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REMARKS: Guidelines For Review of Programmatic Data Associated With Deactivated Imaging Satellite Reconnaissance Programs			
(b)(3), (b)(6)			DATE 5/9/95

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
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**GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF PROGRAMMATIC
DATA ASSOCIATED WITH DEACTIVATED IMAGING
SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS**

1. **Objective:** To outline guidelines for use in identifying releasable material associated with the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD imaging satellite reconnaissance programs.

2. **Scope:** These guidelines are applicable to the information and material that are associated with the development and operation of the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD imaging satellite reconnaissance programs. Classification guidelines for programmatic records associated with current systems are addressed in extant National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) policy documents (b)(1)1.5c controlled material. Guidance for the security classification of the reconnaissance film acquired by these and other imaging satellite programs is published by the Central Imagery Office (CIO).

3. **First Principle:** The Intelligence Community must continue to protect from disclosure any imaging satellite reconnaissance information which, if disclosed, reasonably could be expected to reveal sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or otherwise compromise intelligence collection systems. This specifically includes information and material associated with the older, retired systems. There are three categories of information that potentially could have such an impact:
 - a. Information about US imaging reconnaissance systems that, if made available to foreign powers, could be used against the US to collect intelligence that the foreign powers do not now have the capability to collect, or which would materially and substantially reduce the investment such powers would have to make to do such collection;

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b. Information about US imaging reconnaissance systems that, if made available to potential targets, could be used by the targets to develop countermeasures against US imaging satellite reconnaissance operations and associated exploitation; and

c. Information about sources and methods associated with the acquisition and protection of US imaging satellite reconnaissance systems that, if known by potential adversaries, could be used to acquire insights into vulnerability of our sources and methods.

4. Guiding Principles:

a. Any decision which would permit the release of satellite reconnaissance material must be consistent with the Director of Central Intelligence's statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods associated with our current programs and activities.

b. The NRO is the Executive Agent for providing guidance for the protection of non-product aspects of imaging satellite reconnaissance. (This includes all (b)(1)1.5c controlled material and any other classified information related to the development, funding, and operation of these satellite systems.)

c. The Director, CIO is the Executive Agent for providing guidance for the protection of imagery and imagery-derived products collected by imaging satellite reconnaissance systems.

d. Any declassification actions for NRO-controlled program information must be evaluated and decided upon on a case-by-case basis for different categories of information associated with each system (e.g., hardware for the KH-4, funding for the KH-4, contractual relationships for the KH-4, etc.).

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e. Comprehensive guidelines for older material are essential in order to ensure the continued protection of any sensitive, current satellite reconnaissance material.

5. **Discussion:** When determining whether or not an imaging satellite reconnaissance program contains sensitive information, the process is to evaluate the components or categories of the program in terms of the relevant sensitivity factors.

a. **Categories of Programmatic Material and Information.** There are six categories of material and information associated with the development and operation of satellite reconnaissance systems. Each of these must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and the assessment must consider the impact on the other categories, i.e., would the subsequent disclosure of one category compromise a sensitive aspect of any of the other categories?

(1) **Hardware:** The actual physical equipment involved in the operation of the reconnaissance system. It includes the four subcategories of: launch vehicle, spacecraft, sensor, and mission ground station equipment.

(2) **Software:** The computer programs used to operate the hardware. It also includes three subcategories: launch, spacecraft maintenance, and sensor operations.

(3) **Documentation:** The engineering design, operation manuals, and reference documents for the various subcategories of hardware and software.

(4) **Management & Organizational Relationships:** The management structure and the identification of organizational relationships. It includes the main subcategories of government and contractor. Particular attention needs to be given to any

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formerly covert relationships involved in the building and operation of the reconnaissance systems. Each contractor and government component is to be considered as an individual case.

(5) Funding: The overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the satellite reconnaissance system.

(6) History of Program Development: Documentation that describes how the program was developed and integrated into an operating system. This specifically includes research, manufacturing and test facilities; logistics arrangements; and the cover/security methods used to protect any and all elements of the program. The main focus in assessing this category is to evaluate sources and methods implications. Specific consideration must be given to the possibility that disclosing a security or cover approach used in the distant past may highlight or foreclose use of a similar or related method in the future.

b. Sensitivity Factors. There are four factors that are indicators of the potential damage that could result from unauthorized disclosure. Asking questions about these factors will suggest the degree of national security damage that could be expected if the particular category of reconnaissance information were to be publicly disclosed.

(1) Technology: The degree of technological sophistication associated with the material. Is the reconnaissance material unique and highly sensitive because it approaches state-of-the art technology? Or, is it common and without sensitivity because it reflects commercial off-the-shelf products?

(2) Methodology: The degree that the material or information reflects current, unique, intelligence methodology. Does the information or material provide insight into the intelligence methodologies that are essential to current intelligence activities? Does the information or material

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reflect a unique way in which the US would in a secure/covert way integrate technology into a current, successful, imaging collection system?

(3) Foreign Policy: The degree to which public disclosure would damage US arrangements with its allies or damage US relationships with governments and international organizations. Would foreign governments acquire unacceptable economic, military, or intelligence advantages over the US because of the disclosure? Would the disclosure embarrass other governments or otherwise cause them to retaliate against the US? Would disclosure put the US at a distinct disadvantage in international organizations (e.g., United Nations)?

(4) Age: The degree to which the age of the material has made it irrelevant to current national security issues. Has sufficient time elapsed to cause the information or material to lose its operational and policy significance?

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CORONA/ARGON/LANYARD REVIEW CRITERIA Program Information of Continued Sensitivity

1. Specific Information about the Satellite Control Network,¹ including:

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¹ Specific release must be coordinated with Air Force SPACE COMMAND.

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2. Details about security techniques, methodology, and cover techniques, including:

- a. Specifics of the cover story;
- b. Details of security plans; and
- c. (b)(1)1.5c
but not the program terms "CORONA", "ARGON" or "LANYARD").

RATIONALE:

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3. Compromising contractor information, including:
- a. Covert contracting procedures;
 - b. "Fact of" and details about Kodak covert film processing and associated Kodak facilities (i. e., the Rochester Plant);
 - c. Names of Kodak employees and CIA relationships; and
 - d. Plans and identification of specific contractors for involvement in future programs.

RATIONALE:

- (1) *Compromise could increase the risk of penetration or overt disruption that could reduce the company's ability to covertly build programs in the future.*
- (2) *Compromise could result in negative customer reactions that could affect the company's economic soundness and impair its capability to support USG reconnaissance requirements.*
- (3) *Negative consequences for the company could result in the company's reluctance or inability to enter into future covert contracts, thereby making a particular intelligence source and method unavailable.*

4. References to and information about follow-on programs, sensitive collection operations, complementary collection missions, and related covert activities, including:

a. Fact of US satellite SIGINT (b)(1)1.5c
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b. Indications of sensitive tasking (b)(1)1.5c
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c. (b)(1)1.5c
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d. (b)(1)1.5c
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RATIONALE: This information continues to require protection in the interests of national security and remains classified.

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