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Mr. Kaufmann/10-25-62

ANNEX 2 - Cuba and the Strategic Threat

Strategic considerations require that an evaluation be made of the additional threat to U.S. general war forces posed by the continued presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. Current intelligence estimates state that by the end of 1962 the Soviets

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following number of ready ICBM launchers:

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<u>Class</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Basing</u>
SSp6	6 - 10	Chief. Declass By Dir. & Assoc. Div, WHS
SS-7	75 - 90	Fixed, soft
SS-8	5 - 10	Fixed, hardened.

Conclusive evidence now exists that the Soviets have deployed MRBM's and IRBM's to Cuba in the following quantities:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Basing</u>
MRBM (SS-4)	24	Mobile
IRBM (SS-5)	16	Fixed, soft

If we assume the high ICBM threat of 110 missiles, the total number of missiles aimed at the U.S. increases by nearly 40 per cent with the addition of the Cuban sites.

In its present alert condition, the SAC bomber force is located on 76 bases. Of these, 34 are within range of the Cuban MRBM's. With the exception of a portion of the Northwestern U.S., all remaining strategic bases could be reached by IRBM's launched from Cuba. However, the number of IRBM's currently in place is limited.

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What would be the consequences of a Soviet first strike ICBM attack without and with current Cuban missile capabilities? The following table shows U.S. strategic capabilities in peacetime and the consequences of a Soviet no-warning attack:

Surviving U.S. Strategic CapabilitiesSoviet no-warning attack, 1962

	<u>Peacetime U.S. Capabilities</u>		<u>Results of Soviet Attack without Cuba*</u>		<u>Results of Soviet Attack with Cuba*</u>	
	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
ICBM	144	144	144	144	118	118
POLARIS	96	96	96	96	96	96
B-52	600	1800	81	243	81	243
B-47, B-58	<u>895</u>	<u>1790</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>126</u>
	1735	3830	x 405	841 **	358	x 483 **

\* U.S. forces are assumed to be dispersed and on DEFCON III. Although bombers and missiles are on alert, they receive no usable warning. Under current conditions, this assumption is almost certainly valid for bombers attacked by the Cuban missiles.

\*\* If we allow 50 per cent attrition of the bomber force in its retaliation, this would mean that approximately 444 weapons would reach the BRL in the first case, and 303 weapons in the second case.

The size of the Soviet ICBM force does not allow adequate coverage of both soft bomber bases and soft missile sites (110 missiles for 87 aiming points) unless this force is augmented by submarine launched missiles. The addition of the Cuban MRBM/IRBM force permits coverage of all soft bomber and missile points. The Cuban MRBM's and IRBM's, in

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coordination with Soviet ICBM's and 96 submarine launched missiles would probably eliminate all soft bomber and missile sites as well as some moderately hardened Atlas sites.

In either of these past two circumstances, the U.S. could not hold the POLARIS force in reserve and at the same time adequately cover high priority Task I targets in the Soviet Union (consisting of approximately 220 points). In short, where the Cuban missile force is added to the Soviet ICBM's, it reduces by about 12 per cent the vehicles, and by roughly 30 percent the weapons, that the U.S. can deliver against the Soviet Union.

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