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R 112227Z APR 97
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DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

S-E-G-R-E-T SECTION 01 OF 08 BOGOTA 003463

STATE FOR INR/IL, ARA/AND, DRL, INL, EUR/RPM (MFITZPATRICK)
NSC FOR JAMES DOBBINS

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UNCLASSIFIED

REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B2, 1.4(D), 1.4(B)
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2010  200604350

SECRET

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UNCLASSIFIED

REVIEW AUTHORITY: NORMAN M BOUTON
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 APR 2022
DATE/CASE ID: 09 APR 2008  200604350

SECRET
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1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECONOFF PEG WILLINGHAM. REASON: 1.5(D)

2. (S/NF) REF A REQUESTED ANSWERS TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS REGARDING PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY IN COLOMBIA. POST NOTES THAT OBTAINING SOME OF THE SPECIFIC INFORMATION SOUGHT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. MOREOVER, PARAMILITARISM IN COLOMBIA IS NOT A MONOLITHIC, EASILY-CATEGORIZED PHENOMENON. AS REF B REPORTED, PARAMILITARY PATRONS INCLUDE NARCOTRAFFICKERS, LANDOWNERS, CATTLE RANCHERS, AND OTHERS. MOTIVES FOR HIRING VIGILANTES RANGE FROM WANTING TO DEFEND ILL-GOTTEN GAINS TO FRUSTRATION AT THE GOC'S FAILURE TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY. NO COMMON IDEOLOGY BINDS PARAMILITARIES TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH MANY, SUCH AS THE NOTORIOUS CARLOS CASTANO [REDACTED] FOCUS ON COUNTER-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES.

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3. (S/NF) MANY OBSERVERS OF CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA SUSPECT COLLABORATION BETWEEN PARAMILITARIES AND SOME ELEMENTS OF THE

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MILITARY. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT LINKS LIKELY EXIST AT LOCAL LEVELS. COMMANDERS OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS MAY, AT A MINIMUM, TURN A BLIND EYE TO PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREA. ALLEGATIONS OF MATERIAL COOPERATION ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVE, ALTHOUGH SOME MAY BE WELL-FOUNDED, GIVEN THE NUMBER OF STORIES ABOUT THE ISSUE AND THE COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS THAT PARAMILITARIES AND THE MILITARY OFTEN SHARE. GIVEN THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY'S PROBLEMS IN COUNTERING GUERRILLA DEPRADATIONS, IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL FOR THEM TO OPPOSE THE ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES OF PARAMILITARIES. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY BELIEVES THAT AS LONG AS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH PARAMILITARIES IS ONE OF TACIT ACQUIESCENCE, RATHER THAN ACTIVE SUPPORT, IT IS NOT VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY COLOMBIANS, DISGUSTED BY GUERRILLA KIDNAPPINGS, USE OF LANDMINES, MURDERS OF CIVILIANS, AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE, MAY FEEL FEW QUALMS ABOUT PARAMILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS. MANY MEMBERS OF COLOMBIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELITE ARE LANDOWNERS. EVEN IF THEY DO NOT ACTUALLY PAY PARAMILITARIES TO GUARD THEIR PROPERTY, AND MIGHT PUBLICLY DENOUNCE PARAMILITARISM, THEY BENEFIT FROM PARAMILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE OVERRUN THEIR LAND.

4. (S/NI/FO) HIGH-LEVEL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS FLATLY DENY THAT SUCH LINKS EXIST, AND IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE ANNOUNCED (WITH NO TANGIBLE RESULTS TO DATE) A GET-TOUGH POLICY AGAINST -SECRET-

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PARAMILITARIES. ON APRIL 5, PRESIDENT SAMPER ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOC WAS COMMITTED TO COMBATTING PARAMILITARIES AND GUERRILLAS WITH EQUAL VIGOR. (COMMENT: GIVEN THE GOC'S INEFFECTUAL PROSECUTION OF ITS WAR AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, THIS PRONOUNCEMENT PROBABLY DID NOT WORRY THE PARAMILITARIES TOO MUCH. END COMMENT.) WE BELIEVE THAT THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION DOES NOT SPONSOR PARAMILITARISM. HOWEVER, THE GOC HAS MADE VIRTUALLY NO EFFORT TO GO AFTER PARAMILITARIES, AND HAS BEEN RELATIVELY OPEN ABOUT PAST COOPERATION. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT THEY WORKED WITH SOME PARAMILITARY GROUPS TO COMBAT GUERRILLAS IN THE MAGDALENA MEDIO AREA IN THE 1980S. INTERIOR MINISTER HORACIO SERPA, WHILE STOUTLY DENOUNCING PARAMILITARIES AS CRIMINALS WHO MUST BE PROSECUTED, ACKNOWLEDGED IN A LATE MARCH RADIO
INTERVIEW THAT THE MILITARY "SOMETIMES" COOPERATED WITH PARAMILITARIES IN THE PAST IN PARTICULARLY CONFLICTIVE AREAS.

5. (S/NF) HOWEVER, CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF CURRENT MILITARY-PARAMILITARY LINKS IS EXTREMELY HARD TO OBTAIN, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THOSE INVOLVED PRESUMABLY VALUE SECRECY. ANECDOTES AND SPECULATION ABOUT THIS ISSUE ARE RIFE.
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JUSTICE FOR CRIM. WARREN, RICHARD AND NDDS/VAN VLIET
FBI FOR CID/IRS/IRU2
USIA FOR AR, I/GAR
TREASURY FOR FINCEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/07
TAGS: PINR, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PGOV, SNAR, CO
SUBJECT: PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN COLOMBIA (C-AL7-00269)
PARAMILITARY CAMPS IN URABA ARE LOCATED NEAR ARMY INSTALLATIONS; IN THEIR VIEW, THE ARMY MUST BE AWARE OF, AND UNCONCERNED BY, THEIR PRESENCE. THE BEST-KNOWN PARAMILITARY GROUP IN COLOMBIA, ACCU (AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE CORDOBA Y URABA), IS HIGHLY VISIBLE; MEMBERS REPORTEDLY WEAR "ACCU" T-SHIRTS AND ARMBANDS AND OPERATE ROADBLOCKS IN WELL-TRAVELLED AREAS. CITED AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE A CASE INVOLVING A MARINE UNIT IN BOLIVAR DEPARTMENT THAT ROUTINELY MANNED A CHECKPOINT BUT ABSENTED THEMSELVES ON THE DAY THAT A PARAMILITARY GROUP MURDERED FOURTEEN PEOPLE.

6. (S/Na) IN A DECEMBER 3, 1996 INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN "SEMANA" MAGAZINE, PARAMILITARY CHIEF RAMON ISAZA (SEE PARAGRAPH 15) SAID THE MILITARY DECIDED SOME TIME AGO TO STOP "PERSECUTING" HIS ORGANIZATION AND "LET US WORK. THEY SOON SAW THAT WHAT WE HAD DONE WAS THE BEST AND THAT THERE ARE AREAS WHERE THERE ARE "AUTODEFENSAS" THAT THE ARMY DOES NOT NEED TO TOUCH BECAUSE THERE ARE NO GUERRILLAS. WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO THEM..." ISAZA ADDED THAT "OF COURSE SOMETIMES THEY DO MAKE US ANGRY BECAUSE THEY DON'T LET US ENTER SOME AREAS..." REF C REPORTED ON CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICE IN CHARGE OF CONVIVIR (RURAL SECURITY COOPERATIVES) HAS ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED WEAPONS SALES TO SUSPECTED PARAMILITARIES AND NARCOTRAFFICERS. THE ONGOING LEGAL PROCESS AGAINST RETIRED GENERAL FAROUK YANINE AND THE APRIL 1996 SEGOVIA MASSACRE ARE TWO PROMINENT CASES, DOCUMENTED IN OUR 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, INVOLVING ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY-PARAMILITARY COOPERATION. ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOURCES, SOME-PARAMILITARIES MAY BE FORMER POLICE OR ARMY MEMBERS, OR EVEN EX-GUERRILLAS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME ACTIVE-DUTY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES "MOONLIGHT" AS PARAMILITARIES.

7. (S/Na) EVEN IF THERE WERE NO EVIDENCE OF LINKS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY GROUPS, THE FACT THAT THE GOC RARELY
PROSECUTES OR ENGAGES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST PARAMILITARIES IS NOTeworthy. SOME OBSERVERS ARGUE THAT THE CLANDESTINE NATURE OF PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE COLOMBIAN ARMy TO ENGAGE THEM MILITARILY. OTHERS, HOWEVER, CONTENT THAT THE

COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND POLICE CANNOT HELP BUT BE AWARE OF PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY IN THEIR AREAS AND DELIBERATELY TURN A BLIND EYE TO ATROCITIES. A COLOMBIAN ACADEMIC TOLD POloff APRIL 4 THAT THE FACT THAT MEMBERS OF CARLOS CASTANO'S ACCU CAN REPEATEDLY TRAVEL FROM CORDOBA DEPARTMENT TO SOUTHERN CESAR DEPARTMENT, COMMIT MASSACRES, AND RETURN HOME WITH IMPUNITY STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE ARMY AND POLICE ALLOW THEM TO DO SO.

8. (S/NF) IN A CONVERSATION APRIL 2 WITH POST HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER, DESCRIBED HOW 50 PARAMILITARIES ARMED WITH UZI SUBMACHINE GUNS ENTERED THE TOWN OF ANDAGOA MARCH 27. AND SOME TOWNSPEOPLE CONFRONTED THE PARAMILITARIES, WHO SAID THEY WERE LOOKING FOR GUERRILLAS. ALTHOUGH THE GROUP ULTIMATELY LEFT ANDAGOA WITHOUT HARMING ANYONE, IT PASSED ON TO THE TOWN OF ISTMINA, WHERE ITS MEMBERS MURDERED A TOWN COUNCILMAN AND THE TOWN COUNCIL PRESIDENT. SAID THERE WAS NO WAY A GROUP THAT SIZE COULD HAVE TRAVELEd TO ANDAGOA WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOVERNMENT FORCES.
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NSC FOR JAMES DOBBINS

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Have described such incidents as typical, stating their belief that the paramilitaries, at a minimum, move about some regions areas with little or no interference by government, particularly army, forces. Sources characterize the army as failing to assist and, in some cases, obstructing investigations of incidents involving paramilitary forces.

9. (S/NF) The government clearly lacks the will to enforce its own laws. In the case of Castano, subject of outstanding arrest warrants for murder and for whose capture former Mod-Esguerra, responding to pressure from human rights activists, offered a million dollar reward in December 1996 (see Ref H), even though it was the defense minister who announced the reward, military forces commander General Harold Bedoya has demonstrated no interest in pursuing Castano. Presumably sensing that he has no reason to fear a high profile, Castano was recently interviewed by the "New York Times" and other media. In addition to journalists, virtually anyone who wants to, including NGOs and GOC officials up to the secret...
RANK OF VICE MINISTER VISITS CASTANO IN CORDOBA DEPARTMENT, NO ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO PLACE HIM UNDER ARREST.

10. (C) THE EMBASSY RECENTLY OBTAINED A COPY OF A PART OF A DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE A COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE NOVEMBER 1996 "THIRD NATIONAL SUMMIT OF THE SELF-DEFENSE (AUTODEFENSAS) MOVEMENT OF COLOMBIA." THE DOCUMENT DECLARED THAT THE SUMMIT'S PURPOSE WAS TO ANALYZE THE GUERRILLA SITUATION AND FORMULATE STRATEGIC PLANS FOR DEALING WITH IT. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE REPORT WILL BE DISCUSSED BELOW IN THE SECTIONS RESPONDING TO OTHER QUESTIONS IN REF A. REGARDING LINKS WITH THE MILITARY, THE SUMMIT DOCUMENT IS FAIRLY CLEAR: "THE PARTICIPATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN OUR OPERATIONS HAS BECOME A HEADACHE; IT SUFFICES TO REMEMBER THE CASE OF GENERAL FAROUK YANINE DIAZ AND CAPTAIN NESTOR CANAS IN SEGOVIA. FROM NOW ON WE SHOULD WAGE THE WAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF EACH REGIONAL GROUP." THE DOCUMENT ALSO STATES THAT "THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL NOW HAS SHOWN A GOOD DISPOSITION TO RESPECT US AND OPEN WAYS TO UNDERSTANDING." A COLOMBIAN ACADEMIC TOLD POLOFF THAT THIS GROWING AUTONOMY DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN BREAKING WITH THE MILITARY ALTOGETHER, HOWEVER. IN HIS VIEW, PARAMILITARIES STILL BENEFIT FROM WORKING WITH THE MILITARY, AND VICE VERSA.

11. (S//NF) COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES FROM PUTUMAYO TOLD EMBOFFS APRIL 2 THEY BELIEVED THE RETURN OF PARAMILITARY FORCES TO THE REGION SINCE 1994 IS A DIRECT RESULT OF THIS LARGER STRATEGY AS DECLARED IN THE PARAMILITARY MANIFESTOS, AND DID NOT SUGGEST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

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PARAMILITARIES AS SURROGATES?
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12. (S//NF) REF A ASKED IF THE MILITARY IS USING PARAMILITARIES "AS SURROGATES TO DO THINGS THEY CANNOT DO BECAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The above-mentioned paramilitary summit communiqué stated that "the operative incapacity of the armed forces, due to the pressure of human rights organisms and other institutions like the procuraduría (attorney general's office) and fiscalía (prosecutor's office), places us in the vanguard of the fight." The document also says "it is difficult to rely on any military command ... some avoid getting close to us for fear of the procuraduría (attorney general's office) and others simply want to use us, since it is well known that we are the ones in the end who throw ourselves into combat and in a good part of the anti-guerrilla operations." In his December "semana" interview, Ramon Isaza criticized human rights organizations for trying to get the army to "stop collaborating with us and, on the contrary, persecute
US. BUT THANK GOD, UP TO NOW THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED." HOWEVER, HE SAID, "TODAY, IF THE ARMY WANTS TO DO THINGS, IT CAN'T BECAUSE IT
IS HANDCUFFED BY HUMAN RIGHTS."

13. (S/NF) WHILE THIS IS SUGGESTIVE, THE QUESTION POSED IN REF A IMPLIES A LEVEL OF CONTROL BY THE MILITARY THAT IN FACT PROBABLY DOES NOT EXIST. SEPARATE PARAMILITARY GROUPS HAVE DIVERSE AGENDAS, SOME OF WHICH COINCIDE WITH THE MILITARY'S, AND SOME WHICH DO NOT. PARAMILITARIES LIKE CARLOS CASTANO APPEAR TO HAVE "OUTGROWN" THE MILITARY AND ACT WITH INCREASING INDEPENDENCE.

14. (S/NF) HOWEVER, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT PARAMILITARIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR AN INCREASING NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AS DOCUMENTED BY OUR 1996 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT AND OTHER SOURCES. FOR EXAMPLE, A RECENT SURVEY OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN COLOMBIA SHOWED THAT CASTANO IS DISGUSTED WITH THE ARMY'S LACK OF GRATITUDE FOR HIS "ACHIEVEMENTS" ON ITS BEHALF. CASTANO EVEN ACCUSED THE MILITARY OF KILLING SOME MEMBERS OF ACCU TO SILENCE THEM.

15. (S/NF) REF A SOUGHT BASIC DATA ON PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE NORTHWESTERN COLOMBIA. CARLOS CASTANO'S ACCU SENDS LOCAL COMMANDERS TO CESAR, SUCRE, AND BOLIVAR DEPARTMENTS TO "ADVISE" OTHER PARAMILITARY GROUPS. HOWEVER, HE APPARENTLY DOES NOT COMPLETELY CONTROL THESE OTHER GROUPS AND DENIES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ABUSES THEY COMMIT (ALTHOUGH HE FREELY ADMITS THAT ACCU COMMITS MURDER AND OTHER CRIMES). AS
FOR NUMBERS, IT IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE WITH ACCURACY HOW MANY PARAMILITARIES OPERATE IN COLOMBIA THAN IT IS TO ESTIMATE GUERRILLA NUMBERS. REF D REPORTED ESTIMATE OF 4,000-- 6,000; WE CANNOT COME UP WITH A MORE SPECIFIC FIGURE. MOST PARAMILITARY MEMBERS ARE INVOLVED ON A PART-TIME BASIS. ALTHOUGH CASTANO CLAIMS THAT HE CONTROLS 2,000 MEN, ESTIMATES THAT ONLY A FEW HUNDRED ARE FULL-TIME PARAMILITARIES.

LIST IS BASED ON


VICTOR CARRANZA'S ORGANIZATION: ASIDE FROM CARRANZA, LISTED "GUILLERMO TORRES," ALIAS "SESTAN" OR "DON GUILLERMO," AND "CARLOS CASTILLO," THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION ARE LISTED AS PUERTO LOPEZ, PUERTO GAITAN, EL PORVENIR, RIO TILLAVA, EL DORADO, CUMARAL (ARIARI), VILLAVICENCIO, ACACIAS, AND GUAMAL (META DEPARTMENT), AND MEDINA AND PARATEBUENO IN CUNDINAMARCA DEPARTMENT.

AUTODEFENSAS DE MEDIO MAGDALENA: AFTER CASTANO AND CARRANZA, THIS
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GROUP'S LEADER, RAMON ISAZA (DOB 30 NOVEMBER 1941), IS THE BEST KNOWN PARAMILITARY LEADER IN COLOMBIA. BOTH AND THE PARAMILITARY SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ SUGGEST THAT HE AND CASTANO ARE RIVALS. THE LATTER DOCUMENT, WITHOUT NAMING ISAZA, STATES THAT THE MAGDALENA GROUP SHOULD STOP CONTACTS WITH GUERRILLAS, GIVE UP PLANS TO NEGOTIATE ITS DEMOBILIZATION, AND "ACCEPT THE COMMAND" OF CARLOS CASTANO. WHO CHARACTERIZED ISAZA AS "CRAZY," TOLD POLOFF THAT CASTANO WAS ANGRY WITH HIS RIVAL AND WANTED TO BRING HIM "UNDER CONTROL." HE IS SUSPECTED OF LINKS TO THE NARCOTRAFFICKING GAITAN FAMILY.

"LA MENCENTA" GROUP: COMMANDED BY "ALIEN BATALAN," THIS APPARENTLY SMALL GROUP OPERATES IN PUERTO BOYACA, BOYACA DEPARTMENT, IN THE MAGDALENA MEDIO REGION.

"RODRIGUEZ GACHA" GROUP: ALTHOUGH THIS NARCOTRAFFICKER HAS BEEN DEAD FOR YEARS, SAYS THE PARAMILITARY GROUP HE FOUNDED STILL EXISTS AND COOPERATES WITH CARRANZA. IT OPERATES IN SAN MARTIN (SOUTHERN CESAR DEPARTMENT) AND GRANADA (ANTIOQUIA..."
AUTODEFENSAS DEL BAJO RIONEGRO: COMMANDED BY "CAMILO" (NFI), THIS APPARENTLY SMALL GROUP OPERATES IN SAN RAFAEL DE LEBRÍJA AND SABANA DE TORRES IN SANTANDER DEPARTMENT.

AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DEL CESAR: THIS GROUP IS A SUBSIDIARY OF CASTANO'S ACCU AND IS LED BY "LUIS EDUARDO RESTREPO" AND "ALFONSO MACIA." IT OPERATES IN SOUTHERN CESAR DEPARTMENT AND EL COPEY, NORTHWESTERN CESAR.

AUTODEFENSAS DE VALENCIA: THIS GROUP IS COMMANDED BY SOMEONE NAMED "OSCAR" AND OPERATES IN VALENCIA, CORDOBA DEPARTMENT, PRESUMABLY LINKED TO CASTANO.

AUTODEFENSAS DE SUCRE: THIS GROUP IS COMMANDED BY "JAVIER PIEDRADITA" AND OPERATES IN TOLUVIEJO, SUCRE DEPARTMENT, AND ELSEWHERE IN SUCRE. BELIEVES THIS GROUP MAY BE A SUBSIDIARY OF CASTANO'S ACCU.

16. (S/NF) ALSO LISTED "AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE ANTIOQUIA" AND "AUTODEFENSAS CAMPESINAS DE ARAUCA" BUT HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THEM. TOLD POLOFF APRIL 7 THAT BELIEVES THAT SEVERAL CONVIVIRS (LEGALLY-ESTABLISHED RURAL SECURITY COOPERATIVES) ARE IN EFFECT PARAMILITARIES: GROUPS OPERATING IN EL DIFICIL, PLATO, AND SANTA ANA IN MAGDALENA DEPARTMENT, LED BY "EL CHOPE BARRERA"; A GROUP OPERATING IN PUERTO LOPEZ, META DEPARTMENT, LED BY "JUAN DE JESUS PIMENTO"; A GROUP OPERATING IN PUERTO GAITAN, META, LED BY "DON GUILLERMO" (PREVIOUSLY THE SAME "DON GUILLERMO" LISTED ABOVE AS WORKING WITH VICTOR CARRANZA); A GROUP OPERATING IN SAN MARTIN, CESAR DEPARTMENT, LED BY "ANOUAS SALEMON CARTRA"; AND A GROUP
17. (S/NF) ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES, A GROUP KNOWN AS "LOS MASETOS" IS THE MOST PROMINENT PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION IN PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT. "MASETOS" IS ALSO A TERM FREQUENTLY APPLIED TO ANY PARAMILITARY MEMBER, DERIVED FROM "MAS" ("MUERTE A SECUESTRADORES”), A GROUP FORMED IN THE EARLY 1980S BY MEDELLIN CARTEL MEMBERS TO EXACT REVENGE ON KIDNAPPERS AND RIVALS. "LOS MASETOS" WERE SPONSORED BY THE NARCOTRAFFICKING OCHOA BROTHERS AND CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN THE MAGDALENA MEDIO AND ELSEWHERE AFTER THE OCHOA BROTHERS WERE ARRESTED.
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ACTION INR-00

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TREASURY FOR FINCEN

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18. (S/NI) THE PARAMILITARY SUMMIT DOCUMENT DESCRIBES "SUCCESSFUL ANTI-GUERRILLA WORK IN CORDOBA, URABA, SOUTHERN CESAR, META AND MAGDALENA MEDIO. IN THOSE ZONES, WE HAVE SNATCHED AWAY FROM THE ENEMY THE AFFECTION OF THE POPULATION AND HAVE MANAGED TO DELIVER IMPORTANT MILITARY BLOWS." THE REPORT PROPOSES "RECONQUERING" THE FOLLOWING AREAS: COFFEE COUNTRY (PRESUMABLY ANTIOQUIA, RISARALDA, AND CALDAS DEPARTMENTS); NORTHERN VALLE DEPARTMENT; THE NORTHWEST OF ANTIOQUIA; LA GUJAJRA DEPARTMENT; NORTHERN CESAR DEPARTMENT; CASANARE DEPARTMENT; THE LOWER MAGDALENA AREA; PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT; NORTHWEST TOLIMA DEPARTMENT; AND THE EASTERN PLAINS "IN GENERAL."

19. (S/NI) THE DOCUMENT SAYS IT IS A "PRIORITY TO INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE WORK IN URBAN ZONES LIKE CIUDAD BOLIVAR, BOSA, AND SAN CRISTOBAL (NEIGHBORHOODS) IN BOGOTA; MORAVIA AND ARANJUZ IN MEDELLIN; THE DISTRICT OF AGUA BLANCA AND EL LIMONAR IN CALI; CRESPO IN CARTAGENA; THE SOUTHEAST OF BARRANQUILLA; AND IBAGUE (CAPITAL OF TOLIMA DEPARTMENT). BARRANCABERMEJA IS A PRIORITY JOB BECAUSE THE SUBVERSION HAS RECONQUERED ZONES THAT WERE ALREADY FREE FROM THIS SCOURGE. ALSO PEREIRA (CAPITAL OF RISARALDA DEPARTMENT),

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20. (U) THE MARCH 31 EDITION OF "SEMANA" MAGAZINE REPORTED THAT THE FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTS ARE SUFFERING FROM THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GUERRILLAS AND PARAMILITARIES: ANTIOQUIA, ESPECIALLY URABA; CESAR; SUCRE; ARAUCA; CASANARE; CAQUETA; BOTH SANTANDERS; BOYACA; CAUCA; NARINO; AND COFFEE COUNTRY. ALEJANDRO REYES, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AND EXPERT ON GUERRILLAS AND
PARAMILITARIES, IS QUOTED AS SAYING COLOMBIA CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS, WITH PARAMILITARIES RULING THE NORTHWEST AND GUERRILLAS THE SOUTHEAST. HE PREDICTED THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN AREAS WHERE THESE TWO AREAS CONVERGE: THE SIERRA NEVADA DE SANTA MARTA MOUNTAINS AND ENVIRONS; SOUTHERN CESAR DEPARTMENT; BARRANCABERMEJA; THE NORTHEAST OF ANTIOQUIA; VALLE DE CAUCA; CUNDINAMARCA; AND META. ACCORDING TO "SEMANA," THE GOO'S PEACE COMMISSION CALCULATES THAT PARAMILITARIES ARE PRESENT IN 450 OF THE COUNTRY'S MORE THAN 1000 MUNICIPALITIES. BY CONTRAST, GUERRILLAS ARE THOUGHT TO BE PRESENT IN OVER HALF OF THE MUNICIPALITIES, INCLUDING WIDE SWATHS OF TERRITORY THAT ARE ONLY SEMI-POPULATED. WHERE THE TWO GROUPS OVERLAP, BLOOD FLOWS.

21. (S/NI) REF A ASKS UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES PARAMILITARY GROUPS ARE MOST LIKELY TO FLOURISH. AREAS WHERE GUERRILLAS ARE ACTIVE ARE LIKELY TO ATTRACTION PARAMILITARIES, ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF LARGE LANDHOLDINGS, PARTIALLY OWNED BY NARCOTRAFFICKERS, SEEMS TO BE STRONGEST INDICATORS OF PARAMILITARISM. RELATIVELY STRONG ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, SUCH AS CATTLE RANCHING OR OIL PRODUCTION, ALSO SEEMS TO BE A MAGNET FOR BOTH GUERRILLAS AND PARAMILITARIES. POOR, SPARSELY POPULATED DEPARTMENTS LIKE GUAVIARE, CAQUETA, VICHADA, GUAINIA, VAUPES AND AMAZONAS ARE VIRTUALLY NEVER MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH PARAMILITARISM.

22. (S/NI) REF A ASKS HOW PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OPERATE AND WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT THEY RECEIVE. THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE SAYS "THE AUTODEFENSAS MOVEMENT REMAINS ON THE MARGIN OF THE LAW AND OF POLITICS, EVEN THOUGH MANY OF OUR COLLABORATORS, MANAGERS (GESTORES), HELPERS, FINANCIERS AND GUIDES (ORIENTADORES) FORM A PART OF THE POLITICAL CLASS (AGITADO QUEHACER POLITICO)." AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 2, A VARIETY OF PEOPLE SPONSOR PARAMILITARIES: NARCOTRAFFICKERS, LANDOWNERS, CATTLE RANCHERS, AND BUSINESSPEOPLE. BY DEFINITION, PARAMILITARIES ARE HIRED GUNS WHO SERVE ANY MASTER WILLING TO PAY THEM, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR PATRONS IS ONE OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST. CARLOS CASTANO, BY MOST ACCOUNTS, HAS...
SECRET

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ACTION INR-00

INFO  LOG-00  ACDA-10  ACDE-00  INLB-01  AID-00  ARA-01  ACQ-01
INL-01  OASY-00  SRPP-00  DS-00  EB-00  EUR-01  OIGO-01
TEDE-00  ADS-00  MMP-00  SCT-00  ASDS-01  DSCC-00  DRL-09
/026W

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R 112227Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5826
INFO DEA WASHDC
NDIC JOHNSTOWN PA
SECDEF WASHDC//OCDEPS//
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
FBI WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
DIRENDCP WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
NSC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 2023

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A certain charisma and may command personal loyalty, but in general paramilitaries, even those motivated by hatred of the guerrillas, are mercenaries.

23. (S/NF) In addition to protecting their employers and targeting suspected guerrilla sympathizers, paramilitaries have been accused of intimidating and killing people involved in land disputes, such as the "Hacienda Bellacruz" case.

24. (S/NF) It is difficult to state with accuracy what kind of support paramilitaries receive in terms of money, training and arms. Several sources say that paramilitaries, like guerrillas, demand protection money from local residents. Narco money is another likely resource (see ref C), according to...
EARN MONEY FROM LAND AND INVESTMENTS AND CASTANO DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE, BUT CLAIMS HE MAY BE FORCED INTO "SECRET"

25. (S/NI) AN IMPORTANT COMPLICATING FACTOR IS THAT NARCOTRAFFICKERS FINANCE BOTH PARAMILITARIES AND GUERRILLAS, DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, GEOGRAPHY, AND CONVENIENCE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS PHENOMENON Closely. ITS COMPLEXITY IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE EXAMPLE OF NORTH VALLE NARCO TRAFFICKER DIEGO MONTOYA SANCHEZ [ ], ACCORDING TO A RECENT "WASHINGTON POST" ARTICLE, MONTOYA IS THE PATRON OF A PARAMILITARY GROUP.

26. (S/NF) IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE MILITARY WOULD PROVIDE CASH, SINCE MOST UNITS IN THE FIELD ARE THEMSELVES POORLY SUPPLIED.

WE HAVE NO OTHER INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT THIS IS A WIDESPREAD PHENOMENON. FOR THEIR PART, PARAMILITARY WARLORDS DO NOT SEEM TO PROVIDE MUCH TRAINING TO THEIR FOLLOWERS, RELYING MORE ON RECRUITING INDIVIDUALS WITH PREVIOUS MILITARY (POSSIBLY INCLUDING GUERRILLA) OR POLICE EXPERIENCE. GIVEN THAT 6,000
MEMBERS OF THE POLICE HAVE BEEN FIRED IN THE PAST TWO YEARS FOR CORRUPTION AND OTHER CRIMES, IT IS LIKELY THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM HAVE USED THEIR SKILLS TO JOIN THE RANKS OF PARAMILITARIES.

27. (S/NF). REF A ASKED IF A CORRELATION EXISTS BETWEEN THE IDENTITY OF SUPPORTERS AND THE TACTICS USED BY PARAMILITARIES. PARAMILITARISM APPEARS TO BE MUCH MORE REGIONAL THAN THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, AND SEEMS TO VARY FROM PLACE TO PLACE. THE PARAMILITARIES THAT FLOURISH IN URABA SEEM MORE "PROFESSIONAL" OR "SPECIALIZED," IF SUCH A TERM CAN BE APPLIED TO INTIMIDATION AND MURDER, THAN OTHER, SMALLER GROUPS AROUND THE COUNTRY. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CORRELATION BETWEEN THE IDENTITY OF SUPPORTERS AND THE KIND OF TACTICS EMPLOYED, BUT AS REF E REPORTED, TACTICS MAY VARY FROM REGION TO REGION, WITH MASSACRES OCCURRING IN URABA BUT MORE SELECTIVE MURDERS TAKING PLACE IN CASANARE. IN ADDITION TO MURDER, KIDNAPPING, AND SCARING THOUSANDS OF PEASANTS INTO FLEEING THEIR HOMES, PARAMILITARIES HAVE ALSO BEEN ACCUSED OF "SOCIAL CLEANSING," KILLING PETTY CRIMINALS AND OTHER "UNDESIRABLES" IN THEIR AREAS OF INFLUENCE.
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ACTION INR-00
INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 INLB-01 AID-00 ARA-01 ACQ-01
INL-01 QASY-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-01 OIGO-01
TEDE-00 ADS-00 MMP-00 SCT-00 ASDS-01 DSCC-00 DRL-09
/026W
-------------AEESF1 112232Z /38
R 112227Z APR 97
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5827
INFO DEA WASHDC
NDIC JOHNSTOWN PA
SECDEF WASHDC//OCDEPS//
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
FBI WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
DIRONDCP WASHDC
USCINC WASHDC QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
NSC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 2024
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

S-E-C-R-E-T SECTION 08 OF 08 BOGOTA 003463

STATE FOR INR/IL, ARA/AND, DRL, INL, EUR/RPM (MFITZPATRICK)
NSC FOR JAMES DOBBINS

SECRET

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ONDCP FOR JANET CRIST
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

Current Class: SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
DEA FOR OF, OFL, OC, AX
JUSTICE FOR CRIM. WARREN, RICHARD AND NDDS/VAN VLIET
FBI FOR CID/IRS/IRU2
USIA FOR AR, I/GAR
TREASURY FOR FINCEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/07
TAGS: PINR, PHUM, PTER, PINS, PGOV, SNAR, CO
SUBJECT: PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN COLOMBIA (C-AL7-00269)
30. (S/NF) WE WILL BE KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE RESULTS OF WASHINGTON ANALYSTS' STUDY OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN COLOMBIA. FRECHETTE