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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, DC

MP

29 October 1962

SUBJECT: (U) Current Indications and Implications of
Military Capabilities in Cuba

TO: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Joint Staff

1. Attached for your information is a study analyzing the significance of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba, based primarily on the numbers and types and operational status of military equipment observed.

2. The conclusions of this study are:

a. That the Soviet Union was moved to establish an offensive base in Cuba by knowledge that unhampered development would add substantially to their total nuclear attack capability against the United States; but, equally as important, by their estimate that they could demonstrate the United States to be no longer capable of preventing the advance of Communist offensive power into the Western Hemisphere.

b. That the Soviets miscalculated the rapidity with which the United States would become aware of the establishment of the offensive base. (There are relatively strong indications that the Soviets were aiming for a fully offensive operational capability by mid-November - mid-December. Estimated fully operational dates for the MRBM were 22-28 October, IRBM from 1-15 December, and IL-28 from 1-10 December.)

c. That the Soviets apparently miscalculated the timing and vigor of the United States reaction, as well as underestimating the degree of world support the United States response did, in fact, evoke.

d. That, unless heavy U.S. pressure is maintained, the Soviets will stall in dismantling missile systems and IL-28s and will attempt to salvage as much of their original plan as possible (which apparently was to culminate about mid-November to mid-December). In any event, even if designated offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba the extensive build-up of modern defensive capabilities has resulted in the establishment of a secure, heavily defended, strategically located Soviet base in the heart of the Western Hemisphere and, as such, constitutes a substantial Soviet gain.

e. Future Soviet actions, both immediate and long-term, are expected to provide further appreciation of the full nature of these activities.

Joseph F. Carroll
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

1 Atch
Sov Mil Build-up in Cuba Study

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~~TOP SECRET~~ DIAAB SPECIALY GROUP STUDY ON CUBA

SUBJECT: (U) Current Indications and Implications of Military Capabilities in Cuba

1. The Soviet military build-up in Cuba, has, since its inception in the summer of 1960, resulted in reorganization of Cuban ground, sea and air forces. Present estimates of total deliveries of major types of weapons to Cuba are shown in Attachment 1 to this study. At the upper echelon the Cuban military appears to be organized along the lines of the East European Satellite armies, and in many respects is operating Soviet equipment under the precepts of Soviet tactical doctrine.
2. We believe that the Soviets made their original decision to engage in a military build-up in Cuba following the Mikoyan visit in February of 1960. This decision probably was based on a combination of his reports as to the viability and Communist inclination of the regime, as well as the results of Soviet observation of the actions of the Castro government.
3. Soviet reluctance to go all-out in their military aid was apparent in the early stages of the program. This reluctance was largely dissipated by the political-psychological climate which prevailed following the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference in May.
4. The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961 probably contributed to a further disappearance of Soviet inhibitions regarding the scope of the military build-up. The invasion attempt may have been more frightening to Castro and the Communists than it seemed at the time, or the subsequent increases in the extent of the military build-up may have resulted from increased confidence in the value of Cuba as the first major

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Communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Identification of the real reason for the marked expansion of the build-up is a question that remains to be resolved.

5. The developments which were apparent in Cuba up to late July 1962 seemed primarily designed to rebuild the Cuban military and train it for internal security and defensive operations.
6. The significant developments which have been observed since then, however, indicate that perhaps as much as a year ago, the Soviet leaders began to think in terms of a completely different plan for Cuba: the establishment of a Soviet strategic offensive base on the island. It is almost certain that the implementing decisions in this respect were made not later than March of this year.
7. The rapid establishment of a system of 24 operational surface-to-air missile sites which virtually blanket the island; the establishment of an operational capability with medium-range ballistic missiles and the concurrent development of intermediate range ballistic missile sites; the shipment of nuclear capable jet light bombers, all give ample evidence of this decision.
8. The recent appearance of improved Soviet medium tanks, the indication that short range tactical missiles may have been added to the inventory, and the progressive appearance of modern inventory items of ground force equipment deployed about the island, while not basically inconsistent with the purely defensive build-up thesis, do indicate that Soviet plans in this respect have gone well beyond their original concepts.

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- 9. The present aggregate of weapons systems on the island -- assuming proficient command, control and employment -- constitutes a force of considerable capability. The offensive capability, if developed to the extent now indicated by detected site development, would increase by about 50% the present megaton yield which the Soviets could lay on United States targets in an initial salvo with missile-delivered warheads. (Details of the major components of the offensive and defensive systems will be found in Attachments 2, 3, and 4.)
- 10. However, any determination of the effectiveness of the weapons systems now known or estimated to be in Cuba will not derive from determination of actual inventories, but from a determination of the professional capabilities of the commanders and troops who use them.
- 11. In the case of the offensive missile systems, there is no doubt that they are completely controlled and operated by Soviet personnel. The capability of the force would, if developed to the extent which can now be foreseen, constitute a significant addition to the total strategic threat to the United States.
- 12. The ground based components of the air defense system will probably remain largely in the hands of Soviet personnel. It seems certain that the present defensive missile sites are operated by Soviet personnel, and equally as certain that the supporting electronic detection, tracking and control systems are operated by Soviets. Cuban personnel may be in training for the operation of these systems, but up to a year probably would elapse before any Cuban unit could achieve a real independent operational proficiency.

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13. The MIG 15/17/19 components of the Cuban Air Force probably are largely manned by Cuban pilots, but available indicators point to a significant presence of Soviet advisors, technicians and instructor personnel. The force of MIG-21 aircraft is probably still largely Soviet-operated and may even be a Soviet unit though the most proficient Cuban pilots are probably being trained as rapidly as possible.

14. Cuban naval forces, possessing only light craft, would be capable of primarily harassment operations. There is considerable doubt that the Cuban naval command capability is such as to permit full exploitation of even this limited capability. An exception exists in the case of the KOMAR-class guided missile boats. These craft are believed still largely manned by Soviet naval personnel.

15. Despite possession of substantial numbers of modern heavy weapons, the Cuban army probably has its greatest present capability in the use of individual weapons at small unit level. All indications point to intensive continuing Soviet training programs in the techniques and employment of the more sophisticated equipment.

16. The Cuban ground forces (75,000 active; 100,000 reserve; and 100,000 home guard troops) was organized primarily for suppression of the civilian populace and for counter-insurgency operations, and probably has not yet trained at levels higher than battalion combat team. Even with assistance in the field from Soviet advisor/instructor personnel, ground conflict in Cuba at present probably would be characterized by a series of small unit actions. Artillery units probably could operate as battalions in a fluid situation and possibly by brigade in a static situation from previously

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prepared and surveyed positions. Cuban armor would probably be committed piecemeal, tactics which might have an initial effectiveness against airborne troops, but which could not hold a determined mass armored attack.

17. If their artillery and armor were destroyed, it is probable that Cuban infantry units would, after a sharp engagement, break contact and move to the hills for continued operations at the guerrilla level.

18. The single factor which would substantially increase the capabilities of the forces on Cuba to offer major resistance to any attack would be the extent to which Soviet combat units could be committed, or to the numbers of Soviet combat elements which could be used to stiffen Cuban regular units.

19. Khrushchev has admitted the purely Soviet control of offensive missile weapons in Cuba. Available indicators also point toward the presence of individual Soviet army units. In the latter case, the extent of Soviet unit presence is still undetermined.

20. According to our best information, no new Soviet equipment has been brought into Cuba since institution of the United States blockade. Khrushchev has now stated his intent to remove all offensive weapons. Demonstrated Soviet activities, principally in Cuba over the next few days, will be our best indicator of actual Soviet intention as to the scope and timing in the fulfillment of their pledge.

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1. Est. of Bloc Wpns Delivered to Cuba
2. Summary of Offensive Missile Developments
3. Developments in BEAGLE/IL-28 Capability
4. Status of SA-2 System

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ATTACHMENT #1

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED QUANTITY</u>
<u>LAND ARMAMENTS</u>		
<u>Armored Vehicles</u>	JS-2 Heavy Tank	40
	T34 Medium Tank	185
	(probable) T54 Medium Tank	120 (?)
	SU-100 Assault Gun	75-100
	Armed Pers Carrier BTR-152	40
	Armed Pers Carrier BTR-40	Unknown
	WHD Amphib 4x4 w/dart-like rockets	Unknown
<u>Artillery</u>	152-mm Gun-Howitzer	180
	Truck-mounted rocket launchers	70
	122-mm Gun	120
	122-mm Howitzer	120
	85-mm field gun	300
	76-mm field gun	200
	57-mm antitank gun	300
	57-mm antiaircraft gun	120
	37-mm antiaircraft gun	120
	30-mm twin antiaircraft gun	90
<u>Mortars and Machine guns</u>	120-mm mortar	180
	62-mm mortar	600
	14.5-mm quad AA machine gun	350
<u>Small Arms</u>	Rifles, carbines, submachine guns	200,000+
<u>Transport Equipment</u>	Prime movers, trucks, jeeps	7,000-9,000
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>		
<u>Jet Fighters</u>	MIG 15/17/19	60
	MIG 21	39
<u>Jet Light Bomber</u>	BEAGLE/IL-28	23*
<u>Prop Trainers</u>	Zlin-326	12
<u>Prop Transports</u>	IL-14	11
	AN-2 (Utility)	15
<u>Helicopters</u>	MI-1	11
	MI-4	34

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<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED QUANTITY</u>
<u>NAVAL VESSELS</u>		
<u>Patrol Craft</u>	Kronstadt-class sub chasers	6
<u>Motor Torpedo Boats</u>	P-6	16
PGMG	Komar GM boats (2 missiles ea.)	12
<u>UNGUIDED MISSILES</u>		
<u>Short-range Tactical</u>	FROG (50-mm)	1**
<u>GUIDED MISSILES</u>		
<u>Air Defense</u>	SA-2	70 - 80***
<u>Coast Defense</u>	Cruise-type (15 nm)	3 - 4****
<u>Medium Range Ballistics</u>	SS-4 (1,020 nm)	33#
<u>Intermediate Range Ballistic</u>	SS-5 (2,200 nm)	##

* Six BEAGLE in various stages of assembly, remainder in shipping boxes.

** One probable FROG on launcher seen in 26 October photography.

*** 70-80 missiles confirmed or probably on launchers; 24 operational sites plus 2 alternate under construction.

**** Missiles in land-based sites. (This is in addition to missiles carried by KOMAR boats.)

Missiles counted at 6 deployed sites. Estimate launch potential 24 missiles, with refire within 4-6 hours of an additional 24 missiles.

3 sites under construction. Estimate launch potential 24 missiles with possibility existence of 8 additional for site whose construction not yet started.

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ATTACHMENT #2

MRBM/IRBM

Photo coverage of 27 October correlated with previous coverage and other intelligence indicates:

- a. Construction on the IRBM and refinement of the MRBM facilities continues at an unabated rate.
- b. No additional missiles have been identified.
- c. There is as yet no firm evidence of nuclear warheads or nose cones in Cuba which will substantiate a 24 October statement by Khrushchev to an American industrialist that both nuclear and conventional warheads are available in Cuba for the Soviet ballistic missiles. Previous statements by Khrushchev on Soviet atomic energy matters provide no guide for determining the validity of this statement. Two additional bunkers for possible nuclear warhead storage have been identified. The other 5 probable bunkers at MRBM sites are not yet operational for storage, assembly, or checkout of warheads. This construction is now underway at Guanajay No. 1; Remedios; San Cristobal Nos 1, 2 and 3; and Sagua La Grande Nos 1 and 2.
- d. Six of the MRBM sites are now considered fully operational.
- e. It is assumed that all MRBM sites could be in any condition of readiness from 4 through 1, and can maintain a readiness 1 condition (30 minutes to launch) for many hours.
- f. The MRBM sites while still fully road mobile are rapidly moving away from the characteristics of a basic field site. This is evidenced by all-weather modification of the launch pad and erector area and construction of buildings and bunkers.

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Concrete pads are being installed for the erector, launcher, missile transporter and theodolite platform. Thus reaction time, reliability, and accuracy will be enhanced.

g. Camouflage and canvas covering of equipment is continuing at a rapid rate at the MRBM sites.

h. Construction of the IRBM sites is continuing at a deliberately rapid rate. 68 vehicles have been identified at Guanajay Site No. 1 including 4 tracked prime movers (two attached to fuel trailers and the other two attached to cylindrical trailers approximately 45 feet long).

i. At three of the sites, AAA positions are being developed in an apparent intent to provide low level defense. 6 gun 57-mm AA and 4 to 6 gun twin barrel 30-mm sites are emplaced at San Cristobal MRBM Complex, Site No. 1 and No. 2.

j. Additionally, new trenchworks are under construction for ground peripheral defense.

k. An improved road with wide radius turns was located about 3 1/2 miles south-east of the Remedios site. The road terminates at the edge of a wooded area which may possibly be the location for the expected second site in the Remedios area. A large quantity of pre-fabricated concrete forms and other construction material in open storage areas would provide adequate support for an additional site.

1. The IRBM sites are expected to become operational as shown:

<u>Site</u>	<u>Emergency Operational</u>	<u>Fully Operational</u>
Guanajay		
Site 1	15 Nov	1 Dec
Site 2	1 Dec	15 Dec
Remedios		
Site 1	1 Dec	15 Dec

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ATTACHMENT #3

IL-28

Coverage of San Julian airfield on 27 October showed one IL-28/BEAGLE in final stage of assembly with both engines installed, three in various stages of completion, one fuselage being worked on, one fuselage and tail section recently uncrated, and 21 fuselage crates on the taxiway. A total of 23 IL-28's, in and out of shipping crates, have been identified on this airfield in Western Cuba.

Work parties were active around all four of the above aircraft. This concentration suggests that completion of necessary internal assembly and ground check-out of the aircraft and its component systems is under an accelerated emphasis.

A ramp formerly crowded with fuselage shipping crates near the airfield operations building has also been cleared of all except three such crates. These have been dispersed about the ramp indicating that preparations for initiation of assembly activity at these ramp sites.

Over-all, the above activity reflects a Communist attempt to accelerate the assembly and checking out of these jet light bombers. The activity indicates that assembly of all 23 aircraft could be completed by approximately 1 December with a sustained high-level effort and as ground crew technicians become increasingly experienced in their local environment.

Ground crews working on the aircraft at San Julian have had one IL-28 outwardly assembled since approximately 17-18 October although the aircraft

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is not yet ready for a check-out flight. The present activity around the aircraft, however, manifests a real Communist desire to get it and the other assembled aircraft flyable as soon as possible. If the final checkouts on the ground and the checkout flight or flights do not uncover the need for a substantial re-working of some system, the first two IL-28's could have some operational capability during the first week of November 1962 with a Bloc aircrew. Assuming the same progress for the remaining aircraft, all should be assembled by 1 December and operational with Bloc aircraft by about 10 December.

The total number of IL-28s which Cuba is to receive has not been revealed. However, in view of the number received by other non-Bloc countries and practices within the Bloc, plus indications of additional shipping boxes enroute, it is estimated that Cuba may receive approximately 50, or two regiments.

Additionally, apparently for local air defense a military convoy was observed on a road leading to San Julian airfield on 26 October transporting antiaircraft artillery to this field. A total of 27 each 30-mm AAA guns were identified in this movement, but since have not been located.

A mobile GCA has been noted on the infield near the intersection of the runway.

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ATTACHMENT #4

SA-2

All twenty-four SA-2 sites observed to date are assessed as operational; however, work is still progressing on most.

The presently identified SA-2 SAM systems have been determined to be of the new variety (employing "C" Band instead of "S" Band frequencies) based upon ELINT acquisitions. The significant point in the "C" Band assessment is that no non-Soviet troops have previously been furnished this system. Further, this frequency range has been isolated for only one year and the Soviets are now gradually replacing the "S" Band systems in the GSFG SA-2 sites in East Germany. A conclusion can therefore be reached that the SA-2 sites in Cuba are now, and will continue to be, manned only by Soviet troops.

During the night of 26/27 Oct 62 a U.S. flight succeeded in receiving a "C" Band FRUIT SET signal from the vicinity of Santa Lucia. The significance of this emission lies in the fact that the FRUIT SET locked on and a subsequent "L" Band command and control signal for the GUIDELINE missile was received. This signifies an immediate readiness to fire at any time the order might be given; however, at this time it is probable that there is not an integrated SAM defense but only local operational capability for specific sites. By the time additional sites reach the operational readiness stage the integrated SAM defense net should also be ready.

Further indications on 26/27/28 October were that at least 15 additional SA-2 installations were operationally radar ready.

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