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August 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETAR

THE SECRETARY OF DEPENSE

SUBJECT: Air Force Proposed Changes to the Tentative Force Guidance

This memorandum refers to my June 18, 1964 memorandum on this subject. General LeMay's comments are attached. The Air Force proposal regarding the AMSA, including studies and program change proposals, will be handled through separate correspondence.

There are three areas in your Tentative Force Guidance which I believe deserve specific comment. They concern the Strategic Retaliatory Forces, the Continental Air Defense Forces, and the Airlift Forces. Although we believe that a larger force may be justified in the General Purpose Forces, we are not making a reclama at this time. Under the present program there will be opportunity to add to the force, should our additional studies further indicate the desirability of doing so. We also are making studies which may result in recommendations for a different mix of tactical fighters, including the addition of less expensive and less complex aircraft for missions such as close support under specialized circumstances.

With respect to the Strategic Retaliatory Forces, I believe that a 1200 Minuteman force represents a sensible minimum. None of the studies that I have reviewed have convinced me that we should reduce our position below this figure. The provision of one on-launch reliable Minuteman missile for each time-urgent target still seems to be a rational basis for sizing the force from the standpoint of both assured destruction and damage limitation. As shown in the attachment, the current requirement for known time-urgent targets is 1000 Minuteman missiles. Any growth in the number of targets and the minimum addition for contingencies would require a greater number than 1200 Minuteman missiles in 1970. We support your objective of a balanced

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damage limiting program; however, the cloudy future of the full fallout shelter program and the uncertainty regarding Nike X tend to emphasize the role of the Minuteman. Until these uncertainties can be resolved, it would appear prudent to place more, not less, reliance on the damage limiting value of the Minuteman. I doubt that additional studies based on currently known facts will give us better answers for the requirements. In my opinion we should add an increment (per attachment) to our present 1000 missiles; therefore, 1200 Minuteman missiles would become our currently

planned total. This will permit us to review the intelligence next year and make new decisions without loss of

continuity of Minuteman installation.

With respect to the Continental Air Defense Forces, I think we should continue with the program in the manner proposed in my memorandum of July 27, 1963. At that time I agreed with you that it was premature to set any numerical level for a new interceptor force, but I was convinced that we should preserve a real option to go into production should there be indications that the Russians were making serious efforts to deploy a manned bomber force with supersonic capability or with advance air-to-surface missiles. While the fact that the number of Blinders in the Russian inventory is greater than we had estimated is not in itself conclusive, it does convince me of the need to continue affirmative efforts in the direction of being able to deploy an interceptor force capable of coping with an improved and enlarged bomber threat. Since my specific proposals to meet this need involve details in the special projects area, I am forwarding them as a separate memorandum from this paper. Further, even a buy of a limited number of these new interceptors will provide a meaningful increment of operational capability for deployment either here or abroad. In addition we would acquire a capability to intercept, inspect and identify high altitude, high performance aircraft such as high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and supersonic transports.

I also recommend that you revise your intention to phase down our present interceptor force as sharply as you

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propose. Although the force is admittedly far from an ideal one and is of diminishing value, nonetheless, it does offer some degree of effectiveness in the light of the present Russian bomber threat.

Because of the relatively small cost, as the attachments show, it would seem to me worthwhile to leave the interceptor force at the present level pending decisions on the larger questions regarding Air Defense.

With respect to the Air Transport Force, I believe studies currently in progress will show clearly the advantages of including the CX-HLS which have already been indicated by preliminary studies. Not only will this aircraft provide us the necessary outsize cargo capability, but equal or greater importance, it will provide us a higher degree of cost-effectiveness than any other transport. For these reasons, I believe that your proposed Option B is the solution that we should adopt.

Attachments

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

## PROGRAM I - STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES

Some fundamental changes to the philosophy and forces contained in the Tentative Force Guidance are considered essential for the continued military effectiveness of US strategic forces.

Determination of the total Minuteman forces must be based on a range of parameters, where a change in any one will affect the end requirement. One consideration cited in the Tentative Force Guidance that I certainly support is the need for a balanced damage limiting program, e.g., strategic offense, air/missile defense and fallout shelters. However, as noted in recent studies, the effectiveness of a terminal missile defense is dependent on the offense while the effectiveness of the offense is much less dependent on the terminal missile defense. Thus, improving the capability of the Minuteman force need not be delayed until decisions are made on the terminal missile defense system. Other major considerations are damage expectancy criteria, size and composition of the target system to be attacked by missiles, and the operational concept for reprogramming missiles for known failures.

The operational concept of reprogramming missiles for known failures is critical to the total forces required. Considering the eight stored targets capacity of the Minuteman and survivability of communications, it is not considered practical or possible to reprogram throughout the entire force. Assigning six targets to each flight of 10 missiles, and assuming a reprogrammable reliability of .70 will provide a high assurance (85%) that sufficient missiles will be available for each flight to cover its target. In addition, it can be expected 12% of the force will be available for reserve or the assured destruction requirements. This rationale provides for a reprogramming factor of 1.67 inventory missiles for each on-launch reliable missile assigned a war plan aiming point.

The median target list used in the CSD draft memorandum for the President, dated 6 December 1963, contained 80 bomber/staging bases, 130 tactical bases with a nuclear capability, 35 sub bases and 45 offensive controls. When currently confirmed missile sites, plus reported starts are added to these, the known time urgent total is around 600 (590). Using a reprogramming factor of 1.67 as developed in the preceding paragraph and assigning one on launch reliable missile per aim point, the current requirement for known time urgent targets is 1000 missiles. Prudence requires that 60-80 targets be added to the list for unknowns and possible Soviet missile deployments. This increases the requirement to some 1100 Minuteman. Based on DIA estimates\* the Soviets will have 622 Missile Aiming points by 1970. Adding the other time urgent targets increases the list to some 900 which would now require around 1500 Missiles (900 x 1.67).

<sup>\*</sup> DIA publication, "Future Strategic Targets in Eurasian Communist Countries," April 1964, projected to 1970.

A recent study indicates that a force of 1000 Minuteman is inadequate to cover the projected 1970 Soviet nuclear delivery capability and provide sufficient Minuteman missiles to support the Combined Minuteman/Polaris assured destruction requirement. The total Minuteman force requirement in this study ranged from some 1200 missiles to nearly 1800, dependent on the desired damage expectancy against Soviet hard Missile sites. The AMSA Study was also based on a 1200 Minuteman force in the 70 time period to assist in the damage limiting task.

Another major consideration in determining future force requirements is the projected qualitative characteristics of the weapon system. As CEPs of 17 to 10 nautical miles are predicted in the 1970 time period it appears prudent to use a criterion of programming one on launch reliable missile against each time sensitive target. This tailors the force requirement to meet the low side of the threat (by numbers of missiles) for the early time period and provides the option of increasing missile capability for the later time period by qualitative improvements to the force.

Taking full consideration of the force previously approved by the Secretary of Defense and reaffirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JSOP-69, the projected qualitative improvements to the Minuteman system in the early 1970's such as improved guidance and multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and in the interest of lessening the cost impact, a revised program (Tab A) has been developed for 1200 Minuteman force by end FY 69. Future objective force proposals will include recommendations for qualitative improvements to the Minuteman force.

Based on these considerations, it is recommended that a 1200 MM force be achieved in FY 69.

<sup>\*</sup> USAF Blue Dart. A report on the interrelationships between strategic offensive and defensive forces. 30 June 1964.