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HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



3 JAN 64

26 DEC 1963

General Curtis E. LeMay
Chief of Staff, USAF
Washington, D.C. 20330

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Dear General LeMay

1. On 16 September 1963 General Estes sent you a letter describing the CIA proposal to establish a Missile and Space Technical Intelligence Center. This has now come to pass. On 7 November CIA did formally establish the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) in the CIA Deputy Director/Science and Technology. Mr. Carl Duckett was named Director of the FMSAC.
2. On 10 December General Carroll and key members of his DIA staff along with some ranking DDR&E people were briefed by Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director/Science and Technology, CIA, and Mr. Duckett on the new FMSAC organization. The stated objective of the briefing was to determine how FMSAC could serve DOD. It is understood that General Carroll intends to reply to CIA by 23 December.
3. The briefing contained a run-down of the mission, functions and organization of FMSAC which is generally along the lines described to you in General Estes' 16 September letter. Functionally, FMSAC is planned to provide for the evaluation of collection activities, detection and trajectory analysis, signal analysis, and optical data analysis. An overall planned strength of some 270 people was mentioned.
4. The directive establishing FMSAC is sufficiently broad to give FMSAC the charter to clearly duplicate activities currently being carried out within the DOD and, more specifically, within the USAF. The establishment of this activity within CIA is most certainly the first step in competing with and possibly attempting to usurp the Services' capabilities in this area of scientific and technical intelligence. While it is certainly within the prerogative of CIA to have a role in this function, the line of demarcation of the CIA role vis á vis the DOD role is by no means clear. The present DOD survey of the space and missile intelligence activities, as well as the management thereof, should be completed, and some accord reached on respective roles. Meanwhile, establishment of FMSAC has already resulted in undesirable competition for special talent and for special data. Mr. Duckett was hired from the Army at Huntsville. Dr. Wheelon offered positions in FMSAC to highly qualified USAF employees. Such duplication and proselyting are unwise and imprudent, and could result in serious degradation of our Service intelligence capability.

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S.A. GOLDBERG
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FORGING MILITARY SPACEPOWER

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
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5. There will undoubtedly be some people in the Department of Defense who will welcome transferring the cost of technical intelligence to CIA and relying upon CIA to furnish this information to us. The current DOD economy drive will tend to encourage this attitude. Technical intelligence is as critical to military R&D as target intelligence is to strategic bombardment. We can no more rely upon CIA for critical technical intelligence than we can rely upon CIA for target intelligence. CIA must be restrained from duplicating and eroding DOD technical intelligence capabilities which are vital to military technology just as CIA has been restrained from duplicating DOD strategic bombing intelligence. CIA has had and should continue to have an important role in scientific intelligence which does relate to DOD technical intelligence. The role here is again similar to CIA's role in economic intelligence which of course relates to target intelligence, but supplements rather than duplicates it.

6. As mentioned above, I am fully aware of the DOD group that has been brought together to review all DOD missile and space activities with the purpose of improving DOD management of this activity. In fact my DCS/Foreign Technology and AFNIN are cooperating with this survey and I intend to meet with the group the latter part of December. I understand that the recommendations of this survey group are due at the end of January and should help the Secretary of Defense delineate the service position and stem CIA's infringement upon DIA activities. However, I do not believe it is prudent to wait for this report before we move to delay CIA's incursion into our missile and space intelligence.

7. I believe immediate action should be taken to slow down or block CIA action to duplicate DOD missile and space intelligence. Accordingly, I recommend that General Carroll, in his own capacity as the senior military member of the USIB, be encouraged to protest the CIA operations in missile and space intelligence, at least at this time until an agreement on respective responsibilities and mutual support can be reached. However, I believe this problem can not be solved through intelligence channels alone, so I also recommend that you and the Secretary act to protest this expensive and unnecessary duplication of DOD space and missile intelligence analysis by CIA. Our capability represents a significant investment in manpower and resources and is an extremely vital function which must not be lost or permitted to be eroded by another governmental agency.



B. A. SCHRIEVER
General, USAF
Commander

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