MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance

1. Rhodesia. Congressional leaders have responded positively to your sanctions decision. The entire House Democratic leadership -- O'Neill, Wright, Brademas, Zablocki, Solarz -- have promised to help us bottle up sanctions-lifting resolutions. The situation is slightly less helpful in the Senate, where Helms has already introduced a resolution to overturn your decision. The SFRC has agreed to schedule hearings on the Helms resolution, which it will have to discharge to the Senate floor in about ten days.

Though they would have preferred an unconditional statement that you would lift sanctions when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury, the British have expressed their appreciation for your decision. On the negotiating front, agreement at Lancaster House on ceasefire arrangements is bound to be difficult, especially with regard to the disposition of the respective armies during the ceasefire. It will be hard, however, for any party to leave the conference now that the negotiations have come so far. If all goes well, the British hope to conclude the Lancaster House talks within the next ten days.

2. Zablocki. Warren and I had breakfast with Clem Zablocki today and went over the current foreign policy agenda. On Iran, he fully supports your position and the steps you have taken. He expressed appreciation for the briefings we have been providing the Members of the House, and said that they have played an important role in keeping Members from getting out of control. Clem has been personally helpful on this front.
On Morocco, Clem agreed that it would be better to let the issue on the new arms sales come up initially in the SFRC where Dick Stone feels we have a solid margin. Clem feels that the sales would probably be approved in his committee but only after a difficult struggle. On Israel, Clem expressed great concern about the effect of the Israeli plan to deport the Mayor of Nablus and urged us to weigh in heavily.

3. Soviets-Kampuchea. We asked Dobrynin today to obtain his Government's help on Kampuchea relief activities -- specifically, that the Soviets use their influence with the Heng Samrin authorities to open additional airports, permit more relief agency personnel and more relief flights to enter the country, allow more truck convoys to lengthen their operating radius from Phnom Penh, and renew efforts to get food and medicine in by road from Thailand and Vietnam. We also urged the Soviets to encourage the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin to show restraint in the border area with Thailand.

Dobrynin said the Soviets had recently encouraged Phnom Penh to accept humanitarian aid but that the Soviets had only limited influence there. He added that the Kampucheans opposed the land-bridge proposal since it traversed battle areas, and because of suspicions the idea was a U.S. effort to aid Pol Pot. He undertook, however, to report our views.

4. Namibia. South Africa yesterday finally joined the technical talks on a demilitarized zone which the UN opened in Geneva on Monday. Pretoria has taken the position that the UN force would have only a passive role in the DMZ and therefore would not be an effective control mechanism. The UN has stressed in reply that the UN force would have a "ready reaction" capability in case of violation of the zone. While the South Africans temporize, Front Line representatives have agreed to the DMZ in principle, although minor points remain to be worked out. The Front Line and SWAPO also have apparently confirmed that SWAPO will not insist on bases inside Namibia.
5. Morocco. The Saudis have agreed in principle to fund the military supply package for Morocco. We are proceeding with informal notification to Congress of our intent to provide Morocco with six OV-10 aircraft, either 24 Hughes 500 or six Cobra helicopters, equipped with TOW, and eight F-5E aircraft to replace Moroccan losses.

6. Taiwan. At Warren's testimony today on the Taiwan agreements before John Glenn's subcommittee, there was no serious challenge to the way in which we are carrying out your commitment to continue unofficial commercial relations with Taiwan. We do not expect a Congressional effort to modify the Taiwan Relations Act or any other aspect of the new arrangements in a way that would disturb our relations with Beijing. Taiwan has clearly been waiting to see how much Congressional support it would get before agreeing to replace the old air agreement with a modernized unofficial arrangement. The outcome of the hearings should help elicit greater Taiwanese cooperation on this and other aspects of the new arrangements.