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Air Force Planners Memo No. OPS 70-62 (Revised) dtd 15 Nov 62, 3 pages,

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Authority E.O. 12958

By AL NARA Date 10-20-11

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Ru(L2) 30.9 Cuba
et/ 11/1/62*

AF PLANNER'S MEMO NO. OPS 70-62 (Revised)

NOV 15 1962

SUBJECT: Cuba (U) (J-3 Ops 189-62)

TO: Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff
Director for Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff

1. I have reviewed J-3 Ops 189-62 and consider that the proposal to direct preparation of an additional CINCLANT contingency plan for attack of the threat targets in Cuba specified in the paper, employing nuclear weapons, is inadequate and inappropriate. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed that certain potential targets in Cuba warrant identification for possible nuclear attack on the basis of active offensive threat to the US, and on the basis of capability to support operations against the US, these targets and their associated defenses are more properly contained in the SIOP than in a contingency plan. Countering a nuclear threat to the United States would appear to qualify as something beyond a contingency. Moreover, the JSCP provides guidance for the use of nuclear weapons in limited war, and the execution of nuclear operations against Cuba specifically, under conditions short of general war, is addressed in Annex W to CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan No. 314-61, now under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCLANT has recently requested* additional guidance in this connection under the limited war provisions of the JSCP. There is an additional requirement for the capability to execute attacks against Cuban threat targets and associated defenses under conditions of general war. In order to provide for the necessary integration of effort and to utilize the capability for instantaneous response,

*CINCLANT msg DTG 021702Z Nov '62

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
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I consider it essential that these targets be incorporated in the National Strategic Target Data Base and that the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff be afforded the opportunity to apply forces to those targets as required.

2. I have also reviewed J-5 P 1208/1 and provided recommendations* separately with regard to the matter addressed therein, which I consider complementary to the question addressed by J-3 Ops 189-62. The former would respond to the message** by CINCLANT dealing exclusively with limited war operations while the latter would respond to a message*** by JSTPS dealing exclusively with general war operations. The two matters are unquestionably related and should be considered in context; however, I believe that each should receive individual evaluation in the light of the circumstances of war which each addresses. In the absence of other, overriding criteria, it would seem logical to address them in the order in which they came to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. In view of the foregoing, I recommend that the draft Memorandum to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic contained in Enclosure A to J-3 Ops 189-62 be withdrawn and the Enclosure hereto be substituted therefor.

4. This Memo supersedes AF Planner's Memo No. OPS 70-62, dated 19 October 1962, which holders are requested to destroy in accordance with appropriate regulations.



RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Asst Director of Plans
Joint Matters, DCS/P&P

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*AFPM 180-62

**CINCLANT msg DTG 021702Z Nov '62

***DSTP msg to JCS, JDD B84971, DTG 021615Z Oct '62

DRAFT ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING

SUBJECT: Cuba (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your message* JDD B84971 which recommends consideration of Cuba as a part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc for purposes of targeting in SIOP. They consider that circumstances at the present time make it appropriate at a minimum to select those Cuban installations for incorporation in the National Strategic Target Data Base which constitute a potential nuclear threat to the US, those which are capable of supporting or recovering nuclear offensive operations against the US, and defenses associated with the foregoing.
2. You are authorized to select DGZs consistent with the foregoing and with the Guidance for the Preparation of SIOP-63, assuming Cuba to be a part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc for targeting purposes, and to apply such SIOP forces to those DGZs, for optional attack at the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as may be required in the light of evolving intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to be informed of DGZs selected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also desire to be kept informed of the actual extent to which SIOP committed forces are applied to DGZs in Cuba, as well as the nature of those forces.
3. In this connection choice of delivery system, tactics, weapon yield and height of burst, and DGZ selection will be predicated upon the lowest feasible levels of population casualties, collateral damage to non-military facilities, and radioactive fall-out which is compatible with neutralization of the targets selected.

*DSTP msg to JCS, for Director, Joint Staff, JDD B84971, DTG 021615Z October 1962, AFIN 27181