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MEMORANDUM

DOS

THE WHITE HOUSE

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review(s)

WASHINGTON

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completed.

February 6, 1980

1. Watson's Policy Recommendations on U.S.-Soviet Relations: Ambassador Watson's overall recommendation is to maintain a tough stance on the sanctions already announced, while leaving open the door for later redemption; to make clear by our actions that we object only to Soviet behavior and do not seek to overthrow the Soviet system; to proceed carefully in defending areas of vital interest in order to avoid our having forced on us a choice between defeat on the ground and nuclear war; and to explore ways to maintain a dialogue. Regarding informal explorations on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and also on starting up arms control talks, Watson suggests using himself and Dobrynin for smoking out the possibilities and possibly sending an unofficial interlocutor such as Averell Harriman. The ambassador continues that it is up to us by our actions to get across to the Soviet leadership that they have misjudged us: we are not trying to do them in, but we cannot be stampeded by a show of strength. In these circumstances, Watson observes, the President's cool but determined approach may have to continue for some time. We will want to show our capability for moving along lines that could hurt their interests on key sensitive points -- China, international isolation, a possible new arms race. He speculates that the Soviets will not show much desire to talk seriously until they become convinced of the inevitability of the President's reelection. Watson cautions that a great danger arises if we assume that the threat of direct military combat between Soviet and American forces will cause Moscow to back away and that only token forces will be required to make the threat valid. Tripwire forces might in fact even invite their attack; the Soviets may not believe any threats to use tactical nuclear weapons; and if we were forced to use them, Watson believes the worst predictions about escalation will come true. (Moscow 2027 NODIS Cherokee, LDX) (C)

2. Iranian Pressures on Pakistan: Ambassador Hummel expresses concern about increasing indications of considerable pressures on Pakistan from Iran, urging the Paks not to engage themselves in any new relationship with the U.S. He specifically cites a CIA field report from an excellent source that the messages are coming through various channels, all with the

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same kind of warning. The ambassador sees this as being obviously the work of Soviet-sponsored elements in Iran seeking to play on already-present Pak skittishness about the U.S. relationship. As for countering these efforts, Hummel suggests that we continue our follow-on dialogue with Islamabad both there and here urging their continued resistance to the pressure. (Islamabad 1041 NODIS, PSN 8585) (S)

3. EC Foreign Ministers Council on Summer Olympics: Embassy Brussels reports that there was a lengthy discussion of the Olympic issue at yesterday's EC foreign ministers council. While no decision was taken and no formal council statement was issued, Genscher, Carrington, Ruffini and Burke made statements to the press which appear to have been coordinated in the council. The four ministers each said that it was up to the Soviet Union to create the conditions under which all countries can participate in the Olympics. (Brussels 2296, PSN 8051) (C)

4. Human Rights Commission -- Argentina's Position: Ambassador Castro reports that the media, as anticipated, had a field day with his visit to the foreign ministry to deliver a copy of the department's human rights report on Argentina. Judging from his conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Cavandoli, Castro believes the report obviously has taken its toll. Cavandoli was curt, and made clear Argentina's unhappiness with the report. He repeated several times that Goodpaster had given assurances that the U.S. would respect and honor the recommendations of the UN committee of five experts. Cavandoli added that Argentina would accept the findings of the five experts, even though it is not what they want, and that he was confused as to how the U.S. can now renege on its agreement to abide by the recommendation of the five experts, who are now requesting additional information on missing and disappeared persons. (Buenos Aires 1066 NODIS, PSN 7846) (C)

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