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DRAFT - November 7, 1962
PAUL H. NITZE

THE REMOVAL OF IL-28's FROM CUBA

1. So far the Soviets have refused to remove IL-28's from Cuba. Their removal may require increased pressure by the U.S. and even their destruction by air attack. We should plan on the actions to take if the Soviets do not agree in the next several days to their removal. We should begin now to establish the basis of public understanding and support for these actions, should they become necessary.

2. Kuznetsov should first be told that we will shortly have to make public the fact of Soviet non-performance on the jet bombers and once this is done, follow it up with necessary and appropriate action. Should this step not produce a satisfactory reaction from the Soviet Union, we should issue a public statement within the next few days preferably shortly after we have confirmation that the ships carrying the declared inventory of missiles from Cuba have passed our outward bound inspection. The public statement should include the following points:

a. It should lay out the key facts on the removal of offensive systems from Cuba:

- I. Evidence of the dismantling of missile sites;
- ii. The apparent movement of missiles and their equipment to port and loading on ships;
- iii. The departure of ships believed to be carrying the declared inventory of missiles.
- iv. The visual inspection of missiles on the departed ships from U.S. naval vessels.

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- v. Continuing uncrating, assembly and readying of IL-28 jet bombers;
 - vi. The degree of progress achieved on arrangement for inspecting incoming ships;
 - vii. The failure to make progress with regard to UN on-the-ground inspection in Cuba.
- b. It should state that the Soviets appear to have partially -- but only partially -- carried out the agreement arrived at in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters. An important weapon system capable of offensive use, the IL-28 jet bombers, more than 40 in number, remain in Cuba. These aircraft, with a radius of action of 740 nautical miles, remain a potential threat to the southern U.S., Mexico, the entire Caribbean area, and the northern portion of South America. The U.S. regards these jet bombers as included among those offensive weapons which it was and is not prepared to tolerate in Cuba. The President's address on October 22 specifically mentioned "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons" as "an explicit threat to the people

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and security of all the Americas". The proclamation of October 22 specifically listed bomber aircraft. The President also referred in his letter of October 27th to Chairman Khrushchev, to the need, as a first step, for all weapons in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable under effective U.N. arrangements. The Soviets agreed on October 28 to "the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the ones which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union".

c. Pending completion of their portion of the agreement arrived AT in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters, the U.S. has no choice but to delay the lifting of the quarantine measures imposed but the supplementary actions may be necessary in order to assure the removal of the jet bomber threat. The President is, however, prepared to assure that these actions will not include an invasion of Cuba.

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3. If this statement does not result in removal of the IL-28's, the U.S. should proceed as follows:

- a. Announce that in view of the continued presence of jet bombers in Cuba and the failure of the Soviets to live up to their agreement, the U.S. is extending the quarantine to fuel that can be used by jet bombers, including crude petroleum from which jet fuel can be made. Heavy petroleum used by power generating plants would be allowed through.
- b. If the imposition of such a partial POL blockade does not promise to lead to the removal of these aircraft, we could make the POL blockade complete, or we could carry out an air attack on these bombers.

4. If an air attack is decided on:

- a. It should be preceded by a warning that action to remove this threat is about to be taken; that the area where these aircraft are located should be evacuated by all personnel; and that any attack on U.S. aircraft will be met with appropriate counter-action.
- b. In the absence of air counter-action, the attack should be strictly confined to the destruction or serious damaging of the IL-28 aircraft by the most precise air attack means available. If there is air counter-action, appropriate defense suppression will be required.

5. To assure maximum international support, the OAS and the NATO Council should be consulted in advance and asked to support our

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position and the actions we propose to take.

6. On 4 November, Kuznetsov told McCloy that if the U.S. was honest in its pledge on non-invasion, it should not be disturbed by the existence of IL-28 aircraft in Cuban hands, since they are defensive and subsidiary arms. Such a turnover to the Cubans would, in our view, be a violation of the intent of the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement. If Chairman Khrushchev, nevertheless, confirms transfer to the Cubans as being the Soviet position, we would have the option of holding that our air action against the IL-28's was not being taken against the Soviet Union, but only against offensive weapons now in Cuban hands. Alternatively, we could maintain our position that these are Soviet weapons. This latter position may increase the likelihood of some Soviet counter-action although Soviet behavior so far suggests that the likelihood of a serious riposte is low.

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