

**TOP SECRET**JCSM-885-62  
10 November 1962**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE****Subject: Possible Way to Terminate the Cuban Incident**

1. It appears likely to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a situation is developing in our dealings with the Soviet representatives whereby we will be unable to effect the withdrawal of the IL-28 aircraft by negotiation or to insure against further introduction of offensive weapons. The United States will thus be faced with obtaining the withdrawal or destruction of the IL-28's by force or with accepting their continued presence.

2. The use of force such as blockade or air attack on the IL-28's has disadvantages which include the possibility of remaining at the end still obligated to give some kind of guarantee to Castro. If we are not willing to use force, we will have to live with the consequences of their continued existence but this situation would carry with it the distinct advantage of allowing us to repudiate our commitment to give some kind of guarantee to Castro.

3. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that as a choice between unsatisfactory alternatives, the better course of action would be one in which the USSR and the UN might be "disengaged" from the current situation in Cuba, leaving the United States and the OAS to deal with the Cubans on what the Russians say is a Cuban matter (the IL-28's). This might be accomplished by:

a. Informing the Russians we accept the IL-28 issue as a Cuban rather than a Russian matter.

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b. Informing the Russians that we consider their removal of the missiles as being only partial completion of their part of the bargain with us, in return for which we will remove the quarantine on shipping to Cuba,

c. Informing the Russians that since all offensive weapons systems have not been removed from Cuba, we naturally can give no guarantees relative to Cuba and will henceforth deal with Cuba on issues wherein there are differences between the OAS, the United States and Cuba.

d. Informing the Cubans that we, in conjunction with the OAS, will continue surveillance as we deem necessary so long as Cuba poses an offensive threat to the United States or to Latin American countries and that we will take such action against Cuba as may be required to nullify such a threat or Cuban-inspired subversion in the Western Hemisphere.

**For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

**MAXWELL D. TAYLOR**  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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