . change very little" from decade to decade. This in sharp contrast to the other five countries where constant change would seem to have been their main characteristic, as clearly documented in the essays. What is equally important is that the world itself was significantly transformed in the last three decades of the twentieth century so that the old-fashioned game of geopolitics-the story of "the rise and fall of the great powers"-became less and less relevant. Instead, regional communities, transnational movements, and global networks of goods, capital, labor, and ideas came to provide the context in which nations sought to define, protect, and promote their interests. All countries with strong interests in, or concerns about, North Korea were aware of such changes, while the latter alone seemed to hold to its old ways. While most of the contributions in this volume focus on the security question, in particular the implications of North Korean's nuclear armament for regional stability, they also touch on many other issues that always complicated the formulation of an appropriate response to that challenge.

In the first chapter, William Stueck traces the development of U.S. policy in the Korean peninsula in the framework of a six-party relationship, including Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It is a complex story, but the author's research finds that while most administrations in Washington have been eager to reduce U.S. commitments in Korea, this has proved very difficult because of North Korean's unwillingness to cooperate. Although examined in the framework of regional security affairs, Stueck also mentions that from around 1989 the United States began to emphasize "the promotion of human rights and democratic values" among its objectives in the Pacific. This is not surprising in view of what appeared to be global democratization at that time, including the Chinese demonstrations at Tiananmen Square; but we can put it in an even larger framework, that of the growing importance of transnational, as against international, issues in the world at the end of the twentieth century, issues such as human rights, refugees, and global warming.

In that context, Seung-young Kim's chapter on human rights makes a superb addition to the literature, showing that the promotion of democracy became a fundamental aspect of U.S. relations with South Korea during the 1970s and beyond. Particularly revealing is Kim's discussion of the protest movement in South Korea against President Chun Doo-hwan that persisted throughout the 1980s, in which U.S. officials kept in close touch not only with the Korean military as well as opposition leaders but also with Chinese leaders. There were clearly global political developments in which all these countries became enveloped.

While the third essay in this book, Yasuyo Sakata's study of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation, focuses on geopolitical issues, it also touches on such topics as international aid to North Korea during its periods of food shortage and the alleged abduction of Japanese by North Korean agents, a human rights violation. Perhaps "human security," the term that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) began to use in the 1970s, might best describe the trilateral relationship. The next chapter, by Michael Chinworth, Narushige Michshita, and Taeyoung Yoon, brings the story of the sexangular relationship to the present and offers measured optimism about the possibility of renewed cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Even so, the authors stress that "communication . . . remains a problem" among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.

The final two chapters expand the focus to examine Chinese and Russian diplomacy on the peninsula. Gregg Brazinsky examines China's approach to North Korea, which, the author shows, became inseparable from the PRC's overall relationship with the United States. The leadership in Beijing was determined to pursue its policy of modernization and globalization, which any crisis in the Korean peninsula would be sure to frustrate. In South Korea, too, China wanted to encourage political stability and "the country's evolution toward democracy." It may seem strange that a dictatorial regime in Beijing should encourage democratic government in South Korea, but it all fits into the theme of economic connections with the outside world. Here again, one sees the intrusion of larger forces on more traditional geopolitical strategies.

Given PRC's growing involvement with South Korea, Pyongyang's leaders not surprisingly turned to Moscow for assistance, a story that is presented in Radchenko's chapter. He notes how isolated politically and intellectually North Korean leaders appeared to be when they visited the Soviet Union during the 1960s and the 1970s. They seemed to follow where their dogmatic ideology took them, and it was up to Soviet and Eastern European officials to disabuse them of some of their excessive ideas. They did succeed to some extent, but, as the essay suggests, the two countries' paths diverged further in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Communication is a critical component of diplomatic efforts to address the security dilemmas on the Korean peninsula. If security were susceptible to "realistic" solutions, lack of communication would not matter. But in today's interconnected world, mutual understanding is more than ever crucial, and one cannot enhance understanding by merely focusing on national security. We have to think in terms of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans, Japanese, Americans, Chinese, Russians, and many others who come into daily contact with one another all over the globe. It is ultimately they who must build the world of tomorrow.

Brief excerpts from Trilateralism and Beyond:

William Stueck (University of Georgia) – "Despite the increase in anti-Americanism and pro-Chinese sentiment among young and middle-aged South Koreans, it is a good bet that, if U.S. forces and commitments to the ROK decline over the next decade, the primary impetus will come not from Seoul but from a Washington saddled with increasingly unmanageable expenditures growing out of a prolonged domestic economic crisis and ongoing military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Seung-Young Kim (University of Sheffield, UK) – "The United States also played a crucial role in changing the tide in favor of democratization in South Korea during the Reagan administration. … but [has] balanced this goal against U.S. security concerns in the Korean peninsula. …But the growth of the powerful voice of civil society in South Korea also created a new task for U.S.-South Korea relations. This new challenge will be better addressed if the decision makers in Seoul and Washington pay greater attention to the views of civil society in South Korea when introducing new policy initiatives. Yet, Korean society will also have to consider the importance of longer-term cooperation with the United States in the light of Korea's sensitive geopolitical location in Northeast Asia."

Yasuyo Sakata (Kanda University, Japan ) – "If TCOG or trilaterals are to become more effective, Japan and South Korea must be more committed politically and organizationally… Making it more formal and embed in the region would alleviate its dependence on Washington. It would also benefit Washington to have a firm foothold in the region - not just in bilateral relations and alliances but in a trilateral framework and other multilateral forums."

Michael Chinworth (U.S.-Japan Center for Studies & Cooperation, Vanderbilt University), Narushige Michishita (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo) and Taeyoung Yoon (Kyungnam University, South Korea) – "The United States, South Korea, and Japan do not always view security issues in a common light. Contingency planning and confidence-building measures would minimize future differences in perspectives while building regional security by establishing trilateral and respective bilateral ties. Given the range of possibilities on Northeast Asia's security outlook, measured and systematic steps that do not force hasty policy changes but accept the prospects of long-term evolution-while being equally realistic on the possibilities of sudden destabilizing events-appear to be in the best interests of the United States, Japan, and South Korea."

Gregg Brazinsky (George Washington University) – "Although China's interest in ensuring that stability prevails on the Korean peninsula gives it a great deal of common ground with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, its interest in preserving and extending its influence in Korea may create grounds for further tension and friction. … It is quite possible that there is some credibility to Beijing's claims that its influence over its reclusive ally is limited, but the PRC has also shown reluctance to pressure [North Korea] in response to Western demands. It recognizes that doing so risks alienating the DPRK and further diminishing the once-substantial reserves of goodwill between itself and Pyongyang. While Beijing will encourage the DPRK to seek peaceful relations with Seoul and the rest of Asia, Americans will probably continue to, at times, be frustrated by its refusal to take a more coercive approach in its dealings with the regime."

Sergei Radchenko (University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China) – "…as the cold war came to a close, the expectation in Washington was that the North Korean regime would crumble, so there was no use in compromising or even talking directly with Pyongyang, save for sporadic contacts in Beijing, which made it look that the United States had a viable policy when in fact it did not. North Korea was pushed far down the list of priorities. But a problem forgotten is not a problem solved. This message should not be lost on today's policy makers, lest expectations that the North Korean problem will solve itself once Kim Jong Il passes from the scene preclude head-on engagement with this insecure, volatile, very dangerous country."

Selected Declassified Documents from the Holdings of the National Security Archive:

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Russell Murray, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis & Evaluation, Subject PRM-45 (TS), June 6, 1979 (OSD FOIA)
The U.S.-South Korean security relationship underwent serious strain during the Carter years due to President Carter's desire to withdraw U.S. forces from the peninsula. As this and the following document illustrate, there were serious disagreements within the administration over the extent of the North Korean military threat and Seoul's ability to contribute more towards the costs of maintaining the needed military forces to deter and if need be defend against an attack from the north. This memorandum for Secretary of Defense Harold Brown touches on many if not all of the issues shaping these debates, including estimates of North Korean ground forces, the need for increased South Korean forces, the impact of withdrawing U.S. troops, and effect on deterrence of the existing plans to have any counter-offensive stop at the DMZ.

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense [from Mike Armacost?], Subject: DIA Concerns About Korea (TS), October 10, 1979 (with attached memo (TS), dated October 11, 1979, transcribing handwritten comments on the above by David McGiffert. (OSD FOIA)
This memorandum provides a counterpoint to DIA concerns about the dangers of a North Korean attack. Arguing that the DIA's concerns paint a misleading picture of North Korea's current situation and likely policies, the memorandum outlines a series of observations about Pyongyang's recent diplomatic, economic and military situation and actions that the author feels casts doubt on any likelihood of an attack.

Memorandum of Conversation, President Bush's Meeting with Premier Li Peng of the People's Republic of China (S), February 26, 1989 (Bush Library) [filename: 19890226a.pdf]
As a number of chapters in the book discuss, China has been and continues to be looked to as a key player in efforts to deter North Korean actions and policies that threaten to destabilize the peninsula and the region. This memorandum of conversation between President George H.W. Bush and Premier Li Peng of the People's Republic of China (along with the following memorandum of President Bush's meeting with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang) provide examples of the U.S. seeking to encourage Beijing to use its influence on Pyongyang, and frustration shared by the Chinese over the difficulties in dealing with the North Korean leadership. As Li Peng tells Bush, "Our friend [Kim Il Sung] over there has great confidence in himself," prompting Bush to say (to amused laughter on both sides) "That is a classic understatement."

Memorandum of Conversation, President Bush's Meeting with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China (S), February 26, 1989. (Bush Library)
In this meeting with the Chinese Communist Party head, Bush continues his efforts to press China to exert its moderating influence on North Korea. Zhao echoes Li Peng's protestations of limited Chinese ability to affect the actions and policies of the North Korean leadership. Bush for his part tries to explore the possibilities for dealing with anyone other than this leadership, saying "We have to identify people who have influence who are more reasonable than the two top people in North Korea, Kim Il-sung and his son. … They have a stake in hostility toward the U.S. We need to find other people who are more reasonable to deal with." Unable to provide much hope for this approach, Zhao bluntly tells Bush "In my view, it you want to improve relations with North Korea, you must deal with the two people you don't like."

Memorandum of Conversation, President Bush's One-on-One with President Roh Tae Woo of Korea, February 27, 1989 (Bush Library)
This memorandum and the following one record President Bush's meeting with South Korean leader Roh Tae Woo immediately following his trip to Beijing, discussed above. In this preliminary one-on-one meeting, Bush's agenda included not just North Korea, but encouraging the ongoing process of democratization in South Korea, reassuring Roh about America's continuing security commitment, and ongoing trade negotiations. Bush recaps his meetings with the Chinese leadership for Roh, repeating his pessimism about dealing with the North Korean leadership and noting that even the Chinese seemed embarrassed by North Korean behavior.

Memorandum of Conversation, Plenary Meeting Between President Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of Korea, and Lunch (S), February 27, 1989. (Bush Library)
Following the above meeting, Bush and Roh joined the larger meeting with their cabinet members, where again North Korea is one of the key topics of discussion. Looking at inter-Korean relations, Roh expressed his view that Kim Il Sung seemed to be in the process to transitioning power to his son Kim Jong Il, and that Pyongyang was in a difficult position politically and economically, which presented opportunities as well as risks. While both leaders reaffirmed the strength of the bilateral security relationship, both also acknowledged that trade disagreements threatened this unity. As Bush warned, trade disputes could spill over into the security relationship, noting the feeling in Congress that trade and security issues must go together.

Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Lee Sang Hoon, Minister of Defense of Korea (C), July 20, 1989.(Bush Library)
This brief meeting serves to highlight a number of persistent concerns for the bilateral relationship, including continuing Russian military support for North Korea, the need to short up Congressional support for the U.S. military presence in South Korea, and the troubling incidents of anti-Americanism in South Korea.

Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea (S), October 17, 1989. (Bush Library)
In this high-level meeting, a number of familiar issues shape the discussion, as well as a new and troubling one. As always, Roh seeks reconfirmation of the U.S. security commitment to South Korea and Asia. Korea's domestic politics remain an issue of concern, with Roh touting the advances made in democratization - claiming the last traces of authoritarianism had been "exterminated" - but also apologizing for the recent trashing of the U.S. ambassador's residence in Seoul by anti-American protesters. Progress was also noted in the trade negotiations between the two nations, though unresolved issues still threatened to elicit Congressional actions that could overflow into the security relationship Even more problematic were diplomatic concerns, as the U.S. was still seeking to get relations with Beijing on track following the Chinese government's forceful repression of the Tiananmen Square protests the previous June. The new and potentially most destabilizing issue was the signs that North Korea was moving to develop nuclear weapons. Bush and Roh again commiserated over the lack of reasonable leaders in North Korea, with Kim Il-Sung enjoying what Roh termed "god-like status," and his sone Kim Chung-Il essentially the number two for all substantive matters.

Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea (S), June 6, 1990 (Bush Library)
Recent South Korean talks with Russia and Japan were key topics of note in this meeting between Bush and Roh. Roh had recently held brief but unprecedented postwar talks in San Francisco with Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev, talks that had drawn the condemnation of North Korea. Roh told Bush that the Russian leader had passed on Kim Il Sung's concerns about U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, but Roh had reiterated the agreed "neither confirm nor deny" response. Roh for his part asked Gorbachev to pass on three messages to Pyongyang: that North Korea needs to engage in direct talks with Roh's government; that North Korea had to change its basic attitude towards world affairs and domestic politics; and to stress to Kim Il Sung that South Korea will never seek military superiority. Regarding possible U.S. direct talks with North Korea, Roh said he supported these, provided the U.S. stressed IAEA safeguards [to monitor North Korea's nuclear activities], pressed Pyongyang to prevent terrorist activities, and to abandon their schemes for Korean reunification and engage in constructive dialogue with Seoul. Regarding his visit to Japan, Roh noted that he shared the same basic problem - trade- that the U.S. faced with Tokyo. Further complicating matters was the historical problem of Japan's actions during World War II. Roh said he had frank and sincere talks with Prime Minister Kaifu and the Emperor on this issue, and was able to make progress on related issues, such as the legal status of Korean residents on Japan.

Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea (S), July 2, 1991 (Bush Library)
With the first Gulf War now wrapped up, much of Bush and Roh's talk centers on reaffirmations of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Roh outlines his vision of a region seeing strong economic growth, where over time Japanese, Russian and Chinese involvement will also only increase, and these countries will stand ready to step in if U.S. influence should wane. Waxing somewhat optimistically, Roh tells Bush that Korean unification could take place before the end of the century. However, still hanging over Korea's future is the question of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and the need for the U.S., South Korea and other interested countries to continue coordinating their approach to Pyongyang on this issue. Roh states that Seoul is ready to enter into negotiations with North Korea on three conditions: that the U.S. maintains its nuclear guarantee; that North Korea accept full lAEA inspections; and the North give up reprocessing of its nuclear fuel rods.

Cable, Seoul 03331 to Secretary of State (S), Subject: SECDEF Meeting with ROK Minister of Defense Rhee, April 21, 1994 (State Department FOIA)
Though suffering from some significant redaction, this cable is interesting for shedding light on discussions between Secretary of Defense William Perry and the South Korean Defense Minister Rhee Byong Tae in the midst of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program in 1994. The main thrust of Perry's efforts was to make sure Seoul was still on board with continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis, with sanctions as the fallback should diplomacy fail, and military force kept ready in case North Korea follows through with its position that sanctions would be an act of war. For his part, Perry sought to reassure Rhee that the U.S. did not believe they were facing any "imminent danger of war on the peninsula." A key goal for Rhee was securing U.S. commitment to carrying out the Team Spirit joint military exercises, which had been postponed when negotiations began over Pyongyang's nuclear activities. Perry agreed to announce the two governments had resumed planning for the exercise, which would be held if North Korea failed to take the necessary steps to address the nuclear issue.

The North Korea International Documentation Project and
the Cold War International Documentation Project

Present

Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma During and After the Cold War

10 July 2012

3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

5th Floor Moynihan Boardroom

The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars is located in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 T 202/691-4000

RSVP: nkidp@wilsoncenter.org

The fall of the Berlin Wall more than two decades ago brought an end to the Cold War for most of the world. But the legacy of that era remains unresolved on the divided Korean peninsula, which still presents a clear danger for the United States and its allies. Two triangular alliances-one comprised of the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and the other of Russia, China, and North Korea-lie at the heart of the security challenge and all efforts to pursue a final peace treaty.

Trilateralism and Beyond brings together a collection of essays by leading American, South Korean, and Japanese scholars that probe the historical dynamics formed and driven by the Korean security dilemma. Drawing on newly declassified documents secured by the National Security Archive's Korea Project, along with new archival resources in China and former Warsaw Pact countries, the contributors examine the critical relationship between the United States and South Korea, exploring the delicate balancing act of bolstering the security alliance and fostering greater democracy in South Korea. The volume expands its focus to include Japan and a look at the history and future challenges of trilateral security cooperation on the peninsula; impending difficulties for security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan; and the trials that Russia and China have experienced in dealing with an often demanding, unpredictable ally in North Korea. The authors move beyond simple images of ideological support by the two great powers to draw a more complex and nuanced picture.

Trilateralism and Beyond offers an essential historical perspective on one of the most enduring challenges for U.S. foreign policy-ensuring stability on the tumultuous Korean peninsula.

Chair: Robert A. Wampler, Senior Fellow, National Security Archive, George Washington University

Speakers: William Stueck, Distinguished Research Professor, University of Georgia; Michael W. Chinworth, Senior Visiting Fellow, U.S.-Japan Center for Studies & Cooperation, Vanderbilt University; Gregg Brazinsky, Associate Professor, George Washington University; Seung-Young Kim, Kim Senior Lecturer, School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield

Commentator: Sang-Yoon Ma, Associate Professor, Catholic University of Korea, and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Speaker Bios

Robert A. Wampler is a senior fellow at the National Security Archive at George Washington University. He is the editor of three document sets on U.S.-Japan relations between 1960 and 2000 and a fourth set entitled The United States and the Two Koreas from Nixon to Clinton (1969-2000) (ProQuest, 2010). He coedited with Akira Iriye Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001 (Kodansha, 2001) and has authored articles and book chapters on U.S. cold war diplomacy and strategy.

William Stueck , Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Georgia, is one of the leading historians of the Korean War and U.S.-Korean relations. In addition to his numerous articles and chapters on these and related issues in U.S.-East Asian relations, he is the author ofRethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton University Press, 2002) and The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1995).

Michael W. Chinworth is a senior researcher at the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization and a senior visiting fellow at Vanderbilt University's Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation. He was formerly a senior analyst at Asian Technology; a program manager of technology assessments, evaluations, and forecasts at TASC, Inc.; and vice president and senior consultant at NAC International. Chinworth is the author of Inside Japan's Defense: Economics, Technology and Strategy (Brassey's, 1992) and numerous articles on Japanese defense and technology policy.

Gregg A. Brazinsky is associate professor in the Department of History and the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of Nation Building in South Korea : Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (University of North Carolina Press, 2007) as well as numerous articles and reviews on modern Korean history. A former Wilson Center Fellow and Kluge Fellow at the Library of Congress, Brazinsky's current research focuses on a study of the cultural impact of the Korean War in the United States, Korea, and China and on Sino-American competition in the third world during the cold war.

Kim Seung-Young is the Kim Senior Lecturer in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield. He was formerly a lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Aberdeen. He is the author of American Diplomacy and Strategy Toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950 and After (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and has also published articles on Korean and Japanese diplomacy. Presently Kim is completing a book on diplomacy and statecraft in Northeast Asia.

Sang-Yoon Ma is associate professor in the School of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea and is presently a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar. His research interests include international politics of East Asia, Korean politics and foreign policy, U.S.-ROK relations, U.S. foreign policy and Cold War international history. He has published widely on these topics in both English and Korean. Formerly, Ma was dean of the office of international affairs at the Catholic University of Korea and a visiting fellow at Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He earned his doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford and both his master's and bachelor's degrees in political science from Seoul National University.

10 July 2012

3:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

5th Floor Moynihan Boardroom

RSVP: nkidp@wilsoncenter.org

The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars is located in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 T 202/691-4000