THE BATTLE FOR IRAN

Contents

I. INTRODUCTION

II. IRAN, ANCIENT AND MODERN
   A. The Nation
      1. Imperial Past
      2. The People
      3. The Economy
      4. Politics and Government
   B. Between Russia and The West
      1. Aggression from the North
      2. The Oil Dispute, 1949-53
      3. Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy

III.

IV.

V.

APPENDICES

A. Whose Oil? An Abbreviated History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute
B. Biographic Sketches
C. D.
E. The Trial of Mosadegh and Riahi
G.
II. IRAN, ANCIENT AND MODERN

A. The Nation

1. Imperial Past

The first Persian empire, that of the Achaemenid dynasty, was founded by Cyrus the Great in the Sixth Century B.C. through conquest.

1 See Appendix B for a brief biography of Hosadeq.

2 Persia was derived through Greek from Persis, the name the Greeks used for Parsa, the tribe and province of the Achaemenids. In 1935 Rez Shah insisted that foreigners use Iran, the native usage which means "land of the Aryans," rather
of the Hades and other kin. The region now generally known as the Middle East. Cyrus, Darius, further extended the empire, which he divided into 20 satraps or provinces connected by a network of imperial roads. The Achaemenid empire endured for almost 200 years, until it was destroyed by Alexander the Great of Macedonia. The Greeks were soon succeeded by the Parthian dynasty, which in turn was followed by the Sassanids, who ruled for 400 years from the third to the seventh centuries A.D. and who restored the glory of ancient Persia. In 651, however, the Arab invasion swept across Persia, which for the next nine centuries was ruled by a succession of foreign conquerors. A native Persian dynasty rose again at the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids came to power; their rule lasted over 200 years and reached its peak under Shah Abbas from 1587 to 1629. Invading Afghans overthrew the Safavids in 1722 and were in turn driven out by Nadir Shah, a Turkic-speaking tribesman who launched a campaign of conquest that included invasions of India and the Caucasus. The succeeding dynasty, that of the Qajars, lasted until the early 1920's when Reza Khan, a colonel in the Iranian army's Cossack Division, seized power in a military coup. He became Shah in 1925, deposing the Qajars and founding the Pahlavi dynasty. When Iran was occupied in 1941 by British and Soviet troops in order to guarantee the Allied supply route to the Reza Shah embattled Russians, abdicated and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the present Shah.

2. The people

Of Iran's population in 1952 of under 18 million, more than 75% were ethnic Iranians of Indo-European stock; Persians made up

3 See Appendix B for biographical details on Reza Shah.
50% of the total. The other major groups included Kurdish, Gilani, Mazenderani, Lur, Bakhtiari, and Baluchi tribesmen, many of whom were nomadic or seminomadic peoples. Another 22% or so of the population were Turkic peoples, primarily the Azerbaijani of the northwestern provinces but also including the Turkmen and Qashqai tribal groups. Arabs made up about 5% of the population, and the remainder were non-Muslims, including Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews. Persian (or Farsi, as it is known in Iran) was the official language, spoken by most ethnic Iranians, although Turkic and Arabic dialects were also in use.

Almost all Iranians are Shia Muslims, in contrast to the Sunnis who predominate in the Muslim world. Shiites believe that the true succession to the leadership of Islam continued through the line of 'Ali (Mohammad's son-in-law) in the series of the 12 Imams, in contrast to the Sunnis who insist that the Caliphs succeeding Mohammad were selected by the consensus of the Muslim community. Although there is no organized Shia hierarchy, certain titles distinguish special members of the religious community. A cleric of limited theological training is a "mullah," while one who has studied at a higher institution is a "mujtahid" and qualified to adjudicate questions of religious conduct. The most important Iranian religious leaders have borne the honorary title of "Ayatollah," and the leader at the Shrine at the city of Qom may issue decrees which have the force of law to the faithful. A descendant of Mohammad may use the title "Sayyid" as part of his name, but he is not necessarily a religious figure.

The social structure in the early 1950's included an elite composed of the Shah, his court, and the 200 or more ruling families whose wealth...
derived from agricultural labor. Below the elite was the upper middle class that included government officials, professional men, importers, bankers, and merchants. The urban middle class consisted mainly of small merchants, craftsmen, lower level clergy, and teachers and as a group had not benefited greatly from the economic development and educational opportunities of the previous two decades. The day laborers, street vendors, and service workers were at the bottom of the urban class structure. Most of the country's people were working in the 1950 era as tenants, bound to their landlords by an almost feudal system. Outside the Iranian social structure were the tribes, whose social system in times of peace impeded the progress and modernization of Iran and was a source of weakness. In times of stress, however, the tribes were a source of strength.

In the 1941-45 period, they remained relatively untouched by the general collapse, but internal stability, the tribes contributed to confusion and disorder through their clannish narrow-mindedness, tribal rather than national loyalties, and readiness to resort to violence.

As a people, Iranians have been described as having an intense national pride that has resulted from a fairly homogeneous stock and a 2,500-year history. In spite of this pride in the achievements of past dynasties and the high level of intelligence among those who have had the means to develop their potentials, the national movement of the 1950's accomplished little.

The reasons accounting for this are the fact that nationalism, the feelings and native intelligence are often accompanied by an individualism that inhibits cooperation, by a cynicism that despises enthusiasm, by an impatience that derides calculation, and by a volubility that abhors discretion. Their nationalism thus has lacked an air of common purpose, of willingness to sacrifice, of the dedication that has given impetus to the national movements of other, less well-endowed peoples.

3. The economy

In 1950 Iran was still basically an agricultural nation with a backward economy. Farming, stock raising, forestry, and fisheries probably accounted for half the gross national product; wheat was the major crop, followed by barley, rice, cotton, and tobacco. Manufacturing was growing in importance, with textiles—cotton and wool—leading the cement, match, and glass industries, although food processing was still the most important non-oil activity.

Oil, of course, prior to 1951 when the effects of the dispute with the British were severely felt, was contributing about a third of budgetary revenue and nearly two-thirds of foreign exchange. Oil revenues started to climb when the war ended, going from £7.13 million in 1946 to £16.03 million in 1950; by 1952, they were only £3.3 million. In 1950, 31,217,000 metric tons of oil were exported, but this fell to 9,158,000 metric tons in 1951 and to a pitiful 14,000 metric tons in 1952 when the British left.
4. Politics and government

Until the early years of the 20th century, Persia had either been an absolute monarchy or had been under the rule of foreign invaders. In July 1905, however, popular resentment against the excesses of Mozaffir ad-Din, a Shah of the Qajar dynasty whose excursions to Europe were nearly bankrupting his country's treasury, grew so strong that widespread demonstrations and riots forced him to proclaim a constitution. This relatively liberal document, supplemented in 1907 and amended in 1925, 1949, and 1957, provided for a government of three branches. The power of the executive was vested in the cabinet and in government officials acting in the Shah's name. The judiciary was composed of a hierarchy of civil courts up through the Supreme Court, while the legislative branch comprised the parliament, or Majlis, of 136 members, elected by the people every 2 years, and, after 1949, the smaller Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the Shah and half elected.

Whatever power remained in the hands of the Qajar Shah vanished soon after World War I, in which Iran had maintained a slightly pro-German neutrality that was violated by Turkey, Russia, and Britain. In February 1921, a young reformist politician, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, and Col. Reza Khan, commander of the Iranian Cossack Division, combined to overthrow the government. Zia ed-Din became Premier and Reza Khan commander-in-chief of the army, but the two soon quarreled, and Zia ed-Din fled into exile in May 1921. Reza Khan remained

---

5 The Cossack Division, at that time the only well-organized and effective unit in the army, came into being as a result of Nasr ed-Din Shah's visit to Russia in 1873. The Shah admired his Cossack escort and asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize a Cossack cavalry regiment in the Iranian army. It grew to a brigade and then a division, and its White Russian officers and noncoms were retained until October 1920, when Reza Khan replaced Col. Starrossolsky as commander and other Iranians took over for the remaining Russians.
in power as Minister of War, devoting himself to the reorganization of
the army. Unifying the numerous military units into a closely knit, con
trolled army, he employed it to pacify Azerbaijan, and quell the rebellious tribes. Reza Khan took over as Premier in 1923, and two years later he became Shah.

The two focal points of Reza Shah's dictatorial rule were nationalism and modernization, and in this he greatly resembled Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, although his methods and goals were less radical. He improved the status of women and checked the power of the Shia clergy, but he stopped short of Ataturk's romanization of the national language--Farsi retained its Arabic script. As a nationalist, he was suspicious and guardcd toward the Soviet Union and challenging toward the British, particularly as to the oil concession, which he felt did not sufficiently benefit Iran. He brought in first American and then German economic advisers to reorganize the country's finances and to serve as a counterweight to Soviet and British influence.

Reza Shah's dictatorial rule ended with the occupation of his country by the Soviets and the British in August 1941--an episode that will be discussed below--and a month later he abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was proclaimed Shah by the Majlis. He left Iran at once and eventually didd in exile in South Africa in 1944. The Iranian government he left behind faced a difficult period, with a Russian occupation in the north and a British one in the south. Tehran remained a neutral zone, but the Allies controlled the transportation

6 His biography appears in Appendix B.
system, and wartime shortages and consumer goods led to a
crippling inflation.

Suddenly brought to power in an occupied country, the young Shah, who had been educated in Europe and who was believed to favor constitutional government, was unable to provide strong leadership to his government. As a result the power of the Majlis increased, a large number of transitory political parties and partisan newspapers were started, the tribes again became defiant, the clergy became stronger, and the Communists—banned as a party in the 1920's—returned in the guise of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh, headed by leftists and former Communist Party members, received funds and direction from Moscow and recruited both members and sympathizers throughout Iran during the war years and until its overt apparatus was crushed in 1954.

Little more than a department of Reza Shah's government in the 1920's and 1930's, the Majlis emerged from the years of occupation as a revitalized political force. It insisted on confirming the appointment of the U.S. financial advisory mission in 1942, it imposed limits on the government's right to negotiate oil concessions, and it took on the selection of a new Premier as its privilege—although the Shah retained the right to approve or disapprove the choice. In its dealings with Premiers or Shahs, the Majlis had a powerful weapon—the quorum veto. The constitution stated that the Majlis could only be considered convened when two-thirds of its 136 deputies had reached Tehran, and half of those present in the capital constituted a quorum. Thus, if 91 deputies were in Tehran, the absence of 46 of them could keep the assembly from functioning.

Political parties in the Western sense had never been strong in Iran, and during the war years their number had multiplied. Only the Tudeh was
an effective political organization and it was included among the "minority" parties, as opposed to a "majority" grouping that tended to vote together on key national issues. In general, political forces in postwar Iran had sorted themselves out into left, right, and center groups. Tudeh and its sympathizers were on the left. The right was more heterogeneous and included Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh's National Front, the fanatical religious organizations Fedayan Islam and Mojahadin Islam, the several small fascist parties, most Tehran University students and professors, and many small merchants and businessmen. The center was moderate and inclined to be more pro-Western; it included the Shah, most army officers, the Democratic Party, and the wealthy merchants and landowners who favored the status quo. Aided by landlord control over the peasant vote, center candidates usually won the majority of Majlis seats, but in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the nationalistic policies of the right regularly won the voting support of the left and center.

8. Between Russia and the West

1. Aggression from the North

Iran lost wars and territory to Czarist Russia in 1813 and again in 1823 and has lived in varying degrees of dread of its northern neighbor ever since. Great Britain was the counterbalance to Russian power—the British goal was to keep Iran as a buffer between Russia and

7 For example, in the 16th Majlis, elected in 1950, the National Front was composed of Mosadegh and eight followers who nonetheless were usually able to carry a majority of deputies with them on key votes.

8 Fedayan Islam, numbering at most a few hundred members, carried out terrorist acts in support of its goal of reestablishing Islamic law and practice to a dominant place in Iran. Mojahadin Islam was more political; its religious spearhead in the Majlis included mullah Ayatollah Kashani and Shams Qanataabadi, two influential, politically oriented religious leaders.
India—until 1907, when Brits signed an accord to divide Iran into zones of influence. The British purpose was to secure Russia as an ally in Europe against the growing power of Imperial Germany, and the result was that northern and central Iran as far south as Isfahan was open to Russian economic and political influence. The British zone was Southeastern Iran adjacent to Indian Baluchistan until 1915, when in return for rights to the oil-rich southwestern zone the British recognized Russian claims to control of the Turkish Straits.

During World War I, Iranian neutrality was violated by the Turks, the Russians, and the British; the Russians entered northern Iran to counter Turkish advances through Iran toward the Caucasus, while the British sent in troops and organized Iranians into the British-officered South Persian Rifles to counter German attempts at subversion among the tribes and sabotage of the oil pipeline. The Russian military collapse in 1917 left a vacuum in northern Iran and the Caucasus that the Bolsheviks, Turks, Germans, and British attempted to fill. Britain's anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia and Iran ended in 1919, but a treaty was concluded with Iran in August 1919 that would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate. This treaty was never ratified by the Majlis, however, and when Reza Khan and Seyyid Zia ed-Din seized power in 1921, Iran formally repudiated it.

From the start, Soviet Russia's official policy toward Iran was friendly. In a January 1918 note, the Soviets renounced all Czarist privileges contrary to the sovereignty of Iran and promised to aid the Iranians in expelling British and Turkish occupying forces. Their note
also declared that the Iran in Britain was no longer binding.

In an additional note of 26 June 1919, the Russians annulled all Iranian debts, renounced all Russian concessions in Iran—including the Russian Discount Bank and all railroads, harbors, and highways built by them—and declared the capitulations (privileges and exemptions guaranteed to Russian citizens in Iran) null and void. The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of February 1921 formalized the provisions of the 1919 note, renounced any interference in one another’s internal affairs, gave Iran the right to maintain naval forces in the Caspian Sea, and permitted Russia to send troops into Iran if it should become a base for a third-country threat to the Soviet Union. (This final provision, which originally applied to White Russian forces, was subject to Soviet interpretation of what constituted a threat, and was a significant factor in restraining forceful British response to the Iranian takeover of the oil industry in 1951.)

Iranian relations with the Soviets in the 1920’s concentrated on trade, which built up significantly until 1926, when a sudden and strict embargo was placed on Iranian agricultural products, mainly from the northern provinces. The embargo forced Iran to conclude a commercial treaty with the Russians that introduced barter transactions and gave the Soviets exclusive marketing privileges in Iran. This had several results: The Soviet share of Iranian foreign trade rose from 23% in 1925–27 to over 38% in 1928–29; Iranian industrial development was deliberately discouraged by the artificially low prices the Soviets put on competitive manufactured goods; and, Iran began to turn toward Germany as a foreign trade partner.

Germany, in addition to increasing its purchases of Iranian products, also became involved in the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, one
of Reza Shah's most important gifts. Germans ran Iran's internal airlines in the late 1920s and the 1930s, supplied railway rolling stock and motor vehicles, and aided industrialization in Iran by setting up foundries, coal mining equipment, a cement factory, textile and paper mills, and a machinegun factory. A German financial adviser replaced the American Dr. Arthur Hillsbaugh in 1927, and the Germans and Iranians signed a trade treaty in 1923 and a treaty of friendship in 1929. As a result, Germany's share of Iran's foreign trade rose from 8% in 1932-33 to 45.5% in 1940-41, and by August 1941 the number of German advisers, technicians, and businessmen in Iran reached 2,000.

The nature and extent of this German penetration into Iran became very significant when German armed forces invaded Russia in 1941 and rapidly moved deeply into the Soviet Union. Iran was the shortest and most feasible route for badly needed war materials to be sent to Russia by its new allies in the West. Further, the possibility of a German takeover in Iran was a risk the Russians could not allow. On 19 July and 16 August 1941 the British and Soviet diplomatic missions in Tehran presented notes demanding the expulsion of the Germans in Iran, but Iran insisted it was neutral and that no danger existed. On 25 August, the final Allied demands were presented and the invasion began; the Soviets entered Iran from the north in three columns, the British from the south in two. Iranian armed resistance was negligible except for a sharp fight in Khuzistan that cost 55 British casualties. The Ali Mansur cabinet resigned on 27 August, and the official surrender took place the next day.
Under its terms, the Soviets were to occupy the five northern provinces and the British the southern ones, leaving central Iran and the capital to the Iranians; all Germans were to be expelled or turned over to the Allies; Iran was to facilitate the transport of Allied supplies. Reza Shah's position was made untenable by the poor performance of his army and by the subsequent hostile Allied propaganda campaign, and he abdicated in favor of his 22-year-old son on 16 September 1941. Although most Germans were interned or sent back to Germany, a number of key agents escaped and sought to stir up the tribes to sabotage and rebellion; Maj. Julius Schulze, working among the Kashgais, and Franz Mayr tried to stir up the Kurds and sabotage the railroads. A number of prominent Iranians were found to be listed among Mayr's actual or potential agents, and many of them—including Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who in 1953 became the leading Iranian military man in the coup that ousted Mossadeq and who succeeded him as Premier—were arrested and sent to detention camps in Palestine.

The de facto situation of the occupation was confirmed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance signed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and Iran on 29 June 1942. In this treaty, the Allies promised to withdraw their forces from Iran not later than six months after hostilities with Germany and its associates had ceased. Although the Iranians feared Russia and disliked the British presence and methods employed in seizing and running the transport system, they declared war on Germany in September 1943, presumably to ensure being on the winning side. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in Tehran in November 1943 (without ever officially consulting or advising the Iranian government), they signed the Declaration on Iran, which recognized Iranian assistance to the war effort, promised economic aid, and reaffirmed Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Nonetheless, when the war ended in 1945, there were difficulties with the Soviets. In late 1944, they attempted to get Iranian approval for their exploitation of oil in Kernan in the Soviet zone. The furor over Iran's rejection of this offer, which was backed up by U.S. Ambassador Leland Morris' statement that the U.S. Government recognized the sovereign right of Iran to refuse to grant oil concessions, led to the resignation of Premier Sa'eed. With the new Premier under heavy Soviet pressure, Mohammad Mosadeq introduced a bill into the Majlis making it a crime for any cabinet minister to enter into negotiations with or to grant oil concessions to foreigners without the approval of the Majlis. The bill was passed on 2 December 1944.

Frustrated in their attempts to obtain a solid claim to oil in northern Iran, the Soviets became reluctant to leave Azarbaijan. On 29 November 1945, the United States proposed that all Allied troops be evacuated by 1 January 1946, but the Soviets insisted on the March 1946 date previously agreed to by the British. On 12 December, the "Autonomous Republic of Azarbaijan" was proclaimed, a national assembly elected, and Ja'afar Pishevari, a veteran Comintern agent, was named Premier. At the same time a Kurdish uprising took place in western Azarbaijan, and a Kurdish People's Republic was proclaimed with Qazi Mohammad as president; it promptly allied itself with the "Autonomous Republic."

On 22 January 1946, the Shah asked Qavam as-Saltaneh to form a new government. After dismissing General Arfa, who had pro-British tendencies as Chief of Staff, Qavam went to Moscow in February to negotiate with the Russians. The Soviets proposed that their troops remain indefinitely in parts of Iran, that Iran recognize the internal autonomy of Azarbaijan (whose premier would also be designated governor-
Iranian-Russian stock company set up, with 51% of the shares to be owned by Russia, 45% by Iran. Qavam rejected these demands and returned to Tehran, where he faced a political crisis. The 14th Majlis was due to end its two-year term on 11 March 1946, and it had voted that no elections for the next Majlis could be held while foreign troops were still in the country (U.S. forces left Iran 1 January, the British on 2 March). The deputies' attempts to meet and vote to extend their terms were frustrated by Tudeh demonstrators, who until after 11 March physically prevented a quorum from gathering. Qavam was thus left to rule the country until the 15th Majlis could be elected.

Iran then brought the matter of the continuing Soviet occupation before the new United Nations Security Council, and under U.N. and U.S. pressure, the Soviets on 4 April 1946 concluded an agreement with Iran that called for evacuation of all Soviet troops within a month and a half after 24 March 1946, the establishment of a joint stock oil company which would be approved by the Majlis within 7 months after 24 March, and arrangements for improvement of relations between the Iranian government and the people of Azerbaijan.

Accordingly, Qavam worked out an agreement with Pishevari that would have conceded most Communist demands while leaving Azerbaijan under the nominal authority of Tehran. The Soviets appeared to be gaining influence in Iran, an impression that was reinforced when on 2 August 1946 Qavam brought three Tudeh Party members and a Tudeh sympathizer into his "popular front" cabinet. In the meantime, Tudeh had provoked an oil
workers' strike in Khorasan tied up 100,000 workers and led to violence and sabotage.

The inclusion of Tudeh in the Qavam government brought a strong British reaction: British troops were moved from India to Basra, in Iraq, with the stated purpose of securing supplies of Iranian oil that Britain needed. Then, with encouragement from British consuls and military advisers in their region, a coalition of Qashqai, Bakhtiari, and other tribesmen was formed which in a demonstration of force captured Bushire, Abadeh, Kazerun, Bandar Amir, and besieged Shiraz. A settlement was ultimately worked out in mid-October between the tribal leader, Nasr Khan Qashqai, and General Zahedi, then commanding the garrison at Shiraz, in which the government recognized the tribes' demands. On 17 October Qavam resigned and took office again, and the new cabinet he formed did not include the Tudehites; on 24 November Qavam ordered the army into Azarbaijan to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis. Given this chance to redeem itself for the failure in 1941, the army responded enthusiastically. There was little resistance from the lightly armed Azarbaijan forces, and on 14 December the "autonomous" regime collapsed. The army also captured the Kurdish stronghold of Mahabad, executing the leaders of that rebellion. In Tehran, Tudeh headquarters were raided, and the way was opened for the elections to begin on 11 January.

When the 15th Majlis was finally inaugurated in August 1947, the opposition led by Dr. Mosadeq began to fight the ratification of the Soviet oil agreement. In the face of Soviet pressure on the Iranians, the new U.S. Ambassador, George V. Allen, in a speech on 11 September before the Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, made it clear that Iran was
free to accept or reject it: offer, and that in any case Iran would be supported by the United \footnote{The New York Times, 12 September 1947} States against Soviet threats or pressure.

Citing American policy aimed at removing the fear of aggression anywhere in the world, Allen said:

The United States is firm in its conviction that any proposals made by one sovereign government to another should not be accompanied by threats or intimidation. When such methods are used in an effort to obtain acceptance doubt is cast on the value of the proposals.

Our determination to follow this policy as regards Iran is as strong as anywhere else in the world. This purpose can be achieved to the extent that the Iranian people show a determination to defend their own sovereignty. Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice.

Iran's resources belong to Iran. Iran can give them away free of charge or refuse to dispose of them at any price if it so desires.\footnote{The New York Times, 12 September 1947}

Thus convinced of U.S. support, on 22 October 1947 the Majlis rejected the Soviet oil agreement by a vote of 102 to 2 and instead passed a bill that forbade further oil concessions to foreign governments or partners and called for negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for a greater share of the profits. This measure was to have far-reaching effects on Iran's relations with Great Britain and the United States.

2. The Oil Dispute, 1949-53

The involvement of Great Britain in Iranian oil went back to the original D'Arcy concession of 1901, the first of a series of grants that were renegotiated at various times to keep up with the growth of the oil industry and world demand for oil. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded in 1909, but it took on a new complexion in 1914 when the British government became the major shareholder. The reason for this
official investment was obvious. Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 and decided, which had been debated for nearly a decade, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to burning oil. On the brink of a major war, the navy had to be assured of a source of oil, which was both efficient and cheap. The Anglo-Persian (Anglo-Iranian, after 1935) Oil Company continued to extract oil under its original concession for the next 30 or so years, building pipelines as well as a large refinery at Abadan. The concession was renegotiated in 1933 to give Iran a greater share of the net profits and to modify the concession area. Managers and technicians continued to be either British or Indian, with the Iranians providing unskilled or semiskilled labor.

Following the passage of the Majlis legislation of 1947 rejecting the Soviet oil concession, the Iranian government presented to Anglo-Iranian a list of 25 points to be discussed. Chief among these were British taxation on Iran's share of company profits, Iran's rights to the company's installations at the end of the concession in 1993, a reduction in the number of British employees, the royalty basis—that is, the price to be paid to Iran for each barrel extracted and sold through AIOC's marketing and transporting system, and Iranian tax and custom exemptions. After lengthy discussions, the so-called "Supplemental Agreement" raising the royalty payment from 4 to 6 shillings a ton and giving Iran 20% of distributed profits and general reserve was sent to the Majlis on 19 July 1949.

Debate began shortly thereafter, but the term of the 15th Majlis ended before a vote on ratification could be taken. Elections for the 16th Majlis were finally completed in March 1950, and Mosadeq and his eight National Front colleagues led the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur
was named Premier, and the proposed supplemental agreement was turned over to the Majlis Special Oil Committee for study in June 1950, the same month in which Gen. Ali Razmara, a former Chief of Staff, became Premier. The commission’s report to the Majlis stated that the agreement did not adequately secure Iran’s rights and should not be ratified. Razmara’s Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement and reopened negotiations with the AIOC, which by February 1951 was willing to agree to a 50-50 profit sharing similar to the agreement that Aramco had worked out with Saudi Arabia. Razmara, however, had asked a group of experts to study the feasibility of nationalization of the oil industry; their view was that Iran lacked sufficient technical expertise to run the industry, that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that heavy compensation would be due Britain, and that both foreign exchange and prestige would be lost by hasty nationalization. When Razmara opposed immediate nationalization as impractical under the circumstances, he was assassinated on 7 March 1951 by a member of Fedayan Islam, the leftist religious terrorist group. Hosein Ala briefly succeeded Razmara as Premier, and the Majlis approved the principle of nationalizing oil. When Ala resigned in April, the Majlis voted to recommend Mosadeq to the Shah as Premier, and he was appointed to the post on 29 April. Acting swiftly, the Majlis approved on 1 May a nine-point nationalization law. This act began a summer of hectic but fruitless bargaining that culminated in impasse and the departure in October 1951 of British managers and technicians.

Because the true issue in the dispute was political, in that the Iranians had come to identify oil with their own resurgent nationalism, the two governments were never able to understand
one another's position. To attempting to deal with a political problem in economic terms, that the Iranians had to sell their oil or go broke and that the best approach was to wait them out, at first for workable terms and later--after nationalization--for adequate compensation. The Iranians, assuming that the West could not do without their oil, were convinced that by hiring non-British technicians and leasing tankers they could operate the oil industry on their own. To the British, the Iranians seemed irrational and wasteful; to the Iranians, the British appeared overconfident and condescending. As a result, their negotiations were so unproductive and mutually frustrating that the British even considered military intervention to seize Abadan, although the strong possibility that the Soviet Union would invoke its 1921 treaty with Iran to oppose such a British move served as an effective deterrent.

The legalistic approach of the British government, which as the major stockholder in the AIOC regarded the oil concession as a treaty or, at the very least, an agreement between nations, was to take the matter first before the International Court of Justice and then to the Security Council of the United Nations. In the end, the Security Council deferred to the decision of the ICJ as to its own jurisdiction, and when in June 1952 the court ruled that the concession was not a treaty and hence not a proper matter for it to consider, all legal approaches were exhausted. The dispute was at an impasse, and by October 1952 diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off. 10

3. Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy

United States foreign policy under President Harry Truman has

10 A more detailed but still necessarily brief description of the oil dispute is included as Appendix B to this history.
Even generally characterized as the "containment" of Communist aggression,

Whatever its name, the policy came to be known as "truman doctrine." In 1947 when the British Government informed the United States that it could no longer afford to support Greece and Turkey—militarily and financially—against the very real threat of Soviet aggression and subversion. In assuming this burden,

Truman said in a message delivered before Congress in March 1947:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred.

But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter...

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East....

Usually credited with originating the containment theory behind the Truman doctrine is George F. Kennan, who in February 1946 as counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow sent the Department of State a long telegram in which he analyzed Soviet postwar policy aims. His telegram struck responsive chords in Washington; James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense, gave the telegram wide circulation within the national security bureaucracy. When Kennan returned from his tour of duty in Russia, Forrestal sponsored him for the post of director of the National War College, where he stayed for less than a year before becoming head of State's new Policy Planning Staff.

Kennan's article "The Strategy of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in Foreign Affairs for July and which is credited with the initial statement of the containment policy, was an amplification of his Moscow telegram. It was originally written for Forrestal in response to a paper on Marxism and Soviet power prepared by a Forrestal staffer and sent to Kennan for comment. In January 1947, Kennan addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on his views on the Soviet Union, and Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong asked him for a paper along the lines of the talk for publication in that journal. Rather than write another paper, Kennan asked Forrestal's permission to publish the one he had done earlier, and when this was forthcoming, sent it to Armstrong with the request that it be signed "X".

In the "X" paper's description of the exercise of Soviet power, Kennan noted the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism that was deeply imbedded in the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow invariably assumed that the aims of the capitalist world were antagonistic to Soviet interests, and that, said Kennan, "means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with." Thus, he continued, "...the main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." These could be contained "by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be

---

However, in Kennan's view in that of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he was not the author of a containment policy or doctrine; he merely described what was happening. That he did it well, in a way that met the approval of a number of key policymakers of the time is obvious, but it was continued Soviet insensitivity in pursuing openly aggressive policies that led to the U.S. reaction to the Korean invasion in 1950, and the Korean War in turn institutionalized a set of operational premises along these lines:

A. The Soviet Union would resort to military expansionism if it were not checked by visible countervailing military power;

B. Local imbalances of military power which favored the Soviets or a Soviet satellite would lead to further "koreas;"

C. The most appetizing local imbalance to the Soviets was in Central Europe;

D. The global balance of power would shift in favor of the Soviets if they were able to swallow the rest of Central Europe, i.e., West Germany and Austria; only the Greco-Turkish flanks had such a critical function for the balance of power (Japan was next most critical);

E. Local imbalances in secondary and tertiary areas must not be neglected; the capability and clearly communicated will to defend whatever areas the Communists chose to attack was necessary to prevent them from picking and choosing easy targets for blackmail and aggression. A number of small territorial grabs could add up to a critical alteration of the global balance, and our failure to defend one area would demoralize nationals in other such localities in their will to resist the Communists.

It was against this background of U.S. policy and planning that the status of Iran in late 1952 was considered, and although Dwight D...
Eisenhower succeeded Truman on 20 January 1953 and John Foster Dulles became his Secretary of State with the shared intention to go beyond containment toward "dynamic liberation." U.S. policy in Iran continued to stress the need to contain Soviet power there as elsewhere. 

The U.S. involvement in Iran's oil problems was admittedly reluctant; we had backed the Iranian government in 1947 when it resisted the oil concession the Russians were seeking to arrange in the north. Our statements at that time probably did much to encourage the Iranian mood to challenge the British concession as well, and that challenge grew into a bitter dispute, the United States found itself caught in the middle of an argument between its chief European ally and an underdeveloped Middle Eastern country to which it was providing military and economic aid. As a result, the U.S. role became not so much one of mediator but rather as an honest broker attempting to bring two clients into an agreement for their mutual benefit. 

Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had proposed in July 1951 that the President send Averell Harriman, his foreign policy adviser, to Tehran to reopen negotiations. Despite violent anti-American rioting by Tudeh the day he arrived, Harriman did get the two sides talking again, but to little avail. When the British brought the case before the Security Council in October 1951, Mosadeq argued Iran's position before the Council; afterward, he visited Washington and met with Truman and Acheson, but their talks came no closer to reaching a basis for settlement. 

With the British out, the United States continued to look for solutions, and proposals including both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the American oil industry were put forth, without success. By the end of 1951 the Conservatives, under Churchill, were back in power in Britain and less willing than Labor to be frustrated by Iran, and Mosadeq's position, increasingly dependent on Tudeh support, grew more precarious.
In 1872, the then Shah of Persia, Mir Ad-Din, in return for much-needed cash, gave to Baron Paul Julius de Reuter a concession to exploit all his country's minerals (except for gold, silver, and precious stones), all its forests and uncultivated land, and all canals and irrigation works, as well as a monopoly to construct railways and tramways. Although the resulting uproar, especially from neighboring Russia, caused this sweeping concession to be cancelled, de Reuter, who was a German Jew with British citizenship, persisted and by 1889 regained two parts of his original concession—the operation of a bank and the working of Persia's mines. Under the latter grant, de Reuter's men explored for oil without great success, and the concession expired in 1899, the year the Baron died. Persian oil rights then passed to a British speculator, William Knox D'Arcy, whose first fortune had been made in Australian gold mines. The purchase price of the concession was about 50,000 pounds, and in 1903 the enterprise began to sell shares in "The First Exploitation Company." Exploratory drilling proceeded, and by 1904, two producing wells were in British. Shortly thereafter, interest in oil was sharply stimulated by the efforts of Admiral Sir John Fisher, First Lord of the Admiralty, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to oil. As a result, the Burmah Oil Company sought to become involved in Persian oil and, joining with D'Arcy and Lord Strathcona, formed the new Concessions Syndicate, Ltd, which endured until 1907 when Burmah Oil bought D'Arcy out for 200,000 pounds cash and 900,000 pounds in shares. Burmah's first gusher came in at 1,130 feet in May 1903, near Masjed Soleyman, and a year later, after some complicated financial
In 1912, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was born, incorporating the shares and rights of the earlier concessionaires. The company chose Abadan as the site of its refinery and made local arrangements for its security with both the Shiek of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiar tribal Khans; the former was paid an annual rent and was promised continued autonomy from Tehran, while the latter were to receive 3% of net oil revenues (to be paid out of the Persian government's share of 16%).

When Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, his persistent prodding changed the Royal Navy over to oil. To ensure a source of cheap oil, the British government became a major shareholder in the APOC in 1914, adding 2 million pounds in capitalization and signing a 30-year contract for fuel oil at cut rates (Churchill wrote in 1923 that this contract had saved Britain no less than 7.5 million on its wartime oil purchases).

Differences as to how profits were to be shared between the Persian government and the APOC began after the company claimed that Persia's share of the profits applied to the earnings of the three subsidiaries actually operating in Persia (based on Article 1 of the D'Arcy concession, which defined its limits as "throughout the whole extent of the country"). Persia claimed it was entitled to a share of the profits from all operations, including extracting, producing, refining, and marketing its oil, wherever these operations might take place. There were also problems over British claims for wartime damage to pipelines by Bakhtiaries incited by German and Turkish agents. The British attempt to negotiate a settlement calling for new profit-sharing arrangements fell through in 1920, and the relationship tottered along under the old agreement until 1933.
In 1921, Reza Shah, a colonel in the Iranian army, overthrew and exiled the last Qajar Shah. He visited Abadan after becoming Shah himself in 1925, and his account of the trip warned of things to come. He noted that of the 29,000 employees in the oilfields and refinery, 6,000 were foreigners, and he expressed concern that so few Persians were being trained for higher level posts. He also saw that the British staff enjoyed an obviously higher standard of living than the others, and that while the refinery area appeared prosperous, the surrounding districts had not felt any positive impact from this major industry in their area. Finally, he was disturbed by a manager's description of cutting down production in order not to upset world markets— but at a loss to Persia.

So, Persian dissatisfaction continued to build up until November 1932, when the government notified the company that the D'Arcy concession, signed under the Qajar regime, was annulled and a new concession would be granted on the basis of equity and justice. This new concession was not easily arrived at—the British government referred the annulment to the League of Nations, whose Council sent Dr. Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia to reconcile the two sides. Two legal points were thus established that were to affect the later dispute in 1951: the right to annul the concession was recognized, and the League accepted the viewpoint of the British that such a case could be brought to the Council under Article 15 of the Covenant (which provided for a hearing on disputes between members that were likely to lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations and for the solution of which no legal recourse existed). The two parties finally worked out a new concession agreement that was ratified by the Majlis (the lower house of the Persian
(1) (caption) and signed by Reza Shah in May 1933; it contained the life of the concession to 1992 and set aside a royalty basis. By its terms Persia would receive 4 shillings on every ton of oil sold in Persia or exported, plus 20% of the dividends over £61,250 distributed to shareholders, with a minimum dividend of £750,000 per year. To avoid Persian taxation, the company agreed to pay a small additional royalty on tonnage, and it would continue to pay British taxes out of gross profits.

It was the oil business as usual until the summer of 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Because German influence in Iran (as Persia was renamed in 1935 by Reza Shah) had grown significantly and because the country was the best route for Allied supplies going to the beleaguered Soviets, the Allies determined to send in occupation forces. Russian troops took over the five northern provinces, British forces went into the south, and the area around Tehran was neutralized. Following three days of futile and desultory resistance, the Shah abdicated in favor of his young son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; Iran was an occupied country until 1946. Abadan continued to produce petroleum products for the Allies, but the Soviets took advantage of the situation and attempted to obtain an oil concession in the north. In late 1944, the Soviets were advised by Premier Sa'eed that the cabinet had ruled out the granting of further concessions until after the war. When pressure was applied through the left-wing parties, Sa'eed resigned, at which point the Majlis passed a bill introduced by Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh forbidding any discussion of or signing agreements for an oil concession with any foreign representatives. The bill passed, despite Communist opposition, thereby blocking a Russian concession, but in the course of the debate the possibility of revoking the
AGC concession was seriously impaired by early 1946, when Premier Chaman
in April 1946 signed an agreement with the U.S.S.R. granting an oil concession
in northern Iran. The Majlis refused to ratify the concession, and in the bill rejecting it, the legislators declared that it was forbidden to grant any concession to export oil to foreigners; further, they instructed the government to look into possible violation of the rights of the people in connection with the southern oil concession held by the AGOC.

With the wartime occupation over, the British oil managers began to have labor troubles. The 1946 general strike was settled with a pay raise, but this was only the start. In 1947 the Iranian Ministry of Finance sent a delegation to London to discuss money due the Iranian government, various employee grievances, reduction of foreign staff, expansion of local distribution facilities, and the AGOC policy of concentrating refining activities outside Iran. To these complaints, the company, obviously feeling secure in the legality of its concession, was relatively unresponsive.

The law of 22 October 1947 instructed the government to open disc-
cussions with the AGOC to secure the nation's rights to its oil resources. These "discussions" started more than 5 years of bargaining and debating, proposal and counterproposal, charge and countercharge, until they eventually reached the Security Council of the United Nations. The Iranians led off in August 1948 with a 59-page memorandum that listed 25 points that were to be discussed with the company in implementing the 1947 law. The main items on this list included British taxation of Iran's share of oil profits, Iran's ultimate rights to AGOC installations outside the country at the end of the concession (it had already been promised those in Iran), reduction in the number of foreign employees, the length of the concession (by 1993,
In Iran as felt, they would like to leave in the ground the royalty basis, and tax and insurance options. Negotiations with company representatives began the following month, continuing intermittently thereafter. Shortly before the 14 January 1949 attempt by a Tudeh Party member to assassinate the Shah at Tehran University, Premier Saidi identified higher profits and more Iranian employees as his main goals in these discussions; he pointed out that Iran's oil royalties for 1947 were only £27 million, whereas the AIOC had paid some £15 million in British income taxes. Specifically, Iran wanted control of the company's operations as well as a 50-50 split of the net profits. On 5 May 1949, AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser came to Tehran with a draft of the "Supplemental Agreement," and this draft was basically the agreement signed by the government and company on 17 July. The royalty payment was increased from 4 to 6 shillings per ton, and Iran was to get 20% of the distributed profits (with a minimum of £2.5 million) and general reserve, terms which American executives of the company were well short of the 50-50 sharing Iran wanted and which Aramco was in the process of agreeing to give Saudi Arabia. The agreement was sent to the Majlis on 19 July, and debate began on 23 July, lasting 4 days before the 15th Majlis formally went out of existence. The oil agreement bill as well as the new elections bill were left over to the next Majlis.

Elections for the 16th Majlis began in the fall of 1949 and were finally completed in March 1950, with Dr. Hoşadeq and his eight followers leading in the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur became Premier, and in June the oil agreement was turned over to the 13-man special oil commission that included Hoşadeq and five other members of the National Front. Six days later, the Shah dismissed Mansur and appointed General Ali Razmara, former Chief of Staff, as Premier. The commission reported back to the Majlis on...
provided that the agreement was to avoid the risks of Iran and that it was opposed to its nationalization. The Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement, announcing that negotiations for increased royalties would be reopened with the AIOC.

In February, the AIOC offered Iran an agreement similar to Aramco’s, including the 50-50 profit sharing, but it was too late; the National Front was intent on nationalizing oil and it dominated the Majlis. The oil commission indicated it too favored that course, despite the report from the experts appointed by Razmara to study the feasibility of nationalization. The experts had pointed out Iran’s lack of technical and financial expertise, plus the facts that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that Iran would be liable for up to 500 million in compensation, that heavy losses in foreign exchange and prestige would result, and that it would be unwise to antagonize Britain. On 7 March General Razmara was shot and killed by a number of Fedayan Islam, a rightist terrorist group, and Hosein Ala succeeded him as premier.

When the Majlis in mid-March unanimously accepted the principle of nationalization, the British Foreign Office notified the Premier that an act of nationalization would not legally terminate the oil company’s operations. Shortly thereafter, strikes broke out in the south as a result of the company’s cutting a hardship allowance for Iranian workers in certain areas plus other grievances. Martial law was declared on 26 March, and in early April rioting began in Abadan that did not end until troops fired into the crowd; 6 were killed and 30 wounded, and two British oil workers and a sailor were also killed.

As members of the National Front were presenting their draft of an oil nationalization law to the special oil committee, Premier Ala resigned.
The Majlis approved the law after five days, the time allotted to it, and voted to return it to the Shah for the appointee of his choice as Premier; the Senate followed suit. The Shah acceded, appointing Mossadegh on 29 April; two days later he signed the nine-point law that in broad terms ordered the government takeover from the AIOC. The company's response was to hold up its May monthly advance payment of £2 million and to ask that entire oil problem be submitted to arbitration, a request that Iran did not acknowledge. On 25 May the British government brought the matter before the International Court of Justice, the same day it despatched the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to Cyprus; two Royal Navy cruisers and three frigates were already in the Persian Gulf area. In addition to the government's request, the AIOC asked the ICJ to appoint an arbitrator, as provided in the 1933 concession agreement. The Iranian view of these appeals to The Hague was simple: Iran did not recognize the competence of the court to deal with the matter, which concerned Iran's internal affairs.

The United States became seriously involved in these discussions for the first time in mid-May 1951. A State Department statement of 13 May urged both sides to try to find an agreeable compromise solution; it noted that the United States recognized the sovereign right of Iran to control its resources and industries but said that the technical knowledge, capital, and transport and marketing facilities were all controlled by the AIOC. It further stated that U.S. oil companies had indicated that they would not, in the face of unilateral Iranian action against the AIOC, be willing to undertake operations in Iran or provide technicians to work there. The note pleased neither Iran nor Britain, which was the object of U.S. pressure to accept the nationalization concept and work toward a compromise. At President Truman's urging, conveyed through Ambassador Grady in Tehran and
By letters to Prime Minister Atlee, de Gaulle informed the British
agreed to send a delegation and Iran agreed to accept it.

Talks got underway on 14 June, with the Iranians demanding that
the AIOC hand over 75% of net oil revenues since 20 March and put the
other 25% into a bank, presumably to be eventually paid as compensation.

The British, 5 days later, proposed that a new company be established
by the AIOC to operate the oil industry on behalf of Iran; the profit
split would be 50-50. No compromise between these two points of view
appeared possible, and on 21 June the British went back to the ICJ with
a request for an injunction to halt the nationalization process until
the court had ruled on the original U.S. application. Since Iran had
already refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction, it was not represen-
ted when the court issued an order to maintain the status quo as of
1 May 1951, with a Board of Supervision consisting of two Iranians, two
Britons, and one individual of another nationality empowered to run the
industry.

Iran ignored this order and prepared to move the managers of the
National Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) into Abadan, while the AIOC began to
slow down the output of the refinery and prepare for evacuation. Export
of oil stopped, and in the face of an antisabotage law introduced in the
Hajlis, the British staff resigned. Mosadegh wrote to President Truman on
27 June, complaining about the British attitude and the actions of the
British technicians, whom he wished to retain as contract employees to
run the oil industry. Truman's reply on 9 July stressed the U.S. desire
for a peaceful settlement and urged Mosadegh to go along with the ICJ
order; he also offered to send his foreign policy adviser, Averell
Harriman, to Iran to help work out a solution. Mosadegh agreed to accept
Harriman as a mediator, proposed a new plan which he suggested would be consistent with the nationalism of the law. Harriman's arrival in Tehran on 15 July was hardly auspicious; in the course of a massive demonstration against the United States, Jewish mobs fought with the National Front and other elements; the police and then the army intervened, and 15 people were killed, over 200 wounded (the Minister of Interior, General Zahedi, resigned as a result of the criticism he received over the handling of the demonstration).

Seeking to find some common ground for agreement, Harriman persuaded Mossadegh to enter into further discussions on how to implement the law, contingent on the British accepting the principle of nationalization. He flew to London to arrange for a new British mission to Iran but found the Labor cabinet insistent on an improvement in conditions in the oil area, including "an end to provocation of British staff." Compromise versions of the messages between the two governments were worked out by Harriman, and Prime Minister Atlee and Foreign Secretary Morrison agreed to send Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal, as the head of a high-level delegation to Tehran. Stokes' proposal, after preliminary meetings with the AIOC staff in Abadan, was very similar to the earlier British suggestion that an AIOC purchasing organization, with Iranian representation, handle the marketing of the oil as a monopoly, with profits evenly divided. Iran, of course, would not give up the idea of nationalization and said it would discuss only three points—the purchase of oil for British needs, AIOC claims for compensation, and conditions required for continued employment of British technicians. At a private meeting of Harriman, Mossadegh, and Stokes, the latter suggested that a British general manager be appointed, to act under direction of the AIOC. The Iranians would not
accept there, proposing instead of an agreement composed of experts from countries "with no special national interest" in Iran. Stakes would not even discuss this point and returned to London on 23 August.

U.S. Ambassador Grady was replaced in Tehran on 11 September by Ambassador Loy Henderson, and Mosaddeq was advised by Harrison from Washington that his proposals were not workable since they did not conform to the practical and commercial aspects of the international oil industry. Iran told the small British staff still in Abadan that it must leave the country within a week from 27 September, and on 4 October the last of the AIOC personnel duly left Iran.

In the meantime, the British government asked that the case be considered by the U.N. Security Council as a potential threat to world peace, and on 1 October the Council agreed to put the question of intervention on its agenda. Mosaddeq flew to New York to present Iran's case. The Security Council listened to both sides, debated the British resolution from 15 to 19 October, and finally decided to adjourn the question until after the ICJ had ruled on its own jurisdiction. In the British general elections shortly thereafter, the Conservatives were returned to power, with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary; in a speech in Commons, Eden declared there were three elements that would be involved in a satisfactory solution to the problem—first, the Iranian economy depended on efficient operation of the oil industry; second, the benefits must be shared between Iran and the developers of the oil resources; and finally, fair compensation must be paid for the act of nationalization.

The ICJ met on 9 June 1952, and the legal arguments eventually were reduced to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration of 2 October 1930
recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court of International Justice (predecessor to the International Court of Justice) was based on the application of treaties or conventions subsequent to the ratification of this declaration. The legal points at issue were whether the dispute related to a treaty or convention and, if so, was it a treaty or convention covered by the declaration? The court finally ruled that the word "subsequent" referred to "treaties" and not "situations" and that since the oil concession was not a treaty, it did not have jurisdiction. The British thus lost their ICJ case and with it their chance to have the Security Council pass on their resolution.

The matter nonetheless remained at an impasse. While the nations involved waited nearly 2 months for the ICJ ruling, other compromise solutions were sought. In November 1951, officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) proposed that the bank finance, as trustee, the production and refining of Iran's oil and then sell it to the AIOC at current Persian Gulf oil prices, Iran to receive payment at those prices, less an agreed discount which would go to the AIOC. The British were willing to go along with this if AIOC technicians would be employed, but Iran would not agree to either the technicians or the discount. The IBRD tried again, proposing a neutral board of management responsible to the bank which would arrange a bulk export contract for the sale of oil through established distribution channels; the profits would be divided three ways—one share to Iran, one to the bulk purchaser, and one to be held in reserve by the bank. However, on the question of non-Iranian management, the use of British technicians, and the selling price of the oil, the negotiations ultimately broke down. The IBRD
In 1951, the United States did not give Iran a loan of $120 million at a time when the country had an opportunity to get "adequate revenue" from its oil resources; he thus made too subtly pressed Mosadeq to settle the oil dispute.

Relations between the Iranian and British governments deteriorated steadily. Iran attempted to sell the oil stored in the tanks at Abadan to Italian and Japanese firms; but AIOC action in the courts plus the cooperation of the international oil industry with the British limited the amounts of oil that could be delivered. In January 1952, Mosadeq had ordered all British consulates closed; he followed that by closing all foreign information and cultural centers in Iran. He made some attempt to reach agreement with the British on compensation, but his proposals included large offsetting amounts for unpaid royalties and other payments stopped by the cessation of oil production in 1951. When the British in October 1952 described his final proposals as "unreasonable and unacceptable," Mosadeq broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

The premier in the meantime had scored internal political victories of his own. Reelected by the new Majlis in July 1952, he asked for six months of emergency powers to rule by decree in order to deal with the critical economic situation. When the Shah refused, Mosadeq resigned, and Qavam was appointed in his place; the result was four days of rioting by both Tudeh and the National Front. Qavam resigned, and on 23 July Mosadeq again became premier; his political ally and one of Tehran's best known religious figures, the mullah Ayatollah Kashani, was named Speaker of the Majlis, which then voted Mosadeq decree powers for one year. The Senate and the Shah concurred, and the stage was set for the anti-Shah.
political maneuvering of manipulators, using which the Government had tried the
Tushniki party and its front group, with the idea of pressuring the United States to come to Iran's aid. Implied threats to turn to the Communists were contained in a Mosadeq letter of 23 May 1953 to President Eisenhower requesting a large loan, and the Eisenhower reply, as a matter of policy, was cold in its rejection of this threat and its accompanying bid for help. Eisenhower's letter concluded:

I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran and the Iranian people. In what I have written, I am not trying to advise the Iranian government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.

In case Iran should so desire, the United States Government hopes to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis comparable to that given during the past year. I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late the Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation.

Following the August 1953 coup that overthrew Mosadeq, the oil dispute was settled along the lines that had been proposed to Mosadeq—the oil industry was nationalized, but its operations were directed by a group of foreign oil companies. The details of this arrangement were worked out by a series of conferences, but Herbert Hoover Jr., as special oil adviser to the Secretary of State, had an important role in convincing the Iranians of the wisdom of dealing with a "consortium." Between Hoover's initial visit to Tehran in October 1953 and the announcement of a new agreement in August 1954, Britain and Iran resumed diplomatic relations. Under the terms of the agreement, the National Iranian Oil Company delegated basic operations in 100,000 square miles of southwestern Iran to an international consortium known as Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd., until

See attached map of...
The AIOC, with an option of extension to 74
British Petroleum, the
-owner of the AIOC, owned 40%
British-Netherlands 19%
compagnie
Franchise des Petroles 6%, and U.S. oil companies 40% (7% each to Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, Socony
Standard Oil Company, The Texas Company, and Gulf Oil Corporation, and 5%
to Iricon Agency, Ltd., comprised of nine small U.S. oil companies).
Since 1955 the AIOC has carried out a number of operations of its own,
and, after the passage of a new oil law in 1957, has allowed Italian,
U.S., and Canadian companies to explore for oil and conduct operations
outside the consortium's territory. The consortium has produced 20% of
Iran's oil, however, and the rate of production has been the highest in the
world, increasing at an annual rate of almost 14% in the 1960's and
reaching 1.7 million barrels in 1971, which was 10% of world output and
second largest production in the Middle East. Price increases levied by
Iran and other Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Companies in 1971 and 1972 resulted in an estimated $14 billion
for those years, and the Middle East oil crisis of late 1973 raised prices
even higher. Iran is currently very concerned about its estimated reserves,
which at current rates of extraction may barely last until 1994. Oil
accounts for 23% of Iran's GDP, including some 35% of its foreign exchange
earnings and 60% of its budgetary revenues.
Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. University of Pittsburgh Press; Pittsburgh, Pa.; 1964


Harlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism. The Cresset Press; London; 1951

Harlowe, John. Iran--A Short Political Guide. Frederick A. Praeger; New York; 1963

Elwell-Sutton, Lawrence P. Persian Oil--A Study in Power Politics. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.; London; 1955

Lenczowski, George. Oil and State in the Middle East. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, N.Y.; 1960
The bare bones of the life of the man who was Premier of Iran from 23 April 1951 to 19 August 1953. He was born about 1331 (1973 or 1379 are probably more accurate dates, but 1331 was always given as his official birth year because of the restrictions on the age of Majlis deputies) in Tehran, his mother being a member of the ruling Qajar dynasty and his father the Minister of Finance for some 30 years. His family background was thus the elite, wealthy, landowning class.

His secondary education being complete, Mosadegh was sent to Khorasan as the Shah's financial agent while barely out of his middle teens. In 1906, forced into exile because of his role in the Constitutional Revolution that year, he went to Europe to study law at Paris, Liege, and Neuchatel, earning his LL.D. from the last institution in 1914.

Returning to Iran, he was elected to the Majlis in 1915, serving on its financial committee. As Under Secretary of Finance in 1917, he resigned after only a few months in office because he was prevented from carrying out reforms in the notoriously padded payroll system. He became governor of Fars Province in 1921, but his criticism of Reza Shah led to arrest in 1930 and exile to the villages. He was again arrested in 1941 but was released in the general political amnesty after Reza Shah's abdication.

Mosadegh was again elected to the Majlis in 1944, where in 1947 he organized the National Front, a small, tightly knit, and highly influential group. As a member of the oil commission, he gained in influence not only in the Majlis but among the people, and his April 1951 appointment as Premier was at the Majlis' request. From then until his removal from office in August 1953, he concentrated his energies on expropriating the British-owned
Of industry in defiance of his rights to negotiate a different
settlement short of complete nationalization. Sentenced to three
years in prison in a post-war trial, he was eventually pardoned by the
Shah in August 1956, but he was forced to remain in his village of
Ahmedabad under virtual house arrest for the 11 years until his death
in March 1967. He had suffered from cancer of the jaw and finally
succumbed to internal bleeding after two operations in Tehran.

The above facts do little to explain his behavior as a
politician, but most of his actions, even his most emotional and
apparently irrational ones, were probably well calculated. The popular
world image of him as an enfeebled old man, given to hysterical weeping
and fainting spells, served his own purposes and gave him tremendous
leverage among his people. He used the accepted belief that he was
ill and weak to avoid things or people he did not want to face, and
his apparent physical debility added to the drama of his personality,
even which in public speeches was capable of moving his opponents.

Mosadegh's power rose from his consummate ability to appeal to
national aspirations and emotions. By attempting to deal with a heated
political problem in logical, rational terms based on economic facts,
the British were unable to achieve anything in the oil dispute but to
unify the people of Iran. Reza Shah had held power for 20 years by
appealing to latent Iranian nationalism; Mosadegh used this awakened nationalism
and the desire for independence to keep himself in power and to defy
Britain. His speeches and programs appealed to social discontent,
exnophobia, religious fanaticism, and national pride in past glories.
His enormous gamble on the oil issue, based on his belief that Britain
and the United States would ---go Communist, ---or ---anti-Communist, or ---anti-Islamic fanaticism. He used ---not the technique of opposition---his nine-man National Front opposed every government in power, whether under Sa'ed, Reza, Reza, or Ali---and then, once Premier, his single plank was opposition to the British over the oil question.

Nesadeq was antagonistic to the Shah for many reasons: his mother was a Qajar, whose family was overthrown by the Shah's father, the same man that had exiled and then imprisoned him; in addition, he had long believed in constitutional reform to reduce the power of the monarchy. He opposed the army because it had brought Reza Shah to power and was the main source of support for Mohammed Reza Shah; by retiring senior officers and putting in his own Chief of Staff, the young, French-trained Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi, he had obtained a degree of control over the army. But, by so doing, he set the stage for the officer corps to turn against him. His own extreme nationalism, fantasies of omnipotence, and lack of conscience---in manipulating Tudeh, at the risk of it getting out of control as it did in the streets of Tehran on 13 August, were the seeds of his own eventual downfall. But he was a most unusual man, one whose character caught the world's fancy, even as he drove his countrymen toward disaster. At any time in 1951 or 1952 he could have had the same compromise through which his successors gained a nationalized oil industry efficiently run by foreign experts to give Iran the revenue that financed the Shah's White Revolution. He chose to gamble on total victory over Britain, the United States, and the international oil industry--and he lost.
Born in 1917 in Tehran, Dimashq graduated from a military school in Tehran and was trained during the early years of World War II and the postwar period under Reza Shah, then a colonel in the Cossack Brigade. As a combat officer, he was decorated for action against assorted bandits and insurgents, including rebellious Kurds, Lurs, and Turkomans. He had become a division commander by 1942, after service as head of the Gendarmerie and the Tehran Police, but he was arrested by the British that year for pro-German activity (his name was found in the papers of Franz Mayer, a principal Nazi agent in Tehran, as an officer who would protect German agents) and deported to Palestine, where he was held until 1945. Despite his arrest and subsequent three years in a detention camp, he did not become fanatically anti-British as did many xenophobic Iranians. Returning to Tehran after the war in 1945, he was given command of the Fars Division and promoted to major general. In 1943, as Inspector General of the army, he was severely injured in a tank accident, losing four ribs, and after 7 months of medical treatment in Germany, some of it by U.S. Army doctors, he was retired in May 1949. The Shah made him his honorary adjutant, and in November 1949 appointed him Director General of the Tehran Police. In April 1951 Zahedi became Minister of Interior in the Ala cabinet and was retained in that post by Mossadeq when he became Premier. He resigned in August 1951, following

* There was a Cossack Brigade in the Persian Army solely because Hasr-ed-Din Shah visited Russia in 1873 and was provided with a Cossack escort by the Czar. The Shah was so impressed by the Cossacks that he asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize such a unit in his own army. The Brigade retained Russian senior officers and noncoms until 1920, and as long as it was in existence, it was the best trained and most professional unit in the army.
the interval. Then in later sections of the document, the clear intent of the author is to inform and educate the reader on the historical events and figures mentioned. The text is well-organized, with clear paragraphs and subheadings that make it easy to follow the narrative. The use of direct quotes and reference to specific dates and locations adds credibility to the information presented. Overall, the document is a valuable resource for those interested in the history of Iran and its political landscape.
In June 1955, he visited the United States as a practicing editor in 1959 and was put on the retired list in 1952 by President. Vahidi, Chief of Staff of the army immediately after the 1953 coup, he retained that post despite friction with Premier Zahedi until December 1955 when he was made Ambassador to Pakistan to ease him out of the army command. Clashes with General Niaz, Chief of the new Supreme Staff, were the probable cause of his reassignment. He then became Ambassador to Iraq in January 1957, was Minister of Interior in 1953-59, and became Adjutant to the Shah in 1959. After serving as Governor of Khorasan, 1955-58, he retired to private life. He had served as Permanent Iranian Delegate to the CCNT Military Committee before retiring from the army 1955.
Reza Shah Pahlavi

When Reza Shah Pahlavi ascended the throne in 1925 at the age of 32 following his father's abdication, Iran was occupied by foreign troops—Soviet, British, and American—and its army was demoralized. He had no solid power base and no political machine, and as a result he spent the first 10 years of his reign in conflict with the traditional political power structure bent on regaining the influence it had lost to Reza Shah. The military coup that ousted Mosaddeq in August 1953 was thus a major milestone in the Shah's political life.

Mohammad Reza was born on 26 October 1919; he studied 6 years as a cadet at the Military School of Tehran and then went to Switzerland in 1931 for his secondary education. Returning in 1936, he attended the Iranian Military College, from which he graduated 2 years later as a second lieutenant. His first marriage, in 1939, was to Princess Fawzia of Egypt, sister of King Farouq, and a daughter, Shanaz, was the only child of this marriage. Divorcing Fawzia, he married Sorya Esfandiari, a half-German, half-Bakhtiari beauty to whom he was very devoted, but the marriage was childless and the throne needed an heir. After the inevitable divorce, he married Farah Diba in 1959, and Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960, followed by two daughters and Prince Ali Reza, securing the succession of the Pahlavi line.

Although various sources criticized the young Shah as suspicious and indecisive to the point of permanent instability, others saw his strengths. An OSS report in 1943 said:

Mohammad Shah is a man of much stronger purpose than is generally realized. He stands almost alone, distrusts most advisers, is honest in his efforts to secure a democratic form of government for Iran. He is not easily influenced and cannot
In 1961, also on the positive side, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran noted:

It is important to observe that the Shah, in ten years of political waverings, his change turned against the intellectual interests, sports, and hobbies which he learned from European sources. His mind remains alert and his principles, although often betrayed, retain great similarity to Christian ethics and philosophy. The tragedy in the conflict of this healthy intellect against the vicious Persian scene carries some triumph since the Shah, so far, has not become corrupted.

The Shah took the successful coup of 1953 as a popular mandate to seize control of his country from the political factions and the ambitious generals; he has never since allowed them to threaten his position or his program. His hasty flight to Baghdad and Rome was either forgiven or forgotten in the triumph of the moment, and although General Zahedi was often angered by the Shah's vacillation and lack of decisiveness, those very characteristics enabled him to frustrate the volatile Zahedi and eventually bring about his resignation and voluntary exile. Given confidence by the popular support he saw during the coup, he pressed ahead to consolidate his power, carefully controlling political activity, which he has said can be permitted to function freely only after economic and social development have taught the people to act responsibly. His reforms launched in 1962 as the "White Revolution" have accomplished much; without the power and prestige of the throne coupled with the Shah's authoritarianism and determination, the reforms and development probably could not have taken place.

The rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973-74 has enhanced the Shah's prestige as spokesman for the more extreme oil-producing countries, and he
has been quick to point out that oil is a finite resource of those countries, that cannot be replaced and that must be conserved, if only by the pressure of cost. The situation has clearly made the Shah a man whom the world listens to, and he has made the most of it.
The world of journalism—ever on the alert for the mote in somebody else's eye—found long ago that the Central Intelligence Agency made great copy. Proceeding on the theory that their readers will believe anything dealing with "spies," "agents," and "the secret world of espionage," a number of writers have told what they insist is the inside story of the CIA involvement in Iran in 1953. A sampling of these is included here, without extensive comment.

Andrew Tully, for example, in *CIA--The Inside Story* devotes Chapter 7, "King-Making in Iran" to a version of most notable for the purple of its flamboyant prose. Some significant passages are:

It was in 1953, of course, that the CIA stage-managed the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, that celebrated compulsive weeper, who had seized Britain's monopolistic oil company and was threatening to do business with the Kremlin. At the time CIA's coup was hailed as a blow for democracy, which it was. But after disposing of Mossadegh, CIA and the State Department reverted once again to a weakness that so often has been disastrous. In the setting up of the new regime, in which CIA took a major part, no consideration was given as to whether the new men had any
intention of attempting to relieve the
misery of the Iranian people. It was
enough for the United States that they
were anti-Communist.

When Mossadegh announced the expropri-
tion of Anglo-Iranian Oil and nationalization
of Iran's oil fields, the international
upheaval was thunderous. Mossadegh could not
do that, and the Western bankers would
prove it to him. Iranian oil was virtually
boycotted. Mossadegh promptly tried to
swing some deals with smaller, independent
companies to work the Iranian fields, but
the State Department gave these companies
little encouragement— which is to say it
told them "hands off." Meanwhile, Iran
was losing its oil revenues and going broke.
Even American financial aid was not enough
although the State Department, with under-
standable reluctance, donated $1,600,000
for a technical rural improvement program
in 1951 and followed that with a foreign
aid grant of $23,000,000 in 1952. Most
of the latter was used to make up Iran's
foreign exchange shortages, but Iran remained
financially unstable.

Meanwhile, CIA learned that Mossadegh
was carrying on a clandestine flirtation
with Iran's furtive Communist party, the
Tudeh. Soviet intelligence agents flocked
into the ancient capital of Teheran and
the traffic jam between them and Allen
Dulles' energetic young men was almost
ludicrous. Almost daily, emissaries from
the Soviet danced attendance on Mossadegh as
he lolled recumbent on his couch, alternately
dozing and weeping. Inevitably, the old
dictator put it squarely up to President
Eisenhower. In a letter received by the
President on May 28, 1953, Mossadegh over-
played his hand—he attempted to blackmail
the United States by warning that unless
Iran got more American financial aid he
would be forced to seek help elsewhere.
Elsewhere was the revolution, with which Mossadegh suggested he would conclude both an economic agreement and a mutual defense pact.

Since Iran otherwise was broke, that meant Mossadegh would have to pledge the rich Iranian oil fields and the refinery at Abadan, the world's largest, in return for financial assistance from the Soviet. The danger to the West was clear. With Iran's oil assets in its pockets, the Russians would have little trouble eventually achieving a prime object of Russian foreign policy since the days of the Czars — access to a warm water outlet on the Persian Gulf, the First World's life line to the Far East. But even if Russia were to get just Iran's oil, the Western world would be weakened throughout the Middle East and Soviet prestige would soar. It was clear, too, of course, that Anglo-Iranian Oil had a stake of billions of dollars, and when private enterprise of that magnitude is involved State Departments and Foreign Offices are apt to react most sensitively.

The time had come for the United States to embark on an international gamble. CIA reports were that Mossadegh, although popular with the masses, had never been able to undermine the young Shah with his people. If something were to happen whereby the Shah was able to take over more firmly the reins of government, there was a good chance Mossadegh could be unseated. In any event, the Shah had a better than even chance of winning any popularity contest with Mossadegh.

So for a month the White House stalled Mossadegh, avoiding a direct reply in a welter of polite diplomatic notes seeking further discussions. Then President Eisenhower favored Mossadegh with a blunt reply: "No." Everybody agreed it was a calculated risk, a gamble that Mossadeqh could be dealt with in such a fashion that he would be powerless to carry out his threat. The CIA forthwith set the wheels in motion for dealing with this tough old man.
First, on August 17, 1961, the Shah left for a "holiday" to Europe to join his wife for a "holiday" in the Swiss Alps. Although the political situation in Tehran was becoming more ominous, Mosaddegh was conferring daily with a Russian economic mission. United States Ambassador Loy Henderson decided he would like a vacation to Switzerland, too. Almost simultaneously, the Shah's sister, the pretty and tough-minded Princess Ashraf, marched into the royal palace and gave her brother the rough side of her tongue for his hesitancy in facing up to Mosaddegh. Then she, too, flew off to Switzerland.

Certainly, the Russian espionage network must have surmised that something was cooking as Dulles, Henderson and Princess Ashraf turned up at the same Swiss resort. Their suspicions were strengthened when an old Middle Eastern hand named Brigadier General H. Norman Schwartzkopf suddenly was discovered in the midst of a leisurely flying vacation across the Middle East. He had been to Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon and, while the Russians fumed, he ultimately turned up in Iran.

- The Reds had a right to be fearful, for Schwartzkopf had long been an anathema to the Kremlin. Americans remember him most vividly as the man who ran the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey State Police. But the world of international politics knew him better as the man who, from 1942 to 1943, had been in charge of reorganizing the Shah's national police force. In this job, Schwartzkopf spent little time tracking down ordinary criminals; he was kept busy protecting the government against its enemies, a job that required the setting up of an intelligence system to keep watch on various political cliques which might seek the Shah's overthrow.
In the course of investigating cities, Schwarzkopf had become friendly and adviser to the Shah. More important, to Major General Rashid Zahedi, one of his colleagues on the police force. So when Schwarzkopf turned up in Tehran in August he could explain with a straight face that he had come merely "to see old friends again."

The Russians stormed and protested over his presence in Iran but Schwarzkopf went his casual way, dropping in to see the Shah one afternoon, spending the morning with General Zahedi, and renewing contacts with other old pals in the police and army.

And suddenly the Shah seemed to have located his courage and authority. On Thursday, August 13, the Shah handed down a edict that sounded as if it had been written in collaboration by Schwarzkopf and Zahedi. Mossadeq was ousted as Premier and his successor was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadeq, and the wheels seemed to be turning.

But for some reason the colonel seemed seized by inaction. It was not until two days later, on midnight of August 15, that the colonel and a platoon of his troops showed up at Mossadeq's residence. There they found themselves surrounded by an array of tanks and jeeps, manned by hard-faced Army veterans. Mossadeq had rounded up while the colonel vacillated.

The colonel, of course, was clapped into jail and Mossadeq announced that a revolt against the rightful government of Iran had been crushed. He also had some unkind things to say about the youthful Shah, and Iran's king of kings and his queen took the hint and hopped a plane for Rome by way of the then royally safe country of Iraq.
Schwartzkopf, he was to an extent at least, a puppet on the Iranian stage, to rock over as checkers piece, paymaster for the Mosaddegh-Mast-Go oligarch. Certain Iranians started to get rich, and the word later was that in a period of a few days Schwartzkopf supervised the careful spending of more than ten million of CIA's dollars. Mosaddegh suddenly lost a great many supporters.

The climax came on Wednesday, August 19, four days after Mosaddegh had "crushed the revolt." The tense capital was filled with troops, mounted against a new uprising, but none of them looked very happy. There seemed no reason for alarm when a long and winding procession of performers appeared on the scene for one of these impromptu parades common in Teheran. In the procession were tumblers, weight-lifters, wrestlers, boxers -- all performing their specialties as they moved slowly along the streets. As usual, crowds flocked out into the streets to watch the show and to follow the parade.

Then, apparently, somebody gave a signal. The weird procession suddenly broke into an organized shouting mob. "Long Live the Shah!" they cried. "Death to Mosaddegh." The crowd joined in the shouting, some of them undoubtedly keeping one hand tight against pockets where their American wages were secured. Soon the entire capital was in an uproar, and when the din was at its loudest troops who had remained loyal to the Shah launched their attack.

For more than nine hours the battle raged, with Mosaddegh's troops fighting fiercely but gradually giving ground. Obviously, they were confused by the tactics and swift logistical maneuvers of the Shah's forces, who had been exposed to some American who knew the ropes. Anyway, by midnight Mosaddegh's soldiers had been driven into a little ring around the Premier's palace and they were forced to surrender. Troops forcing their way into the palace captured Mosaddegh as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in silk striped pajamas. Somebody telephoned Rome and the Shah and his queen packed again, to return to Teheran and install Zahedi as Premier.
This was a coupaddy to the security of the United States, as possibly to that of the Western World. It was another case of the United States not requiring tough enough terms in return for its support. It is needless, as some observers have written, to say that the Iranians overthrew Mossadegh all by themselves. It was an American operation from beginning to end. But at the end, CIA -- and the American government -- stood by while a succession of pro-Western and anti-Communist administrations, uninterested in the smallest social reforms, brought Iran once again to the edge of bankruptcy. And, of course, the American taxpayer has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to this corruption.

Then, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in their "explosive bestseller" The Invisible Government provided yet another version, as follows:

1953: Iran
But guerrilla raids are small actions compared to an operation that changes a government. There is no doubt at all that the CIA organized and directed the 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and kept Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi on his throne. But few Americans know that the coup that toppled the government of Iran was led by a CIA agent who was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt.

Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, also a seventh cousin of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, is still known as "Mr. Iran" around the CIA for his spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago. He later left the CIA and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as "government relations" director in its Washington office. Gulf named him a vice-president in 1960.

One legend that grew up inside the CIA had it that Roosevelt, in the grand Rough Rider tradition, led the revolt against the weeping Mossadegh with a gun at the head of an Iranian tank commander as the column rolled into Teheran.
A CIA man familiar with the Iran story characterized this as "not romantic," but said: "Kim did run the operation from a basement in Teheran -- not from our embassy." He added admiringly: "It was a real James Bond operation."

General Fazollah Zahedi, the man the CIA chose to replace Mossadegh, was also a character worthy of spy fiction. A six-foot-two, handsome ladies' man, he fought the Bolsheviks, was captured by the Kurds, and, in 1942, was kidnapped by the British, who suspected him of Nazi intrigues. During World War II the British and the Russians jointly occupied Iran. British agents, after snatching Zahedi, claimed they found the following items in his bedroom: a collection of German automatic weapons, silk underwear, some opium, letters from German parachutists operating in the hills, and an illustrated register of Teheran's most exquisite prostitutes.

After the war Zahedi rapidly moved back into public life. He was Minister of Interior when Mossadegh became Premier in 1951. Mossadegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in April and seized the huge Abadan refinery on the Persian Gulf.

The refinery was shut down; thousands of workers were idled and Iran faced a financial crisis. The British, with the backing of Western governments, boycotted Iran's oil and the local workers were unable to run the refineries at capacity without British techniques.

Mossadegh connived with the Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, and London and Washington feared that the Russians would end up with Iran's vast oil reserves flowing into the Soviet Union, which shares a common border with Iran. Mossadegh, running the crisis from his bed -- he claimed he was a very sick man -- had broken with Zahedi, who balked at tolerating the Tudeh party.

* He died September 1, 1963, at age sixty-seven.
It was agreed that the CIA and Kim Roosevelt go first to Teheran and install Saidi. Al, one of the Camp Roosevelt, then thirty-seven, was already a veteran intelligence man. He was born in Buenos Aires. His father, the President's second son, was also named Kermit. Kim was graduated from Harvard just before World War II, and he taught history there and later at the California Institute of Technology. He had married while still at Harvard. He left the academic life to serve in the OSS, then joined the CIA after the war as a Middle East specialist. His father had died in Alaska during the war; his uncle, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, died on the beaches of Normandy a year later.

The British and American governments had together decided to mount an operation to overthrow Mossadegh. The CIA's estimate was that it would succeed because the conditions were right; in a showdown the people of Iran would be loyal to the Shah. The task of running the operation went to Kim Roosevelt, then the CIA's top operator in the Middle East.

Roosevelt entered Iran legally. He drove across the border, reached Teheran, and then dropped out of sight. He had to, since he had been in Iran before and his face was known. Shifting his headquarters several times to keep one step ahead of Mossadegh's agents, Roosevelt operated outside of the protection of the American Embassy. He did have the help of about five Americans, including some of the CIA men stationed in the embassy.

In addition, there were seven local agents, including two top Iranian intelligence operatives. These two men communicated with Roosevelt through cutouts — intermediaries — and he never saw them during the entire operation.

As the plan for revolt was hatched, Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who used to appear on radio's "Bang Busters," turned up in Teheran. He had reorganized the Shah's
police force there in 1949. He was best
known for his investigation of the Hindle
baby kidnapping case when he headed the New
Jersey State Police in 1932. Schwarkopf,
an old friend of Zahedi's, claimed he was in
town "just to see old friends again." But
he was part of the operation.

On August 13 the Shah signed a decree
dismissing Mossadegh and naming Zahedi as
Premier. The uncooperative Mossadegh arrested
the unfortunate colonel who brought in his
notice of dismissal. Mobs rioted in the
streets; the thirty-three-year-old Shah and
his queen (at that time the beautiful Soraya)
fled to Baghdad by plane from their palace on
the Caspian Sea.

For two chaotic days, Roosevelt lost com-
munication with his two chief Iranian agents.
Meanwhile, the Shah had made his way to Rome;
Allen Dulles flew there to confer with him.
Princess Ashraf, the Shah's attractive twin
sister, tried to play a part in the inter-
national intrigue, but the Shah refused to
talk to her.

In Teheran, Communist mobs controlled the
streets; they destroyed statues of the Shah
to celebrate his departure. Suddenly, the
opposition to Mossadegh consolidated. The
Army began rounding up demonstrators. Early
on August 19 Roosevelt, from his hiding place,
gave orders to his Iranian agents to get
everyone they could find into the streets.

The agents went into the athletic clubs
in Teheran and rounded up a strange assortment
of weight-lifters, muscle-men and gymnasts.
The odd procession made its way through the
bazaars shouting pro-Shah slogans. The crowd
grew rapidly in size. By mid-morning it was
clear the tide had turned against Mossadegh
and nothing could stop it.

Zahedi came out of hiding and took over.
The Shah returned from exile. Mossadegh
went to jail and the leaders of the Tudeh
were executed.
In the aftermath, British lost their monopoly on Iran's oil. In August, 1958, an international consortium of Western oil companies signed a twenty-five-year pact with Iran for its oil. Under it, the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company got 40 percent, a group of American companies* got 40 percent, Royal Dutch Shell got 14 percent and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 6 percent. Iran got half of the multimillion-dollar income from the oil fields under the deal, the Anglo-Iranian was assured a compensation payment of $70,000,000.

The United States, of course, has never officially admitted the CIA's role. The closest Dulles came to doing so was in a CBS television show in 1962, after his retirement from the CIA. He was asked whether it was true that "the CIA people spent literally millions of dollars hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things, to get rid of Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about that?"

"Well," Dulles replied, "I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false."

The former CIA chief also hinted at the CIA's Iran role in his book The Craft of Intelligence. "... support from the outside was given ... to the Shah's supporters," he wrote, without directly saying it came from the CIA.

Magazines did their part as well. In The Saturday Evening Post for 6 November 1954, Richard and Gladys Harkness co-authored an article entitled "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," which appears to have been a key source for both Tully and Wise-Ross. Richard and Gladys said:

* Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey and California, The Texas Company and Socony-Mobil.
Another CIA-influenced coup in the successful overthrow of Iran in October of 1953, of old, dictatorial Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and the return to power of this country's friend Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi.

On May 28, 1953, President Eisenhower received a letter from Mossadegh amounting to a bare faced attempt at international blackmail...

The White House stalled Mossadegh for one month; then turned down the crafty premier with a blunt no. This was a calculated risk at best. It was a daring gamble, in fact, that Mossadegh would not remain in power to carry out his threat. It was, as well, a situation which required a little doing. The doing began in short order through a chain of stranger-than-fiction circumstances involving [Allen] Dulles, a diplomat, a princess and a policeman.

On August tenth Dulles packed his bags and flew to Europe to join his wife for a vacation in the Swiss Alps. The political situation in Tehran was becoming more conspiratorial by the hour. Mossadegh was consorting with a Russian diplomatic-economic mission. Loy Henderson, United States Ambassador to Iran, felt he could leave his post for a short "holiday" in Switzerland. Princess Ashraf, the attractive and strong-willed brunette twin sister of the Shah, chose the same week to fly to a Swiss alpine resort. It was reported that she had had a stormy session with her brother in his pink marble palace, because of his vacillating in facing up to Mossadegh.

The fourth of the assorted characters in this drama, Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, at this time took a flying vacation across the Middle East. His itinerary included apparently aimless and leisurely stops in Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon -- and Iran. Schwartzkopf is best known to the public as the man who conducted the Lindberg kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey state police. But from 1942 through 1943 he was detailed to Iran to reorganize the Shah's national police
Chief, Schwartzkopf: "I have now not only the TV, but..."

He protected the government against its enemies — on a significant intelligence, an intelligence on the political cliques pitted against the Shah, knowledge of which only elements could be counted on to remain loyal and familiar with the Shah's weakness. Schwartzkopf became a friend and adviser to such individuals as Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, his colleague on the police force, and the Shah himself.

Schwartzkopf returned to Iran in August of 1953, he said, "just to see old friends again." Certainly, the general will deny any connection with the events that followed his renewal of acquaintance with the Shah and Zahedi. But as Mossadegh and the Russian propaganda press railed nervously at Schwartzkopf's presence in Iran, developments started to unfold in one-two-three order.

On Thursday, August thirteenth, the Shah suddenly issued a double-edged ukase: Mossadegh was ousted by royal decree and his successor as premier was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh. Two days later, at midnight of Saturday, August fifteenth, the colonel went to Mossadegh's residence to find himself and his platoon surrounded by tanks and jeeps. The colonel was clapped in jail, and Mossadegh proclaimed that the revolt had been crushed. The Shah and his queen, taking events at face value fled to Rome by way of Iraq.

On Wednesday, August nineteenth, with the army standing close guard around the uneasy capital, a grotesque procession made its way along the street leading to the heart of Teheran. There were tumblers turning handsprings, weight lifters twirling iron bars and wrestlers flexing their biceps. As spectators grew in number, the bizarre assortment of performers began shouting pro-Shah slogans in unison. The crowd took up the chant and then, after one precarious moment, the balance of public psychology swung against Mossadegh.
Upon signal, it is said, key forces on the Shah's side began to move. The fighting lasted a bloodier nine hours. By nightfall, following American-style military strategy and logistics, loyalist troops drove Mossadegh's elements into a tight cordon around the premier's palace. They surrendered, and Mossadegh was captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas. In Rome a bewildered young Shah prepared to fly home and install Zahedi as premier and to give Iran a pro-Western regime.

Thus it was that the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued from the closing clutch of Moscow. Equally important, the physical overthrow of Mossadegh was accomplished by the Iranians themselves. It is the guiding premise of CIA's third force that one must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty.45

More than a year later, Crosby Myles, writing in the Washington Star for 27 September 1953, discussed obliquely the significance of Ambassador Henderson, CIA Director Dulles, and Princess Ashraf being in Zurich the same week in August, and mentioned General Schwarzkopf's visit in detail. Without making any direct accusations, he hinted: "It is possible that the CIA agents whose departure from Iran was observed and reported were on purely routine intelligence missions. It is possible — as a leading columnist has suggested — that Mr. Henderson's trip to Switzerland was no more than a 'policy of studied indifference' on the part of the State...

strongly toward the Musulman regime. A friend of the Princess Ashraf, here in Washington, holds stoutly to the view that her visit with the Shah was undertaken simply to ask him for money. It is possible that Allen Dulles is genuinely fond of mountain-climbing and that Gen. Schwarzkopf just happened to show up in Tehran at a critical moment.

"It is all perfectly possible. But as long as the practice of putting two and two together continues, the argument about what really happened in Iran last summer seems likely to continue."
The following is a U.S. Embassy translation of the Court of Revision verdict against Mosadeq and Riahi, handed down on 12 May 1954. It reviews the case, sums up the charges against the two defendants, and examines their respective defense. It objects to and overrules the verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and concludes by resentencing the defendants.

Under the indictment issued by the Army Prosecutor, the accused were charged with the following:

In connection with Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq—

1. Order for the arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general), Commander of the Royal Guards, who carried the order for the dismissal of Mosadeq;
2. Unlawful arrest of official and nonofficial persons;
3. Disarming of the Royal Guards protecting HM the Shah and the royal palaces;
4. Sealing of the royal palaces, dispossessing the officials and guard of the Royal Court from the properties and palaces of the Shah;
5. Issue of telegrams to the Iranian ambassadors abroad instructing them not to contact HM the Shah;
6. Issue of instructions for omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in the military centers;
7. Issue of instructions for the holding of meetings by taking advantage of Government propaganda facilities with a view to insulting the monarch and the constitutional regime, and broadcasting the meetings by radio;
8. Issue of instructions for pulling down and breaking the statues of the late Shah and the present Shah with a view to humiliating the royal household and encouraging insurgents to rise against the constitutional monarchy in Iran;
9. Issue of instructions for the dissolution of the Majlis;
10. Issue of instructions for keeping under surveillance the members of the royal household in Azerbaijan;
11. Issue of instructions for the unlawful arrest of General Zahedi, the Prime Minister appointed by the Shah, and the offer of a reward to the person capturing him;
12. Elimination of the royal anthem from the program of Tehran Radio; and
13. Action for the formation of a regency council by referendum.

In connection with Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi:

1. Arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general) who was carrying the order for Dr. Mosadeq's dismissal, and other officers without any legal warrant;
2. Disarming of the Royal Guards;
3. Issue of instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers; and
4. Issue of instructions that the demonstrations of the Tudeh Party should not be checked and insurgents should not be prevented from making demonstrations against HIM the Shah and that those people pulling down the statues of the late Shah and those of the present Shah should not be checked.

By virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, capital punishment was demanded for the above-named. The case was referred to the Court of First Instance; which Court after performing the legal formalities and investigating the case, affirmed that Dr. Mosadaq's offences corresponded with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. With due regard to Article 413 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, Article 44 of the Criminal Code, and Article 46 of the same Law, since the accused is over 60 years of age, he was condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment; General Riahi's offence was found to conform with paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and he was condemned to two years of correctional imprisonment and permanent dismissal from the Army (according to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law).

After the communication of the verdict issued, the military prosecutor and the accused appealed for a revision according to Articles 217 and 218 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Article 219 of the same Law. The case was referred to this Court according to File No. 103, on December 26, 1953.

The Court of Revision was formed on April 9 after pass through the necessary formalities, and listened in nine sessions to the explanations of the prosecutor and the objections of the accused and their defense counsels about the defects of the file and the incompetence of the Court.
On April 22, 1954, the original members of the Court by a majority vote of six to one did not find the objections of the accused and their defense counsel about the defects of the file and incompetence of the Court plausible, and declared their preparedness to investigate the substance of the accusations levelled against both of the accused. The Court of Revision, in 17 sessions held from April 23 to May 12, listened to the objections of the Prosecutor, the accused, and their defense counsels in respect to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, and to the last defenses of the above-named. At 12:20 p.m. on May 12, 1954, it declared that the matter had been sufficiently debated and announced an adjournment of the trial. The Court immediately started its deliberations, and with due regard to the substance of Article 209 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law completed the deliberations at 3:30 p.m. on May 12, 1954, and issued the following verdict:

**Court's Verdict**

A. The main objections of the Prosecutor and the accused to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance are as under:

Summary of the objections of the Army Prosecutor to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance in regard to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq.

1. HIM's statements to the effect that he waived his claims for the injustices rendered to him by the accused have been interpreted by the Court of First Instance as the pardoning by HIM of his personal claims, while in fact a personal right has a special interpretation from the judicial viewpoint. The Court's interpretation is not proper, because HIM the Shah had not lodged a personal claim against Dr. Mosadeq so that he could withdraw his claim in due course.

2. Since the Court of First Instance has ruled that the crimes attributed to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq correspond with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and has issued its verdict with due regard to Article 46 of the Criminal Code, and since the above-named's crime is borne out by the circumstances mentioned in the above, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq apparently should have been condemned to ten years' solitary confinement.
3. Another mistake made by the Court is that reference has been made in the verdict to Article 43 of the Criminal Code, while this Article refers to a mitigation of the original punishment, and Dr. Mohammad Rezaq has been condemned to three years' solitary confinement. These two facts are contradictory.

4. The Court of First Instance has not stated in the verdict whether the verdict was issued by a unanimous or majority vote.

Summary of the objections raised by the Army Prosecutor against the Court's verdict in connection with General Riahi.

1. The Court has not observed Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (the Court's verdict must be substantiated and borne out by facts in connection with the crimes attributed to the accused and their conformity with the relevant regulations). Moreover, the subordinate punishment (dismissal from Army service) which must never be mentioned in the verdict has been mentioned contrary to Article 253 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

2. The Court's reasoning in regard to the defenses put up by the defense counsels of the accused supports the bill of indictment and the Prosecutor's statements made in the Court. The Court has considered the General's actions as hostile and as having been carried out with ill-will and for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchy. However, the punishment decreed has been made to conform with Article 330 of the Judicial Law, i.e., the negligence of duty vis-a-vis the orders of the Army.

3. The Court has considered General Riahi responsible for the actions attributed to him and has affirmed the bill of indictment, but has made an oversight in fitting the crime to the relevant article of the Law. For the Court has in its verdict made clear that the issue of the instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers, and the failure to check the pulling down of the statues and the explicit announcement that the Shah was a fugitive were meant to overthrow the monarchy. Therefore, the crime committed by the above-named conforms with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

Summary of the Objections Raised by General Riahi and his Defense Counsel to the Verdict issued by the Court of First Instance:

1. With regard to Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, General Riahi was not neglecting his military duties while executing the orders of his superiors, so that the Court of First Instance should not have condemned him according to Paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.
2. The Court has, by setting forth its reasons, considered that the Article referred to by the Prosecutor did not correspond with the accusations leveled against General Riahi and the Court exaggerated the accused of the charges leveled against him. Therefore, there were no grounds for the Army Prosecutor to request that the same accusations be again leveled against the accused.

3. During August 19-12 Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq held a legal and official title as far as all army officers were concerned and no one was aware of the command dismissing him; hence the legalization of Mosadeq's orders. Moreover, ever since HIM the Shah ordained that General Riahi, the then Chief of General Staff, should receive his orders directly from the then Minister of National Defense, the Minister was the only lawful commander of General Riahi.

4. In connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers to which the Court has alluded, this had nothing to do with the direct will of General Riahi, hence the Article regarding the cancellation of an instruction could not apply to him. The Commander of the Officers' College asked for instructions in connection in order that probable incidents might be averted, and the then Chief of General Staff reported the matter to the Minister of National Defense and communicated the order issued by the Minister.

The Summary of the Objections of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq and his Lawyer to the Verdict of the Court of First Instance:

1. Concerning the arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (presently a brigadier general), if I meant to conceal the disposal order, I would not have given a receipt for it. This order could not possibly have remained a secret even though Colonel Nasiri was arrested. His followers and some other no doubt knew of it. He was detained because he had come to my house at 1:00 a.m. to arrest me and complete his coup d'etat. When he understood that the guards of my house were increased, he only submitted the order of His Majesty.

2. The Court of First Instance said that I issued a notice about an imaginary coup d'etat in order to call the Royal Guards aggressors and to provoke the followers of His Majesty, and that I detained the faithful servants of the monarch so that people might be incited against this regime. I did not issue any order to arrest the followers of the monarchy. The police forces were responsible for all the actions which took place. The duty of the Royal Guards is to protect His Majesty and the royal palaces. It cannot arrest ministers or Majlis deputies.
3. The Court of First Instance said that I ordered the Royal Guards to be disarmed so that when His Majesty returned he would have no one to protect him and hence the mobs could have freedom of action. My purpose was to prevent another coup d'état.

4. You said that I sealed the royal palaces in order to deprive His Majesty of his own properties. Because His Majesty left the country without any previous notice, my action was simply to protect the royal properties.

5. The Court of First Instance mentioned the fact that telegrams were sent to the Embassies of Iran in foreign countries, forbidding the members to meet His Majesty. I have no knowledge of such telegrams and if Fatemi should say that I told him to so so, I shall bear any punishment set by law.

6. The Court of First Instance also said that I ordered the omission of the name of His Majesty from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers. It was thought that His Majesty did not wish to have his name prior to that of Iran, so the order was given to the soldiers to pray only for the perpetuity of Iran. After all, if the soldiers pray for the perpetuity of Iran, this does not mean that treachery was meant to his Majesty.

7. The Court of First Instance said that Hosadaq and his friends meant to insult His Majesty by allowing the people to demonstrate and take part in meetings. Whenever the representatives of the guilds or the National [ist] parties asked to be allowed to demonstrate, they were given the right to do so provided that the leftwing parties were not permitted to take part, to talk, or to demonstrate. The meeting of that day had no other basis. If the speakers said things and did wrong, it was not my fault and I should not be blamed for their actions.

8. The Court of First Instance believed the destruction of the statues of His Majesty and his father was to excite the people against His Majesty and his powers. I know nothing of the destruction of the statues. In the first place, installation of the statues was against the Shariat. I was told on August 17 that the leftwing parties intended to destroy the statues of Reza Shah. If they would have done so, the Government would have been accused of having cooperated with them. To prevent this, the National[ist] parties and guilds did so and their actions were taken only on the basis of opinion and not to excite the people against the monarchical regime.

9. About dissolving the Hajlis, the Court of First Instance said: "The proclamation of the accused to dissolve the Hajlis had no precedence in the parliamentary history of Iran and indicates that he wants to put an end to the parliamentary regime and to the fundamentals of the government of this country." First
I must say that if an act which has not been done before and is not written in the laws is carried out, one cannot say that it is a crime. Secondly, our Constitution is based upon government of the people and by the people so a referendum which is also based on the same principles is completely logical and legal. Thirdly, referendum is a good tool in the hands of governments by which they can rely upon the people. For these reasons, a referendum was for the benefit of the country and democracy.

10. About the arrest of the royal family in Azerbaijan I must say that I know nothing and the police have done their duty.

11. The Court of First Instance referred to the order for the imprisonment of General Zahedi, the elected Prime Minister. He was appointed after I was dismissed and because my government could not arrest him, no crime has taken place that I may be punished for.

12. The Court of First Instance thought that the omission of the National Anthem from Radio Tehran was against the customs of the country. I did not give an order for the omission of the National Anthem, but I personally believe that some authorities could cause trouble for those persons who go to places for fun and hear the Anthem but might not honor it as they should. I am sure you do not want the people to be bothered by every possible method.

13. The Court referred to the formation of the Regency Council through a referendum. This action of mine is the best clue to show that my deeds did not follow the contents of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. If my deeds were according to the three subjects of that article, I did not have to form a Regency Council through a referendum. I intended to send some representatives to Rome so that they might beg His Majesty to return or to appoint the Regency Council in case His Majesty did not wish to return. If His Majesty would not appoint the Regency Council, there was no Majlis and the Government had no right to do so either. The only possible solution was through a referendum, which in turn is neither against the laws nor the benefits of the country.

8. Considering the objections in the appeals of the Army Prosecutor, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq (accused No. 1), Gen. Tuqi Riahi (accused No. 2) and their lawyers, which seemed to be acceptable, for the following reasons the verdict of the Court of First Instance is invalid:

In the case of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq:

First, as the Army Prosecutor object, the Court of First Instance thought that the communication of the Royal Court meant that His Majesty overlooked his personal rights. This is not so because His Majesty's position is so high that it does not allow him to become a private plaintiff. Moreover, the offense was not a personal one so that the offended party would overlook his rights.
In addition to that, according to Article 55 of the Criminal Code, pardon can only be given when the crime has been established. For these reasons, the reference of the Court to the above communication is invalid.

Secondly, considering the nature of the accusation and the reasoning used by the Court of First Instance whereby it compared the punishment to that of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, and observing Article 46 of the Criminal Code, the punishment fixed for him was solitary confinement. Because the said Article has fixed the maximum and minimum penalties of solitary confinement, without taking the mitigating circumstances into consideration, the period of solitary confinement could be fixed without any trouble. Although the Court tried to reduce the sentence and referred to Article 46 of the Criminal Code, the effect of this Article is not noticed in the fixing of the punishment.

In the case of General Riahi:

According to Article 75 of the Constitution and Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, the verdict of the Court had to be reasonable and the Court had to pay careful attention to the accusations. Not only is the verdict of the Court about Gen. Tajd Riahi unreasonable, but also his deeds do not correspond to section 6 of Article 33 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (this Article concerns the failure of commanders to fulfill their military duties in special circumstances). On the other hand, the Court of First Instance reasoned that the actions of Dr. Nosadeq (accused No. 1) corresponded to Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. The Court also related all the accusations against General Riahi (accused No. 2) to some of the deeds of Dr. Nosadeq, directly and indirectly. Therefore, the verdict was given on the basis of the unity of their crimes, although considering their confessions, one can see that the crimes were not the same for both of them. For this reason the verdict of the Court of First Instance is not correct.

For these reasons, the verdict of the Court of First Instance is cancelled in accordance with Article 233 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and the verdict of this Court is now announced for Dr. Nosadeq (six votes to one) and General Riahi (five votes to two):

For Dr. Nosadeq:

He confessed to some of his crimes and by means of fallacious and confusing arguments he tried to escape the punishment for the rest. Considering his file and the testimony of witnesses in the Court, his defense did not influence the verdict of the Court, and none of it had any judicial value. His ignorance of some of the events (such as the telegrams to Iranian ambassadors ordering them not to meet His Majesty, formation of meetings through governmental facilities, the speech at the meeting of August 19, 1953 by Dr. Hassie Fatemih, who was regarded by the
accused as his Foreign Minister, the destruction of the statues of His Majesty and those of Reza Shah, and the arrest of the royal family does not seem acceptable because he was Prime Minister, though illegally, and according to article 61 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister is responsible for all events.

In some places he has shown good will such as concerning the formation of a Regency Council through a referendum about which he frankly said, "my intentions were to send some representatives to Rome in order to beg His Majesty to return and if His Majesty did not wish to do so, to beg him to appoint the Regency Council. In case His Majesty did not agree to either of those two requests, the Regency Council was to be appointed by a referendum." The Prosecutor of this Court believes that his statement is neither legal nor logical; therefore, he does not accept it. If Hosadeq were right, he would have sent the representatives to Rome during the four days of his illegal regime. Although he had all possible means of transportation and so on in his hands, he did not do so. No action was taken for the appointment of representatives to be sent to Rome. His good will did not even induce him to send wires directly or indirectly (through the Embassies of Iran in Baghdad and Rome) to His Majesty although he could have done so. On the contrary, the telegrams sent to the Iranian ambassadors in foreign countries show and prove that he did not intend to show goodwill in this case.

Likewise, in connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in military centers, his statements are contradictory to those made by General Riahi because the accused has stated: "Since it was assumed that HIM the Shah did not wish his name to precede that of Iran, it was ordered that the soldiers should pray for the country, in order that HIM the Shah might reign in an independent and free country; the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers for the continued existence of Iran does not indicate any treason against HIM the Shah."

General Riahi has alleged that on the proposal of the Commander of the military College in order to prevent undesirable events, the prayer in question was changed with the advice of Dr. Hosadeq; however, the said accused (Dr. Hosadeq) has not been able to prove his good will in altering the morning and evening prayers or in omitting HIM the Shah's name from the prayers, and has not shown why he did not take this action before receiving his dismissal order, or how it happened that these events which were against the monarchy occurred after the issue of the dismissal order and his refusal to obey it. Therefore, in short, the activities of the above-named from August 16 at 1:00 a.m. until August 13, singly and collectively, clearly fall under Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. Considering the fact that the army prosecutor applied for a revision of the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, the above-named is, by virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment, considering the fact that his age is over sixty years.
The period of his detention since August 15, 1953, must be deducted from the period of his imprisonment.

For General Riahi:

In all the actions committed by him, General Riahi's aim was merely to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the accused No. 1 (Dr. Mosadeq). While having full knowledge of the aims and objectives of the above named, he has colluded with accused No. 1 to weaken the sense of royalty, shake the position of the monarchy, eliminate the monuments which indicated the existence of the monarchy, encourage the adversaries of the monarchy and the army, and prosecute those whose hearts were kindled with the fire for the love of the king and the monarchy. The issue of the instruction for the alteration of the morning and evening prayers by omitting the Shah's name from the prayer, the despatch of telegrams to the 6th Army Division of Fars and the Military Governor of Abedan to the effect that the Shah was a fugitive, the fact that he did not prevent the pulling down of the statues, and the instruction for shooting on August 19 at individuals who manifested their royal feelings are, in the opinion of the jury, sufficient proofs to corroborate his collaboration and complicity with accused No. 1, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq.

Therefore, the above-named was an accomplice of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq, and by virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Articles 23 and 29 of the Criminal Code, and Article 30 of the said Law, he is condemned to three years' imprisonment with hard labor. The period of his detention since August 19 will be deducted from his term of imprisonment.

An appeal may be made to the Supreme Court against the above verdict within ten days of its declaration, with due regard to the circumstances mentioned in article 253 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

President of the Court of Revision for the Events of August 16 to 19, 1953.................General Javadi

Signature of the Jury:

General Isa Hedayat
Ebrahim Vali
General Nasrollah Khoshnevisan
General Ahmad Ajudani (substitute)
General Esfollah Zarqami (assistant)
Lt. Col. Aghayari, Army Prosecutor

May 12, 1954 (3:30 p.m.)