

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 26, 1979

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SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING
December 26, 1979

TIME AND PLACE: 9:30-10:30 a.m.;
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting
on Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher,
Deputy Secretary
David Newsom,
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs
Harold Saunders,
Ass't. Secretary for
Near Eastern & South
Asian Affairs

DEFENSE

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Deputy Secretary
Robert W. Komer, Under
Secretary for Policy
Affairs

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director
Frank Carlucci, Deputy
Director
Arnold Horelick, NIO for
Soviet Union
[REDACTED] Military 1,50
Analyst

WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC

Thomas Thornton
Col. William Ocom

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Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason: NSC 1.13(b)

Declassify on: OADR

Partially Declassified/Released on 6/8/58
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions in Afghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 transports, including AN-22s, AN-12s, and IL-76s, arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union during December 25th. Kabul airport appears to be a major reception point. Activity at Bagram airport is not known. This size airlift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat force level in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and one and one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushka have yet crossed the border into Afghanistan. Thus we have an unusually large air movement but no ground re-inforcement. There is [REDACTED] direct politburo supervision of parts of this operation. (S)

The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Soviet operation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your position here at home. Our objective, then, should be to make the operation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting off the ground. CIA will submit a full status report tomorrow. (S)

There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regional impact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that time we should have a more definitive picture of the scope of Soviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options for dealing with the issue, including possible recourse to the UN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning:

1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actions to reach the media on its own and maintain our current public posture.
2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to concerned countries in the region as well as other interested parties.
3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today in connection with planned briefings on Iran.
4. You should not become personally involved in a further demarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have Tom Watson reiterate our concerns and press for an explanation of recent troop movements; the Soviets have probably passed the point of no return. (S)

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Review on Dec. 26, 1999
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason: NSC 1.13(b)

Declassifyon: OADR