

# **The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev**

**1973**

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January 6, 1973

Even though it's Saturday, I spent the whole day at work. We're preparing yet another report on the International Communist Movement [ICM] for Ponomarev. The only satisfaction I get out of it is seeing how much better I can do the work than the "guys" (consultants), and naturally, they willingly submit to my skill. But you can't respect a person who hasn't learned anything after ten years on the job.

We've got a circus going on with the dual management of the Department by Kuskov and Zagladin. Kuskov is tongue-tied and nonsensical, which is probably a reflection of his dulled intellect and tired brain that was subject to too much alcohol in its day. Plus, Kuskov did not have proper training or develop a good work ethic when he was young. Zagladin is not exactly using him because of this, but he finds his helplessness annoying, because it steals time from his subordinates, not to mention the incomprehensible tasks he gives them.

I am reading Bykovsky.

January 8, 1973

There is a flu epidemic in Moscow, they say that 70,000 people get sick every day (citing statistics from the city committee). It's probably a lie. But there are many sick people around.

The day before yesterday I met with a delegation from the Austrian Communist Party. [Franz] Muhri (chairman) and [Erwin] Scharf (former social-democrat, a member of the Resistance). We had a big discussion about social democrats. Their subtext: you are doing business with them like you would with government officials. This is detrimental to us, because they are not only an integrated part of the State monopolistic capital, they are also its smartest part, capable of controlling and directing it better than today's bourgeois parties.

Reception for [Pat] Clancy (from the new pro-Soviet Communist Party of Australia) at B.N.'s this week. Their undertaking is really a lost cause.

We summarized (on orders from the Central Committee [CC]) the requests made by our fraternal parties during the USSR's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations. Mostly it's all about money: to publish newspapers, set up small firms, give pensions to veterans. But also it's to send someone's niece to a Moscow conservatory, to provide a scholarship for a son who is studying in a university in Ukraine, to "help" write a book (i.e. it will be written for the party leader, and he will sign it), etc. In a word, it is a depressing picture.

Kapitonov gathered all the heads of the CC Departments. They are discussing the Secretariat's plan for the first half of the year. The people present are bosses, and act accordingly. Dolgikh, the new Secretary, seems to have grown into his role already. He clearly is smarter than Kapitonov, which, however, is not very difficult.

Then Shauro dragged me into his office. We talked for two hours. He seems to have a complex of being "misunderstood and disregarded by everyone." He, like many other people, sees a hidden and mysterious power in the workers of the International Department, because they

communicate closely with the very top. This explains his apologetic tone, particularly with me. He talked a great deal, mainly about the changing “atmosphere” among cultural figures, writers, and about their attitude towards him and the CC in general. However, there was not a penny’s worth of independent thought or personal conviction in his speech, not to mention policy. But he seems to understand the situation, and mostly takes it into account so as “not to get tripped up.”

Astonishing situation. Brezhnev pampers Pompidou in Byelorussia, while at a press conference in Paris last week Pompidou said the following about us and our whole “cause”:

Question (Pierre Charles, “France-Soir”): “Without overestimating the joint program (socialists and communists), I must say that in addition to the main policy directions it contains a certain plan for society. The Prime Minister has stated the main policy lines that the current majority plans to defend. Could you tell us about your plan for society?”

Pompidou’s response: “What is my plan for society? In fact, the joint program provides at least a general outline of the so-called ‘socialist’ society, i.e. communist, that is, in my view, a totalitarian society in the fullest sense of the word. What I mean is that everything is in the hands of the state, everything depends on the state and the state itself is in the hands of the Party, and this Party commands people’s lives in all aspects.

“On the other hand, there is – it’s true – the classical capitalist society, which no longer fully exists anywhere, but is still preserved to a great extent in the United States and Japan (although this has yet to be proven). But in France today, the capitalist society is a thing of the past after a number of reform measures adopted by previous governments – in 1936, and during the Liberation, and after 1958.”

February 3, 1973

Story with Ulyanovsky (one of B.N.’s deputies specializing in the Middle East). Gafurov (academician, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies) wrote a letter to Brezhnev about him – that he used materials produced for the International Department in his own articles and brochures; that he monopolizes the editorial process of various anthologies and books on the international liberation movement; that he creates a mess when he publishes several articles in various places almost simultaneously, and each of the articles contains strong, prescriptive opinions that contradict each other from one article to the next; that he re-prints the same articles in various sources; that he receives huge honoraria. .

B.N. was very upset. He paced around his office for a long time. First there was the drinking party organized by his deputies for the November 7<sup>th</sup> holiday in Zagladin’s office, which Pelshe himself investigated, and now this new reminder that his deputies are “not well in the head”!

Clash with B.N. over a report on the ICM, which we prepared for him (for the “congregation” of the republics’ ideological secretaries). He called me a pacifist and said that we cannot see beyond the success of the Peace Program, that the arms race continues, military budgets are growing (U.S. – 83 billion), NATO continues its maneuvers to perfect the military

machine, and Pompidou smiles at us while scheming with Americans and encouraging anti-communism.

I told him: “How will this make you look? If at a closed meeting, in front of the leadership elite, you essentially suggest that there is no point to the Peace Program, that our ‘peace offensive’ is getting nowhere, that nothing has changed in the world and that 90 percent of Brezhnev’s and others’ time devoted to foreign policy (and only 10 percent to the economy) is time wasted.

“Plus, our listeners judge Pompidou based on the TV broadcasts where they see the ‘embraces,’ smiles, reciprocal gifts and so on, at the highest level. And at this very moment you will tell the ideologues that all of this is nothing but a façade, that in reality Pompidou is our bitter enemy, and so on?”

He lost some steam... Naturally, the report remained unchanged, except for a small addition about the U.S. military budget.

However, in the tactical sense B.N. may be right. Especially when he gave me a speech about European security: “There is a buzz in the press about it, and you also wrote in my report: European security, new system of relations, cooperation, mutual benefit, exchange of people and ideas, good neighborliness... Hell, Anatoly Sergeyevich, none of this will happen! I assure you. God willing, we will reach a decent joint document, so propaganda can’t use it against us later. Other than that, everything will remain the same. After all, what we wanted from Helsinki we already got (borders and recognition of the GDR). Now it is turning against us, and we just want to find a suitable way out of this idea of ours.”

In this he is right, of course. He knows and reflects the *mentalite* of our entire leadership (although, perhaps, with the exception of Brezhnev himself).

At the same time, this candor contains an admission of something we do not want to admit: world development, the “revolutionary process” took a different route from what we expected for 50 years. We won with our “realpolitik,” based on strength and bullying, but not with our ideology. The more successful our policies, the greater the damage to our ideology (Demichev and Trapeznikov are a classic example of this, and now we can confidently say that it is no coincidence that they represent our ideology).

So in a global-strategic sense, B.N. is archaic. He cannot see even the deep contradictions in his own work. He shrugs off the problems to keep his head above water.

We have a guy named Boris Ilyichev in our Department; he is the head of the Southeast Asia sector. He’s intelligent, educated, sharp, sarcastic, cynical, and cracks jokes. He traveled all over his region, worked in Indonesia for many years. We’ve had some mutual interests for a while; in particular we exchange “Marxist-Leninist” literature on sexual matters. He is a big expert in this field.

The other day he came to my office, sat down in an armchair, and quickly, in his slightly mischievous style, began to expound his vision.

February 4, 1973

So, B. Ilyichev. "I am sick of these endless resolutions to 'counter' and 'rebuff' the Chinese," he said. "My hand is tired of signing these papers. Our leaders are under some kind of spell – they think that once they pass a resolution everything will happen on its own exactly like they said. And even if it did, they're missing the point... Consider this: they put together a group of specialists 'under the CC Secretariat.' For three months the specialists worked on a strategic plan for 'what to do with the Chinese.' The mountain brought forth a mouse, which is now approved by the Politburo. Their analysis is correct to a large extent; it confirms that there will be no changes for the better; that we should not wait for these changes even if Mao or Zhoe, or both of them, should die. For China, friendship with us is unnecessary and objectively not beneficial.

"So what was the conclusion our experts came to? 'The policy of the XXIV Congress regarding the PRC was correct.' Yes, it was the right thing to announce to the world. But we should also have a realistic policy as such, which should stem from the fact that war is inevitably coming from China. If not in 5 years, then in 10, and if not 10 then 15.

"I always thought that after 1945 there could never be another war in Europe. I was sure of this, despite the various crises, West Berlin, and others. Now it is clear to everyone that there will never be another war.

"I understand, of course, that '20 million killed'... it was a psychological problem that we could not simply dismiss. But now there has been a psychological change, too. And yet, we were still spending our primary energy on Pompidou, Brandt, etc.

"In the meantime, the axis of world politics has long moved to Southeast Asia. Right now, after the end of the war in Vietnam, we should be creating a 'Great Vietnam,' combining all these Laoses and Cambodias and Philippines into a 'Great Vietnam' with 100 million people, plus Indonesia with another 125 million. Suharto is a scumbag and an enemy, but we need to get him on our side as quickly as possible. We need to create a serious hostile front for China. If we miss the opportunity and China gets influence over Southeast Asia with the help of the Japanese, it's over for us. A billion Chinese people! No nuclear power of ours can stop this force."

While he was talking I threw out little questions here and there, tried to make fun of his extremism, laughed at his vulgar expressions. But somewhere at the core he is right: we are very inflexible in our policies, very archaic in the ways we implement them... Even though Boris exaggerates and closes his eyes to the "demands of historicism" – "Everything in its own good time."

During these two weeks I've been at the Politburo twice and once at the CC Secretariat. The first time it was chaired by Suslov. Among other things, it was interesting to note the

haphazard nature of opinions on this or that issue, and the majority's (except for the core Politburo members) fear to defend their positions or proposals.

February 6, 1973

At the Politburo meeting there was a discussion of Kirilenko's note on "streamlining" external economic links of the ministries and departments. The point was that ministers and their deputies are more interested in trips abroad than they are in their own work.

Demichev spoke: "We really have to bring some order to this. It has come to the point that departments contact each other across the border, and we don't even know what ministries there are and so on... even people from factories and institutes are traveling abroad, setting up their own contacts. We need to put a stop to this, to bring it under the center's control."

Andropov: "There are violations of the requirement to submit records of conversations held abroad."

Kosygin must have not been paying attention to who said what, and came down on Andropov while responding to Demichev's statements (saying that we are moving toward integration and it's fine if factories, institutes, and others communicate with our permission but directly, because we would sink if everything was narrowed down to the center, plus – it's absurd).

Andropov listened to this for a while, then stood up and said with his high-pitched Komsomol voice that he did not suggest anything of the kind, and that it was "him," and pointed his finger at Demichev. The latter jumped up and started mumbling that it's not what he meant.

At the CC Secretariat there was a discussion about the "pushers," people sent from companies and agencies to obtain necessary materials. Kirilenko's note. Committee reports provided all kinds of "outrageous" and funny facts about how these trips are used to celebrate anniversaries of superiors in Moscow, to set up fraudulent deals, for tourism purposes, etc.

But then the deputy chairman of the State Logistics Committee spoke and also provided facts to show that abuses do take place, but they are not the reason why "pushers" exist. "The reason lies elsewhere. If, for example, the director of a metallurgical plant responds to the pleas of the people whom he supplies with piping by saying that he may fulfill the supply plan for the first quarter, but he will supply only 13 percent of the order in January, 27 percent in February, and the rest in March. What would you do? How is the plant supposed to work when it has such a supplier? What is it going to pay its workers? How is it going to fulfill its plan?"

"Or: a construction site needs a certain type of metal, but the wrong material was delivered to it, and this wrong material lies around and goes to waste, because it cannot be used for this particular project. But the supplier fulfilled his quota in terms of the tons of metal delivered, and already received a bonus for his work. And so forth."

I was surprised when Solomentsev, Ustinov, Dolgikh – CC Secretaries – spoke quite sharply in support of the State Logistics Committee's analysis. They said that we have to look

beneath the surface to reveal the true reasons for pushers. In other words, they see all of this and understand very well that the root of the problem lies in the general and universal non-compliance with the Plans.

At the last Politburo (February 2) there was a “summary and review” of the conclusion of the Vietnam War, or to be more precise – the outcomes of Brezhnev’s meetings with Le Duc Tho, and Suslov’s meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Duy Trinh.

Brezhnev reviewed the responses to his speech at the reception of Vietnamese officials in Moscow (traveling from Paris, from negotiations). “The most important thing is that the West is emphasizing ‘Brezhnev’s firmness in the struggle for détente.’ And they believe that the line of the XXIV’s Congress is not just a conjuncture, but a matter of principle. Not to bring military vehicles into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam like before. I gave ‘no reaction’ to Tho’s questions about economic assistance.”

Grechko: “The Vietnamese still are not giving us the downed U.S. aircraft; they won’t let us near the B-52 or the American sea mines.”

Brezhnev: “Let Sadat think about what the end of the war in Vietnam means for him. Andropov and Gromyko are assigned to look for new ways to establish contact with Israel. Past attempts were unsuccessful. To just sit there with severed relations – that is not a policy.”

At the same PB session Polyansky was appointed Minister of Agriculture and relieved of the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. When this was published in *Pravda* on Saturday, no one could understand what happened. I couldn’t either (I was only present at the discussion of the Vietnam question). Today I heard a rumor that it happened despite Podgorny’s objections. Brezhnev suddenly agreed with Kosygin, who had had a long-running feud with Polyansky, after Kirilenko had “prepared” Brezhnev for it.

Thus, now there is a fairly large group of disgruntled, resentful people at the Politburo: Shelepin, Shelest, Voronov, Polyansky. Plus, the Premier and the General Secretary aren’t friends, and the relations between the President and the Premier are even worse.

People in Georgia are very upset because [Vasil] Mzhavanadze, the ousted First Secretary, is shielded from criticism and denunciations. He and the General Secretary were friends during the war.

In Armenia, the CC Bureau of the Communist Party of Armenia made a unanimous decision to relieve First Secretary [Anton] Kochinyan of his duties. But they received urgent instructions from Moscow to cancel their decision. There was a meeting of the CC Plenum, whose members pretended not to know about Moscow’s opinion and berated the PB members, who naturally cancelled their decision, for lacking principle and for spineless liberalism. Kochinyan is also General Secretary’s wartime friend.

Back in early January the plan was approved for the CC leadership's foreign policy activity in 1973, including the main events: Brezhnev's trips to India, the FRG, the U.S., Poland, Czechoslovakia, possibly Finland, and some socialist countries.

I remember how in May of last year, when we were preparing Brezhnev's speech for the XV Congress of Trade Unions, Arbatov got upset with me for insisting that Tsukanov should throw out the passage promising to devote the next CC Plenum to the Scientific-Technical Revolution. I told him at the time: "You're not going to get your Plenum in 1972." Now it looks like it won't happen in 1973, either.

There is a lot of noise in the newspapers, on the TV and radio about restructuring socialist competition to a more "competitive" mode. But the CC Propaganda groups, who toured the country with the "outcomes" of Brezhnev's report for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the USSR, got the sense that nothing is really being done on this issue. Nothing is being done in general. It's as if there was no December Plenum.

Is this a repeat of the situation in the fall of 1964?

[Rodney] Arismendi (First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay) visited Suslov. I spoke with him about his trip to Korea. His impressions of Kim Il Sung. The splendor of the reception there. Dinner at Plotnikov Street. My toast. Seeing him off from Sheremetyevo-2.

Conversation with Galya Volchek about her new production of "Ascent of Mount Fuji" (by [Chinghiz] Aitmatov), which I saw two days before. It is the forefront of theater, a profound and sharp work. Once again, it is a challenge to our "cultural powers that be." The culmination of the play is the protagonist's (who is an institute director) exclamation: "That came later (rehabilitation), but then was not later!" This is a discovery at the level of Pushkin's "the people are speechless."<sup>1</sup>

[Vladimir] Vysotsky's new songs. One of them is about two working class guys, lowlife drinking buddies, who decide to go to Israel (a Russian and a Jew). The Russian one was allowed, but the Jew did not pass under the fifth paragraph [nationality]. Marina Vladi. We talked. She is sweet.

February 8, 1973

Was at the Politburo again, for the discussion of the USSR joining the international convention on copyright protection. Yesterday, on B.N.'s orders, I spent the whole day preparing a draft resolution on the new Constitution for this Politburo. B.N. clearly wants to take the lead on preparing this document. However, my draft, which was sent to the Politburo with Ponomarev's signature forged by Balmashnikov (Ponomarev's assistant) (Ponomarev is on vacation in Gagra), was not discussed today. The CC Secretariat was assigned to "prepare and submit the question..."

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<sup>1</sup> The last line of Alexander Pushkin's play *Boris Godunov*. [Trans.]

The other day Borya Pankin visited me, he is the editor in chief of *Komsomolka* [Komsomolskaya Pravda]. He said, "Our common (and individual, for people like us) problem is that the people occupying key positions are scum, especially in the information apparatus (or, for us, in ideology). And there is nothing you or Yakovlev can do about it. For example, you made your statement in *Kommunist*, and everyone seemed to agree. But now they are slowly pecking away at you in the 'discussions' and 'scholarly councils,' and indirectly in the press (see issue No. 12 of "History of the CPSU"). And there is nothing you can do. They are creating a 'public opinion' in a certain layer of society, and the 'masses' of cult wardens (as we used to call them a little while ago, and now I would simply call them ideological priests) are willing to do anything to keep their feeders."

I saw Shauro in the PB vestibule today. He told me, "You know, Safronov published the first volume of his collection and got 75,000 rubles for it! What's going on!!" He tells me this!

February 9, 1973

I jumped out of bed at 6 a.m. Went to tennis, lost a match, got energized.

Read a couple dozen ciphered telegrams, gave various orders... Asked for the proofs of Arismendi's article in *Pravda* on the revolutionary process in Latin America. Proofread a set of articles for *Izvestiya* about Chinese chauvinism.

Talked to Katushev about next week's arrival of [Hermann] Axen with a large group from the SED to review information [*na vzaimoinformatsiu*] on the International Communist Movement. I assigned the sector to prepare materials.

I wrote two notes to send to Ponomarev in the south – about the Australian CP and about the forthcoming conference of forty-two Communist Parties on the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, to take place in Berlin in March.

I read the information from TASS. Spoke with Shaposhnikov and Pukhlov about a letter the father of one of our junior assistants wrote to us, essentially a denunciation of his son. The son may be a piece of shit, but it is clear that the father is a real scumbag. I asked them to get to the bottom of it, particularly why he wrote such a thing about his son.

I spoke with the Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov about some materials for Brezhnev's visit to India, and with the head of the sector on how they will be prepared in our department.

Rewrote and signed several ciphered telegrams to different parts of the world.

Had several talks with Balmashnov regarding various projects and decisions adopted by the Politburo and the Secretariat.

Almost started reading the manuscripts for the *Questions of History* editorial board meeting that will take place on Monday, but didn't get the chance.

Prepared drafts for the note and telegram to Berlinguer, who will come in mid-March for a meeting with Brezhnev.

There was something else, I don't remember.

I'm reading [Pyotr] Proskurin's *Destiny*. It's about collectivization, a new resuscitation of Stalin. There is a waiting list for this book in the CC library.

February 13, 1973

There's been a string of festivities. On Saturday at Gililov's (a colleague from the days at the *Problems of Peace and Socialism* [PPS] journal). Arbatov, Kovalyov (editor of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia) with his now quite bloated and aged Sonya. Toasts. Everyone told me how young and unchanged I look. It was nice overall: Gililov was with Olga (his new and relatively young wife), as if this is how things always were.

On Sunday Ziegel (my school friend) had a party for his wife Galya's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Again a strange collection of very different people: from the sci-fi writer Kazantsev, who is advertised in a West German film "Remembering the Future," to a Colonel of the tank troops, who got drunk and said, "What's keeping Soviet power propped up? Its authority, you think? That evaporated long ago! We are keeping it up, that's who! That's why we will always be in good shape."

Their eldest daughter Tanya is charming. Poems about her mother, lanterns made out of tree bark and metal, caricatures of Ziegel as Peter the Great and Galya as Catherine II – their photos are pasted onto the picture, it turned out great. The girl is stately and quite ripe, willingly brushed against me with her hips.

Ziegel said a number of toasts in honor of his wife and gave her a manuscript (hobby) about Catherine II, who was "Galya's prototype"... as if in the last seven years there was no Klava, no waitresses from various Moscow cafes every year, etc.

In a word, they are an attractive, organized, disciplined Russian-German intellectual family, which were probably typical in "Moscow society" in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with vestiges of such families surviving into the 1920s.

As for the guests (the relatives and "those" friends), it was a pretty tasteless bunch: Soviet bureaucrats with pretensions to importance.

On Monday at Mitta's house there was a completely different "society," though no less unpleasant. Sasha Mitta himself is a director of excellent children's films, he is kind, charming, down to earth, smart, and without a hint of showing off or being a modern bohemian. His wife's name is Lilichka (by the way, she is Dezka's cousin). She is lovely, and also is an incredibly talented woman. She is a puppeteer and illustrator of children's fairy tales. Their nine year old son is a simply brilliant Jewish child. The things that he draws in the spirit of expressionism and primitivism (not childish drawings, but done specifically in that style) could outshine exhibits by

popular European artists. The caricature portraits he made when he was three years old are remarkable in the depth and accuracy of the captured image.

I am always amazed at the mystery of talent that can capture and express things that are unattainable even to encyclopedic learning. In this case one is simply dumbfounded. The kid is nine years old, he is a regular schoolboy.

But to come back to the “company.” Actresses, diplomats, scientists, writers. Medium-small-fry, of course (with the exception of Galya Volchek). But what pantsuits they had, what heels, what blouses and costume jewelry! How the cigarettes and glasses of gin rested in their fingers! What arrogance and “ease” in their manners. And at the same time, the women had a constant carnivorous searching gaze in their eyes – might this new, unfamiliar man take the bait, especially since people say he works at the CC!

A few years ago I would have wanted to blend into the wall from shyness in such company. Now for some reason I feel good and completely relaxed. I don’t need anything from them. The airs they put on are amusing. Nevertheless, there were maybe five people out of these two dozen who were genuinely interesting and nice.

Ostrovityanov said about the funeral of Shavrov from MGIMO: “It turns out that dying is even worse than living.”

Zagladin finally came back to work after over a month-long illness. He told me what he kept busy with: studying the “collective laborer.” He revealed Marx’, Engels’, and Lenin’s system of ideas regarding the concept of the “working class.” He enthusiastically described the diagram he came up with, but then grew quite bored when I started telling him about the work I had been doing for him this whole time... He brushed off the suggestions of things that he should pick up himself now...

Also, I was looking at his huge, soft body, which is now sick, too, and at heart I was terrified: this body cannot fly up a flight of stairs; it cannot embrace a woman without causing disgust; it does not know the pleasure of a ski trail; it cannot enjoy tennis; it basically does not know the general sensations of agility, strength, and health. This is scary. It is good that he doesn’t know it. And he is seven years younger than me.

February 20, 1973

We prepared a speech for Ponomarev for an international conference in Berlin on the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the “ghost” that was “wandering through Europe” in those days. Additionally, he will be opening the conference in the Hall of Columns.

But when I was offered to go to Bonn for an analytical conference on State Cadre Policies, Ponomarev set the invitation aside. We were talking and he accidentally revealed the reason, “It would mean that you would have to prepare for your own presentation...” He doesn’t want me to spend time on myself when he needs a “fresh, interesting, and informative text” for himself.

A large delegation from England arrived. We are meeting with them. They are meticulous, everywhere they go – the raikom [regional committee], the CC Department of Organizational Party Work, the Writers [Union] – they ask why everyone here votes unanimously “in favor” of everything. Is it possible that there is so much agreement on all issues? Because consider, before Khrushchev was removed, if you had asked the people what they thought of his policies, they would have unanimously voted “in favor” of them. But a week later they voted “in favor” of removing him!

We tell them: would you like us to have parliamentary theatricals? Have a referendum on every question?

The closed conference of European Communist Parties on youth issues begins tomorrow. Even though I was involved in its preparation, I do not understand what merits it being closed... We do not raise any youth issues either “with us,” or “with them.” In fact, it’s not really clear what the purpose of this meeting is; we just have to show to ourselves and the parties that the ICM is internationally active.

Yesterday I met an Irish woman who came here for the youth conference (Edwin Stewart). She told me in the car that three Catholics were killed in their building three days ago. She is afraid for her daughters (10 and 18 years old). On Sundays they send them from Belfast to other cities to visit relatives. The Protestants are particularly vicious on Sundays. She also worries in the evenings, because she and Jimmy (husband) are often at meetings or on the road. The girls are usually at home. She is around 40 years old.

On Sunday I went skiing at Uspenka. This is the first real ski day of the winter. I raced all around the paths I found last year. Three hours – to the point of total exhaustion. Then in the evening I ended up having to go meet the British delegation (with Kapitonov!) and had dinner with them.

Today I was signing forms to issue pocket money to the people arriving for the youth conference (100 rubles per person, and that’s for two days! Considering that their living arrangements and other services are taken care of). I thought to myself, all of this is “at the expense of the Tambov peasant.” I think no other country could have borne the duty of internationalism for so long. And internationalism would have been long gone had the revolution (the main one) occurred not in Russia, but, say, in Germany or France.

### February 24, 1973

February 21<sup>st</sup> at Plotnikov Street – the Moscow correspondent of the *Morning Star* Colin Williams together with his wife Jane and a delegation from the Communist Party of Great Britain. My toast. Presented him with a watch “from the CC CPSU.” The toast of the head of the delegation (Gordon McLennan) and its subtexts.

The youth conference of the European CPs has concluded. I participated in it indirectly.

The next day two Swedes (conference participants) said it was alright, of course. But it's not clear why this conference was necessary. And the geezers working on youth issues are just too old.

Reception at Plotnikov on occasion of the completion of the conference. My neighbors at the table were a young Italian and a Frenchman.

B.N. has another report to the CC apparatus coming up on the 28<sup>th</sup>. My God! Besides the trip to Berlin with "the ghost," he will also be opening the festivities in honor of this occasion in the Hall of Columns.

March 4, 1973

It was a difficult week. The British delegation returned to Moscow (Leningrad, Kiev, Vilnius, Lvov). They were a lot of work, but in the end it was interesting. They started asking (back when they first got to Moscow, at the automobile plant) – "What is the average salary at your plant? 150 rubles, ok..." Then he quickly calculated something on a piece of paper, "So one would need to work for three years, no food or drink, no going to the movies, to be able to buy a car."

This started a rowdy altercation with mixed results. In the evening, the bearded guy, Ralph Pindor – a young, red-haired shop-steward from Scotland – asked the head of the delegation to gather the members together. "What did you come here for? To pick fights, like provincials? To spoil relations between the parties? Are you at a bar around the corner, or are you carrying out a political assignment?"

In the morning everyone was apologetic.

With each passing day their critical enthusiasm waned. They ended up not raising even the questions they had asked everywhere and wanted to convey to the CPSU Central Committee. These were about the Jews (their theorists came to the conclusion that if we cease considering the Jews a nationality and recoding that in documents, the problems would suddenly disappear); about social-democrats; about the Common Market. They want us to continue fighting against it.

Matkovsky and Lagutin traveled with them and said that after numerous meetings at all levels, the Brits admitted to being in a strange state. They couldn't come up with any objections or arguments, but a sense of dissatisfaction remained.

Apparently, this stems from the fact that they, like most of the West, want to measure us with an incommensurable scale. Mainly, they are stunned by our size, by our strength (which is dilapidated, but then again, only we notice this), and by the fact that they are somehow a part of this... In the end, nitpicking an entity with which you really can't argue seems ridiculous and petty. So they quiet down.

Nevertheless, I had a serious conversation with Gordon McLennan when we were working out the communiqué. We discussed why we needed them to say that they "appreciate

the building of communism;” we talked about the Common Market, about our foreign policy, about why we needed the formula of “joint struggle for unity of the ICM.”

On March 1<sup>st</sup> there was an official reception of the delegation by the CC CPSU. The delegation (its head) no longer made any claims and praised everything profusely. Gordon timidly noted that all questions have essentially been answered and left it up to B.N. to decide whether to go over the questions. But B.N. did not think it necessary and rattled off some kind of stock paragraphs from his last report for propaganda. It was embarrassing to listen to. But the Brits kept listening and nodding. Even in response to Gordon’s question about agriculture, B.N. brazenly declared that “the West is lying” that we have difficulties. There was no 1972, there were no problems at all and everything is just fine.

I sat there and thought: why is he doing this? Everyone knows that it’s not the case. But maybe there is some kind of wisdom in this? Maybe they need to hear a stream of optimism from an official source, so they can officially fend off the anti-Soviets in England?

Then Kapitonov spoke “about the Party.” Reading off a paper, he was expounding some total absurdity from the point of view of the British people’s needs. He talked excitedly about how today Leonid Ilyich signed Party ticket No. 1 – to Lenin. The Brits stared and could barely restrain the smirks on their faces. Then he stopped reading from the paper and made some more comments, which were totally incomprehensible and tongue-tied. Dzhavad, the interpreter, did the best he could to find something to translate into English from the nonsensical stream of words.

At first I felt very ashamed, and then grew downright scared. After all, this person is in charge of all the executive cadres in the Soviet Union! It’s lucky that he happens not to be a malicious person. But his intellectual potential, his understanding of human values and the needs of the Soviet people – they are impossible to define because they are like clay, capable of taking any form and squeezing in any direction.

In an unprecedented move, B.N. and Kapitonov joined the farewell dinner at the hotel in the evening. Overall it was pretty good. And sincerely friendly. B.N. is good at these kinds of events. After they left, McLennan pulled me back into the banquet hall and the real heartfelt toasts began. I gave a long one, about my love for England and the future of this “after all great country.”

The aforementioned “bestowing” [*vruchenie*] (as Parshin called it at our Party meeting) of Party ticket No. 1 contained its own “musical moment”: Podgorny, Kosygin, and Suslov were not in Moscow that day, but they wanted to be depicted as taking part in the event. Therefore, Zamyatin (from TASS) was assigned to edit the photograph in *Pravda* and include them in their proper places next to Leonid Ilyich. However, he did not bother to include Shelest and Shelepin in the photo, who were also absent from the ceremony but included in *Pravda*’s official list of attendees.

Party ticket No. 1 was not the end of it. The next day *Pravda* ran an announcement that Party ticket No. 2 was presented to L.I. Brezhnev!.. It’s not enough for him that prior to this the

whole of Moscow was buzzing for a week that “Brezhnev embraced Podgorny on paper” (on the occasion of awarding Podgorny a second gold medal of the Hero of Socialist Labor on his 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary).

I am amazed by all of this, despite the fact that I know Brezhnev and many of the rest of them personally. Do they not see that this goes beyond the banality of these “events” (though just banality would be alright, it could be passed off as “let the intellectuals squirm a little bit”); do they not see that this directly damages their prestige? Because the people are laughing, and not good-naturedly. They are laughing with contempt.

On March 8<sup>th</sup> I have to go to the FRG for a conference on the State Cadre Policies. I was writing my report all day yesterday, came up with twenty pages.

On the 9<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Ponomarev is giving speeches on “the ghost” in the Hall of Columns and in Berlin. He really watches carefully that I work on his reports and not my own. Indeed, I haven’t had a single day to work on my text.

Today I spent three and a half hours skiing. I must have covered around 40 kilometers, if not more. The dacha is a fairy tale. This is probably the last good skiing day this year. And I can still do it as a skier! At least to others, I don’t look like someone who’s just out on a stroll, or skiing for exercise. I look like a racer, though an aging one.

### March 5, 1973

Tonight Iskra and I went for a walk. I wanted to arrange a trip to Italy for her through one of the Italian Communist Party organizations, to give lectures. We do this every year. B.N. suggested that I look for some new, good people to send. I immediately thought of her and recommended her. After all, she is a great public speaker, has excellent command of the audience, is broadly educated, smart, charming. What better candidate could they want?!

But the KGB took a very long time running a background check on her. That struck me as odd. Then they sent a brief note: “was in close contact with Burkhard.” Who is Burkhard? Verbally, they added that her husband (Gulyga) has so much baggage that it’s best not even to go into it (though they called the Department Secretariat, not me personally). And they said in general they are pretty suspicious. “But for Andreyeva (Iskra) herself, there is nothing besides Burkhard.”

I decided to ignore it and presented her to the committee for foreign travel. They called her in and the instructor casually asked her if she knew Burkhard. Iskra later told me that she did not understand at first and based on the context of the question thought that it was one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party, and that she was being tested on her knowledge of that Party. She sheepishly said that she does not know this man (!) (she did not understand that it was a woman).

The instructor explained that he is talking about a woman convicted for anti-Soviet activities. Still, Iskra could not recall this Burkhard. But she said that she had known some

acquaintance of a relative of Solzhenitsyn. As we later learned, the instructor noted down that she was lying and deliberately confusing the matter.

The other day N.N. [Nikolai Nikolaevich] Organov, the chairman of the committee for foreign travel, called me and started indignantly telling me that Andreyeva is an anti-Soviet [person], that she helped to smuggle Daniel's manuscripts abroad, that Burkhard is Daniel's wife and she was also sentenced for anti-Sovietism in 1968, etc. In a word, they cannot let her out of the country and intend to report everything to the raikom.

I raised my voice, even though Organov is older and a high-ranking official. I told him that I don't believe a single word of this so-called "investigation," and that if this was the case she would have been expelled from the party a long time ago (she has been a member for 20 years) like the others, and she would have been fired from her job. I said that I've known Andreyeva for a quarter of a century, "I know the real person, not a piece of paper," and will not listen to such accusations for a minute longer. All of this is complete nonsense.

Of course I did not tell any of this to Iskra. I found out that she had been questioned about this Burkhard (by the way, Daniel's wife is Bogoraz, not Burkhard at all, who is someone else. But Iskra did not know either of them) not from Iskra but from the committee. I advised Iskra to call the instructor and "responsibly declare" that she does not know Burkhard or Daniel's wife, and that they should not smear her with this.

Iskra is terribly upset. Now her official biography has such (!) a "blemish." On my part, I am afraid that they may report this to the raikom after all. If that happens, my initiative to send her to Italy will result in her not getting her party card renewed. Holy shit!..

Ponomarev told me today that he is thinking of recommending me for the position of director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism [IML]. But, he says, he doesn't want to let me go. Still, Fedoseyev needs to be relieved of one of his positions (vice president or director of IML). I suggested Zagladin, who told me numerous times that he wouldn't mind going there. But B.N. erupted against Vadim, calling him scatterbrained. And he made all kinds of contemptuous faces while talking about him. He said that the real reason behind the order he gave "back then" regarding publications by his deputies and the workers of the International Department in general was not Ulyanovsky, but Zagladin. Suslov had shown B.N. a whole stack of brochures and collections "edited" by Zagladin, and demanded that B.N. stop this "laxity." And in general, B.N. concluded, Zagladin is not at all well-liked up there (!)... (he accompanied this with an upward thrust of his head).

Personally, I think B.N. got wind of some of the "statements" Zagladin made about him on the side, or maybe even in the circle of Aleksandrov-Agentov... Which is quite likely. Zagladin really has picked up a Belyakovian<sup>2</sup> tone regarding Ponomarev.

March 19, 1973

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<sup>2</sup> In the 1960s A. Belyakov was the first deputy of the International Department. He was a talented but boisterous guy, who was later sent as ambassador to Finland. He clearly intended to take B.N.'s place.

From March 8-15<sup>th</sup> I was in the FRG for the first time. All kinds of major impressions; this was probably the most interesting of my business trips.

March 8<sup>th</sup> – East Berlin. Meeting with Gary Ott (Deputy Head of the SED International Department). Lunch at the Party hotel. A chance meeting with Sasha Kheinin, the Second Secretary of the CP of Israel, who is vacationing in the GDR with his daughter. His daughter is a genuine Jewish goddess. My jaw literally dropped when Markovsky introduced us and I turned around to shake her hand. I think I've never seen such a beautiful woman – not in art, or in the movies, or in real life.

Lunch. Ride through the “Wall” to West Berlin. In an hour we were in Cologne. In the evening – dinner at a restaurant with Trambovsky (Secretary of the Rhine-Westphalia regional committee), member of the PB Gerd Daumlich, and someone else. Boring. First conversation – first intelligence-gathering mission.

March 9<sup>th</sup> – conversation in the Rhine-Westphalia regional committee. Speech, discussion. After lunch, [visit to] Wuppertal, the homeland of Engels. The *partprosvet* [party education committee] house, which was burnt by the Nazis in January. The house where Engels was born, or rather the place where his house once stood; it was destroyed by a bomb. Wreath by the stone. The house-museum of Engels' family. Created by the municipality. Very decent, but the communists are grumbling, they are upset that it's not theirs.

March 10-11<sup>th</sup> – conference in Cologne devoted to “the ghost.” But it was a political action rather than a scholarly symposium. I was in the presidium, next to Bachmann (Chairman of the German Communist Party [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP]). Bachmann's report, my report, Diehl's report (the director of some institute in East Berlin), the report of the Head of the SED Central Committee. Regarding Diehl, twelve times conference participants approached Rykin and me to express their contempt for the nonsense he was saying, which “embarrassed him and our Party.” It is telling that they wanted to bring this to our attention without particularly trying to be discreet.

Visit to downtown Cologne. The cathedral! House No. 4711, where *Eau de Cologne* was invented. The building where the “League of Communists” process took place. The building where Marx made speeches.

March 12<sup>th</sup> – Monday. In Bonn. Conversation with Ambassador Falin. He was pointedly easygoing, but kept his distance, as if to say “You should know who appointed me here and to whom I am accountable” (he is from Brezhnev's Zavidovo team. Friends with Tolya Kovalyov). He is a clear and efficient thinker with an aversion for idle talk and common phrases; he is somewhat artificially critical, which implies that everyone else is a fool.

His main ideas:

The national problem was handed over to Brandt. He is a national hero. The “beard” (Ulbricht) had a vision for a future Germany, even if it is utopian for now: when all of Germany becomes socialist, then the unity of the nation will be restored. Honecker has no vision. He goes

with the flow and is manipulated by his close associates, who know what they are doing. On the one hand, they offer the Soviet Union integration, fully understanding that it will not be accepted but will appear as a gesture of utmost loyalty. On the other hand, they organize small provocations against Brandt's policies – with the status of journalists, with reunification of families (especially children), thereby arousing hatred first and foremost in the population of the GDR. That said, they are not risking anything personally. Because they are practically acting on instructions from the West German intelligence service.

Take into consideration, Falin continued, that in addition to very active economic ties between the GDR and the FRG, about which we know “almost nothing,” the two sides share general, invisible but powerful, ties. You know, these are the undercurrents that ultimately determine the life of the ocean. They take place on all fronts: trade unions, scientific, technical, cultural, but especially personal and family ties, and (!) the top secret inter-party and political ties.

Dozens, hundreds of emissaries with various well-concealed assignments travel back and forth daily. First and foremost, they hide this from us. Recently the following episode took place: one such unsophisticated emissary was supposed to transfer something urgent to Berlin, but of course there are no coded communication lines. He hurried to our embassy and asked to do it through our services. We did it. Later we found out that by the time he returned to the GDR he was expelled from the party and disappeared somewhere.

They (the GDR) really display the most loyal friendship to us (the USSR). To this end, if you remember, they proposed projects of complete industrial product integration. We could not praise them enough; we were wide-eyed listening to them. In the meantime, they were well aware that we were not able to accept their “bold internationalist projects.” And notice that despite all our proposals, the East Germans persistently refuse to accept our All-Union State Standard system and use the West German, Common Market system of standards. So much for integration.

And what could you expect! To theorize about the division of a great nation, at the end of the XX century! Is this not absurd! We need to seriously think about “the concept of Germany.” Otherwise, in five years or so we could have such a situation in the GDR that the occupation forces may not be enough.

Falin talked a great deal about the incident that happened a month ago. A member of the DKP Politburo “lost” his briefcase with the complete party personnel files and information on the party's financial relations. The briefcase turned up at a police station... Now everything is in the hands of Genscher – Minister of the Interior of the FRG.

Somewhat contradicting himself, Falin believes that the DKP will not become a serious force unless it refuses to “worship” the SED and repeat all its “positions” on fundamental issues... At least until the DKP gets its own independent line in such matters as the common market and the national question. A fine thing! – I replied. You are suggesting this when the DKP practically belongs to the SED and exists through its means!

He talked about [Herbert] Wehner, deputy chairman of the SPD, chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, former member of the Communist International, and now a “patriarch” of the SPD.

I ended up having to give a report to the diplomatic staff of the embassy, after which Marta (Kapluk’s wife) drove Rykin and me from Bonn to Essen (120 km) in 30 minutes. She is a real ace behind the wheel, and to top it off she plays around by passing cars at 200 km per hour. She was a “liaison” for the Party at some point in the underground. She transported prohibited literature, people’s documents. In ten years she was never caught and always evaded pursuit if someone “got on her tail.”

That evening in Essen there was an extended plenum of the regional committee, taking stock of the strike at “Mannesmann.” Huge impressions. The communist workers, the ones who made the strike despite the trade unions and social democrats, they assured its success. Their stories about what happened, day by day and hour by hour. For the whole week. Their summaries and conclusions. And all of them such good speakers! And this fighting proletarian spirit! After all, there are only 12 communists at the factory, and 3200 social-democrats.

We had two meetings with the party administration. One on Sunday, right after the conference, and the second on Wednesday – Angenfort, Mueller and others. Farewell to Bachmann, Mies. Intellectual and political potential of almost all leaders. Their seriousness and authority is based on capability, knowledge, the force of their dedication, their high ideals and openness to any debate, any action, to anyone who wants to test their qualifications and dedication. But where is this potential going? It is serving a hopeless cause.

The roads, bridge over the Ruhr Valley: 2 km on thin supports, 125 meters high. It’s a marvel. Germany’s industrial might is evident on the sides of the autobahns when you travel through the Ruhr. At night you see lights, during the day – the massive factories. The cities of Ruhr – Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Dortmund, Essen – are now a single metropolis with a population of over nine million. You don’t notice when you leave one city and enter another.

German women are beautiful, well bred, clean, busty, and richly and tastefully dressed. The strength of the nation. In no other country have I seen so many beautiful women – they are everywhere, throngs of them.

### March 21, 1973

It has only been a week since I was in Germany. Even those impressions have passed by.

Today we had some “ominous events.” Unexpectedly, Zagladin and Shaposhnikov were summoned to the CC Secretariat and told to make a “public, stern reprimand” for the events of the night before November 7<sup>th</sup>, i.e. events that took place almost 5 months ago (referring to the small party, with alcohol, in Zagladin’s office. I was among the participants, as well as Kuskov, Zhilin, Pushkov, and Brutents. But most of the people left early, the ones who were “caught” were there until about 11 p.m.).

Why has this surfaced again? We all discussed this for a long time, tried to get to the bottom of it. Is it a swipe at Ponomarev? For what? It seems the points of power at the top are still shifting, there is a rebalancing of forces, and the first clear sign of this is Polyansky's demotion. The thing is that after the critique of Zagladin and Shaposhnikov, the Secretariat immediately removed Yakovlev from the position of first deputy of Agitprop ("to send him to diplomatic services"). The excuse is his article in *Literaturka*, which blasted the Pochvenniks and modern Slavophiles. Actually, it was not so much the article itself as the fact that it was published "without permission." (Note: any person with an understanding of the apparatus knows that it could not have been published without permission). When it was published and Golikov & Co. started raising a stink about it, Yakovlev leaked some information – namely, that Demichev approved and allowed the article.)

However, when Suslov raised the issue at the PB, Demichev said that he never read the article. Nobody so much as batted an eye at this blatant lie, and all conclusions were made against Yakovlev. It was "suggested" to Demichev to present Yakovlev for expulsion. Despite Demichev's statement at the PB, people say that there is a note that he "signed off" on the article, adding that he does not object to the content even though it has some ideological-political shortcomings. The main thing that Yakovlev is being accused of – that he proceeded without permission – is an obvious lie. The social implications of this act are clear: the article appears to be a mistake, and of such magnitude that its author, a member of the Oversight committee [*revizionnaya kommissiya*] and practically the head of a CC department, is being removed from his position. All our Black Hundredists will be quite happy.

... Recently, B.N. mentioned several times that Suslov has whole binders of our work (i.e. the International Department staff) on his desk. Mikhail Andreyevich [Suslov] rubbed Ponomarev's nose in it, saying that it is bad, because these "authors" are perceived as representatives of the CC.

Ponomarev himself is under great suspicion on this subject. After all, he appears in print more often than all the other Politburo members, candidate members, and CC Secretaries put together. With the exception, of course, of the General Secretary.

The assistants (a special clan that occupies Usovo and Uspenka) openly grumble about Ponomarev's "theoretical" activity. He has a whole pack of writers-consultants at his beck and call.

But all of this has clearly already "settled" at the top. This creates (or rather gives off) the atmosphere of some great collective immorality. The so-called "interests of the cause" have nothing to do with this life.

B.N. gathered the entire department today. He talked about vigilance when dealing with foreigners. The meaning of his speech: do not say anything that has not been published here. Record everything you and your interlocutor say into a numbered notebook. And so on. All of this is completely absurd. You cannot engage in politics if you turn its agents into dummies that mindlessly repeat newspaper phrases.

March 23, 1973

I got up early. Reading *Literaturka*, the last issues that I missed because of my trip to the FRG. There are many articles about the modern worker, the modern intellectual, the modern literary hero. What is he like? What should he be like? At the center is the image of a manager. The object of discussion is Peshkov from *A Man from the Side* by Dvoretzky (I saw it in "Sovremennik"): "Social activity, awareness, civic integrity and personal courage of the modern hero. Professional skills, exceptional competence, and absolute rationality as conditions for a moral approach to modern problems." The discussion of this aesthetic search for a modern Soviet literature is passionate and intelligent. But considering what was said earlier, are they doing this without the boss? Or perhaps the boss is out of the loop?

Yesterday I went to the Tretyakov Gallery to see Boris Musatov. Only, perhaps, the "Requiem." The rest – an anemic world of a sickly, "wretched," as people used to say, person of refined tastes. A world that makes you think about the infinity of variations and possibilities of the human spirit, about the secret mysteries of this spirit, which is attractive and thrilling. But the artist himself is not exciting at all.

April 1, 1973

The *Voprosy literatury* [Problems of Literature] journal printed Akhmatova's previously unpublished manuscript about Pushkin's death. About Pushkin in general. Lyubimov's Pushkin ("My friend, believe...") at the Taganka Theater. I got to see the transcript of the numerous discussions of the "runs-through" of the show before the decision was made to allow or not allow it. Among the comments were the terrible statements of our head of culture Pokarzhevsky, as well as the brave comments of the writers, who said that they also have a responsibility before the people for their cultural and spiritual development, and that the various departments' claims to a monopoly on culture are intolerable, etc. So, about Pushkin. Why do people keep coming back to him? He is universal like any genius, and like all the greats – he is "eternal." But Pushkin is universal and eternal in the genius of each one of his specific, inimitable manifestations. And then – the word! I am reading him right now and realizing that previously I perceived a lot of it simply as music, without particularly thinking about the meaning of the phrases. And sometimes, it turns out, I did not even understand the meaning of his poems. Right now my feeling for the words is very acute, right now I see the poem in its entirety, its balance, as well as each stanza and each syllable. The music has fused with the delight of penetrating into every nuance of the idea. There is a great labor behind this, too. Some poems appear in quite a different light than in the past. For example, "To the nobleman" (to Yusupov, the owner of Arkhangelskoye Palace).

At the same time I am reading a book I brought from the FRG, Jack Pine's *The Love Sucker*. It's a sex-bomb book, with a rare collection of lusty techniques. It would seem I am a well-informed person in this sphere... But there were quite a few surprises. Truly, the sexual revolution, like every revolution, opens up extraordinary creativity!

"Che Guevara died, but 'for boys, Poses do not die' and his ghost wanders the countries of America and Europe like a stern warning to all who are over-fed, too relaxed, presumptuous, bowing and scraping, kowtowing, everyone who forgot about the human values of dignity, truth,

and justice.” That is from V. Guseyev’s [sic] from “Yunost” [Youth] No. 3. This is when the apogee of power over our spiritual life is in the hands of people like Demichev, Trapeznikov, and, as Lenin used to say, *tutti quanti*.

I saw Trapeznikov – that freak in a large cap – today, from a distance, in Uspenka. Once again I was consumed with rage and wanted to walk up to him and mug him in the face, lift him up by the collar and hit him in the face again, saying “This is so you would stop abusing Soviet system, stop defiling our ideals!”

April 2, 1973

Yesterday I read Roger Garaudy’s *Alternative*. I put it off for a long time. At first it seemed like it was all the same. After all, he publishes a new book every year. And actually, it’s more or less true this time as well. But still it gives you something to think about (in your spare time).

Since he is a renegade who burned all the bridges, he enjoys his freedom of thought. He is literally swimming in it; he frolics like a stallion that’s been locked up too long in the pen of Marxist dogmatism. By the way, Garaudy played a very active part in the construction of this Marxist pen, not only abroad but also here in the 1950s and early 1960s.

But such uncontrollable “freedom of thought” is bad for real scholarly analysis. The flaws of dogmatic Marxism are obvious. They have long been on the surface. All one needs is some writing experience to build a “system for the future” based off these flaws. This is even easier for a person who was raised on Fedoseyev-style Marxism (they say that Fedoseyev was even an official reviewer for Garaudy’s dissertation at the Academy of Social Sciences). But such work has little potential. Entire battalions of various types of anti-Soviets are engaged in this kind of work. This is the first point.

Second. Since he is, as we used to call him, an “educated Marxist,” i.e. a person who is well-read in Marxist-Leninist literature and history, and in addition a person who is aware of the huge flow of public opinion in the West<sup>3</sup>, he grasped practically all the fundamental problems of the modern revolution. Many of them he presented interestingly and innovatively, maybe even correctly. For example, starting at a certain moment, namely when production begins to “determine” the market, to dictate and invent needs, to impose demand and thereby expand it by renewing the stock of goods – at this point the position of A and B radically changes in the method of production. (B) begins to consume the bulk of investments, which deprives the production of means production (A) of its defining role: 1) in the development of the cycle; 2) in the creation of a trend to lower the rate of profit, which, according to the facts, is no longer valid today. (Also, thanks to the transformation of scientific labor into “living labor,” directly create a profitable price, and not just immobilized in the past in vehicles, etc.)

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<sup>3</sup> The majority of our “scholars” have a misconception about Western public opinion based on the loud criticism in our newspapers and magazines; some privileged Muscovites have a better idea from literature reviews; and only a handful of people who know foreign languages and have access to the original publications and have some real understanding.

Things of a similar nature and many others require very serious attention and analysis, of course. But the problem is that everything that Garaudy touches becomes revisionism – not only for us, but in our entire Communist movement. I felt it vaguely in the FRG: at the conference we were discussing the same questions that Garaudy writes about in his books, but nobody wanted to rebuke him, his name was not spoken once in two days. But (and more importantly!) nobody dared to put questions the way Garaudy puts them (or even in a different form), though perhaps it is impossible to put this question in any other way. This is the obvious damage of his defection.

But any public reflection on this subject in the Soviet Union and in our Communist movement is now taboo, revisionism. Because here Garaudy walked arm in arm with the Spanish [Santiago] Carrillo.

As for the Fedoseyev-style Marxism, it turned out to be so timid and (really) so impotent in terms of creativity, and ignorant to top it off, that it does not dare to raise the problem and solve it better than Garaudy attempts to do. Besides, Fedoseyev's goals are different – to stigmatize foreign and catch domestic revisionists, instead of delving into the essence of things.

Third. Garaudy's anti-Sovietism is fierce and blinding, like every renegade's. It has led him not only beyond the limits of the Communist Party of France [Parti communiste français, PCF]<sup>4</sup>, but outside the limits of common sense. He has many interesting ideas about, for example, overcoming capitalism. In particular, about the "national strike," an idea he borrowed from Carrillo. What is interesting about that idea is that the decisive struggle will take place "in the workplace," not on the street or in Parliament. (By the way, unbeknown to himself, Ponomarev insists on this idea before every report he makes). However, all details are devalued if they are not organized in the context of the core balance of forces in the world. After writing us off ideologically (techno-bureaucratic socialism), he also ignores us politically, not understanding that by now we are an organic component of the entire process of modern development, at least on the course that has or will have historical meaning. And vice versa, by believing Mao and supporting him ideologically (philosophy of the Cultural Revolution) he politically accepts Maoism only with a plus sign. In the meanwhile, it is a reactionary force, and more and more so. If it ever does form a new advanced civilization, it will only be through the suppression of existing civilizations. Garaudy should understand this, as he is no stranger to understanding the essence and possibilities of religious ideology in human history (and here we also have the racial psychology of the masses). However, his eyes are obscured by that same anti-Sovietism.

April 3, 1973

Yesterday I also read the new novel by [Vladimir] Voinovich about Vera Figner. It is a stylistically talented work, done to resemble prose from the 1880's. It introduces the atmosphere of the era very well. However, its chief merit is the hidden philosophy. The complex modern fate of our Revolution (October) is extrapolated from the revolutionary events of the time: the pure

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<sup>4</sup> Certainly, if Garaudy's position was not so anti-Soviet and did not infringe on "democratic centralism," i.e. [George] Marchais' position, he would have remained in the party and all his theories would be in a different "system of relations."

ideals embodied in Vera and her friends coming in contact with crude reality from top to bottom. But the author and the narrator, who tells the story, is deeply ironic (not only in the literary sense, but, significantly, also in the philosophical sense). This makes his interpretation of this contradiction not trivial. With sympathy and bitterness, he seems to be constantly mocking and ridiculing the helplessness, innocence, and the general pointlessness of their heroism and sacrifice. At the same time, he leaves the reader with a deep belief in the historical inevitability and... the necessity of such actions, such ideology.

#### April 4, 1973

Coming back to *Vera Figner*. In recent years, the theme of Narodnaya Volya [People's Will] and "that era" in general is very popular, both in historical literature, in art, and in journals and publishing houses. Just the things that have crossed the radar of my attention: about Perovskaya, about Bakunin, about Kropotkin in the *Lives of Outstanding People* series and in the popular series *Nauka*. Strepnyak Kravchinsky has been re-issued. There is something in every issue of *Prometheus*; in the latest issue – about Kletochkin (an agent of the III branch of Narodnaya Volya). From time to time there is something in *Questions of History*, where I am a member of the editorial board. Now Voinovich, who appeared on the literary horizon 7-8 years ago with his far-from-orthodox short stories, released a book about Vera. And [Aleksandr] Lebedev (author of the famous *Chaadaev*) is finishing a book about [Andrey] Zhelyabov.

What could it all mean?

It clearly resonates with things like the quote from *Yunost'* about Che Guevara. There is a void in spiritual life. Young people (the best part of them) are pragmatic, businesslike, learning professionals, getting married early. A relatively small part of the children of the "elite" are freeloading off their parents. The rest are simply working and living, not thinking about anything. There is a rather large group of Komsomol loudmouths and careerists on the sly. Among these Komsomol activists, very few are truly ideological and dedicated, or business-minded and positive people but "without all these fantasies" (for example leaders of student groups). A cross section of our youth reflects the state of our society.

And, perhaps, right now it's not the youth who have a "need for ideas." More likely it is the "combat generation," the people who lived through the war and are eager to do everything they can to prevent the dangerous (in its irreversibility) leakage of spirituality from public consciousness and life.

#### April 5, 1973

The thirst for spirituality arises not so much from the day to day life; it is fed by the subterranean current of the "national tradition." Right now Tocqueville is in vogue (among refined intellectuals). The pressure of the "old order" (almost synonymous with "human nature") manifests itself not only in the structure and habits of state practices, but in ideological life as well. It finds various expressions. One is well known – neo-Slavophiles, Pochvenniks from [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn to [Vladimir] Soloukhin and beyond – neo-Stalinist *Molodaya Gvardiya* [Young Guard]. The other is neo-Westernism, which started with *Novy Mir* [New

World] (especially Lakshin with his brilliant journalism). The interest in Populism, and even Narodnaya Volya, joined with this course. This is not just the desire for ideological purity and selflessness. There is some kind of vague suggestion here. No wonder this trend intensified in connection with the shooting at Borovitsky Gates three years ago.<sup>5</sup> Back then people said that if the country is destined to go through another revolutionary cycle of historic proportions, right now it is in a state equivalent to the '60s of the XIX century (by analogy).

The search for spirituality is based on Soviet tradition. The increasingly frequent (and increasingly stylized – for the convenience of contemporaries) references to the civil war era are indicative. But even more remarkable is the deep-seated and passionate, indestructible like a guilty conscience, interest in the “Great 1941.” No matter how much Demichev’s minions try to hush it up, falsify it, or conveniently channel it, the roots of this interest are deep and will thrive for a long time. The year 1941 was the culmination in the development of Soviet social consciousness. Sometime in 1942 you can date the beginning of the “post-revolutionary” period of our state and society.

#### April 7, 1973

My first day at work after being out sick. There is a feeling that things would get done even if I was not here. And the quality of the work wouldn't even suffer that much without me. In only one sector – England, Ireland, and Australia – would things not be done as they should. The main impression I get after every break from my job is that I need the work more than it needs me.

At my 52 years, I am so integrated in this activity that I cannot imagine myself in any other life situation.

It turns out that intense preparation has begun for the CC Plenum. People have been waiting for two years, if not more, for a plenum on scientific-technical progress. But it has been postponed again, same as the plenum on international issues. It seems the generals and colonels from agriculture, obkom leaders and others, are filling with a quiet rage. Indeed, what's the logic? The areas that are getting worse are left untouched, nobody wants to raise these issues (maybe because nobody knows how to solve them; or because the key decision has not been made – weapons or economy, there is no money to solve them; or because the General Secretary himself is not preparing the Plenum, it is in the hands of other people, namely – Kirilenko). The areas that are successful and straightforward will continue in that direction anyway. In these spheres there are numerous lavish discussions of “findings and conclusions,” of which 99.99 percent have no direct correlation with the Plenum.

However, it is tempting [to concentrate on the successful aspects]: the entire world's media are working here for our prestige and authority. Everything is in the open: beautiful and pleasant. And you can see the work...

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<sup>5</sup> Attempted assassination of Brezhnev.

Ponomarev, Aleksandrov-Agentov, Zagladin & Co. have bunkered down in Novo Ogarevo. They are preparing the main report and alongside that materials for Brezhnev's trip to the FRG. This connection is not coincidental. Zagladin "leaked" the following conversation with the speaker [Brezhnev]: "I do not want it to look like my trip; I want it to be our mutual undertaking, collective..." That is why, contrary to the practice established after the XXIII Congress, other members of the leadership will be speaking at the Plenum, including Ponomarev. The consultants headed by Zhilin are very busy because of this. Yurka [Zhilin] told me about the central issue, which is how to present the General Secretary's achievements in B.N.'s speech. By the way, he, Zhilin, recalled an incident that occurred in Berlin, where B.N. gave a report on the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the "ghost." He had to make a toast at the final banquet. He did it off the cuff, and later, when Yurka presented him with the written text for the press, B.N. started to anxiously lecture him, "It should be just as I said it, namely: not 'headed by,' but 'Politburo,' comma, 'personally Comrade Brezhnev,'" etc. He repeated it several times. Then he caught Zhilin as he was leaving the room and "explained" it to him one more time.

They say Yakovlev is already appointed as ambassador to Canada. Moscow does not know yet. He is in the hospital. Frail folk we have nowadays!

April 10, 1973

More on Yakovlev. They say that the article in *Literaturka* was not the real reason, only an excuse. The main problem is that he did not provide the correct presentation of the leadership in our propaganda. He did not develop this theme enough, he even held it back!

One momentous episode corresponds to this. At the last CC Secretariat there was a discussion of the second book of Volume V of the "History of the Communist Party." It was a closed session. Everyone was asked to [leave]... The people who stayed were Pospelov (editor in chief of the whole publication), Fedoseyev (director of the IML, where it is published), and Kukin (responsible for the publication at IML). Only M.A. (Suslov) spoke. Conclusion: "The book was prepared at a very low theoretical level, with gross political errors."

What was the matter? The period under discussion was 1946-1958. It turns out that the authors allowed a negative evaluation of the Party's activity. They downplayed its role. Accentuated the criticism. Incorrectly assessed the XIX Party Congress.

How would an "astute reader" understand this, i.e. the interested public that got wind of information about that Secretariat?

They would understand it very simply: after all, Brezhnev was first elected to the Party leadership at the XIX Congress! How could this Congress be criticized! On the contrary, its role should be elevated, like the Battle of Novorossiysk, for example.

This is how Sparrow presented the matter to me. I first found out about what happened from him.

Apropos: The Department of Science gave a critical opinion of the layout, but not a devastating one. It was sent to the secretaries before the meeting, as is usually done. However, M.A.'s speech was not based on this note, but on another note, prepared by Brezhnev personally based on information from his assistant Golikov.

The Science Department has its own agenda – to take a jab at B.N. again. The thing is that Zaitsev is the editor of the fifth volume, and he is a consultant in our department. To all intents and purposes, for the last fifteen years he has been Ponomarev's lieutenant on CPSU history and something like a foreman in the preparation of CPSU history textbooks, as well as other books edited by Ponomarev. Trapeznikov has been trying to get at him for a long time now. And what an opportunity this presented. But the blow turned out to be more severe. Zaitsev told me today that he is done for.

It is symptomatic that B.N. did not know anything, i.e. he did not know what turn this affair was taking. He was not present at the Secretariat either, because he was in Zavidovo with Brezhnev, preparing the Plenum and Leonid Ilyich's trip to the FRG.

For now we can make only one conclusion: Trapeznikov plus Golikov did a great job pushing their line by fully exploiting the senile weak-spots of the leadership. And, in fact, it's hard to argue against them. After all, what was so bad or wrong at the XIX Congress? Stalin's speech was actually very interesting and insightful...

Timofeyev stopped by. He always acts as if people have nothing better to do than listen to his intrigues. His sense of self-importance has ballooned so much, it seems his skin could burst any second. In the episode with the CPSU History he saw only one thing: an opportunity to get at Fedoseyev.

Note on relations with the social democrats.

Note on a new meeting of fraternal parties on European security (Berlinguer's suggestion) similar to Karlovy Vary.

Note on a meeting of communist parties on ideological struggle (against anti-Sovietism).

Note on the creation of a research department on the ICM under Ryzhenko (Rector of the Lenin School), to help our group of consultants.

April 14, 1973

Modifications and finishing touches on Ponomarev's speech for the forthcoming Plenum.

Party meeting regarding the Subbotnik; offensive mediocrity of our Party secretary Parshin. I get infuriated when I see him, and especially when I hear him (all the more when it is from the podium). It is not even the fact that he is this way; there are plenty of cretins in the world. It is the fact that B.N. is "satisfied" with him, the fact that B.N. promotes him and has recommended him for this position for the third time. The only reasonable explanation is that B.N. knows whom he has to deal with in the party committee of the apparatus and in the

Secretariat, and, knowing that the party organization of a CC department amid the apparatus is a complete nonentity and has no effect on the work and state of affairs, B.N. prefers to have a party idiot to cover for the “intellectualism” and “freedom of thought” that he allows in his operation, because without this the Department could not perform its complex functions.

But I think he is mistaken in thinking that Parshin does a good job in this role. Rather, he actually exposes the dirty laundry that B.N. would like to hide behind his idiotic face and dense cretinism. He does not do this out of meanness, but out of simple, primal stupidity and malice for certain persons.

I was at the premiere of “Pushkin” at the Taganka Theater. PB Member Polyansky was there (his son-in-law is the Jew Van’ka Dykhovichnyi, who plays one of the “Pushkins.” He is a wonderful guy, maybe even a great actor, musician, etc. He leads the “Pushkin the Hussar, playboy, loafer” line).

In some places a shiver runs through your spine from the lines or whole scenes, which use Pushkin’s words to throw a cheeky challenge to the present order. All of this passed [the censors], despite the fierce resistance of the “cultural authorities,” because Lyubimov perfectly mastered and deftly used the “emperor with no clothes” principle. Every more or less thinking person will ask the question: what social meaning did the director instill in this production? There can be only one answer – “he’s giving the finger behind his back, and sometimes he shows it openly, too!” But nobody wants to or can say it publicly, for fear of looking like an idiot or a reactionary. Everybody applauds loudly, from representatives of the raikom to members of the PB, not to mention the general public, which is laughing mischievously to boot. Technically, everyone applauds the skill of the director and actors... It really is quite stunning at times, even though this play, as all the previous ones, is not without the usual Lyubimov vulgarities, for which he sacrifices taste, or maybe his good taste simply leaves him in those moments.

#### April 16, 1973

I met with Ponomarev. He gave me an assignment to write the resolution for the upcoming Plenum. Gave me Brezhnev’s draft version. I don’t know what will remain in the final version, but for now:

1. If [the events in] Czechoslovakia hadn’t happened, right now there would be no Brandt, no Nixon, no détente, no cooperation.
2. Trust in Nixon. Regarding Brandt, for the first time we say that he is an anti-fascist, an émigré who fled Nazi Germany and came back in the uniform of a Norwegian officer. The Germans have elected such a person – is this not a psychological change?
3. About the Common Market: for the first time [it is referred to] not as the “economic base of NATO,” but even somewhat the opposite.
4. Economic cooperation with the West and Japan – at the heart of our entire “international corner.”
5. Things are going badly with the Comecon [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance]. It’s our fault, our departments (and possibilities). Hence the unfavorable balance of trade with socialist countries, the unfavorable export structure, and the fact

- that their volume of trade with the West is growing faster than the volume of trade within Comecon countries.
6. Unequivocally positive about Poland and (!) Hungary. The same with Yugoslavia – the Politburo always considered it a socialist country, so to speak.
  7. The Chinese (in connection with the U.S., Europe, Japan) are finally “slipping through” as the main danger.
  8. For the first time [we mention] that we are economically interested in arms control and that without the materialization of a political détente through disarmament (reducing arms) there can be no real peaceful structure of international relations.
  9. Praise for U.S. and West German businessmen (must be Arbatov’s work) with the message that their desire to make a profit is a factor that is more reliable than any political commitments. So that is what we should use to take our bearings.
  10. The idea for a new Karvoly Vary-style conference of European communist parties on European security has been approved. An idea for a new general meeting of the ICM has been proposed – for the indefinite future.
  11. The upcoming trip to Germany as a way to define our friendship and cooperation with West Germany for the “long term,” forever!
  12. About the GDR, it says that they have not yet figured out what to do in the new situation.
  13. The Romanians and Koreans are the black sheep.

A very frank report.

April 29, 1973

About the Plenum. The report was truly outstanding in terms of recognizing the realities and understanding that we need to be guided by these realities. From this perspective, there were the following breakthrough ideas: a) our economic ties, as well as others’ economic relations with us, ensure the solidity of peace and peaceful coexistence; b) rejection of the policy of seeing foreign economic relations as a filler for the economy for plugging holes. Instead, it is an integral part of planning our national economy, especially for the long-term; c) the Chinese are really our #1 enemy.

The problem of the “cult.” We came across it even before the Plenum, when we were preparing the resolutions and Ponomarev’s speeches. At the level of the deputies we debated for a long time whether to include a mention of the “personal contribution” or not. We included it. Ponomarev removed it and, it seems, got approval (most likely acquiescence) from Suslov. This was followed by an “outcry” from Aleksandrov-Agentov, who turned to Zagladin to find out who prepared it. Of course Zagladin brought it to B.N. The latter started to backtrack, but in a reserved manner. The draft remained without mention of the “personal contribution” until the middle of the second day of the Plenum. Then, during an intermission, at Kirilenko’s urging, the Secretariat quickly added the formula that appeared in the published text. For B.N. it was a total loss: he opened himself up, and Suslov seems to have set him up.

It is unlikely that B.N. was motivated by “ideological consideration;” most likely he misjudged the alignment of the main forces and underestimated where things were inevitably moving. Here are the facts:

Podgorny spoke first at the Plenum. During his speech, three times the audience stood up to applaud when Podgorny mentioned Brezhnev. After this speech, every mention of Brezhnev, even in passing, triggered more or less strong applause.

That evening, Ponomarev called me to his office. He was frustrated and angry, sitting at his desk with the draft of his speech in front of him on the table, as well as some paper with scribbles about the importance of Brezhnev (as I later saw). Flashing me with his eyes, he asked: “Do you see what is going on?” I told him that I had no doubt that it would happen.

He relaxed a little and started speaking with disappointment: “I did not expect this from Podgorny. He always held himself like ... (he made a gesture to show distance). And now... What’s going on?!” And so on.

I blurted out, “Maybe we could include something on his ability to link domestic and foreign issues?” B.N. stared at me [and said], “Include where? In the resolution? Are you serious? (He almost said “crazy”)... For the whole world to see?!” I said, “No, add it to your speech.” B.N., “Oh, that is a little better”... then suddenly he got wound up, jumped up and slammed his leather folder on the edge of the table. It slipped and fell to the floor. At this moment I suddenly thought that he may be concerned for more than just his personal situation.

Evidently, he felt very much alone in his stubborn and secret desire to defend some small line, which for him turned out to be quite strong for a number of reasons, stretching from the XX Congress. The dull echo of Bolshevik public morality.

Suslov spoke very clearly, with honed orthodox formulas, which contained carefully considered recognition of the “new approach” to world politics and class vigilance, an emphasis on strengthening the ideological struggle. About the General Secretary’s role, he spoke in moderation (not as profusely as Podgorny) but weightily. In general, he looked true to himself and the reputation he has in the Party. One could almost physically sense the power of his authority by the way the audience was listening to him: there is something in him of the old “mystery” that surrounded leaders of the Stalin era.

Almost a month before the Plenum, Ponomarev told us that there are plans to hold it “in a new way” – to break with the rule established after the XXIII Congress. Members of the leadership, except Brezhnev, do not speak at the Plenums. This time it was assumed that many members of the Politburo and Secretariat would speak. And in general, there would be a discussion as opposed to just an “approval of the report.” But none of this happened. Except for Podgorny, Suslov, and Kosygin, no one from the “center” got to speak, despite the fact that people prepared. Among those was, needless to say, Ponomarev, and also (I found out) – Pelshe, Kirilenko...

Besides the abovementioned, everything went the usual way: Leningrad, Sverdlovsk (Ural!), republics on the perimeter and in the bushes (Azerbaijan from the Caucasus, Kirgizia from Central Asia); Sniečkus from the Baltics – he lost his voice on the second sentence and made the rest of his report in a whisper. Nobody could hear anything even through earphones, but nevertheless he finished his speech and got his applause. Masherov, in a loud, theatrical voice, erupted in a stream of lush words – completely meaningless propaganda blabber. It was obvious that people were not listening to him, same as to many others. Representatives of the workers, peasants, the intelligentsia. During such speeches the auditorium was buzzing with chatter, some people talking openly. The chairman kept ringing the bell to call to order.

So, it was an ordinary performance, same as at public events, interrupted occasionally for important points: Andropov, Gromyko, Grechko, Patolichev, and partly Shcherbitsky.

A little from their speeches:

Andropov. I jotted down, “a united front of imperialists and anti-communists, left and right-wing revisionists, Maoists and Zionists” – against us. The wide use of tourism for espionage, or more precisely to perform “ideological sabotage.” And – “the Zionist activity is not aimed at securing full freedom of emigration for our Jews, it is aimed at creating a ‘Jewish question’ in our country.”

He was received very warmly, especially after Brezhnev digressed from his speech to say a few words about Andropov and the KGB, along the lines of, “The KGB provides enormous help to the Politburo in foreign policy. People who think that the KGB is all about seizing and jailing people are deeply mistaken – the KGB first and foremost means colossal and dangerous work in foreign countries. [KGB personnel] must be capable and have character... Not everyone can... not sell out, not betray, and resist the temptations. This is not like this... with clean hands (he ran rubbed his palms together). This work requires great courage and great devotion.”

All of this was followed by thunderous applause.

Gromyko. He talked a lot about the fierce political battle that Leonid Ilyich led during his meetings with Nixon; about the “mighty Central Committee” that all the Sovietologist press is writing about. Some of his phrases stuck in my memory: “The former Germany died; it collapsed under the weight of its crimes.” About the People’s Republic of China: “Our country is big and prosperous, but we have no spare lands,” and “Our country has no intention of conceding its place in the world, which it holds by right.”

He gave an evaluation to the Politburo and the General Secretary: “they are doing their work well and respectably.”

Later, when he was elected to the Politburo, I remembered that during his speech I made a note in my journal, “He acts as if he were the second person in the Party and the government.”

Grechko. What struck me is that our estimates of China’s nuclear capacity are much less than U.S. estimates (in the press): several dozen missiles with a range of 2000 km, around 200

nuclear units. Grechko joked: “As for us...” he interrupted himself, turned to the Presidium and asked: “What do you (!)<sup>6</sup> think, Leonid, should I say how much we have?” Brezhnev replied from the Presidium, “Don’t say it, don’t scare us!”

I was also shocked by the following: he said that their [nuclear] capacity cannot be compared to ours, and that according to our estimates, they will not reach our current levels for 15-20 more years. Alright. But in 15-20 years even if they do not reach our capacity, they will get close. And our current capacity is enough to destroy all the vital centers of our country several times over. What then?

Patolichev’s strong side was that he wasn’t reading from a piece of paper but speaking freely. You could feel the old Party schooling of a public speaker from the 1930-1940s (he was an obkom secretary at the time). In a word, he is a character. However, after a good start in the spirit of a report on the significance of foreign economic relations and our helplessness and clumsiness in dealing with big business, the latter part of his speech was petty, with hints at Baibakov (Gosplan [State Planning Committee]). Baibakov sat with a contemptuous scowl on his face (I was sitting very close to him); he knew well (and he knew that Patolichev knew too) where it is a matter of incompetence of the cadres, and where it is objectively a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul, i.e. where Patolichev was striking below the belt and everybody saw it.

Kosygin’s speech was interesting: it was very frank in being a totally technocratic speech, with figures, etc. Quotes: “We cannot develop the STR [Scientific and Technological Revolution] in isolation from other countries;” “we need a new concept of cooperation with other countries;” “we should be able to look at these things with a fresh perspective. Our future depends on it.”

Facts: 2/3 of our loans are going to Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia; weapons and equipment for developing countries make up 25 percent of the value of our exports; 2/3 of our economic ties are with socialist countries.

And not a single word about the General Secretary’s role. He was the only one of all the speakers to do this.

Finally, one more point in connection with the Plenum. During the last intermission the participants received copies of the draft resolution. Two people were sitting behind me, Stukalin (chairman of the press committee) and Khrennikov. The former says, “Look, the draft is just three and a half pages but it contains all the main points of a report that was three and a half hours, and it is pretty accurate.” Khrennikov agrees, “Amazing!” Stukalin: “What skill, eh?!”

This was nice to overhear, because I wrote the resolution. Of course, I wrote it the only way I could have written it since this “labor” of mine has no influence on policy (although it is possible that in another manifestation something might have been overlooked, or some stylistic nuance might have been accented differently). However, after this “dialogue” of people who do

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<sup>6</sup> Grechko uses the familiar form of address when asking Brezhnev the question. [Trans.]

not know me, I felt strange to look around the auditorium where the vast majority of the people had absolutely nothing to do with the political content of the Plenum.

I held the meeting on the first volume of the multi-volume project on the International Labor Movement. We have a solid group of people. It could be interesting. Time to start writing the introduction (Ponomarev is the author!).

There was another Secretariat resolution on the fifth volume of the "History of the CPSU." Zaitsev was removed. It looks like he will be removed from the apparatus. Fedoseyev was approved as the editor-in-chief of the entire publication: he emerged unscathed and even got a raise, even though he signed the proposal together with Pospelov and accompanied it with positive feedback in the CC. Pospelov was transferred to the rank and file of the editorial board. Trapeznikov's people have been put in charge of volumes V and VI, i.e. the entire period from 1946-1964. Trapeznikov himself was put on the main editorial board.

My secret (handwritten) note to B.N. in Zavidovo on the eve of this decision, in which I expounded my views on the situation as it relates to him, based on the words of Timofeyev, Volobuyev, and others. He called me afterwards; he was very sad and helpless.

It all started when Trapeznikov and Golikov slipped something to Brezhnev about this wretched volume. He raised the question at the PB, asking why the XIX Congress and the work of the Party during that difficult period are being maligned. The Secretariat was assigned to look into the matter. Now many people are under the impression that Suslov used this occasion to carefully "put down" Ponomarev as an ideologist, or in any case to cut off his claims to play the ideologist on the domestic front with his "History of the CPSU" hobby.

Before the Plenum, which was scheduled to bring personnel changes that were unprecedented since 1957, this operation was "quite timely."

#### May 5, 1973

Ponomarev has already adjusted. I have a pile of routine work for him (and the other deputies probably do too), but he has no time for that right now. He is busy with the commotion surrounding preparations for Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, even though he has no direct orders for it. Yesterday he called Shaposhnikov and me and assigned us to urgently prepare: a) a message for the press conveying Brezhnev's appreciation for the worldwide flow of congratulations on being awarded the Lenin Peace Prize; and b) Brezhnev's speech at the ceremony after receiving his award.

On this occasion we stayed up working until 11 p.m., and today (Saturday) is a work day. However, this is not the problem, we've been spoiled with too many days off anyway, with all the May holidays and Victory Day. The problem is that we are not doing our work, including the work stemming directly from the Plenum, which was assigned to us, the International Department, specifically!

#### May 6, 1973

In the morning I was at the dacha. Played tennis a little. Watched a movie based on Mikhail Bulgakov's play about Ivan the Terrible – "Ivan Vasilievich Changes Professions." It is funny, but bitter at times.

In the evening Iskra and I went for a walk from Ploshchad' Nogina to metro station "Dynamo." We talked about everything, and everything became clearer and easier. She is very wise, and very good to me. It is astonishing how she sees everything.

Brutents stopped by, told me what he heard from Gavrilov (Demichev's assistant): Yakovlev was removed on direct orders from Brezhnev. After the Secretariat session where it was decided not to remove Yakovlev (for the article), Brezhnev called "the Chemist"<sup>7</sup> to his office and lectured him for an hour. Demichev came back to his office red and white in the face and did not see anyone for the rest of the day. The next day he prepared a statement about appointing Yakovlev as ambassador to Canada. Gavrilov said that Demichev was framed and made to remove Yakovlev himself. The reason for this, according to Gavrilov, is Yakovlev's reluctance to understand what was required of him. And what was required was to "concentrate the propaganda on one person." They had tried to "tame" him, to "be nice" to him, but he, supposedly with "the Chemist's" silent support (this is quite doubtful!), pretended not to understand. Apparently Zamyatin complained that he "restrains," i.e. makes it difficult to roll out full glorification. [Ivan Ivanovich] Udal'tsov (Novosti Press Agency) was doing the same thing. (And I had seen him and Yakovlev together practically every Sunday at Uспенka!). According to Gavrilov, Demichev is in isolation. He is a nonentity to the rest of the leadership. It's telling that in the last year and a half not one of his candidates has been approved for more or less important positions in the ideological apparatus. This is supposedly a clear sign that "it won't be long" for him.

Gavrilov also told me that they (he and Demichev, we must understand) are getting daily complaints about the press from all ends of the country: the more or less serious criticism immediately evokes protest from the relevant departments, which immediately make suggestions like – fire the editor, reprimand, publish a rebuttal in *Pravda*, etc. Gavrilov said they are keeping them at bay as best they can. But the complainers are working "on message": they understand that they will eventually find support because at the very top they "want everything to look good and in order everywhere."

There are clearly many implausible elements in this picture, which were dictated by the bitterness of a man who feels that the ground is crumbling under his feet. For the last twenty years he had considered himself a representative of the ruling class, and he thought this position is for life. He behaved like a swine and a scoundrel who can do whatever he wants. Demichev as a fighter for democracy... that idea is too incredible to accept it without scrutiny. It seems something else is behind these "palace" affairs.

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<sup>7</sup> This was Demichev's nickname in Moscow, given to him by Lyubimov. It is a reference to his deceitful nature and intrigues ("khimichit") [literally: to do chemistry; figuratively: to do deceitful manipulations]. At the same time, the nickname was a mockery of the fact that a chemical engineer is in charge of our ideology, because that was Demichev's university degree.

I wonder, is there any connection between Volume V of the “History of the CPSU,” the Yakovlev case, the “Chemist’s” position, the affair with Zagladin and Shaposhnikov’s punishment for drinking, and the atmosphere at the Plenum?

May 9, 1973

It’s Victory Day today. As always, I met up with Kolya Varlamov. We walked around the streets, wearing our medals and ribbons. We hung out and drank vodka. Did not talk about the War. Talked about our present-day affairs, about our daily fuss. He talked about the General Department, I talked about mine. He recalled how he nearly knocked Stalin off his feet on a staircase in the Kremlin (he worked in a special sector at the time). I echoed him, relating how I nearly knocked down Suslov the other day when I was coming back from tennis in the morning, using the first entrance. The difference!

We are getting old. Though to be honest, I see it more in others than in myself. I don’t feel the age myself, and I don’t really show it yet either. Nevertheless, it has been 28 years just since the end of the war...

Yesterday before the end of the day there was another “intimate” scene at Ponomarev’s. He was asking for my advice on how he could refuse the editorship of the 12-volume “History of the CPSU.” I told him, “Ten volumes have already been published. You are listed there. How would ‘the public’ perceive your absence from volumes XI and XII? They would definitely connect it to the issue with Volume V.” He put off further discussion.

Then he said, “You work and you try – the multi-volume publications, the articles, the delegations, the papers, and materials for him (?)... And then they find some phrase you wrote, and everything goes to fucking shit...”

Suddenly he switched to another topic, though it was appropriate by association, “Take our prime minister... At one point he had the noose around his neck. In the late 1940s we lived nearby. I knew his wife well, and I knew his daughter, who is now Gvishiani’s wife, from when she was a little girl. I worked in a special sector of the Politburo back then... He told me himself how, as candidate member of the PB, he found out from the materials on the questioning of Kuznetsov and Popkov (the Leningrad case) that he, it turns out, was plotting together with them to give Leningrad to Finland and so on. I remember he told me then, ‘I have a couple days left.’

“Soon after that Poskrebyshev called me at two in the morning:

‘Do you send the materials to the PB?’

‘Yes, as always.’

‘Don’t send them to Kosygin!’

‘Why not?’

‘It’s none of your business. Do as you’re told.’

“I was sure back then,” B.N. continued, “that he would be seized any day. Especially since his guards were increased from the usual twelve to forty-five.

“However, somehow it blew over... And now? All the time he remembers Stalin, when it is appropriate and when it’s not: ‘Stalin said this,’ ‘Stalin ordered that,’ ‘Stalin would have solved this issue like this,’ etc. etc. Yesterday we received Assad (President of Syria), and even there he managed to bring up Stalin. The bust on Red Square is his work, plus Shelepin’s. Brezhnev was reluctant about this idea, he was in no hurry. But Kosygin insisted and got it done. What is happening? I don’t get it.”

Then he switched topics to his article in the Encyclopedia of the Comintern. I was the one who wrote it about seven years ago for an historical encyclopedia. Since then it has been reprinted maybe three times. Right now it was supposed to go into the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. But as soon as Kovalyov, the editor in chief, got wind of the Secretariat decision on Volume V of the “History of the CPSU,” he immediately sent a revision to the paragraph that discusses how the cult of personality led to the liquidation of some parties in 1938 and many prominent figures of the Comintern.

There has been an “explosion” in public life. After the Plenum and the mention of the “personal contribution” in the resolution, the ideological atmosphere is quickly filling with the General Secretary: speech on the Mausoleum on May 1<sup>st</sup>; speech in Warsaw when awarding [Edward] Gierek with the Order of Lenin; television: farewell – departure – arrival, trip to the GDR and speeches there, then there will be the award of the Lenin Peace Prize, then trip to the FRG, then the U.S. ... And everywhere speeches, speeches and speeches, which will be broadcast over the radio and television several times. Nobody feels the “reverse” reaction of the common man, of the masses, not to mention the intelligentsia.

For all that, his achievement in the work for peace is undoubted, and therefore his achievement in the general turn of world development toward true coexistence, i.e. to a completely new era, radically different from the one that was a direct legacy of the October Revolution and World War II.

Karyakin is inviting me to Neizvestnyi’s. But I don’t really want to go. Probably because the conversation will turn into a discussion of the incident with the State Prize for Zelenograd. And what will I say?!

In the last few days I’ve been doing a lot of work on the multi-volume publication on the labor movement, even though I have a great deal of daily work as well. I’m meeting with the authors of the volumes. All of this could be very interesting. But in order to produce something new and decent, we would need: a) time, and b) absence of Trapeznikov.

May 15, 1973

B.N. called a meeting with his deputies. He told us that Brezhnev said at the airport (from Berlin) that Gierek and Honecker think that we do not need a second Karlovy Vary conference; instead we should have a big meeting against the Chinese. Naturally, none of those present

(members of the PB, secretaries) objected. On the contrary, they praised the meeting of 1969. However, this is completely unprofessional: nobody would attend an openly anti-Chinese meeting, save for the completely puppet parties; an openly anti-imperialist meeting would look absolutely ridiculous in light of our foreign policy; a rejection of a European conference (like Karlovy Vary) would mean that we are going to do Europe[an policy] without Communist Parties and we are openly telling them as much. Moreover, the Karlovy Vary idea was expressed by Berlinguer in conversation with Brezhnev. And the latter approved it in general. The Italians already started work on this front. If we flip, they will organize a separate CP conference in Western Europe, the more so since they and the French (especially) are suspiciously watching our “world policy,” on which we do not even consider it necessary to consult with the world communist movement. They, the Communists of the West, are giving more and more thought to the possibility of figuring out their own affairs in between or on the side of the big game of the “two superpowers”?! ([Jean] Kanapa’s article in *L’Humanite* on Nixon-Kissinger’s idea about a new Atlantic Charter).

There is only one right approach: the European conference.

And the Chinese?... The Western Communists do not really care about them. More and more they are beginning to think that is an interstate fight. They do not think about its world significance, they have other things to worry about.

Zaitsev turned out to be noble, though he appeared to be a simpleton. He wants to leave quietly, along the lines of: “Let history be the judge, and you, Boris Nikolaevich, should not get involved in this business, it won’t do anyone any good.” B.N. is torn because he is afraid that he will get in trouble if he doesn’t take measures against Zaitsev, it would seem like he disregarded the General Secretary’s opinion and the Secretariat’s decision. On the other hand, his conscience does not let him to do away with Zaitsev so easily. Plus, the “public” could perceive it as yet another blow to Ponomarev himself. Against this background, Zaitsev’s noble behavior really irritates and embarrasses him.

He consults with me, but does not take my advice. It’s just that he doesn’t have anyone left to talk with about “intimate matters”!

May 16, 1973

Note on the preparation of the new International Conference of Communist Parties. I wrote it. We discussed it at Kuskov’s with the other deputies. Kuskov is either truly becoming demented, or he is being clever: his slurred speech has become almost incomprehensible; you can just feel the anger or resentment in his incoherently strewn words.

A Leningrad writer named [Nikolai Vissarionovich] Masolov wrote a nonfiction book about the partisans of the Gdov region called “The Flint Strikes the Fire.” I read it tonight. It mentions our Zaitsev, who, it turns out, was a detachment commissar; he is from that area himself. (His father was also a partisan, and was hanged by the Nazis.) And this Zaitsev was abused by two morally and physically deformed monsters – Trapeznikov, head of the CC Science Department, and Golikov, the General Secretary’s adviser, with the help of the Politburo

and the Secretariat. They come off as the better patriots and communists although one was born lame and the other club handed, so naturally neither of them served in the war. When you think about these two bastards, this scum in the truest sense of the word, all you want to do is catch them in some dark corner and beat the shit out of their faces until your arm gets tired.

May 19, 1973

Brezhnev is in the FRG. Television is working at full capacity. Yes, this is certainly a symbol of a new era, and not in the tattered propaganda sense of this word, but truly. Alas, very few people in the party really understand this (much less accept it!), especially from the people who work in the multimillion ideological apparatus, 90 percent of which is still saturated with the spirit of Trapeznikov-Golikov.

John Gollan. May 17-18<sup>th</sup> on his way to Vietnam. In the evening I met him at the airport. At 5 in the morning I saw him off on the rest of his trip. Evening on Plotnikov Street. As they say, “besides harm, no good came of it.” He was irritated at being met by an official of my level, while “in Romania he was met by Ceausescu, in Hungary by Kadar, in Yugoslavia by Tito,” etc. (These are his own words! He is one of those people!) He was irritated that there was no reaction to his offer to meet with Brezhnev either on the way to Vietnam or on the way back. I felt tense and self-conscious because of his attitude, especially after all my attempts to start some kind of political conversation were met with contemptuous silence: he was not going to discuss these things at my level.

May 20, 1973

Arbatov was awarded the Order of Labor: “For contributions to the development of Soviet science (!) and in connection with his fiftieth anniversary.” And this (unlike what happened with the likes of us) was printed in all the newspapers. He invited me through Shishlin (ostensibly because he was in the hospital until yesterday – he injured his back while moving in early May to a new apartment on Starokonyushennyi Pereulok) to his reception, but solo (saying there were too many people and not enough space). I immediately decided that I would not go without my wife. It was a shitty move on his part, and I wouldn’t want her to be offended and mad at him for the rest of her life. I composed a telegram that he can easily understand in light of the upcoming Plenum. That should suffice.

May 22, 1973

Brezhnev is back in Moscow. Everything went as expected. This is a symbol and start of a new era, for which our society (and our apparatus) are not ready economically and especially culturally and ideologically. It is usually the other way around during moments of drastic changes in history.

In the meantime, preparations for the visit to the U.S. are in full swing. Our department is working on the General Secretary’s speech on American television. Brutents-Zhilin wrote a beautiful text. But already at the level of Kuskov the “struggle” started over how much

ideological primacy to include so as not to offend [the hosts] and interfere with the most important thing – collaboration.

The issue of informing fraternal parties about the Plenum. Kuskov fussed about it pointlessly and exhausted the consultants. While Ponomarev (with my help) wants to knock out all of this, even though there is already a Secretariat resolution (which was made without Ponomarev's knowledge). Seriously, it is absurd to confidentially report something that the whole world has been talking about for a month. And the aspects that are really "for domestic consumption" should not be brought to the attention of Communist parties (both so there are no leaks, and so as not to shock them with the true motives of our policies: they are not ready for it, and many of them don't want us to follow these policies because if we are completely successful, these parties will have no place in the historical process).

Arbatov stopped by. His KGB fears. He is horrified that Bovin was quietly telling jokes about Brezhnev at Arbatov's birthday party, "in this new home!" He railed against Bovin, who does not know how to use his magnificent brain. He told me some things I did not know from the "story of [Bovin's] downfall." Besides the fact that Bovin visited [Bohuslav] Chňoupek (ambassador of Czechoslovakia) and when he'd had a few too many drinks told him all kinds of things that the latter dutifully reported to the appropriate places, there was also the following episode: in December of 1971, towards the end of a regular meeting at Zavidovo, Bovin took advantage of [Brezhnev's] departure on a hunting trip and got disgustingly drunk. He was "rowdy, harassed the women, said obscenities, including about the man himself in the presence of Andrei and Zagladin." Brezhnev found him in a beastly state and, it seems (Arbatov thinks), at that moment decided to "distance Bovin from himself."

Already after Bovin's expulsion, Andropov suddenly summoned Arbatov. He talked about Bovin as if he wanted to "help" and stand up for him together with Tsukanov. But "just look at what he is doing" – and he showed Arbatov a photocopy of a letter. Bovin had written it from his "creative holiday" in the South to his Avochka.<sup>8</sup> "General delivery... and you know, we are suspicious of such letters." He wrote about the mediocrity, stupidity, and ignorance surrounding him, Bovin, and how hard it is to work and live... along those lines. And even though the NAME was not mentioned, Andropov thought that he was primarily talking about the General Secretary. "I (Arbatov), tried to assure Yu. V. that Sashka meant Rusakov (head of the department), maximum Katushev... I don't know whether he took the letter to the General Secretary or not, especially since Bovin was already out of the CC."

Andropov also told Arbatov that he summoned Delyusin and met him with the words, "Interpret this any way you will: I invited you to a former acquaintance of mine, we worked together at the CC department, or..." Arbatov thinks that it is clearly a "prophylactic measure." Yu. V. rebuked Delyusin for his connection with Lyubimov and "all those conversations" with him and especially with Mozhaev, "who has dealings with Solzhenitsyn." "He behaved badly (Yu. V.'s words). Denied everything," etc. "You should warn him," he advised Arbatov.

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<sup>8</sup> The wife of professor V. T. Loginov, later Chernyaev's friend and colleague at the Gorbachev Foundation.

*For some reason when Yurka was telling me about Bovin's photocopied letter, I thought that "the Avochka affair" appeared at the Party Control Committee in connection with this, even though formally she was cited for "not getting along with the team, personal use of work car, exceeding her authority" – in the "Znanie" society where she worked.*

He railed at Lyubimov for not repaying the trust that the General Secretary vested in him. He kept on with "his antics." And now (Hear! Hear!) he chose Polyanski as his patron. "He should pick one thing" – pointedly concluded the wise Arbatov.

Iskra stopped by today. Tomorrow she is going to the Caucasus with her husband. I gave her a present for her daughter. Iskra still has a strikingly beautiful face. She is smart and deep. But age has already ruined her body forever, she lost her form and stateliness: she is an elderly woman.

May 26, 1973

I turned 52. I do not feel elderly in any way. I do have what is called the "weariness of the soul."

Yesterday Ponomarev gave me the ill-fated draft of Volume V of the "History of the CPSU," for which Zaitsev was fired. What he was accused of is pure slander and falsification. All the necessary information (regarding the Party's work to restore our economy and such) is there. That means that a scumbag who is close to power can slip a completely falsified version (for the sake of his shady dealings), and this becomes the grounds for a CC resolution. And even a CC Secretary (Ponomarev) is powerless to refute the barefaced slander. Even more – he considers it a breach of the rules of the game to even try to say that it was a nasty lie.

June 2, 1973

I read some of the foreign policy program of the Labour Party (we got an unpublished draft). Tomorrow a big delegation from the Labour Party is coming (the Chairman, General Secretary), they want to establish "good relations" with the CPSU!

B.N. is planning to get off easy with some banal formalities. If that happens, we will be missing a chance. Then again, people like B.N. do not make the policies around here. But at least he could try to play up to the real policies, rather than holding on to the phobias of social democracy and fear of Trapeznikov & Co.

On the 28<sup>th</sup>, Vysotsky + Marina Vladi (lovely!). He sang new songs. He is becoming more openly philosophical. Ivan Dykhovichny (Polyansky's son-in-law), a great guy with his modern Hussar ballads. Sasha Mitta and his Lilichka. An emerald.

Tennis on Petrovka, surrounded by youth and healthy bodies, the self-confident and calm life of sport.

Matkovsky and the whole sector are helpless trying to prepare materials for the Labour delegation. Their approach to the work is dismal; they can't even simply carry out tasks. He is

the yesterday of the International Department. If we don't take measures (and all our sectors are on this level, there is a huge gap between sectors and consultant groups) very soon we will be pushed out of our sphere by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA is already taking some of our work: information for communist parties on Soviet-Chinese relations, for the first time it's no-nonsense and truly businesslike, and for the first time it was prepared by the MFA, not us. They even included a list of parties to send it to. Though they still "listened" to our corrections.

I am reveling in an anthology "Dostoyevsky on Art." What power, and how little we knew him on the whole!

June 6, 1973

The Labour Party delegation has arrived. Seven people: the Party Chairman, General Secretary, Deputy Leader [Edward] Short, one woman – a redhead, large, with a very beautiful, fine and haughty face. They say she supports a kindergarten through her own means, she is raising four adopted orphans, and she is not married even though she is only 35 years old.

We received them in Sheremetyevo airport, followed by dinner at "Sovetskaya." Cynical politics came through right away. "We came here as a political party that wants to be in power. If you, the USSR, would like to see a Labour Party government in Britain, help us. For that, Brezhnev and Gromyko have to receive us. Even for just five minutes. The most important thing for us is to meet with them and report this to our press. A discussion would be nice, of course. We are even ready to listen to your comments on our new foreign policy program. But the most important thing is your support of the Labour Party's prestige. Dozens of reporters saw us off at the London airport; they are gleefully awaiting our return. If you don't meet us halfway, all of England will be laughing at us for a week. And we will certainly lose in the upcoming Parliament elections. Recently, your Kosygin met with [Peter] Walker (Conservative, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) for three hours. There are at least three potential future Walkers among our group, as well as one possible Deputy Prime Minister (Short)," etc. along those lines.

I understood that these speeches will have no effect on Ponomarev. The Labour Party for him is not just an ideological problem, but a personal ideological problem because he is afraid that the Trapeznikov camp could again accuse him of connivance with revisionism. In view of this, as well as his intellectual-educational backwardness, and in some part his sincere conviction that "all of them are betrayers of the working class," he is not capable of "doing politics" (and with social democrats it is completely out of the question). He looks really foolish (even to me) as a person who only wants one thing from the social democrats – that they would think "like Marxists-Leninists" (in his understanding of the term) and would concern themselves with nothing but applauding the CPSU's every step in foreign and domestic policy. It is simply embarrassing to listen to him rant on the subject (including in connection with the visit of this Labour Party delegation).

So. I knew that something had to be done to bypass Ponomarev, or we would lose a political opportunity and maybe even make some enemies. In that case it would have been better not to invite them at all... and not get this thing started. Although, B.N. did even this quite reluctantly, with great pressure from me.

I suggested to Inozemtsev to call Gromyko directly (they know each other). N.N. agreed. We went to Plotnikov [street] to the direct phone line and he called, but did not get through (Gromyko was already at home). In the morning he reached him. He called me and said, “Gromyko thinks we are doing everything right and is prepared to receive them himself, but the International Department has to put in a formal order to that effect through the CC.” Gromyko advised Inozemtsev to see to it that the International Department note is written in “hysterical tones, so it gets through...” And, he said, we should definitely insist on a meeting with Brezhnev.

A propos: here is the fundamental difference between a modern politician and a political ideologist (Ponomarev). Gromyko immediately grasped the main point: if the biggest social democratic party of one of the major countries comes to Moscow and practically begs for help in coming to power, and turns to the “Bolsheviks” for it, whom it had slighted for so many decades – this is a chance. We have nothing to lose, but we may have something to gain.

Inspired, I went to Ponomarev (he didn’t want to receive me so early, he had to edit some paper, but I insisted).

“What is it?!”

Quite insistently, I conveyed to him the delegation’s requests. Added some things from myself. Set out all the obvious political benefits for us, etc.

“Anatoly Sergeyevich! Do not fall for it, do not be naïve. They’re sweet talking now, but when they get home they will start saying bad things about the CPSU again. I know them. Many of them personally. This Healy for example...”

And he started telling me how he and Suslov were in England 15-20 years ago, how they were at the Transport House, had good conversations about everything, and then, what happened?

“So that’s that. Now they want to see Brezhnev! Not if I can help it! You, Anatoly Sergeyevich, should not succumb to illusions. They are only after their own interests.”

“I never doubted that for a minute. Would you, B.N., like them to come here for the sake of our interests?”

He got angry, even red in the face.

“No, no, Anatoly Sergeyevich. We had an agreement: if they like, I can receive them here. If not – sorry!”

“But Gromyko agreed to meet with them and thinks that it wouldn’t hurt to have them meet with Brezhnev as well,” I played my trump card.

“How does Gromyko know?”

“Inozemtsev told him.”

“That is not right. He should not have done that. And in general, you and Inozemtsev are exceeding your authority... However, of course, we cannot hide their requests. Alright, write a note and the draft resolution of the Politburo.”

I wrote it in a very pressing tone and even with quotes from [Ronald] Hayward (General Secretary). B.N. crossed out all this “lyricism,” together with the proposal for a meeting with Brezhnev. We were left with a meeting with Gromyko.

Reception by Suslov, Ponomarev, Inozemtsev and Chernyaev in the CC CPSU.

This passed. The draft turned into a resolution in a matter of hours. This morning B.N. told me to make an “official” announcement about it to the delegation, in a formal setting. I arrived toward the end of their conversation at the Committee for Science and Technology and there, in Kirillin’s office, told them that the Politburo discussed it and gave orders, that Suslov is the second person in the party, etc. They were polite. It was obvious they were pleased that Gromyko would be there. They reacted coldly to the Suslov-Ponomarev meeting. And Hayward said after all that he remains deeply disappointed that there will not be a meeting with Brezhnev.

However, this was not the end of it. B.N. told me that we will not be able to receive them until Monday (and their return flight tickets are for Monday morning!), so they should delay their departure. I suggested this to them very politely. Almost all of them grimaced. Simpson (member of the delegation) said that they will discuss it and give us their answer later.

Gromyko received them after lunch. Inozemtsev, who was there, told me that the delegation was charmed by the sincerity and the candor, and the truly political approach to affairs.

In the evening I told this to Ponomarev. I did this deliberately. He made a face. I added that they haven’t given their answer regarding Monday, but from my conversations with their staff it seems clear that the answer will most likely be negative: they will leave.

B.N. called the materials we prepared for Suslov an “amateur poster.” He said we should wait till tomorrow. If they do not agree, then we can hand over all these papers to the archive. I turned around and walked out.

This is the state of Ponomarev’s big politics nowadays.

By the way, in “pendent”: a week ago, he ordered us to “boil down” the question of the CPSU’s policy toward social democracy, planned for discussion at the CC Secretariat, to offering information to our fraternal parties on the “CPSU’s work with social democratic parties.” The same Trapeznikov fear mechanism is at work, as well as the staleness of his political thinking.

Ciphered telegram about [Herbert Richard] Wehner's conversation with Falin before Wehner returned to Berlin to meet with his old friend from the anti-fascist underground Z. Honecker, who now seems to believe that "I, Wehner, folded at some point..."

June 9, 1973

The Labour Party saga continues. They agreed to stay until Monday. We (with the sector, consultants, and Inozemtsev) were rewriting various memos to Suslov for the umpteenth time – what he should say at the meeting. Ponomarev, as usual in such cases, does not know what might be good or bad. So, one day he calls something an "amateur poster" and the next day he praises it. He nitpicks but does not carefully read anything that we bring to him (Suslov materials included). Neither does he have time to listen: he is busy sweating Brutents and Sokolov for Brezhnev's TV appearance in the U.S., then for his conversation with "businessmen." He is fussing frightfully.

He told me, "You have never worked on the Labour Party" (I thought it beneath my dignity to tell him that students are still using textbooks in which I wrote the chapters on Great Britain and its Labour movement, and that I gave special lectures on the Labour Party). It was his roundabout way of telling me that I do not understand the matter with the Labour delegation... And he started to scold Matkovsky... (Although partially it was deserved!) I defended him, "We do not have a position and until their arrival we had no idea that they meant serious business. We were not ready for it. Matkovsky's sector could not and cannot change anything. We need a political solution, a political approach, we need a position, and it is not Matkovsky's place to define it. I also cannot do it. And you do not have the time."

"I have a position," he announced. However, he chose not to reveal it to me, saying he was too busy!

When we were discussing the draft communiqué, I got another strong whiff of what really concerns him – the fear of smearing himself with social democracy. Why was their delegation put before ours? (Although it was always done this way in such cases!) Why is there no word about our different ideological positions? (Even though it is clear that if we had offered this in the draft, they would have jumped on our readiness to discuss ideological issues and reduced the entire conversation at the CC to a discussion of Czechoslovakia!).

I feel sad that fate tied me to a small man in a big chair. Still, he is not the worst. And, it is hard for me to imagine myself in a similar position under anybody else. At least with him we can speak openly, even if it doesn't have any effect.

June 10, 1973

A terrible accident last Sunday (June 3) at Le Bourget with the Tu-144. Self-sacrifice + possibly sabotage + maybe something of our Russian chaos.

The great Dostoyevsky... I am reveling in the anthology on art. For the first time, he appears to me as a completely different person from the one I knew through his novels and what

I'd read about him, and even from what I learned from Karyakin. This is our Tocqueville, and consequently, he is ten times more powerful than Tocqueville.

In the past year it has become particularly clear that there is no alternative for me: I will be at the International Department until I'm dismissed. A party official who is essentially powerless. The sphere of my work – the communist movement – is hopeless and either dying or completely changing. The people who control our relations in this sphere, like B.N. and Suslov, have become cemented in the era of the “Short Course”<sup>9</sup> and do not allow it to naturally develop into something constructive, revolutionary in a new way and at the same time relevant to us. Or, if matters take a sharp turn, in Western Europe for example, these people will be the objective reason for us severing relations with the communist movement (or rather, it will sever relations with us); or in the best case scenario we will have complete sterilization of real content in our connections with them. We have already come very close to the latter.

June 16, 1973

On Monday there was a reception for the Labour Party delegation in the hall of the Secretariat. Suslov, Ponomarev, Inozemtsev, myself, Matkovsky. Suslov was bolder than I expected. He (on behalf of the CC and Brezhnev) took their “challenge” for better relations. They were impressed by the meeting, in part because contrary to their expectations, our “Party level” reception was actually quite impressive! And in the CC building to boot. Afterwards, Suslov took them to Brezhnev's (empty) office!

The day before, on Sunday, after the England-USSR soccer match, there was a dinner at Sovetskaya. Toasts, which soften the ground for politics. My toast. Joan Lester's toast. She wore a white dress with a train and got drunk.

Kuskov told me yesterday how Suslov was receiving a delegation from the Colombian Communist Party and talked about the Labour delegation: “It is a testimony to the profound changes in the global community.”

Yes... he is pleased. So is B.N. (his fears have faded, though he did try to “educate” the Labourists in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism during the dinner, in his usual manner).

And despite our reservations regarding “ideological differences” (which suited the Labourists as well), the myths are crumbling. (Then again, they are not myths, but an ideological superstructure over the inevitable past. But it is going away).

Bezymensky stopped by before returning to the FRG. He told me how the Swedish ambassador to the FRG (naturally, a social democrat), with whom he is acquainted, told him about an evening at Brandt's (Werner was also there). They “shook their heads” for a long time regarding the latest publication by the USSR Academy of Sciences “on the issues of modern social democracy.” However, they are already laughing about all of this. They themselves

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<sup>9</sup> “A Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks),” a textbook of Party history published in 1938 under Stalin's direction. Until Stalin's death, the “Short Course” defined not only Party history, but also broad elements of the study of history in general. [Trans.]

(Brandt – like a missionary) are building a social democratic Western Europe on the basis of the wealth and organizational achievements of state monopoly capitalism. Berlinguer and now Marchais are clearly conforming to this process.

So: we talk about ideological incompatibility, but at the level of practical policy, no serious person can really specifically point to these truly fundamental differences between the average modern social democracy (Brandt-Palme-Mitterrand) and the average Western communist movement (PCI, PCF, CPGB, and the Swedes and so on). That is why things are moving towards a social-democratic Western Europe. And we are quite satisfied with this in the political and especially economic sense.

Brezhnev has left for the U.S.! Another sharp turn... but in the same general direction. Our press is full of “business” embraces with America.

June 24, 1973

The Brezhnev-Nixon agreement for the prevention of nuclear war has been signed. In the rational history of humanity this is probably more significant than Germany’s surrender in 1945, in the madness of that time. Although, there are still plenty of reserves for madness: China, “Trapeznikovism,” the “third world.”

Brezhnev’s whole trip signifies, of course, a significant ideological turn. The intensification of ideological struggle, which the Trapeznikovists will insist on with all their might (using the official thesis “on the inevitability” of such intensification, because imperialism has understood that it is impossible to crush us with the threat of war) only serves to confirm the reality of the ideological change (Zhdanovism arose under similar circumstances, but times have changed since then).

Here are the symptoms. In conversation with our consultant Kozlov, Professor Kovalyov, head of the Department of Scientific Communism at Moscow State University and a moron, so to speak, ex officio, lamented: “How can this be? Peace is good, of course. Lenin was also for peace. But we are concluding economic agreements with capitalism for 30-50 years... We are creating an economic structure for peaceful relations. At the same time we are tightly binding ourselves with the capitalists. We are helping them to emerge from crises, etc. Hence, we believe that for another 30-50 years there will not be any revolution? Then how are we to teach scientific communism and talk about the death of capitalism?”

Indeed! Put yourself in his shoes. Whatever he may be, but he comes into daily contact with students, for whom the things they see on TV and read in newspaper (if they read them), and the things they hear from the pulpit of “scientific communism” in their seminars and such – these are two very different things. They do not overlap in any way, there’s not even a hint of similarity. From their point of view, what kind of theory is this to predict the future?! (*By the way, this theory in the form of textbooks, lectures and professors, all of it – psychologically and logically – grew out of the “Short Course,” it came from the era of Stalinism and represents either a distortion or scholasticism of Leninism*).

As the result, the students (this is already a fact, not a possibility) in the best case scenario are indifferent to “scientific communism.” For some, it is only a compulsory subject on the exams; the rest simply despise and mock all of this “theory,” they are increasingly cynical about the values of Soviet society, including the truly heroic parts of our history. Our future leaders will come from this environment, but they will be even greater cynics, careerists, and God forbid, scum. However, they will rule in the name of the same “scientific communism,” and rely on the total indifference of the masses. Right now, these masses are being handed a real “perpetual peace” from Brezhnev, and possibly material prosperity in the near future as well.

A way out of this is to declare war on Trapeznikovism. The established peace necessitates it. The enormous difficulty of such a war is that we are not talking about just professors and a part of the apparatus, we are talking about a whole layer of society that spans several generations. It cannot be reformed, and most importantly – you cannot make it into smart and educated supporters of something new. You have to start with a strong-willed restructuring [*perestroika*] at the level of the General Secretary of the main theoretical concept itself; a genuine revival of Leninism on a modern basis; the liberation of public life from ideological dogmas. In their day these dogmas had a real meaning for social development, especially in our country, and this lasted for a long time. But now they turned into ideological myths, into obstacles and dangers for our society, and the source of its moral corruption.

I wonder what language will Brezhnev use when he meets with the leaders of socialist countries after returning from the U.S. – the language of ideological myths, or the language of real politics? Or a mix of both?

Sunday evening. After coming back from the dacha. Brezhnev’s final scenes in U.S. are on TV. Goodwill, openness, and even a friendly manner in interactions with Nixon and his wife, the senators, the business circles, etc. As if the reciprocal barking that lasted for a quarter of a century was nullified with one fell swoop. The commentator cited the American newspapers’ assessments: Brezhnev acted like a major politician, world-scale statesman who sees the perspective, with courage and boldness that is necessary for such a major turn.

American newspapers probably don’t even suspect that for all their high praises, they are still underestimating what Brezhnev has achieved over the last year. For us, the consequences of his achievements will be more significant than the XX Congress (unless, of course, there is another “restoration,” even though it is unlikely).

It required great political skill to bring our top leadership to agree to such a turnaround. And it required truly great courage to make this change on such a scale, not half-heartedly, with petty glances at ideology and the like.

Now, is there enough generalizing power and political culture of the highest kind to draw **all** the overdue conclusions from this turnaround?... However, this would require infinitely more trained and “willing” cadres than the beginning of the turnaround in foreign policy. ...Cadres that would be able to understand, explain, and create a new ideological-political atmosphere in the country, and who can work, really work according to today’s standards.

Instead, the cadres right now are starting to hiss – “selling out the country’s wealth,” “why can’t we master our own pantries,” “have we run out of talent,” and other banalities.

June 30, 1973

Yesterday the Politburo was in session all day. Discussed the visits. The resolution was published in *Pravda* today. There is an “anti-imperialist” balance there. The spirit of Suslov is still alive. And people are still afraid of this spirit. He is our form of political realism (“healthy distrust” of the partner-opponent, and a balm for the revolutionary conscience). We are still formulating the outlook for the upcoming meeting between Brezhnev and Gierek, Husak, and the rest. Zagladin made comments on my text. They pushed me to strengthen the social aspect, to connect the “irreversibility” with the growth of the Left and its potential rise to power in the form of social-democratic governments. Zagladin complained that he is sick of it all. He would rather spend his time on the students of the Lenin school – “real life,” which to me seems to be nothing but political chinwagging. In this (windbag) style he kept making his comments, but I accepted only his premises, not his conclusions or specific suggestions. By the way, he said that he “worked with Kosygin” on the forthcoming official visit to Austria. Praised him for “examining, analyzing, asking questions,” seriously reviewing the materials... “Which Brezhnev does not do... The latter just wants to act, but does not want to know anything. He does not read anything longer than three pages!” Here Zagladin must be speaking from his experience at Zavidovo.

July 14, 1973

I haven’t written in a long time because I was sent to the “woods” – Volynskoe 2. It is not far from Stalin’s dacha. They say Zhdanov lived there at one point, and Marshall Vasilevsky lived nearby in a smaller house (during the war). The property is several hectares, fenced off by a dilapidated (but “green”) fence. Paradise: clearly it was once a large estate; you can still guess where the alleys used to be, now lined with lindens and elms that are over a hundred years old. It is overgrown with verdant and thick foliage, grass is at a man’s height, crisscrossed with asphalt roads for cars going to the dachas, and these roads follow the curves of the old roads for horse drawn carriages. The place is cool even on very hot days.

So, I was summoned there by Aleksandrov-Agentov himself. The people gathered there (to remember), besides Aleksandrov-Agentov, who was, of course, in charge – Blatov, Mikhail Nikolaevich Smirnovsky (MFA, former ambassador to England), one more guy from the MFA who spent five months in Vienna on disarmament, Shakhnazarov, Pekshev (head of the economic consultant group from Katushev’s department), Gorbachev (from the same place as Pekshev), Zhilin. Then Zagladin arrived and deputy of the MFA Kovalyov (straight from Helsinki). The task at hand was the same as I already mentioned: materials for Brezhnev’s meeting with Gierek, Husak, Kadar, etc. But this time it was not Ponomarev’s “amateur” efforts, even though they were done following PB orders, but the main take-away text.

From the essence [of the discussion]: for peace – sincerely and unconditionally, without deception. Disarmament – the honey is sweet, but the bee stings. In other words – we have an abstract wish to reduce the resources we send into this abyss. But we know for sure that this will

not happen. Because in the end, everything is based on the belief that our foreign policy successes and our internal stability are the result of, mainly, a powerful and unquestioning military machine (by the way, precisely when we were preparing the materials in Volynskoe, Brezhnev flew from Zavidovo (where he was preparing speeches with another group for the acceptance of peace and friendship medals and the opening speech for the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the II Congress of the RSDLP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party]) to Kubinka to inspect the “new war machines,” as Aleksandrov put it).

On China, nothing new and nothing good. Despite all the irritation, quite reasonable irritation actually, and despite all the menacing terms of condemnation, we are effectively working from the position that it is a socialist country and thus can be persuaded. The only original idea that came from this policy was – “Maybe we should send them a joint address?” It’s Katushev’s idea. Colloquially we call it – Letter from the Cossacks to the Turkish Sultan. I opposed this stupid idea every way I could, even tried to make fun of it. But I was rebuffed. Although, they made a good point: “Do you have a better idea?” Indeed, it’s not like we can suggest the nuclear castration of China...

“Our” problems in the Communist Movement in general did not cause any disputes. Berlinguer’s idea for a “2<sup>nd</sup> Karlovy Vary” conference of European communist parties was up for discussion, as well as the idea of a “big Congress” (though this time Brezhnev himself suggested not to mention China in the section about the Congress, so it would not leak through the Romanians, otherwise we would not be able to gather even a third of the communist parties!). However, if you think about it, the real meaning of either option is strictly anti-Chinese. Characteristic in this regard were my failed attempts to include in the text a mention of our support for the “left blocks” of the communists and socialists in Italy and France, and that we view their eventual rise to power as evidence of the irreversible turn toward peace. Aleksandrov threw it out twice. (Though he kept the mention of social-democratic governments along the same lines regarding the irreversibility. He said it does not go outside the boundaries of our international affairs, while the support of the “left block” is interference in internal affairs with the goal of changing the social structure). Clearly, it will continue this way – we will not draw in the communist movement into our sovereign affairs, it would only get in our way. Indeed, it would get in our way! That means (even though it is not stated) that we need it as an anti-Chinese factor, in order to morally isolate China and harmlessly (from the perspective of relations in the top leadership circles) maintain our moral prestige in the revolutionary public opinion, which still exists as a certain type of myth.

We had big debates in our Volynskoe group about “the exchange of people and ideas” – an item on the agenda for the Conference of European states. Kovalyov insisted that this meeting will be foiled if we don’t come up with something. Judging by world press, he is right. They (in the West) say pretty openly that the West wants compensation, which, simply put, consists of creating a “free public opinion” in the USSR with the help of their ideas. This public opinion is supposed to be able to influence policy (and the makeup of the leadership), thereby making “sinister designs” impossible. They’re worried that the Soviets will lull people with their “peaceful coexistence” and then suddenly take over all of Europe.

Some of their articles talk about “restoring Europe” to how it was 100-200 years ago; about how “real détente” is when people can live where they want, read what they want, and travel wherever they want.

The primitive (or consciously ideological) nature of these arguments is to juxtapose our leadership and the people who, as Douglas Hume said in Helsinki, everywhere want very simple things – to eat and dress well, to have a place to live, to feel safe and use the opportunities available to everyone.

But our leadership does not want war either, sincerely and forever. But the West cannot understand that Czechoslovakia was an internal ideological problem, not an expression of “the true Soviet foreign policy.”

Kovalyov spoke in support of Blatov, others joined in. But Sparrow got ruffled up and started making speeches about how we don’t understand that there is one alternative – either we allow ourselves to become ideologically soft, or we don’t (the thesis of the inadmissibility of ideological penetration) but still achieve our goals. Because the West really has no choice: we are talking about the inviolability of borders and they are demanding a free flow of ideas, i.e. the right to interfere in our affairs. Any man in the street, according to Aleksandrov, could tell you that these things are not equivalent and it would be madness to give up one without getting the other. Of course, he is right in the tactical sense. But from a historical perspective – it’s an ostrich-like move.

On Friday, July 13<sup>th</sup>, we had a collision between these two approaches, though far from a conscious one and vaguely distinguished by the participants themselves. There was a high assembly at the Grand Kremlin Palace on the occasion of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the II Congress of the RSDLP [Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]. Brezhnev gave the opening speech, Suslov made a report.

Before the event, Ponomarev told me that it was decided to elevate the level of the event (initially it was going to be a scholarly conference at the Institute of Marxism Leninism) to “balance things, because recently we’ve been concentrating on foreign policy and we did not want to create the impression that we are moving away from our class goals.”

Of course, this was done with Brezhnev’s knowledge and consent. But if you carefully compare his speech at the presentation of the Lenin Peace Prize on July 12<sup>th</sup> and even the abovementioned address and Suslov’s report, the difference is striking. The report consists of our iron stamps: “crushing imperialism,” “class foreign policy,” “uncompromising ideological struggle, which will worsen,” and the rest of the pathos that only our way is right, only a party like ours can come to victory... Peaceful coexistence (with all its high estimations, which are evident) is put in its proper place – the prevention of nuclear war.

Brezhnev’s approach is broader and wiser. He said during his U.S. trip that humanity has grown out of the chain mail of the “Cold War,” it wants to breathe freely and easily. People noticed this. And, it seems, this was more than just a beautiful image. Brezhnev understands that the rejection of the “Cold War” and a truly radical change in the world order is bound to have

profound socio-psychological, and consequently ideological consequences... That one cannot open the door to foreign capital and seriously plan to use the international division of labor (and expose a great number of Soviet cadres to direct contact (and new forms of professional activity) with the West) and still believe that the dry dogma inherited from the "Short Course" can unwaveringly remain as the real worldview of the conscious part of the population. Hypocrisy and doublethink has already shaken our ideological life to the core. Turning a blind eye to this would mean deliberately leading society to a dead end.

Neither Brezhnev nor the Volynskoe sages like us know what concrete steps to take (even in relation to an entirely practical problem created by the European Conference). They "don't know" partially because Suslov, who embodies the stability of official ideology, and the multimillion army of its servants all over the Soviet Union will not allow even a thought about a new approach to class struggle in the international arena. The class struggle is really happening but needs to be conducted differently if we want a real victory and if we care about the spiritual wellbeing of our people.

By the way, the audience in the Grand Kremlin Palace greeted Suslov very warmly. No wonder, since the crème de la crème of the "servants" was there.

I can't know Brezhnev's thoughts, of course. And I do not know anything about this... but I cannot believe that he wouldn't have noticed the difference between his approach and Suslov's. (It doesn't matter that the source material is not prepared by the speakers themselves. For one of them it is prepared by the Institute of Marxism Leninism and possibly the Department of Science, for the other by Aleksandrov, Blatov, Zagladin, Arbatov and the rest, under Brezhnev's direct supervision.)

Experience shows that Brezhnev is a great tactician in personnel matters. I am not saying that he may be dissatisfied with Suslov already. No... Up to a point, Suslov may even be beneficial – after all, Brezhnev takes into account that his international power is partially based on the fact that he represents an ideological state. *However, I wonder if Brezhnev feels some awkwardness when listening to Suslov. After all, against the background of this report, his words and manner with the people in the West, and even his very policies may seem hypocritical and a conscious, clever deception. Certainly many people will say (tomorrow all of this will be available through TASS): "What did we tell you! Brezhnev's peaceful coexistence is nothing but Russian ("Eastern") deceit. The true nature of Soviet politics and Soviet intentions is in Suslov's report, which Brezhnev blessed by his presence and his introductory speech."*

*Indeed, from a tactical point of view, did we really need to rush with this ideological evocation [sic, evocation written in English]. We should have finished at least one thing before we were at it again. At least we should have done the European Conference without tripping ourselves up and stumbling halfway! Brezhnev, Gromyko, and many others who look at things realistically could not have missed this! However, the ideological complex is too strong for anyone to dare to object to the "balance" initiated by Suslov. (No wonder he blurted out, or maybe made a bad joke, or deliberately released his stinger when he was meeting Brezhnev at the airport on his return from the U.S. and said, "Good thing that you, Leonid Ilyich, didn't forget that you're a communist and met with Gus Hall and Marchais.")*

But the symptoms of discontent with our ideology are becoming apparent. At Volynskoe, Zagladin told us that while working at Zavidovo (after returning from America), Brezhnev repeatedly and in everybody's presence, including the service and medical personnel, ridiculed and vilified Demichev; he spoke about him with obvious disdain, hinting at his ignorance and mediocrity. However, he casually let it "slip" that "for now, we will let him be," the more so because he cannot even be put in charge of the food industry, despite his background in chemistry. Zagladin believes (and others who witnessed this do too) that it is a question of rotation: Brezhnev supposedly said that people have to be properly fed first... (i.e. according to the law of rotation, the Polyansky issue has to be resolved first).

Yesterday I stopped by Sasha Mitte's place. He was recently in Japan. He is absorbed by his latest film. His film "Tochka, tochka, zapyataya" [Dot, dot, comma] is competing at a festival in the category of children's film. He is a talented and kind man. He was raised in an orphanage, by the way. His wife Lilichka is wonderful; she is a renowned puppeteer and designer of children's books. She started out as a cleaning lady at Obraztsov's theater. Now they are happy as kids about their new furniture, where the couch alone cost 4000 rubles.

#### July 17, 1973

In the morning I met the Irish delegation. They came [by train] from Vilnius with Sniečkus in his lounge car. Tomorrow there will be talks with them in the CC. Commotion over the draft communiqué. B.N. is afraid of something again, that the text is too big, that "people up there will say something, you know?"

Zagladin is once again at Volynskoe-2 to write Brezhnev's speech for the ceremony to award an Order to the Ukrainian SSR. The gist of it: couple words about the visit and the rest is on domestic affairs. He wants to say that in the past, all administrative reorganization did not address the essence of management. Now (with the creation of industrial associations) there has to be a substantial change in management! He will speak about the harvest. Apparently there are 190 million tons this year. Unheard of. I hope we can gather it.

By the way, Suslov was supposed to present the Order to Ukraine. A group had been working on the text for a month and a half (from us – Kozlov). But Leonid Ilyich decided to do this himself too.

I asked Zagladin whether he noticed the dissonance of Suslov's report at the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the RSDLP (I probably shouldn't have asked). Firstly, it became clear that Zagladin did not read the report. Secondly, he said that Brezhnev didn't notice anything. About Suslov's report, he said: it was unbelievably boring, the whole auditorium must have been falling asleep. It was like beating posts into the concrete with a driver. The same thing here – not a single living word, not a single thought. Everything was written and heard a thousand times before.

That's all. But, there is something to this.

#### July 21, 1973

It was a difficult week: the Irish, B.N. fussing over the communiqué (he keeps worrying about appearing immodest). He crossed out one out of two mentions of Brezhnev and reminded me several times not to show anyone the draft where Brezhnev is mentioned in both instances. He insisted I return it to him. Comedy!

Sniečkus – sauna with the Irish at the Lithuanian mission. My toast to internationalism.

Prior to this, during the day – the delegation had a conversation with B.N. at the CC. He led it quite smartly, and quite aptly for his position.

I worked on a text for him for the Crimea meeting, at which Brezhnev invited him to speak.

Veber – an article against Pitterman (flirting with the Chinese). It turned out well. But will B.N. let it go through?

It's interesting that nobody noticed Suslov's report. Arbatov, who was there, said that he only recalls that it was very boring. The Western press also did not pay attention to the contrasts that I wrote about. And none of my colleagues in the Department read the report. There you go.

July 22, 1973

The work week was busy with preparations for Ponomarev's departure for the Crimea (tomorrow the meeting between Brezhnev, Gierek, Kadar, and the others begins there), draft speeches for Brezhnev's visit to India (it will probably take place in September), an article for *Pravda* about the Chinese. All of a sudden, B.N. decided to send this article around the CC Secretaries; he didn't want the responsibility for it. Although this is probably the result of Blatov's phone call to him. The latter objected to one paragraph in our information note for European CPs, "about relations with social democrats." He didn't like that we excluded the possibility of getting in touch with the Socialist International. He does not have good arguments for it; it's just that Brezhnev recently mentioned in passing in a conversation with his advisers, why don't we engage with the Socialist International? However, the info note remained the same: we want nothing to do with the current leadership of the Socialist International.

I read in the white TASS an interview with academician Sakharov for a Swedish newspaper. The most surprising thing is how he does it. He nails our healthcare and education, which are in a sorry state; the economy, which is inefficient and wasteful. He says socialism as a system has demonstrated its ineffectiveness. Capitalism has proven to be much more successful in providing material conditions. In the creative and spiritual realm it goes without saying – socialism "did not give freedom and democracy." The reason for all of this lies in the Party's monopolization of social life. On the one hand it created an apparatus of people who care only about the stability of an order that provides them with privileges; on the other, it bred cynicism, dependency, lack of interest and desire to "put one's heart into it" etc., on the part of the masses. Its great flaw is the lack of internal information (instead we have propaganda), etc.

"Can it be changed?" the journalist asked.

“No, the system is remarkably stable. Plus, a radical change would be yet another catastrophe, and our country has had enough of them already.” He, Sakharov, is for gradual, piecemeal reforms.

“Why do you bother, if nothing can be changed?” the journalist asked.

There was no clear answer, just the intelligentsia’s usual “just so you know” (i.e. in the West). But he immediately added that (because of the lack of information) he knows very little himself.

Prescriptions? “Another oppositional party,” private initiative in small business and in the service industry, information – i.e. the things that official anti-Soviets have been suggesting for a quarter of a century.

Again, this interview will be hyped up. Heinrich Böll has already welcomed it, etc. It is all nonsense. I recall there was a similar character in [Vladimir] Voinovich’s *Vera Figner*: a liberal daredevil who became very disappointed that people didn’t take him seriously and that he was not “in great demand.”

Zagladin put together some new brochure “in his spare time,” i.e. while he was writing (at the dachas) texts for the General Secretary. This is done with the help of the Department’s technical means – stenographers, typing pool, Xerox, etc. I leafed through it, it’s a compilation of jabber, even if it is very readable.

A conversation in his office with Luigi Nono (Italian composer and communist), Lyubimov, Tselikovskaya. Her empty chatter, “they want to show how educated they are.”<sup>10</sup> Nono and Lyubimov started preparing a pop-opera about the revolutionary movement from the Paris Commune to Che Guevara for La Scala. It became possible after Berlinguer’s meeting with Brezhnev that was leaked to Kat’ka (Furtseva) and her deputy Popov. It’s going to be something! Zagladin got all of this going.

Yesterday: impressions from the opening of the youth festival in Berlin (on TV). There are some worthwhile things... At any rate, the détente may, it seems, breathe some new life into these old ideas of ours. However, the struggle against imperialism increasingly begins to look (including in our own *Pravda*) like a struggle against imperialist policies, or even against the “acts” of imperialism, as opposed to capitalism as a system.

I heard the story about the Israeli delegation to this festival. The SED asked the CP of Israel to be “late” to the opening ceremonies. If the Israeli flag had appeared in the parade next to the multitude of Arab flags, it could have caused some “incidents.” But what will they do at the closing ceremonies? The Israeli flag will already be “revealed” during the festival.

August 4, 1973

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<sup>10</sup> Quote from Anton Chekhov’s “The Wedding.” [Trans.]

At work this week: speeches for Brezhnev's visit to India. Samoteikin (assistant to the General Secretary) wouldn't get off my back.

Reply to [Roland] Leroy about the "Common Market," because Brezhnev told [Michel] Jobert (MFA France) that we will be establishing contact between CMEA-EEC. By the way, Brezhnev's conversation with Jobert was quite tough. Brezhnev cut him short: who are you arming against, perfecting your nuclear weapons, etc.? This is in the atmosphere of détente. The U.S. is your ally. You already have more than enough bombs for the FRG. All that's left is us, the USSR. We don't like this and are beginning to worry.

Jobert replied: you, Mr. Brezhnev, recently said yourself (in Kiev) that the struggle between two systems continues and détente does not cancel it; that the goals and ideology of these systems are irreconcilable and contradictory. You talked about class warfare in the international arena. We trust you. We trust that you are sincerely following a peaceful course and that you take coexistence seriously. But you will not last forever!...

He used different words, of course, but that was his meaning.

Brezhnev did not reply to that and turned the conversation to another topic.

Katushev sent some serious materials around the PB in preparation for the Crimean meeting on the situation in each of the socialist countries. The economy is bad everywhere. Almost everyone has huge foreign debt to the West (especially Bulgaria and Romania). In Poland the financial situation was improved at the expense of national income. Of course, agricultural collectivization is out of the question, even in the distant future.

The moral-political situation is particularly worrisome. The GDR is shocked by Brandt's "peace offensive." He is already a national hero, the standard-bearer of national unity. The opening of the gates for West Germans into the GDR led to a massive demand for visits from the GDR to the FRG. Refusals lead to public protests; increasingly there are cases when high officials resign from their posts if their travel requests are denied; party members return their party membership cards. It seems like the youth festival will unravel GDR society even further.

It turns out that in Bulgaria, in addition to terrible neglect in personnel matters (inaptitude, moral bankruptcy, intrigues, nepotism, etc.), there is a very sharp nationalities question: eight thousand Turks, around seven hundred thousand half-Turks, plus Macedonians and Roma. The local authorities are openly oppressing and discriminating them. Matters come to violent clashes. There are mass demands for exodus to Turkey. Zhivkov is quite pessimistic about the situation and sees a way out by transforming Bulgaria into a union republic of the USSR.

In Poland and Hungary we have anti-Sovietism and nationalism. Although the "problem" of youth and intelligentsia is everywhere, even in Mongolia, where the civilized (at our expense) stratum does not want to integrate back into "their own" society, they freeload and despise everything around them. In Mongolia there is also the problem of [Yumjaagiin] Tsendenbal. It seems he has completely discredited himself and everyone there is sick of him. He does not trust

anybody to such an extent that in the year and a half since [Jamsaranglin] Sambu's (chairman of the Supreme Khural) death he has not let anyone take his post. And he doesn't want to take it himself, because he doesn't want to give up his position as prime minister. It's a circus, in other words.

It appears Kadar has tried to resign twice. He really is sick. But, they say, he is also tired of reconciling two groups in the government – the pro-Soviet group (Komochkin & Co.) and nationalist-liberalist group (Atsel, Fok & Co.) It is possible that he spoke with Brezhnev about his resignation when they were one-on-one (and interpreter Nadya, who grew up in the Soviet Union).

In Czechoslovakia the store shelves are full, but the reserves are exhausted, and the main heavy industries are stagnant. The normalization is on the surface, because the masses are fed and clothed. The opposition is working in the environment (and under the cover) of general political indifference and contempt for the authorities. Young people who join the party immediately feel the change in attitude from the foremen, engineers, and others – there is a wall of scorn and ridicule, isolation from friends.

The obkoms in Brno and Ostrava are headed by anti-Soviets. Attempts to remove them at recent conferences failed. The overwhelming majority voted for them again. Many in the top Party echelons are secretly communicating with [František] Kriegel, [Josef] Smrkovský, [Zdeněk] Mlynář and the émigrés. All the creative intelligentsia (film, television, writers, theater) are openly ignoring the authorities. They don't respond to any appeals or entreaties, they don't submit anything to the official publishers or the stage, choosing to write "for the drawer" instead. And those who are trying to break out of this environment and break the silent conspiracy of contempt and neglect are inept and produce garbage that is ridiculed by young people. Students are completely outside the influence of the Party. The church is becoming active. There is no unity in the Politburo. Husak-Bilyak are trying to solve things on their own. But there is no certainty that even between them there is real "unity of views." Husak knows that Bilyak is a favorite in Moscow. Husak is drinking heavily and is a very poor organizer.

July [sic] 5, 1973

Last week – meeting (together with Zagladin) in "Ararat" with Herbert Mies (soon-to-be General Secretary of the DKP [German Communist Party], replacing Bachman) and Gautier, his future deputy. Their approaches to us are somewhat coarse, even though they are smart. We pushed back when he tried to please us by criticizing the Italians. It came out a bit rough, but I think they got the point.

Meeting with Bernt Carlsson (International Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden), together with Shaposhnikov on Plotnikov Street. He is shy and just overly cautious. The same problem as Jobert: we trust Brezhnev, but you have people like Shelest, too. Twice I made fun of him – about Shelest (saying that we removed him because he couldn't manage in Ukraine) and about rumors that we want to restore the Comintern. They have such a primitive image of us. Even well-informed people are affected by the propaganda clichés.

August 27, 1973

Returned to work after a vacation; I was in Tesseli. Issues: preparing Brezhnev's speeches for the peace congress; preparing "ideas" for the meeting of CC secretaries of socialist countries – the result of the Crimea meeting. Plans for our work with social democracy (based on our information for European Communist Parties); miscellaneous stuff. By the way, after reading the transcript from the Crimea meeting, I discovered that 75 percent (of text) of Brezhnev's closing remarks consisted of materials I prepared for a speech Ponomarev was supposed to make at this meeting (but ended up not giving).

A kaleidoscope of all kinds of top secret information from everywhere. In Chile, it seems things are coming to an end. Our attempts to "hold on to" Egypt are barely holding together. The Algerians want to turn the upcoming Congress of the "non-aligned" into an act of institutionalization of a movement like the "UN for the less-developed," with permanent bodies, etc. The main task is to resist the division of the superpowers' spheres of influence. The Yugoslavs wouldn't mind joining this effort, but on the condition that they are allowed hegemony over the whole affair.

The Italians' reaction to the idea of a new International Conference was sour. Incidentally, Ceausescu spoke categorically against it in the Crimea. People's reactions to this were restrained. But his statement that China is contributing to détente roused rebuffs from everyone who spoke after him: Husak, Zhivkov, Tsedenbal. With Zhivkov it even came to an argument. Ceausescu interrupted him, saying that he won't allow his party to be criticized. Then Brezhnev, as chairman, intervened and practically gave Ceausescu a dressing down, calling his comments tactless, and that he "completely shared the comrades' views." In his concluding remarks, Brezhnev again blasted him for his proposal to consider dissolving the Warsaw Pact.

August 28, 1973

Ponomarev sent a note from the South: we have to prepare our positions for the European meeting of communist parties and the International Conference.

He told me to give a positive answer to Aarons: let them come to Moscow at the end of September for talks. This is despite the caricature in "Tribune" (Nixon and Brezhnev hug while a tiny Marx is running around their feet and trying to draw their attention to the *Das Kapital* he's holding in his hands); despite the big document from the National Committee that condemned the hegemony of the CPSU and the ICM and other such things. He says we will lay it all out here. He's concerned that we may lose a "unit" on the threshold of a new meeting. On the momentum of "state interest" he made the right decision, one that goes in the direction of "recognizing the realities" of the ICM. Otherwise the movement will disappear.

Sakharov is the No.1 subject in world press and radio. (Another interview for the French media: advising the West not to agree to détente on the Soviet Union's terms because détente is resulting in police-ideological tightening of the regime here). I just saw on TV a report about a letter signed by around twenty academicians denouncing Sakharov, among them some real luminaries like Frank, Nesmeyanov, Vul, Engelgart, and others.

Reactions by Nenni, Pitterman, "Avanti," Galutsi, and social-democratic bodies to an article by A. Borisov in *Pravda*. I inspired the reaction. Many will gloat about my (tactical) blunder, but strategically I am right.

September 7, 1973

Events: "Nationwide condemnation of Academician Sakharov. Frenzy of Western democrats." Solzhenitsyn's interview in *Le Monde*.

The Yakir-Krasin trial. Press conference with them in the House of Journalists.

Episode with Brezhnev's congratulatory message to *L'Unita*: its release coincided with the ICP's Central Committee's reaction to Sakharov-Solzhenitsyn. Our B.N. and Kirilenko hinted that maybe we shouldn't send a message under the circumstances. But Leonid Ilyich said to Tsukanov over the phone, "Tell them that we are doing politics here, not some bullshit. Let them send it as is." Nevertheless, Suslov managed to have the message not published in *Pravda*, but placed in the next issue of *Party Life* instead.

Today a note of appreciation from Brezhnev was published in response to the congratulations he received after being awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. Zagladin's version of the note was published, not the one that was approved by the CC Secretariat! Zagladin mentioned the CPSU Program in there! To the joy of Ponomarev and anger of the Chemist and tutti quanti.

The X Congress of the Communist Party of China. Zhou Enlai's report. Our leadership is mentioned as "the new tsars," "Soviet-revisionist-imperialist clique," etc. Moreover, people noticed that only Brezhnev is identified by name (quite a few times). In other cases (less frequently) they say, "The other leader of Soviet imperialism." Andropov's analysis (the word is that the MFA analysis is completely worthless): Zhou's faction (pro-Western technocrats) is growing, they are being joined by Wang Hongwen's Shanghai group (number three after Mao and Zhou), and Zhang Chunquiao. Wang is 36 years old; the Western press is predicting he will take Mao's post. He is an ideologist, but not from the Red Guard, he's a rationalist. The "Cultural Revolution" faction has clearly been moved aside, the military is strongly pressed. A third of the report was devoted to us, a third to Lin Biao and his lessons ("negative teacher"), and the rest to everything else. In the part about us, the following phrase shows up amidst the admonishments, "Brezhnev's group has talked a bunch of nonsense about Soviet-Chinese relations, as if the PRC does not want to normalize state relations." In reality, he suggests, that's not the case. This is the thread we are planning to grab onto for Brezhnev's upcoming speech in Tashkent. In the meantime, Western propaganda is talking everyday about how we are preparing the "nuclear castration" of China. Stupid. Although nobody knows what to do exactly.

In my opinion, the most important reality from the CPC Congress is that Zhou Enlai, who holds the real power, has personally forever associated himself with the "course toward the West" plus Japan, with anti-Sovietism, by insulting Brezhnev (from such a podium!).

B.N. is calling from the South. His main concern is Brezhnev's speech at the peace congress. Today Aleksandrov got involved in this too. I had to keep Brutents and Yermomsky

working on Saturday to edit what the consultants did over three weeks. The idea is to form a new “forward-looking” Peace Program.

It turns out the consultants submitted the draft to Zhilin ten days ago. For days he kept feeding me promises, and in the last three days just didn’t show up to work at all – he was drinking. He is blatantly freeloading on other people’s work. At the same time he has the audacity to present the work of others as his own to Ponomarev. He is at the point of moral disintegration.

### September 9, 1973

The annual review of capitalist economy has come out in the IMEMO [Institute of World Economy and International Relations] magazine. It’s not a happy outlook for us (or rather for our ideology). These reviews are strikingly objective; the same goes for many other articles with nonsense analysis, as they say. For example, Manukyan’s article No. 8: “Some changes in the economic development of capitalist countries.” How does this work alongside Trapeznikovism?!

However, a few months ago I read a letter from an IMEMO employee to Brezhnev. The employee accused Inozemtsev (director) and “that whole crowd” of revisionism, of predicting “many long years” of life for capitalism, and of focusing on the growth of capitalism and absence of revolution in the foreseeable future. The letter was being reviewed by Trapeznikov and Demichev. They pounced on it for a long time. Demichev sent a copy around the Secretariat. It’s perfect fodder for them, of course. But I found out recently that the letter was handed over to the archives, and the author was “replied” that he is not objective. Probably they did not dare to encroach on Kolya (Inozemtsev) – after all, he is on the General Secretary’s team, a candidate member of the CC, he provides materials for Kosygin, and he’s an academician to boot.

### September 11, 1973

Military coup in Chile. Three commanders-in-chief formed a junta. They bombed the presidential palace and commenced a military assault. The junta declared martial law, restricted people from leaving their houses and bearing arms. Government radio stations have been ordered to go silent; there were crackdowns on anyone who did not obey. This is the language of counterrevolution. Allende’s revolution just talked, persuaded, and made loud declamations.

This, of course, is a fundamental defeat of modern revolution in general. It is practically a fatal blow to the very concept of a peaceful revolution. The only plus is that Lenin’s iron laws of revolution are confirmed once again: it is a serious thing and can never and nowhere be sustained without a true proletarian dictatorship. This is the main lesson, but it is also a huge defeat – political, ideological, psychological, international.

What about us? Today’s latest news on the radio started with Brezhnev’s note of thanks to Zhivkov & Co. for awarding him the title of Hero of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. Next – about Brezhnev’s reception of the personal representative of the President of Afghanistan in the Crimea. Then – about the upcoming Congress of Forces for Peace (!) in Moscow, particularly

how happy everyone is that Moscow was chosen as the venue. A great subject: we and the modern revolution! Absorbed with ourselves, we are losing touch with reality.

September 12, 1973

Allende committed suicide. I had a feeling yesterday that is how it would end. The junta is already getting to work. They announced the names of 40 people who had to appear at the Ministry of Defense by 16:00 o'clock, "or extreme measures would be taken with all the ensuing consequences." At the top of the list are Corvalán, Altairano... Many of them I know personally. The list includes sisters and wives of the leaders. Over 100 communists and 60 socialists have already been captured in Santiago and Valparaiso. The junta announced they were severing relations with Cuba and other communist countries.

In a word, it's fascist terror.

It seems the socialists were right when they tried to convince me when I was there in the fall of 1971 that "things will not end peacefully, we have to force the revolutionary process and get armed," and asked for help. And Calderon (then Deputy General Secretary of the Socialist Party) took me aside at an embassy reception, took me deep into the garden and tried to persuade me to "persuade Moscow" that they need weapons, "a lot of weapons, secretly, to arm the Party militia, to win the army over to our side." Maybe back then it was not too late. But over the last two years, the government's political, administrative, and especially economic helplessness discredited the revolution. It seems few people wanted to put their lives down for a clearly lost cause. And back then dictatorship [of the proletariat] was still possible, leaning on the sympathy of at least 50 percent of the population.

The ideological and political mistakes of this defeat are countless. Including our mistakes. Brutents was probably right when he called today the "day of Trapeznikov." The idea of block parties, the peaceful road of revolution – all of this now is "pure revisionism," proven! And the Communist Party of Chile got what it deserved for dividing its hegemony with a socialist party (even though the latter was more politically right).

Today Kirilenko called me, asked for "help" in preparing the November 7<sup>th</sup> report. His tone was very friendly. When I told B.N. about it (he called from the Crimea) he was very upset: this report will keep me busy for a whole month.

September 14, 1973

About Chile – we burst out (with the usual delay) with a strong statement from the Central Committee. The whole world is worried about the events there. There are protests from the Socialist International, prime ministers of social-democratic governments, even the FRG government, not to mention the communists. In the meantime, our Basov – the ambassador there, a "hero of Novorossiisk strikes" – advises in his telegrams not to say anything "officially," just to give information with references to news agencies.

Yesterday I sent an outlined plan for preparing the Conference of Communist Parties of Europe (“Karlov Vary-2” as we call it) and a new International Conference of Communist Parties. The fraternal parties want neither of them, according to our information. What they want is to consolidate the communist parties and left-wing forces in Western Europe. They want their own Western European revolutionary path and their own truly Marxist model of socialism, developed on the basis of a highly industrialized capitalist society with highly developed democratic traditions. More and more often they (the British, French, and Italians) emphasize that the “Soviet model, the Russian example” is not acceptable for them. They view the October Revolution and the Soviet Union only as an objective reality that influenced and continues to influence the course of world affairs. This reality has to be reckoned with and its consequences have to be taken into consideration. But [the Western European parties] do not feel the need to imitate us or tie their politics with the intentions and desires of the CPSU. Under no circumstances do they want to identify with Soviet and Eastern European communism. The Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and Yakir-Krasin cases triggered even greater crystallization of these sentiments, thrust them into the public eye once again even more openly – and in a situation when we have to “swallow it” and keep quiet.

This week, following a PB resolution, we stopped jamming state radio stations (“Voice of America,” “BBC,” “Deutsche Welle,” etc.), but not Beijing, Tirana, Tel Aviv, “Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.” At the moment, the airwaves above Moscow are full of “the problem of Sakharov & Co.” We are being compared to South Africa and the like.

The same resolution issued an assignment to “think over” the possibility of allowing foreigners access to a wider range of areas around the country and removing the 40 km. zone around Moscow for foreign journalists and foreigners in general (without special permission), as well as facilitation of contacts with various Soviet organizations and institutions (not just through the appropriate MFA department), the simplification of visa practices, reduction of taxes on international passports for people traveling on private business, etc., etc. All of this is in connection with the second phase of the European Conference starting on September 18<sup>th</sup>, and the heated focus on the agenda point “on exchange of people and ideas.” Brezhnev sent an order about this from the South, soon after the Crimea meeting – to devise measures that would not break our ideological principles, but would keep the European Conference on track as well.

In that case, why did Yakir-Krasin have to be tried right now? Why deal with Sakharov this way and at this exact time?... Either the overall strategy is not thought-out, or it doesn’t exist at all, and the right hand has no idea what the left hand is doing.

Vad’ka stopped by. Again about Sakharov. Among other things, I told him: I don’t know what I would do if I became the leader of the country. But there is one thing I would never allow – no matter what – and that is material prosperity at the cost of legalizing kulak psychology and a kulak lifestyle.

September 16, 1973

I leafed through George Marchais' book, *A Democratic Challenge*. From the point of view of Trapeznikov's (and not just his, alas!) orthodoxy this is more of challenge to the Marxist-Leninist type of socialism than to capitalism. Indeed:

1. Private ownership of the majority of the means of production **will not be** abolished when French socialism is established.
2. There **will not be** any collectivization of agriculture.
3. Crafts and trades **will not be** organized in cooperatives. In general, "comprehensive collectivism" will not be allowed.
4. There **will be no** control of the economy from a single center. The state will only regulate.
5. There **will be no** censorship. "We cannot prosper without creative freedom; we cannot develop without freedom of thought, without its free expression and dissemination."
6. Unconditional recognition of the principle of "rotation" of leadership; submission to the electoral will of the people. The people have the right to withdraw their confidence in the communists, who will then leave without a murmur.
7. One-party rule is out of the question during the transition to socialism; right to opposition, to the existence of opposition parties.
8. The possibility of "our philosophy" (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) turning into the official social ideology is out of the question.
9. Integration of the state with "our ideology" is out of the question.
10. In general, why should we object to the term "democratic socialism." It is slander to say that communists are against democratic socialism. On the contrary, they cannot imagine socialism that would violate the democracy that was won in the people's revolutions of the past (i.e. bourgeois democracy).

The question is, what do the abovementioned points and our textbooks on historical materialism, scientific communism, the history of the CPSU, and hundreds of other books and articles in theoretical and political journals have in common? What do they have in common with the CPSU Program, or with the documents from our congresses?

But if French Communist Party chose revisionism as its Program, then what is left of the communist movement, and can the International Conference of Communist Parties continue to have an ideological nature? What ideological unity can we speak of?

September 17, 1973

Tiring day. Again issues about the text of Brezhnev's speech for the Peace Congress. Again text for Kirilenko's November 7<sup>th</sup> speech. A phone call and resolutions on my notes for B.N. His corrections for the "Karlov Vary-2" plans. Speeches for Brezhnev, who is going to Bulgaria tomorrow to receive his Hero award, and from there straight to Tashkent.

Shemenkov with a sealed packet from Surgut (near Tyumen), with KGB photos of [Nikos] Zachariadis hanging in the noose (until 1956 he was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece). He committed suicide on August 1<sup>st</sup>, after threatening to do so if he

was not rehabilitated and reinstated in the Party. Terrible. (A copy of his suicide note found its way into his son's hands, who was raised and educated here, 23 years old, doesn't even speak Greek).

We are the benefactors and philanthropists of the communist movement and all the dirt from the inevitable back alleyways always stains us. Although, consider this case, what else could we do... to an extent, we protected him for almost 20 years from his own party.

September 22, 1973

“Creative agony” together with Zagladin (he did a lot more work, he even got two nosebleeds) over two successive versions of a speech for Leonid Ilyich for the forthcoming “Congress of Peaceful Forces.”

Tinkering with a draft version for Kirilenko; on Thursday he sent a group to Serebryanyi Bor. On Friday I went there myself. Listened to comments from Richard and Kosolapov (head of the Propaganda Department group). I behaved with dignity, gave unassuming and dutiful replies, and only one time almost exploded (though at a couple of their comments I grew red in the face but restrained myself). However, it's unpleasant to listen to a narcissistic fop, to feel his arrogance, which he cannot hide behind a contrived naturalness of a man who is put in charge of people who are above him in rank and years. Many of his comments were a simple ego trip. When I returned to the Department, I stayed there until 9 p.m. and re-did everything. But I was out of it when I came home.

What is this for? So the speaker can take a nice vacation in the Crimea, and then read this from the podium of the Kremlin Palace to the pompous indifference of the audience, which won't even listen to this ritual celebratory banality. It's not supposed to be anything more! But how nerve wrecking it is; after all, we have to give a new spin to the things we talk about every day.

We severed diplomatic relations with Chile. I knew about it since Monday, it was the decision of the PB. This is a very good action. We should have done the same with Indonesia back in the day.

It sounds like Chile is going through some truly fascist horrors. According to some reports, Carlos Altamirano was executed. I met him when he came to visit Brezhnev in Moscow in June, 1971. Together with him and Calderon we took a boat on the channel to the Solnechnaya Polyana resort. We toasted the Chilean revolution, I made a speech about its international significance, and that they should “take care of it for all of us.” The last time I saw him was at the Presidential Palace, in that very cafeteria where Allende committed suicide. The president was giving a lunch on the occasion of our visit (we went there at the invitation of the socialist party, in October of 1971). Romanov (from Leningrad) headed the delegation.

Our ambassador there, Basov, is a complete moron. Even after the CC CPSU made the statement about the coup, he persisted in his ciphered telegrams that we should not sever

relations. Maybe he was just worried about his post? Of course, he won't find another warm spot like this.

October 14, 1973

Big gap [in the journal]. Like it happened at the front when I tried to keep a diary. In the days and weeks of fighting there was no time to write, not even to make notes. It's not even that there was no time, it was just physically impossible. When things quieted down and I managed to write something, the result smacked of memoirs with literary overtones, not really a diary.

In the meantime, these three weeks were full of things "inside" and "outside" me.

On September 25<sup>th</sup> we went to the Gorky dacha (Zagladin, Zhilin, Sobakin, Brutents, and I), to finish up Brezhnev's speech for the Peace Congress. B.N. was pressuring us both verbally and in writing, he wanted us to give the text a "sense of urgency," even to "scare the public." His idea is that détente is détente but preparation for war continues. Billions are spent on the arms race, on unthinkable improvements of destructive weapons, etc. All of us – "the team" – objected to his approach both internally and vocally. I told B.N. that the very fact of détente to a great extent depends on whether we, the USSR, believe that it exists. All we have to do is to publicly voice doubts regarding the changes we've achieved, and the next day there will be no more détente. Zagladin used an even cleverer argument: a Chinese official spoke at the U.N. and gave dozens of facts to prove that détente is a "superficial phenomenon," including facts from the arms race. And these are facts, not fiction. The point is how to interpret them, and what to set them against. Lenin, Zagladin reminded, said that facts can be found to fit any argument.

Finally, we all delicately hinted to B.N. that Brezhnev would never give up something that is connected to his name all over the world, no matter what negative events and facts may occur. We drew his attention to the fact that despite the massive attack on us over Sakharov and the Jews, despite the fact that the second phase of the European Congress is stuck (because of the "third basket" – exchange of people, Jackson's frenzy over the most-favored nation legislation, etc.) Brezhnev persistently continues to personally receive every one of the American businessmen who come to the USSR, especially when it has to do with commerce. In conversations with them he stubbornly insists on long-term cooperation... He is not bothered even by Congress' refusal to approve the above-mentioned law... And the problem of us vs. the U.S. is still the most important one in terms of the possibility of a new world war.

But the old man with his 1930s *mentalite* [sic] is stubborn. He got upset when we passed over even the slightest of his suggestions; he reprimanded us, etc. As the result the text is neither here nor there. There are big statements about the changes, but right next to them is great concern over the ongoing preparation for war.

The war in the Middle East that began last Saturday, October 6<sup>th</sup>, seems to have worked in favor of B.N.'s concept; although, of course, he was aware of the intensive work done over the "red telephone" between the Kremlin and the White House. And Brezhnev said practically the next day, during a lunch with [Kakuei] Tanaka, that "our foreign policy can only be peaceful." In other words – in spite of everything and against all odds.

He was not embarrassed by a recent reminder from a Chinese official that the Middle East war is being used as a means of intimidation, a threat that the world is on the brink of a global conflagration. The official said this is the jabber of the superpowers, who benefit from keeping the world in a state of “neither war nor peace.” Indeed, as soon as the war started, all our propaganda and all the political acts I am aware of have been aimed at presenting this as a local affair. Even news of the battles are reported somewhere towards the very end of the latest news reports on TV and radio.

October 21, 1973

Monday through Friday I was at Volynskoe-2. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Zagladin, Inozemtsev, Zhilin and Chakovsky – the writer. Inozemtsev and I settled in a small dacha (former dacha of Vasilevsky, during the war) by ourselves. I was in the same room as this summer, when we were preparing the Crimea meeting.

Work proceeded at a pace and spirit that was easy to predict.

After gathering all of us in the same room plus a stenographer, Sparrow started dictating practically without corrections something between an outline and the final text, based on the plan that was put together in his office on Friday. He maintained a strict line of optimism regarding détente. Moreover, he introduced a novelty: to mention Nixon, Brandt, Pompidou, Kekkonen, Palm, Gandhi... in the context of the creators of modern-day détente, i.e. (considering the nature of the event – Congress of Peace) as the “creators of peace.” This was quite bold, of course, considering that all anti-imperialist and other such forces declared Nixon a bloodthirsty murderer and a criminal of Hitler’s caliber (especially in relation to Vietnam).

We did not object (in general, Sparrow differs from B.N. and others like him by the honesty of his political thinking – more on this later!). But we drew his attention to a difficulty of another kind. It would be awkward not to mention the socialist statesmen in this context... But whom exactly? Following the iron tradition – the whole set? But then Ceausescu and Kim Il-Sung (!), i.e. people who are doing everything to stink up our foreign policy? And with regard to Ceausescu, there is an additional delicate matter – he recently made a tour of Latin America. Then the Communist Party of Romania declared his trip as a great contribution to world peace! Thus, if Brezhnev named Ceausescu in the list, he would sanction this statement in front of the whole world.

However, we set to work and assigned people sections to write. I got the last section, “What kind of peace everyone wants,” “combination of current and universal tasks,” “issues on the waiting list to secure détente,” “our philosophy of peace – why are we optimistic?” and the grand finale.

My relationship with Aleksandrov – our Kissinger – is the same. He can’t stand me, probably because he can sense with his penetrating intuition my dislike for him... Even though I have been trying not to show it for a long time. Any of my suggestions or comments caused automatic irritation. He would only consider them if others supported me. Even though he liked my section (he said this to Chakovsky and Zhilin), he scrutinized it, especially in the places

(ironically) that were written based on Aleksandrov's own ideas. He ridiculed some of the ideas, and I was forced to tell him that they were his own. He only glared at me through his glasses.

It seems in the Middle East this week there was a final turn in Israel's favor. The Israelis broke through the front at Suez and for three days now the west bank of the canal has been occupied by 300 tanks, the bridgehead is over 25 km deep. American supplies have caught up and overtaken our supplies (via airlift through Yugoslavia). Sadat's triumphant reports from a week ago already look ridiculous, and his rejection of our services through the UN – to offer a ceasefire – are tragic. Kosygin was in Cairo for three days but it looks like he was not able to get compliance. On the day of his return to Moscow (Thursday) the Israelis attacked the channel and broke through into Egypt.

Last night Kissinger arrived in Moscow, "at the request of the Soviet government." But what can be done? Seems like the only thing we can do is to mutually cease arms supplies. But in that case, it will be game over for the Arabs a few days later. And we will be condemned by everyone who is not "pro-Zionism."

From September 27-October 6, a delegation from the Communist Party of Australia (Aarons, Taft, and Mavis Robertson – a woman) was in Moscow. At the first and main meeting – with Ponomarev – they were obnoxious: Aarons made an official speech and laid out everything they have approved in their policy documents – that the CPSU is leading a hegemonic policy in the ICM, that peaceful coexistence is only the public interest of the USSR, that the Soviet Union is a country with only a "socialist base" as opposed to a socialist society, we are stifling democracy, suppressing dissent with prisons and mental hospitals, and so on in the spirit of Sakharov; the CPSU is aiming to split the communist and labor movement in Australia (followed by a series of big and small facts about our relationship with the Communist Party of Australia).

B.N. fumed, even interrupted him to declare "a protest against slander."

His own speech was helpless in terms of providing real, substantive arguments, and in places it was embarrassingly incompetent, which only strengthened Aarons' position in the argument. They just smiled ironically at B.N.'s "refutations." However, they responded to a firm and threatening tone, which was to say "if you keep at it, don't expect any normalization with us... so much the worse for you, because we couldn't be bothered by your criticism!"

Then, on October 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> (I came from the Gorky dacha for this) on Plotnikov street and in my office in the CC – I did most of the talking. I sensed that on some things, they could still be convinced as opposed to just intimidated. As usually happens in these kinds of debates with foreigners, my "patriotic and internationalist complex" kicked in, and I worked with enthusiasm, believing in everything I was saying in the moment. It worked, first in the tete-a-tete with Aarons, then with the whole delegation. They changed before my very eyes. Mavis made some specific proposals for the development of CPA-CPSU relations, Taft promised to change the "program" positions with characteristics of the USSR.

They really wanted to have a communiqué. B.N. used this and told them to add the recognition of "successes in the building of communism" and "approval of our foreign policy,"

i.e. things that fundamentally opposed their position at the beginning of the talks. After much debate and hesitation, they agreed. With that, [their trip] came to a close. We parted “warmly.” Zhukov and I spent four hours at Sheremetyevo airport, seeing Aarons off. We informed the CPA about everything. They had been expecting a breach. It seems things are moving towards normalization after all. They understand that a break with us would isolate them from the majority of communist parties and eventually would bring them to the position of a sect.

October 22, 1973

In the meantime, today through the combined efforts of the U.S. and USSR the war in the Middle East has ended. This is a huge event in terms of prospects for world peace. It means that the words in our agreement with Nixon about “consulting on principal matters” regarding conflicts that can potentially escalate, etc. – these are not just words. It is a reality, and what a reality!

This is how it happened (according to Ponomarev). Kosygin did not bring Sadat’s agreement to a ceasefire from Cairo. Nevertheless, we decided to offer it to Kissinger. He flew here with the broad powers from the President. And he acted in a big way, with irony, he did not haggle over the little things. He was confident that things would work out. While he was here, the Israelis blasted Sinai on the west bank of the canal – 300 tanks and 13 brigades steadily expanded the bridgehead and created a real threat of capturing the main crossing from the west. At 4 a.m. on Saturday Sadat summoned Ambassador Vinogradov, in total panic and losing his self-control. He practically begged the ambassador to immediately call Brezhnev (i.e. get him out of bed) and ask him to seek an immediate ceasefire. This was finalized with Kissinger in the morning, transmitted to New York, to the UN. The Security Council immediately adopted a resolution by 14 votes (China abstained), with which Egypt and Israel immediately agreed. Assad, however, grumbled that no one even bothered to consult him.

The sides were given 12 hours for a ceasefire. Although Kissinger said, laughing, that the international practice in such cases is to give 24 hours. The reply was, “Why should people die for 12 additional hours?” He responded, “Fine, let it be 12!”

So, it seems, the war has already ended.

The Arabs got sidelined again. It is hard to imagine that the Israelis would just leave the Golan Heights, Sinai, and even the west bank of the Suez Canal (implementing resolution 242!). It is even harder to imagine that the negotiations between the warring parties “under the auspices” would start soon.

However, we also will not be able to return to the policies of 1967-1973: i.e. rearming the Arabs again, sending tanks, planes, rocket launchers, etc. their way, while at the same time “speaking up” for political resolution. And the most important thing – even though it’s clear to everyone that we saved them from destruction once again, they will never forgive us for it. Our game there is up. We should put an end to our superpower concerns and keep our authority in front of them, and in front of the whole world, with just one thing: that we will not allow you to start a world conflagration! As for the liberation movement, not much is left of it. Who will

believe in the progressive regimes and any kind of “ideas,” if Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Morocco came forth as the fiercest carriers of the “just cause”?! All of it is the most vulgar nationalism.

Ponomarev once again is trying to teach the communist movement: an article for *Problems of Peace and Socialism* in connection with the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lenin’s death; a report on the *PPS* anniversary in Prague; and again about the two paths of the labor movement for *Kommunist*. It would be alright, if everything didn’t get boiled down to barely veiled Comintern formulas. Against the background of what is really going on in the sustainable branches of the communist movement (Italy, France, and a few other places), it is embarrassing and ridiculous.

November 4, 1973

Yesterday Pomelov (Kirilenko’s adviser) summoned me to finish up the report for November 6<sup>th</sup>. It is sheer torture when a politician (the fourth person in the Party and the country!) does not know what does and does not need to be done. In particular, mentioning the nuclear alert that Nixon announced on October 25<sup>th</sup>? (In connection with Brezhnev’s alleged intention to send Soviet troops to Egypt to save Sadat from the Israeli tanks and brigades that made it over the canal, which were 50 km. from Cairo). Brezhnev talked about it at the Congress. There was a TASS announcement. What else? I wavered myself... On the one hand, “ignoring the bluff,” as Western press assessed it, made an impression on the West. Western Europe had a fright (U.S. bases) and discord in NATO, a public spat between London, Paris, Bonn, and Washington. Kissinger accused the allies of disloyalty, and they accused him of disregarding their legal rights. The squabbling continues, ten days later. While we, in our official speech, will act like for us it is in the past, a minor episode. And everyone will calm down (!) in NATO.

On the other hand, to say something, and sharply, and to rub salt into NATO’s wounds, would mean to anger the Americans, while we still have to finish up the Middle East with them. Plus, our cancan could bring the Western bloc closer together.

But these are just my hesitations. I am not privy to the complete information...

However... when the report was sent around, the comments came in as follows: Podgorny, Pelshe, Mazurov, and partially Demichev opposed this topic. While Andropov, Ponomarev, Gromyko, and Suslov passed it by with no reaction.

Yesterday at 10 p.m. the speaker decided to remove the topic.

... However, the primary cause of our suffering is the fact that the speaker cannot articulate his thoughts, even at the level of a lower-level party organization. His every second word is a curse word. Not to mention putting words together in some sort of order for a public speech. He does not even have the resolution (though he is quite a resolute man) to pick the more or less necessary subjects from a list of possibilities. As the result, for twelve hours we were reenacting an “accordion” – he would tell us that the speech needs to be cut down by one third. We would cut it down, bring it to him. He would swear and restore the previous version, saying

that he is used to that text and we should cut something else. So we cut something else. He restores it again. Etc.

However, to return to Brezhnev. His conversation with Gromyko. The Minister asks: Leonid, what are we going to do (in the Middle East)?

Brezhnev:

1. We will participate in negotiations, and we will do it persistently and everywhere. We have a right and duty to do this.
2. We will participate in guaranteeing the borders. And Israel's borders too, because that is what we are talking about. They are the apple of discord.
3. At the appropriate time we will restore diplomatic relations with Israel. On our own initiative! Yes, that's right.

Gromyko: But the Arabs will get upset, they'll make a fuss...

Brezhnev: They can go to hell! We have offered them a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrambled. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them. The people would not understand that. And especially we will not start a world war because of them. So that's that. We will act like I said.

On October 31<sup>st</sup>, the last day of the Congress, I met with Urban Carlson – the International Secretary of the Swedish CP. Once again I was convinced that Western communist parties are less and less likely to identify their policies with us. We were talking about the upcoming January conference of Western European communist parties in Brussels. To this they go willingly. But to the Common European Conference of all socialist countries – only with large strain and suspicion.

In light of the Congress of Peace Forces, a curious situation is developing: the non-communist democrats (including the purely bourgeois) on the basis of peace are getting closer to us, while our "friends" are drifting away the more détente becomes a reality. That is to say, "While there was a possibility of nuclear war, we were with you, because you were the only power capable of preventing war. And when the threat is practically gone, excuse us, but we will do our business ourselves."

Carlson noted, by the way, that at the West European conference of communist parties, there may be an attempt to create a common model for the future of socialism for developed capitalist countries. "But I," he said, "am afraid that this will be an **anti-model**" (i.e. everything opposite of the Soviet Union!).

I had an odd and somewhat unusual conversation with Ponomarev. He stopped me after editing the text with Kirilenko. After some hesitation, he reminded me that we need to look for candidates for the position of director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, since Fedoseyev needs to concentrate on the Academy of Sciences (Suslov also thinks so). Keldysh is very sick. The other deputies also do not measure up. “And that one,” B.N. made a face to portray Trapeznikov, “already got wind and is moving forward his Kuzmin, who is a stupid and cowardly man.”

I replied: “Boris Nikolaevich, why are you asking me? You can’t just go out in the street and pick up an academician and member of the CC like Fedoseyev. There are many capable, intelligent, and practical people. But they don’t have the requisite rank and position. Nobody would take them seriously... For example, Zamoshkin from the Lenin School. But you must admit, it would be ridiculous to even suggest him as a candidate.”

B.N.: “Well, why do you say so... Nowadays they would not notice, they would just see that he is young. Suslov wants to propose Yegorov (from *Kommunist*) for the position... But then who would be at *Kommunist*?!”

In the end we did not come up with anyone.

November 9, 1973

On the 7<sup>th</sup> I was on Red Square in the rain. Once again, as every time, there is the feeling of power that overwhelms all “intellectual arguments.” The power of the State is the viability of a nation. This is true right now, and it seems will be true for a long time. At the Peace Congress there was also a demonstration of power, only in different form. That’s why many who came to protest about Sakharov, the Jews, etc., saw the irrelevance of their protests from the point of view of the main cause, the cause for which they worked – peace, and consequently the right to live.

November 10, 1973

The last day of the holiday. Yesterday I visited Dez’ka (David Samoilov, poet) in the hospital. One of his eyes is still covered up, the other does not have a dressing on it but still cannot see. I found him asleep. When he woke up, he started cheerfully telling me about his neighbors in the room: Garin, a famous actor (went home for the Sunday); a Serb – a handsome 50-year old man, KGB agent, for whom it’s not the first time here; a “landowner-Marxist” from Argentina, whom Dez’ka dubbed Stepan Stepanovich, and who pays \$500 a month to stay at this hospital. For this kind of money he could have gone to a good private clinic in Europe. However, this is the Helmholtz Institute!

The conversation did not really come together. We skipped from topic to topic. I could feel that Dez’ka does not really trust me fully anymore, and doesn’t know how to act around me. He called Sakharov the only pure and truly sincere figure in all of this. He mentioned casually that there hasn’t been a Russian social movement where the traitors were not considered heroes, or even right and the winners. As for Yakir and Krasin (who, incidentally, has already been

released), right now the “opposition” is treating them with deference... “In general, all of it is abominable, this so-called opposition movement, not only in its impotence, but also in its content”... “What does Galich have in common with Sakharov? The former is a schmuck who got upset at everyone because someone at the top did not like his little songs... That is the whole nature of his opposition. But he hovers around Sakharov, stains him, writes political texts for him. Sakharov’s woman (Bonner), too, plays a vile role. She herself is totally stupid, and vulgar too”...

... “You know, Tolya, I would make a great (with gusto) reactionary. When I come out, I’m going to write them (!) some poems”...

He acts cheerfully. It seems that great spiritual potential always helps you to stay strong and maintain your dignity. But actually, he is in a bad spot – in the best case scenario, in 2-3 weeks he will be able to read for maybe an hour an half to two hours a day with very strong glasses.

#### November 18, 1973

I spent the whole week at Serebryanyi Bor. Yet another “theoretical problem” -- theses for the meeting of CC Secretaries of socialist countries on foreign propaganda and ideology. It is scheduled for the second half of December. The team [at Serebryanyi Bor] – Shakhnazarov, Medvedev, Veber, Pyshkov and respectively from the other departments. There was a sea of people, which made work more difficult. Burlatsky... he was Shakhnazarov’s boss, he is the creator of the group of consultants in the Socialist Countries Department (when it was under Andropov, he fostered Arbatov, who then replaced him as head of the group). During the preparation of the Party Program and the XXII Congress of the CPSU in general in the summer of 1961 in Sosny he was quite an important person. I was an “errand boy” back then at that dacha. But he was indulgent towards me. Now the tables have turned and everything is in reverse: he is the head of a sector in the Institute of Law and considers the very fact that he was invited for his kind of work a boon. Shakhnazarov is his superior. And Burlatsky’s former arrogance has vanished. Overall he is a fairly talented person who, like Belyakov, at some point decided that “anything goes” and instantly was cast down, he even lost his right to travel abroad. But his old friends, who owe him a great deal, do not forget about him.

#### December 1, 1973

Brezhnev’s visit to India is over. Thousands upon thousands of nice words have been said. Possibly and almost certainly something useful will come of it in practice... but at the cost, oddly enough, of another big step (to use the language of our “journalism”) towards the loss of any prestige: people are sick of the newspaper columns with speeches, toasts, documents, endless TV broadcasts of speeches, receptions, presents, kisses, handshakes, meetings and farewells. No one tries to understand, people couldn’t care less about these ceremonies. Our leader looks absolutely ridiculous with this passion for profuse public speaking coupled with his terrible articulation and muttering of the simplest words. When it comes to Indian names, it’s a complete embarrassment. The absurdity of it all is so universally recognized that all kinds of people talk

about it openly, with no embarrassment or reservation, in the street, in trolleybuses, everywhere. Khrushchev has been “surpassed” on this score a long time ago.

By the way, I found out from the documents that during the peak of the war in the Middle East, the situation was not at all like Zagladin described it: as if that night in Zavidovo, in their pajamas, the three of them together in the sun room with telegrams to Nixon, anger against our own extremists, who proposed a crackdown against Israel, etc. It turns out that when Israel violated the ceasefire agreement on October 22<sup>nd</sup>, seized a large piece of territory on the west bank of the Suez and moved tanks towards Cairo, Brezhnev did two things: a) he wrote a letter to Nixon with a proposal to send Soviet-American troops into Egypt together; or if Nixon did not want to do that, Brezhnev would do it alone. That is why the Americans announced defense readiness condition 1.

b) Brezhnev wrote a note to Politburo members, suggesting to do “something” immediately – to bring the Soviet fleet to Tel Aviv or allow the Egyptians to strike Israel with our medium-range missiles (but not Tel Aviv or Jerusalem), or something else.

Two things remain a mystery:

- Why have Nixon and Kissinger not leaked information (over a month has passed), even though they found themselves in a very difficult position and had to justify their actions to the allies and the Americans, and to public opinion in general – why did they take such a menacing action seemingly without having any serious reasons.
- Why did Brezhnev’s note to the PB not have any consequences. Who stopped this initiative and how.

Moreover, it is astonishing that the letter has not been confiscated. Even some staff in our department have read it, and are still reading it, when everything turned out differently. The image of Brezhnev that comes through in the note is not the same image as he presented at the Congress of Peace over the same issues.

All of this is incomprehensible to me.

December 5, 1973

The last day of the Stalinist constitution that has not been cancelled yet. Yesterday we were preparing for the meeting of deputies of International and Ideology Departments of the Central Committees of socialist countries. I will have to chair it, because Shakhnazarov was summoned to Zavidovo to prepare the CC Plenum. Over the last day and a half we were preparing our own contribution to the speech at the Plenum, about the International Communist Movement... at Ponomarev’s dictation. How is one supposed to think about the fate of the communist movement! On the four pages that Aleksandrov-Sparrow allotted to us, we can barely fit the “personal contribution” (i.e. Brezhnev’s meetings with Marchais, Gus Hall, Rao, Bachman, etc.) and a proposal for a pan-European Conference of Communist Parties and International Conference (the 4<sup>th</sup>, as B.N. prefers to call it). Then again, he told us Suslov’s opinion: the conference should be held after the next CPSU Party Congress.

And in general there is no time to think about the cause. Nobody really cares about it, to be honest. Other concerns are draining the nerves and resources of the mind:

- On the 6<sup>th</sup> there is the meeting of deputies from socialist countries;
- On the 18-20<sup>th</sup> meeting of CC Secretaries from socialist countries, Ponomarev's report is 50 pages;
- On the 24<sup>th</sup>, Ponomarev is speaking at the meeting of ambassadors and representatives of propaganda agencies for abroad;
- On the 27-28<sup>th</sup>, Ponomarev is speaking in Nalchik on the occasion of Kabardino-Balkaria being awarded the Order of Friendship. At the same time he will make a report on the international situation of the ICM.
- On January 7<sup>th</sup>, Ponomarev is making a report in Prague on the fate of the *PPS* journal.
- On January 20<sup>th</sup>, Ponomarev is speaking at the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Lenin's death. The topic – the ICM over half a century.

All of this I have to do in addition to my ongoing work.

Yesterday B.N. told me that Ryzhenko must be removed from the Lenin School. He went to the GDR and “in certain circles” there (probably drunk) railed against Gromyko and Suslov, and said that Brezhnev should take an example from Stalin, who wrote his own reports and speeches. Honecker, horrified, immediately reported all of this to Moscow.

B.N. is suggesting to replace Ryzhenko at the Lenin School with Matkovsky, our chief of department on Great Britain. Well, thank God for that, I'll be free of that mediocrity.

When I was in Serebryanyi Bor and had two-three hours of free time from the official texts, I would read Herzen, volume XII about Vorontsova-Dashkova, his letters to Alexander II, correspondence with Russian friends about his transfer from one tsar to another. This method – to read Herzen all the time – was suggested to me by Academician Tarle 20 years ago. To read Herzen by opening any volume at random, even just one page a day. It's very fruitful, very refreshing. The genius of his insight into events is so great, and the language is so precise and powerful, that it seems you are reading about our times. I read all of this 25 years ago, but right now I perceive it quite differently, like it is more relevant (and for a Russian person, also much more emotionally significant) than, for example, reading Brzezinski.

#### December 7, 1973

Volobuyev stopped by. Talked about his boys. One is a physicist, the other an engineer, the third is studying economics. They and their friends are backing him into a corner. Pashka [Volobuyev] complains that he hasn't got a leg to stand on. This public, he said, follows one of two trends: one seeks salvation in the leader, while the other – in democracy (for example, in alternative elections, etc.). What are they trying to save themselves from? From thievery, drunkenness, idleness, irresponsibility, the degradation of relations between power and the people on any basis but fear.

He talked about his trip to Omsk, how the representative of the city executive committee, a woman, showed him around the city and kept saying: Oh, this developed socialism! We would take any kind of socialism, even a measly one, just as long as it was real, so we could put up some public restrooms and pave the sidewalks.

Why did he try for a whole month to see me? He is being driven out from the directorship of the Institute of History. Rybakov, the Academician-Secretary of the Department of History, already suggested that he should resign (saying that he, Rybakov, needs to be working on archeology and writing his book, but instead there are constant scandals and squabbles because of Volobuyev). It seems this has been discussed with Trapeznikov. Pashka wanted to find out from me whether it has been discussed with the CC Secretaries.

I spoke with B.N. today. He is not aware of anything like that. However, that does not mean that Demichev is not aware of something. B.N. retorted "Why should Volobuyev leave?" I thought to myself: then help him, if you don't want him to leave.

B.N. was flattered and scared (he even turned red in the face) about an idea that is going around Moscow about why Trapeznikov and Golikov are hounding Volobuyev. The idea is as follows: Inozemtsev, Arbatov, Timofeyev, and Volobuyev – all these institute directors are Ponomarev's satellites. The first three are well "covered." But Volobuyev is not. Moreover, he is engaged in subjects that are easier to attack, like the history of Soviet society, i.e. Trapeznikov's monopoly. B.N. got furious and told me to tell Volobuyev not to say such things.

### December 17, 1973

The main worry these days is preparing B.N.'s speech for the meeting of socialist country secretaries on foreign propaganda. Back in Serebryanyi Bor we made the first version, with an attempt (a very timid one, of course) to formulate the specifics of our foreign propaganda as it relates to détente. That version was rejected with disgust. B.N. dictated some bits – an abracadabra of words, which, however, carried the key message that the nature of imperialism has not changed, so we should keep hacking at it the same way. Overcoming our own internal resistance and still trying to push the idea of a new stage in propaganda, Veber, Pyshkov and I struggled over a new text. Now he likes it. But... herein lies the senselessness, the Kafkaesque nature of this whole idea. Today he says to me:

- I heard that they want to make copies of my report. Does that mean they are going to give it out to the conference participants?

- Probably. You know that is what they always do.

- No, no Anatoly Sergeyeovich! It would be one thing if the Chinese got their hands on it, but what if the imperialists get it! It will look like we are gathering our friends here and telling them that détente is one thing, but we should continue to barrage America and the West like we used to... No, no. The text can be given only to trusted people.

...Mother fucker! Why do you, a politician, convene such a meeting, if you are afraid that people in the West will find out that you are calling for a struggle against the West despite all this peaceful coexistence stuff? Are you not proving once again that the only reason for this report is so you personally can position yourself as an ultra-orthodox proponent of revolutionary ideology in front of Suslov-Demichev-Trapeznikov, and all those behind them?! But at the same time you are afraid that your report would resonate politically (which would happen if it reached the West), and then you would catch hell from Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other real politicians. That's the extent of this high philosophy, on which we spent so much energy and creativity. It makes me sick to my stomach.

In the meantime, on December 10-11<sup>th</sup> the CC Plenum took place. There was a review of 1973 and a discussion of plans for 1974.

I was present at the first day of the Plenum. Brezhnev spoke. I came away with some kind of vaguely grave impression. On the one hand, there is a gut feeling that we'll endure. On the other, there is a gnawing feeling about the lack of prospects.

The year was seemingly successful – 7.8 percent growth instead of 5.8 percent. But maybe that is why it's even harder to reconcile oneself to the situation. The Plan was not met this year in energy, metals, chemistry, light industry, etc. The Plan for next year is extremely intense, otherwise we will not meet the Five-Year Plan. Over the first three years there was growth of only 44 billion rubles out of the 103 billion planned for the five years. That means in the next two years we need to do 59 billion rubles.

Brezhnev put the question in "Stalinist terms": either we tell the people "sorry, we can't do it," or we mobilize all forces, and come hell or high water we meet the Plan. Bolsheviks always chose the second option.

It seems there really is no other way. The first option would be a collapse, and there is no alternative to the current regime; we also don't have the conditions for an effective regime change without a terrible national disaster.

The second path, the Bolshevik way – it is a way of rushing. But in the changed social conditions, this method is psychologically rejected by the people. Brezhnev himself told Arbatov, "All the success of this year was achieved by political means (using student, army, and citizen labor during the harvest). We do not have an established automatic mechanism, so we will have to again rely on socialist competition, awards, decorations, etc."

This is the situation:

Baibakov, when making a 15-year long-term plan based on the requests from the Ministries and departments, calculated that if we adopt the project on this basis, the real income of the population will grow by 2 percent per year. That is less annually than during the past 15 years.

Sixty-seventy million tons of metal goes to waste in our manufacturing processes.

Based on the tonnage of our metalworking machines, we produce as much as the U.S., Japan, and the FRG combined; but based on numbers of machines made from that metal and their efficiency, we are far behind each of these countries.

Finland exports 10 times less timber, but makes twice as much currency from the export, than we do. That is because we export it in basic raw form.

We signed an agreement with Germany to construct a pipeline for them as compensation, but did not complete it in time and they made a claim against us for 55 thousand dollars per day of the delay.

We have 2 billion rubles-worth of slow-moving goods accumulated in our warehouses, i.e. goods that were rejected by consumers. This is almost equal to the amount of capital investment in all of light industry for the remainder of the Five-Year Plan.

The construction of the KAMAZ project was estimated at 1 billion 700 million rubles. Now it appears that it will take another 2.5 billion, and then perhaps more. This is considering that we have a planned economy, and everything is centralized.

In 1955 we decided to build a polished glass plant in the town of Salavat. The blueprint was ready by 1962. But in 1961, the British offered us a license for a different kind of production method – firing technology. In 1965 we bought the license, on which three plants have already been built and are producing great glass. In the meantime, construction on the Salavat plant continued. In 1972 it was completed, but it turned out that the equipment that was installed does not polish the glass, but breaks it. It all had to be melted down. We still have not found the responsible party.

We produce three-quarters less material from one cubic meter of wood than the capitalist countries.

Our aircraft and car engines have a much lower motor capacity than theirs.

In Kursk we built a knitting mill with foreign equipment to make the types of fabric that are in short supply. But it works only at half capacity because there are not enough workers. It turns out when the factory blueprint was created, they forgot about housing.

A huge amount (I didn't have time to write down the exact number) of grain that was collected this year was stored in piles out in the open air. It rotted.

The losses of grain, cement, fruits and vegetables, etc., are counted in the millions of rubles due to lack of packaging and delayed transportation.

Because of the poor quality of metal, we are using more tons of it in construction than we would need to [if the quality was better].

Etc., etc.

We planned for Group B [production] to exceed Group A. But since 1971, the balance is still changing in favor of A. Plans for the production of consumer goods are systematically not implemented.

Brezhnev admitted that we cannot overcome this situation while enterprises benefit from lying to the government, and there is an explanation for it: on the side of quantitative indicators we have the Plan, the awards, the tradition, and the chain of command. No wonder that in the battle of quantity vs. quality, quantity always wins. All we have on the side of quality are appeals and smart newspaper articles.

What suggestions are there to overcome this? They are all from the same sphere of reorganization, creation of committees, prodding and appealing. Only this time they are packaged more intelligently than before, because they were written by Arbatov and Inozemtsev, under Tsukanov's leadership.

Because of the critical nature of Brezhnev's speech, the majority of the speakers in the debate threw out dozens of facts like the ones I listed, taking them from Brezhnev's and Baibakov's speeches.

Have we formed some kind of inert, bureaucratic, ossified force of hopeless indifference (following the principle – just to survive a few more years), a force that will swallow anyone who tries to do anything new? If we have any people left who are capable of doing that.

Today at the reception house on Vorobyovy Gory [Sparrow Hills] we coordinated the theses on the results of the meetings of CC Secretaries of socialist countries. The Romanians' claims looked pathetic and ridiculous; the Bulgarians were very active.

By the way, Brezhnev said at the Plenum that we are forming a "special relationship" with the Bulgarians. They have embarked on a path to transform their country into another Soviet republic. At the meeting of Secretaries they proposed this thesis: someone can be considered a patriot only if he loves the socialist community as much as his own homeland! The rest (Hungarians, Germans, and others) exchanged looks, but did not object.

I noticed the way [Brezhnev] speaks in front of our "friends." Great power attitude. The outwardly democratic posture looked more like familiarity. He was above them, the patriarch. He has the right to paternal frankness and suggestion. He spoke without notes and the whole time the subtext was anti-Romanian. Everybody realized this, and the Romanians cringed.

December 25, 1973

B.N. suddenly began having doubts whether we need the European Conference of Communist Parties like the Karlovy Vary one. Wouldn't it be better to just steer the course for the big conference. It seems there are good reasons for it: it's not right for the communist movement to adapt to the International Conference on Security in Europe. It would be even more impossible to contrapose the two conferences; it would be a diplomatic scandal. And since no

one in the communist parties wants to go beyond the framework of international problems at the conference, there is really no platform for it.

At the meeting in Prague for the journal *PPS*, B.N. wants to jump the gun and appear as the guy who was the first to say, "What about the big conference?" Though maybe he will get put in his place for this claim?

December 30, 1973

The week was filled with preparations for Prague. With Yura Karyakin's help we conducted an "education of Ponomarev" on the lessons of Chile, this time expanded to not only confirm the "dogmas" of revolutionary theory, but actually give some real lessons.

I had a clash with Ponomarev over his assessment of the current situation in the world (social). He insists, as he has for many years in every one of his reports, that a crisis of imperialism means a rise in revolutionary struggle. There really is a crisis. And it has its own face: energy. It has tied everything else into its knot. But we don't see a revolutionary upsurge, and there is nowhere for it to come from. I tried to argue with Ponomarev that historical experience belies his dogmatic optimism. In peacetime, economic upheavals were always advantageous to reactionaries and even fascism: 1921-3, 1929-33, 1947-48. During these times, the revolutionary movement either suffered a direct defeat, or fell into long periods of stagnation.

Even now – a shift towards the political right is evident everywhere. Even social-democrats are being pressed everywhere. Naturally, the average guy does not believe in his ability to deal with the crisis. And he, this average guy, wants the crisis to end, not to escalate to the revolutionary point. So he is tempted with the "order" of an authoritarian leadership. Signals are coming from everywhere about the danger of the right wing. (It's another matter that it may accommodate our peace policy!). But it is simply ridiculous to talk right now about the approach of an "excellent revolutionary situation" in the spirit of the Chinese. Not to mention the shortsightedness of such evaluations.

Of course, he got the upper hand in the end. He is the one who will be giving the speech! But for now, while changing the accents, I still kept a large piece about the danger of the right wing.

December 31, 1973

Probably the best summary of 1973 in terms of domestic politics came from this morning's announcement on the radio about [holiday] greetings (!) at "23:45, from the CC CPSU General Secretary Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the Soviet people on the occasion of the New Year"... This is unprecedented. Not the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not the CC and the Soviet government... not even "on behalf of"... No. A personal message.

For all his undoubted merit (especially in foreign policy), he has, unwittingly to himself and noticeably to the rest of the world, slipped onto Khrushchev's path. The apogee of contemptuous irritation (which could be heard everywhere, even in conversations on the street)

about the position he put himself in were the televised broadcasts of his visit to India. Apparently, he was not informed about it. This is the result: his New Years appearance.

It is difficult to judge how his “colleagues” feel about it at heart (!). The only thing I can observe firsthand is that it grates on Ponomarev. His “position” is manifested in his grimaces and gestures, but not in his formulas. Judging by the context of these grimaces (for example, during the discussion of the April Plenum preparations, when “and personally” was officially said for the first time!), Gromyko is also not happy with what is happening.

People in the apparatus know that Demichev hates him fiercely, but he is cowardly and servile. But God forbid if this kind of dissatisfaction (from this side) turns against Brezhnev.

Polyansky, about whom people were talking practically in the street before the December Plenum as a candidate for removal from the Politburo, does not really hide his dislike. Rather he even wants it to be known. I heard this: Vanya Dykhovichnyi, an actor at Taganka Theater who is married to Polyansky’s daughter, is good friends with her brother, Polyanski’s son with whom the latter “shares everything.” So, before the Plenum, Polyansky told his son, “I don’t care whether I remain in the PB. I, like the others, haven’t really been a member for a year now. Nowadays this is the routine there: Brezhnev talks, while we nod and play along.” It seems Polyansky is spreading this so when he is kicked out, it will look like he is not being let go “due to incompetence” (which is probably the case), but suffering for the cause.

The “personal” moment can be quite favorable; and as these years have shown, an effective factor in foreign affairs. But it can also be very dangerous. The Cuban missile crisis happened precisely over a “personal moment,” which nearly led to disaster. This October in the Middle East it seems there was something similar. I recently read an interview by Morgenthau in the *Washington Post*. He said that the high alert in the U.S. was announced because there was reliable information that a Soviet ship was headed to Alexandria with nuclear missiles on board. After the alert was announced, the Soviet ship turned back.

This is consistent with what I wrote earlier: one night, after October 22<sup>nd</sup>, the General Secretary cried “We have to do something!” And a paper was even sent around the PB. This was probably that “something” that no one dared to argue with (already!).

Yesterday I read a very substantial collection by the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences on Brandt. They write so freely and smartly when the product is not censored and distributed among a trusted and “understanding” public, not under the influence of alien views.

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**Postscript to the year.**

This year showed the **inertial** nature of the Soviet Union.

The economy was in a state of depression. But not the kind of depression that is normal for a capitalist economy and that is a part of cyclical renewal. It was the beginning of stagnation and irreversible decline. Because it was a state-run economy that relied on party discipline and the careerism of the nomenclature, it continued to exist, but could not develop.

This was starting to be felt, if not understood, by the ruling stratum. Even smart and well-informed people like Inozemtsev and Arbatov could not suggest anything besides stopgap measures, which did not take us outside the stalled system.

It became clearer and clearer that ideology was falling victim to the hopeless economic stagnation. As a quasi-religion, it was dead at the core. Nobody believed in its dogmas, from top to bottom.

For the first time, official ideology (as a theory) met with internal opposition, which could no longer be stifled by Stalinist means. Sakharov and the dissident movement appeared; they criticized and condemned Soviet power by appealing to its own laws and policies.

The de-facto anti-Semitism of the state spilled out along with the “Jewish question,” undermining the integrity of the internationalist Soviet ideology. Jews, who were the most active ethnic group during the Revolution and the formation of the Soviet state, took advantage of the strengthening of Israel as an international player and demanded the right to leave the Soviet Union. So the former Bolsheviks, their children and grandchildren ran away from their ungrateful and abusive homeland.

Soviet socialist ideology lost its role as a world (essentially expansionist) factor. Enrico Berlinguer’s famous formula – “The momentum of the October Revolution has dried up” – accurately reflected the situation. Communist parties that had some kind of social base in their countries started to break away from the paternalistic roof of the CPSU, following the tracks of “Euro-communism.” The small parties that were insignificant at home and entirely financially dependent on us also rejected the Soviet model for their countries. The USSR ceased to be a symbol of hope and inspiration, a source of enthusiasm. But communist parties without the USSR or against the USSR were doomed. So against their will, they remained loyal to proletarian internationalism.

Thus, the International Communist Movement also continued to exist only **by inertia**. It did not want, nor was it capable, to carry out even the role of a propaganda mouthpiece and defender of its one-time revolutionary “forbearer.” The feverish efforts of Ponomarev’s CC Department to preserve at least a formal shell of the ICM revealed a growing helplessness.

The USSR’s position as one of the two superpowers became a clear contradiction to its claim to be the center of world socialism. Brezhnev, after definitively establishing himself as the undisputed leader, and not being an aggressive or malicious man by nature, recognized his responsibility in avoiding nuclear war. “Peaceful coexistence” became the *realpolitik* for him. He acted accordingly, preferring détente on the main front of the Cold War – in Europe and in

extinguishing regional conflicts (even together with the U.S.) in the third world; he began to search for approaches to normalization with China.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 dealt a fatal blow to the halo of the national liberation movement. For the first time Soviet people and the ruling circles felt that the liberation movements were not a support for us, but parasites capable of drawing us into major trouble when it came to solving the main and vital foreign policy problem – preventing a world war.

In the socialist camp, in our external empire, the trouble was more noticeable. Contrary to expectations, the intervention in Czechoslovakia did not strengthen the socialist system, but became an additional reason for its decay. The burden of fueling a decent standard of living in our allied countries grew heavier for the Soviet people. The connection of economic development of these countries to the Soviet market and the Soviet model of industrial development caused increasing dissatisfaction. The groveling servility of the ruling stratum of our satellites increasingly distanced the power from the people, among whom anti-Soviet sentiments were growing, fueled by powerful Western propaganda.

You could say that the socialist camp also existed **by inertia** from this time forward, rather than on the basis of mutual interest.

Brezhnev's realism was opposed, more and more brazenly, by pressure from his circle – ideologues and conservatives, personified in Suslov and Andropov. He waved them aside in his main foreign policy cause. In everything else, he conceded or was indifferent, even though sometimes he “corrected” them (in relations with creative intelligentsia and Western communists).

As Brezhnev got older and more frail, the negative features of the General Secretary's personality became more prominent. His inordinate vanity often made him ridiculous, and absolute power atrophied his self-control. As his energy levels dropped, his physical weakness caused him to adopt the policy of “disturb as little as possible.”

This played into the hands of the conservatives and ideologues, who determined the social atmosphere. It became more and more gloomy and hopeless. The “creative intelligentsia” either showed its finger behind its back, or sought refuge in the eternal truths of love and everyday worries, or lulled itself and the public with reminders about the nobility and heroism of their fathers and grandfathers in the recent and distant past.

In the apparatus of power (I don't know about the state, but in its main apparatus, the CC, in some of its departments, especially the International Department), a circle of people formed who played by the “rules of the game” and became aligned with the most enlightened and freethinking part of the scholars in the humanities institutes of the Academy of Sciences, in newspapers and magazines, and increasingly felt a sense of responsibility for their country. Inwardly, spiritually and morally (at the level of culture) they already separated themselves from their superiors. The leadership was alien to them and unpleasant even on a human level, in basic interactions.

However, they continued to operate **by inertia**. They tried to correct some things, improve some things, impose some elements through style (being speechwriters and advisers) in the spirit of *realpolitik* and common sense. But they did not try to break away, because they did not know how and were tied down by habit, lifestyle, and intellectual doubts about everything and everyone.

But at this time, in their milieu, there gradually began to form the nucleus of the future staff of perestroika.