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PAGE 001
18 NOV 88

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OCTOBER 1988.

[REDACTED] COMMENTED ON EVENTS OF THE EVENING OF THE 5 OCTOBER PLEBISCITE. [REDACTED] HE LEARNED DURING THE DAY THAT PRESIDENT AUGUSTO ((PINOCHET)) UGARTE, ARMY VICE COMMANDER GENERAL SANTIAGO ((SINCLAIR)) OYANEDER, INTERIOR MINISTER SERGIO ((FERNANDEZ)) FERNANDEZ, INTERIOR SUB-SECRETARY ALBERTO ((CARDEMIL)) HERRERA, AND MINISTER SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT ORLANDO ((POBLETE)) ITURRATE HAD A PLAN IN WHICH THE INTERIOR MINISTRY WOULD DELAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF VOTING RESULTS TO AGITATE THE OPPOSITION, ANNOUNCE PRELIMINARY RESULTS FAVORABLE TO THE "YES" VOTE, AND THEN CALL THE "YES" VOTERS TO THE STREETS TO CELEBRATE THE ALLEGED "YES" VICTORY. THIS WOULD THEN RESULT IN A STRONG OPPOSITION REACTION, STREET CLASHES AND THE NEED TO CALL IN THE ARMY TO RESTORE ORDER; THEREBY PROVIDING A

HANDY EXCUSE TO SUSPEND THE PLEBISCITE. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THIS IDEA WAS BLOCKED BY THEN SANTIAGO GARRISON COMMANDER BRIGADIER GENERAL JORGE ((ZINCKE)) QUIROZ, WHO REFUSED TO PERMIT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS, INCLUDING MAKING AN EXCEPTION FOR A "YES" MARCH.

[REDACTED] REMARKED THAT IT WAS CLEAR BY LATE AFTERNOON THAT THE "NO" VOTE WOULD WIN AND HE PRESSURED THE INTERIOR MINISTRY TO STOP PLAYING GAMES AND NOT FURTHER DELAY ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF VOTING STATISTICS AT PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED TIMES.

[REDACTED] STATED THAT HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT [REDACTED] WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PLEBISCITE CALLED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION.

RESULTS TO AGITATE THE OPPOSITION, ANNOUNCE PRELIMINARY RESULTS FAVORABLE TO THE "YES" VOTE, AND THEN CALL THE "YES" VOTERS TO THE STREETS TO CELEBRATE THE ALLEGED "YES" VICTORY. THIS WOULD THEN RESULT IN A STRONG OPPOSITION REACTION, STREET CLASHES AND THE NEED TO CALL IN THE ARMY TO RESTORE ORDER; THEREBY PROVIDING A

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[REDACTED] STATED THAT HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT [REDACTED] WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PLEBISCITE CALLED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION.

[REDACTED] DURING THE MEETING, WHEN PINOCHET ASKED FOR THE JUNTA'S ADVICE ON WHAT HE SHOULD DO IN THE FACE OF A "NO" WIN, [REDACTED] TOLD HIM TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS.

[REDACTED] PINOCHET WAS NEARLY APOPLECTIC WHEN HE HEARD THIS, ACCUSING HIM OF POOR JUDGMENT, NOT REALIZING THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS, AND WONDERING HOW HE COULD DO SUCH A THING. [REDACTED] STATEMENT QUICKLY WAS SUPPORTED BY [REDACTED]

SAYING THAT HE TOO PLANNED TO ANNOUNCE HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE VOTING, RESULTING IN A SIMILAR BUT LESS INTENSE REACTION FROM THE PRESIDENT. AFTER THE STIR IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALMED PINOCHET, INDICATING THAT THE RESULTS HAD TO BE [REDACTED]

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Continuation page for [REDACTED]

ACCEPTED AND THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOWED. WITH EVIDENT RELUCTANCE, PINOCHET EXPRESSED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE "NO" VICTORY, SAYING THAT THIS DECISION GAVE THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE COUNTRY IN THE FUTURE.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]