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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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September 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM : Edmund S. Muskie *ESM*
SUBJECT : UN Meeting with Gromyko

My meeting with Gromyko in New York will enable us to deal with a variety of issues which have arisen since I saw him in Vienna this May, and to return to the question which dominated that meeting -- Afghanistan. I have five principal objectives:

- o To review our exchanges on Afghanistan, emphasizing the importance of a prompt and complete Soviet withdrawal while reiterating our willingness to explore in earnest the possibilities of a political settlement;
- o To reiterate our views on Iran and the security of the Persian Gulf;
- o To gain Soviet agreement to our scenario for beginning preliminary exchanges on TNF;
- o To convey our general arms control approach post-Afghanistan and to review a number of other arms control matters.
- o To reemphasize the importance we attach to the USSR's fully honoring its CSCE commitments, raising improved treatment of dissidents, Jewish emigration and VOA jamming in the context of the Madrid Review Conference.

All of us should refrain Iraq/Iran conflict

The meeting will take place at the Soviet UN Mission, since Cy Vance met with Gromyko last year in our Mission. This will give me the opportunity to make the first presentation. Given the continuing strains in our relationship, I intend to stick to those issues where it is essential that Moscow clearly understand our views, or where we have substantive business to conduct.

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On Afghanistan, I intend to emphasize the continuing damage the invasion is doing to the international environment and to prospects for relieving bilateral tensions. I will stress that Moscow should be under no false illusions that we will be prepared to return to business as usual as long as the occupation continues. I will review with Gromyko our exchange of letters on Afghanistan, making clear that, for us, the central element in any satisfactory settlement must be a complete Soviet withdrawal. I will nonetheless reiterate our continued preparedness to explore the possibilities for a peaceful settlement which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties.

*Neutral.
No dealing
w/ Babrak =
Transitional
arrangements
ok*

I expect our review of Afghanistan to lead into a discussion of Iran and the Persian Gulf. I will hand over the non-paper worked out under David Aaron's and David Newsom's supervision (Tab A). We expect Gromyko to criticize sharply the security measures we are undertaking to defend our interests in the area. I intend to reply by pointing out the impact on our planning of Soviet activities in the region, emphasizing that we have no offensive intentions in the region, and asserting our determination to back up your State of the Union pledge.

*Give
Gromyko
non-paper,
after
reading
it.*

On TNF, I will be proposing that we reach final agreement for beginning preliminary exchanges in Geneva this October, with each side represented by a small team of senior officials. We won't know for certain that the Soviets will agree until I actually sit down with Gromyko. Before agreeing, however, Gromyko may claim that we are setting a precondition by insisting that FBS be excluded, and he may try to get a concession from us on FBS before accepting our proposals. The line we have worked out on FBS will enable me to make clear that we are not setting any preconditions, but simply will bring a different view to the talks. If Gromyko agrees to our approach, it may be possible to work out agreed general language for a public announcement. Otherwise, I assume each side will be prepared to make unilateral announcements that agreement has been reached.

*Mid-
October
if
possible*

I will also seek to preempt what I expect to be a strong attack from Gromyko by taking the initiative in a number of arms control matters. I will reaffirm your determination to have SALT II ratified and our policy of restraint in the interim. I will stress how the Afghanistan situation continues to make uncertain the timing and success of ratification. I plan to point to your and Fritz's recent public remarks to underscore our continued commitment to achieving balanced, verifiable arms

*Also
Harold's
from
Fase the
+ your 9/21
speech in
Chicago -*

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control agreements with the Soviets. I will reaffirm our basic commitment to the arms control process, including the ongoing Comprehensive Test Ban, MBFR and CW negotiations (and, at an appropriate time, to consider restarting the ASAT negotiations.)

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I also plan to raise the Sverdlovsk incident. We have made a number of bilateral demarches but have not received satisfactory responses. Based on our recent consultations with the British, which included exploration of possible multilateral steps, we think the UK will want to make a demarche of its own to the Soviets. With Gromyko, I will stress the depth of our concern and our determination to pursue the issue until a satisfactory resolution can be found. I will make clear that continued Soviet refusal to cooperate could have far-reaching negative ramifications but that Soviet cooperation would be a very positive step in our arms control relationship.

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I expect Gromyko to raise PD-59. If he does, I will forcefully reaffirm our decision and stress that its sole purpose is deterrence.

I plan also to raise a number of issues which were not discussed at our initial meeting in Vienna because of time constraints, or which have arisen since. I intend to reaffirm to Gromyko the importance we attach to improved treatment for Soviet dissidents and to Jewish emigration levels. I will note that we expect to discuss these matters, as well as security and other issues, in what we hope will be a business-like manner at the Madrid CSCE Review Conference. I will also protest the renewed jamming of our broadcasts into the Soviet Union.

My meeting with Gromyko will provide our first opportunity for a direct high-level exchange with the Soviets on Poland. Barring a change before the meeting in Moscow's present policy of relative restraint, I feel our best course is simply to reiterate our views on the importance of allowing Poland to resolve its internal problems free from external interference of any kind.

I do not expect Gromyko to take the initiative in suggesting a follow-up meeting. If he does, I would propose to accept his proposal in principle, subject to your subsequent confirmation. I do not intend to take the initiative in proposing a new meeting.

While raising undue expectations will be less of a problem in New York than it was in Vienna, our public posture will still be important. Before the meeting I plan to stress the routine

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nature of the UNGA bilateral, and that we expect no major substantive breakthroughs. Except in the case of TNF, we would indicate after the meeting that our expectations had generally been met, and stress its usefulness as a means of keeping open channels of communication. If asked, we would acknowledge that Afghanistan and Poland had been raised, but decline to go into the substance of our exchanges. Beyond that, we would indicate only that a range of issues of mutual interest had been discussed.

Attachment: Non-Paper on Iran/Persian Gulf