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REMARKS:			
Release of the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD Programmatic Data with the Protection of Residual, Sensitive Material			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
(b)(3), (b)(6)			5/8/95

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
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(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

April 14, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Release of the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD
Programmatic Data with the Continued Protection of
Residual, Sensitive Material

REFERENCES: (a) Memo for D/CIO, DDS&T and OGC, 20 Mar 95,
(b)(1)1.5c 27665/95
(b) Memo for NRO, D/IMINT and D/MS&O, 20 Mar 95,
(b)(1)1.5c 27666/95

Action Requested:

That you approve my recommendations to: (a) release selective programmatic data associated with the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD¹ imaging satellite reconnaissance programs; (b) continue to protect the identified residual data that remain sensitive; and (c) direct implementing actions to carry out these policies.

This decision memorandum complements the actions already taken to declassify the camera and the imagery collected by these systems.

Background:

On 24 February 1995 you participated with the Vice President in a ceremony announcing the signing of an Executive Order declassifying imagery from the KH-4, KH-5, and KH-6 early intelligence satellite systems and commemorating the future transfer of a KH-4 camera to the Smithsonian. Within 18 months,

¹ CORONA (KH-4), ARGON (KH-5), and LANYARD (KH-6) were the first three imaging satellite reconnaissance programs. They operated during the period of 1960 to 1972.

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imagery from the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD systems will be available to the public. As a final step in this process of imagery openness, we have prepared this memorandum to address selective release of the programmatic data.

Discussion:

There is justification to release programmatic data associated with the earliest satellite reconnaissance programs (CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD). For the most part, the information is no longer sensitive. If released, it should enhance the value of the imagery that will be declassified and contribute further to the imagery openness atmosphere. Furthermore, the action to declassify the imagery has served to reveal some of the programmatic data and makes it almost impossible to continue blanket protection.

While much of the programmatic data can be released, there may be limited programmatic records in the archives that will remain sensitive and require continued protection, including protection under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Information Act. It is their relationship with current sources and methods that makes this so. In particular, there are issues associated with (b)(1)1.5c, (b)(1)1.5g

(b)(1)1.5c, (b)(1)1.5g

It should take from one to two years to complete the review and transfer of these records to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Because of the anticipated long review process, we plan to release a limited amount of information in conjunction with two 35th Anniversary Commemoration events for CORONA: (1) a joint CIA/Air Force/National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)/Smithsonian/National Space Club reception in May to be held at the Smithsonian when the KH-4 camera will be dedicated and individuals who worked on the program will be honored; and (2) a CIA Center for Studies of Intelligence Conference on CORONA and its intelligence contribution that is tentatively being planned for the same time. The NRO has the technical expertise to review the programmatic records; however, the review will have a substantial resource impact and could be delayed if there are extensive Freedom of Information Act requests during the review period.

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Our approach is to assemble the documents, develop review guidelines and criteria, conduct the review in cooperation with CIA, Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T), and declassify the eligible records upon release to the NARA. To expedite this process, we have already prepared an initial version of the review guidelines and criteria and have requested concurrence from the Central Imagery Office, CIA/DDS&T, and Office of General Counsel (OGC) (Reference a). I have also directed elements of the NRO to begin the assembly of the programmatic material in anticipation of your approval of our approach (Reference b). CIA/DDS&T and CIA/OGC have reviewed and concurred with our recommendations and the proposed approach.

Recommendations:

That you delegate declassification and release authority to the Director, NRO and direct him, in coordination with CIA and other Agency representatives as appropriate, to do the following:

- a. Assemble CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD programmatic material from within the NRO, CIA, Air Force, and other Intelligence Community agencies;
- b. Conduct a review of this material with the objective of releasing a large portion of the material to NARA for public release (residual sensitive material whose public disclosure could reasonably be expected to have an adverse impact on national security would not be released to the public);
- c. Complete the transfer of releasable satellite reconnaissance program materials to NARA within 18 months of the approval date in this memorandum.

(b)(6)

[Redacted signature block]

JEFFREY K. HARRIS

APPROVED:

(b)(6)
[Redacted name]

WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN, Admiral USN
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

4/19/95
Date

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