

**BY ORDER OF
THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER
Edwards Air Force Base California**

EAFB INSTRUCTION 31-17

14 November 2005

Security

**SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR INADVERTENT TRACKING
AND SENSOR ACQUISITION OF LOW OBSERVABLE AND
SIGHT SENSITIVE PROGRAMS**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

OPR: 95 SFS/SFAX (Ronald Paschal, DSN 527-6394)
Supersedes AFFTCR 800-1, 10 April 1992

Certified By: 95 SFS/SFA (Mr. Stephen Gerteis)

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This instruction assigns agency responsibilities during inadvertent or unauthorized tracking of sight-sensitive and low observable (LO) test assets within the R-2508 complex located at Edwards AFB, CA. Tracking devices include, but are not limited to, the following: visual, acoustical, infrared, radar, cross-spectral imaging and electronic/electrical emanation sensors. Regardless of test platform, agencies involved with test procedures for tracking devices must implement the security procedures outlined in this instruction. Any modifications to this instruction require full coordination with all tasked agencies identified in this instruction. General flight line photography procedures and restrictions are covered by AFFTCI 31-4, *Flight Line Photography*.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS: This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It updates and clarifies agency reporting responsibilities in the event of inadvertent or unauthorized tracking incidents; steps to preclude inadvertent or unauthorized tracking incidents; foreign aircrew, engineer and visitor reporting; and notification procedures.

1. TRACKING AND SENSOR RESTRICTIONS

1.1. It is strictly forbidden to train tracking sensors (e.g. radar, infrared, electro-optical, personal cameras, sound recording devices, etc.) on any LO or sight-sensitive assets. The single exception to this rule is to promote safety of flight. If a safety incident occurs, data recording may continue to assist the Mishap Investigation Board. The 95 SFS/SFAX, 95 SFS/SFAP and 412 TW/DRJ will coordinate on mishap investigations involving unauthorized tracking of LO platform systems in order to ensure proper protection of recorded data and allow access by the investigation board as necessary. Recording of data will immediately terminate upon the termination of the flight safety incident. Immediate contact is required with 95 SFS/SFAP, 95 SFS/SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ for review, classification, storage and/or destruction of recorded data. Test directors and aircraft commanders (for airborne sensors) are responsible for

completing an “*Inadvertent Data Collection Checklist*” (Attachment 1), if an inadvertent tracking situation occurs. The stipulations of this instruction will be included in the R-2508 Complex User Briefing identified in AFFTCI 11-1.

1.1.1. The 95 SFS/SFAX, 412 TW/DRJ and the affected site program manager will review suspect data to determine level of sensitivity and sanitize as necessary.

1.1.2. Do not discuss inadvertent disclosure incidents outside of approved channels as described in this instruction and applicable memorandums of agreement (MOA) or support agreements.

1.2. If inadvertent tracking of LO or sight-sensitive assets occur and there is no safety incident involved, immediately terminate the test or sensor activity and report the incident to 95 SFS/SFAX who, in turn, will notify 412 TW/DRJ and 95 SFS/SFAP. Any recorded data, regardless of recording method and/or device used will be considered and safeguarded as classified until official determination is made regarding sensitivity.

2. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY

2.1. The 95 SFS/SFAX will:

2.1.1. Coordinate efforts between 95 SFS/SFAP, 412 TW/DRJ, 412 OG, site program managers and test officials to ensure proper implementation of security procedures and continued protection of sensitive programs.

2.1.2. Serve as focal point for implementing this instruction and primary oversight authority for coordination efforts leading to approval of tracking system tests. Serve as a Reviewing Official for any applicable Letter Of Agreement (LOA), MOA or support agreement.

2.1.3. Coordinate and ensure an annual review of this instruction with 95 SFS/SFA, 412 TW/DRJ, 95 SFS/SFAP, 412 OG, 412 TW/ENR, 412 TW/EW, and AFFTC/XPI.

2.1.4. In coordination with 412 TW/DRJ, identify programs with potential vulnerabilities to tracking and sensor tests.

2.1.5. Coordinate with 95 SFS/SFAP for risk analysis, risk mitigation, and risk management of identified programs.

2.1.6. Ensure requestors of tracking or sensor test programs refer to AFFTCI 16-2, *Memorandums of Agreement and Memorandums of Understanding*, for completion of required MOAs. The LOAs, MOAs and support agreements will be submitted for coordination and approval to all affected agencies and maintained on file for one year after test completion. The 95 SFS/SFAX will sign as Reviewing Official on MOAs.

2.1.7. In coordination with 95 SFS/SFAP and 412 TW/DRJ, organize and conduct a quarterly working group to address changes or enhancements to procedures identified in this instruction.

2.1.8. Coordinate with AFOSI and the affected test program personnel for the review of inadvertent tracking data of designated LO or sight-sensitive assets.

2.1.9. Ensure appropriate flight test squadron (FLTS) operations officer (DO) or designated representative, United States Air Force Test Pilot School (TPS) DO, 412th Operations Support Squadron's (412 OSS) Airspace Manager, and R-2508 Central Coordinating Facility (CCF) representative are familiar with the procedures outlined in this instruction.

2.2. The 95 SFS/SFAP will:

2.2.1. Notify all security managers, 95 SFS/SFAX, and 412 TW/DRJ of tracking and sensor tests involving non-US citizens.

2.2.2. Determine agencies potentially affected by a designated tracking system or sensor test and make necessary notifications of proposed test to include sensor capabilities and flight summaries.

2.3. The 412 TW/DRJ will:

2.3.1. Assist agencies with risk management as necessary to prevent inadvertent tracking or sensor activity.

2.3.2. In coordination with 95 SFS/SFAX, identify programs with potential vulnerabilities to tracking and sensor tests.

2.3.3. Determine programs affected by designated activities involving Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and make necessary notifications, and notify appropriate program and/or project managers.

2.4. The 412 TW/ENR and 412 TW/EWO will:

2.4.1. Designate a representative to coordinate efforts for tracking and sensor test events; focus on surety of Operational Security (OPSEC) requirements with all platforms within the R2508 complex; and coordinate activities with 95 SFS/SFAX, 412 TW/DRJ, and radar and/or sensor sites.

2.4.2. In coordination with 412 OG, provide 95 SFS/SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ with current operational parameters of range sensor tracking systems and risk analysis of known technology to include probabilities of inadvertent tracking of LO or sight-sensitive assets.

2.4.3. Provide 412 OG, 95 SFS/SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ with operational parameters of developmental technology related to tracking or sensor equipment and potential associated risks to LO and sight-sensitive assets.

2.4.4. Assist 95 SFS/SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ with establishing procedures that could mitigate inadvertent tracking and sensor of LO or sight-sensitive assets.

2.4.5. Notify 95 SFS/SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ immediately upon discovery of suspected or known inadvertent tracking of LO or sight-sensitive assets. All data will be safeguarded per paragraph 1.1.1. of this instruction until it has been reviewed to determine classification and final disposition.

2.5. AFFTC/XPI will:

2.5.1. Provide, upon request, results of the Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice (SATRAN) program to requesting agencies or any program and/or project manager concerned with detection of LO or sight-sensitive programs.

2.5.2. When in the best judgment of AFFTC/XPI, provide SATRAN information of significant anomalies to 95 SFS/ SFAX and 412 TW/DRJ, which affects special access programs under their purview.

2.5.3. Notify 412 TW/DRJ of activities involving ISR platforms relating to LO special access programs under their purview at Edwards AFB, R2508.

2.6. Request AFOSI, Detachment. 111:

2.6.1. Provide, upon request, information relating to foreign national threat as it relates to tracking and sensor activities or program security.

2.7. The 412 OG will:

2.7.1. At least quarterly, require from each unit via a memo for record a list of all foreign national aircrew members and engineers permanently assigned, temporarily assigned or visiting their unit. The listing should be updated whenever the status of foreign nationals changes. A "No Change" response is required.

2.7.2. Ensure 95 SFS/SFAP is notified of all foreign pilots flying in the R-2508 complex from Edwards Air Force Base. All foreign national aircraft commanders flying in the R-2508 complex will use "90-series" call sign, such as "Cobra-95". If any units use tail numbers for call signs, add the number "9" to the beginning of the numerical portion of the call sign. Foreign national pilots or other aircrew members who are flying with a US pilot onboard need not use the 90-series call sign.

2.7.3. All aircrew members will refrain from illuminating, targeting, or tracking LO or sight sensitive assets either on the ground or airborne. If aircrew members inadvertently illuminate, target or track any LO or sight-sensitive assets they are required to inform the 412 OG providing a detailed description of the event and immediately notify 95 SFS/SFAX at 277-6394/6395.

2.7.4. Flying unit commanders will disseminate this information to all affected unit members. However, security and adherence to these procedures is the responsibility of each and every crewmember.

2.8. The AFFTC/JT Security Manager will be the POC for coordinating incidents or issues involving JT3 contract personnel.

3. **PROGRAM INTEGRITY.** Well structured and coordinated efforts among all agencies involved in program security are paramount to maintaining the integrity of sensitive programs. Inadvertent disclosure incidents could destroy the advancement of weapon system technology and potentially degrade national security. Commanders and staff agency chiefs are required to adhere to this instruction completely in order to mitigate possibilities of compromising program security.

JEFFREY R. MAYO, Colonel, USAF
Commander, 95th Mission Support Group

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Inadvertent Data Collection Checklist

Attachment 1

(Classify Appropriately When Filled In)

Inadvertent Data Collection Checklist
The Test Director Is Responsible For Filling Out This Form

TD/TC:	Date:
Crew Members(Include crew station number)	
1.	10.
2.	11.
3.	12.
4.	13.
5.	14.
6.	15.
7.	16.
8.	17.
9.	18.
Pilot:	
Co-pilot:	

*****Safety is your first responsibility*****

If known data collection occurs on a sensitive target follow these steps:

1. Note and record beginning and end time of the event.
 Start: _____
 End: _____
2. Record all crewmember names and positions during event.
3. At the end of the flight/event account for all recordable media used during the flight.
 Secure the media in your possession – you are accountable.

Classified Media Inventory List

Media	Location	S/N
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		

(Classify Appropriately When Filled In)
