

DEA HEADQUARTERS
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
DEA ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION
DEA CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION
DEA HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION
DEA LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION
DEA PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION
DEA SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION
DEA MEXICO CITY
EPIC
DEA LAS CRUCES RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA MIDLAND RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA ALPINE RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA TUCSON DISTRICT OFFICE
DEA MONTERREY RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA CIUDAD JUAREZ RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA LAS CRUCES RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA KANSAS CITY DISTRICT OFFICE
DEA INDIANAPOLIS DISTRICT OFFICE
DEA HERMOSILLO RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA MAZATLAN RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA MERIDA RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA GUADALAJARA RESIDENT OFFICE
DEA HQ/NC: CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA HQ/NTS: SECTION CHIEF (SC) (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/NTR: SC (b)(7)(C) NTRM: UNIT CHIEF (UC) (b)(7)(C)
LOFLAND
DEA HQ/NFI: SC (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/NN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/NNC: SC (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/NNCC: IRS (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/OGM: SC (b)(7)(C)
WEST, SC (b)(7)(C)
DEA HQ/SARI
DEA SOD: ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA SOD/NSI: SC (b)(7)(C)
DEA SOD/NSIH: U
DEA SOD/NSIN: I
DEA HOUSTON FD: FIM (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
(b)(7)(C)
DEAMCALLEN DO: GS (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA LAREDO DO: GS (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
EPIC: DIRECTOR (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)

DEA LOS ANGELES FD: FIM (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA PHOENIX FD: FIM (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA TUCSON DO: GS (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA ATLANTA FD FOR FIM (b)(7)(C)
DEA SAN DIEGO ED: FIM (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
(b)(7)(C)
DEA CHICAGO FD: FIM (b)(7)(C)
DEA MIDLAND RO: RESIDENT AGENT IN CHARGE (RAC) (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA ALPINE RO GS (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(F)
DEA MEXICO CITY COUNTRY OFFICE (CO): ASSISTANT REGIONAL
DIRECTOR (b)(7)(C)

SUBJECT: GFM7-10-9448; SOUTHWEST BORDER INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION PLAN
(CIUDAD JUAREZ (CDJ), CHIHUAHUA (CH), MEXICO (MX) VIOLENCE
ASSESSMENT, SECOND EDITION)

CCX: (b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(E)
CCX:
CCX:

REFERENCE (A): CDJ, CH, MX VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT, REFERENCE
TELETYPE DTG: 232348Z NOV 09

(b)(7)(E)

SUMMARY:

THIS REPORT CONTAINS A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT
EVENTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN CDJ, CH, MX, AND
SURROUNDING AREAS, DURING THE TIME FRAME OF NOVEMBER 2009 TO
JULY 2010. THE VIOLENCE IN CDJ GOES BEYOND WHAT WAS ONCE
PERCEIVED AS A BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE CDJ PLAZA

(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(D)

OBTAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE PLAZA. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

REFERENCE (A) LISTED THREE CATEGORIES OF VIOLENCE AS DEFINED BY DEA AS FOLLOWS: 1) CARTEL VS CARTEL; 2) CARTEL VS GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO; AND 3) INTRA-CARTEL. PRESENTLY, THE EVOLVING DYNAMICS IN CDJ SUGGEST THAT THE MAJORITY OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE ARE BEING PERPETRATED ON THREE FRONTS: CARTEL VS GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, GANG ON GANG VIOLENCE AND VIOLENCE BEING COMMITTED BY OPPORTUNISTS. AS A RESULT OF RECENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN CDJ, IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON (b)(7)(E) TO REASSESS THE CATEGORIES OF VIOLENCE SET FORTH IN REFERENCE (A). (b)(7)(E) HAS DEVELOPED TWO ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES OF VIOLENCE FOR A TOTAL OF FIVE CATEGORIES, AS FOLLOWS: 1) CARTEL VS CARTEL; 2) CARTEL VS GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO; 3) INTRA-CARTEL; 4) GANG ON GANG; AND 5) OPPORTUNIST. (b)(7)(E)

DETAILS:

CARTEL VS CARTEL:

1. THE INTRINSIC ANIMOSITY BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF TWO OF THE STRONGEST CARTELS IN MEXICO IS A MAJOR CAUSE AND CATALYST OF THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN CDJ. THE (b)(7)(C) CARTELS CONTINUE TO ATTACK EVERY ASPECT OF THEIR OPPONENTS' OPERATIONS. CARTEL VS CARTEL VIOLENCE INVOLVES VIOLENCE BETWEEN TWO OR MORE RIVAL CARTELS. HIT SQUADS, TRAFFICKERS, FINANCIERS, SUPPORTING CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MANAGERS AND SOLDIERS ARE THE MAIN TARGETS OF ASSASSINATION, AND THE MAJORITY OF THE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN BY CARTEL ASSASSINATION SQUADS. (b)(7)(E)

CARTEL VS MEXICAN GOVERNMENT:

2. CARTEL OPERATIONS AGAINST MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT HAVE BEEN A MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE CDJ PLAZA BATTLE SINCE ITS BEGINNING. THE PRIMARY REASON IS THE HEAVY RELIANCE MEXICAN CARTELS HAVE IN THE USE OF CORRUPT OFFICIALS. TO DATE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE PERPETRATED AGAINST THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE OCCURRED AND WILL BE ADDRESSED LATER IN THIS REPORT. (b)(7)(E)

INTRA-CARTEL:

3. INTRA-CARTEL VIOLENCE IS A PRIMARY MOTIVE FOR HOMICIDES OCCURRING IN CDJ ESPECIALLY AMONG (b)(7)(C) CARTEL ENTITIES.

INTRA-CARTEL VIOLENCE IS A CARTEL'S METHOD OF SELF-POLICING. THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE IS TYPICALLY THE RESULT OF INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS ENGAGED IN UNAUTHORIZED SMUGGLING, STEALING FROM THE CARTEL, CHANGING ALLEGIANCES, COOPERATING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT, ACTIONS RESULTING IN UNWANTED ATTENTION ON THE CARTEL OR OTHERWISE BECOMING A LIABILITY TO THE CARTEL. THESE ACTIVITIES CONTINUE TO OCCUR THROUGH THE PERIOD OF CARTEL WARFARE. THE (b)(7)(C) CARTEL, IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN HEAVILY ENGAGED IN POLICING THEIR RANKS. (b)(7)(E)

GANG ON GANG:

4. MEXICO'S CARTELS RELY ON GANGS NOT ONLY TO ENFORCE THE WILL OF THE CARTEL, BUT AS STREET LEVEL DISTRIBUTORS OF DRUGS AS WELL. THESE GANGS OFTEN HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA OUTSIDE THE CARTEL'S REALM AND EXHIBIT VIOLENCE AGAINST EACH OTHER AND RIVAL GANG MEMBERS WHO OFFEND THEM. A MAJOR EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CDJ IS THE USE OF CRIMINAL STREET GANGS AS PROXIES, THE (b)(7)(C) GANG FOR THE (b)(7)(C) CARTEL AND LOS MEXICLES/ARTISTAS ASESINOS FOR THE (b)(7)(C) CARTEL. (b)(7)(E)

OPPORTUNISTS:

5. THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF EXTORTIONS, VIOLENT ROBBERIES AND KIDNAPPINGS PERPETRATED BY INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL ELEMENTS WHO ARE NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED TO DRUG TRAFFICKING. THE OPPORTUNISTIC CRIMINAL ELEMENT FULLY EXPLOITS THE STATE OF LAWLESSNESS IN A COMMUNITY AND THEREBY, EXACERBATING THE ALREADY HIGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. THIS TYPE OF CRIME IS OFTEN MISCONSTRUED AS DRUG RELATED VIOLENCE. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

PREVALENT CATEGORIES OF VIOLENCE OCCURRING IN CDJ:

CARTEL VS GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO:

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

7. ON JUNE 20, 2010, THE MAYOR OF GUADALUPE, CH, A SMALL TOWNSHIP SOUTHEAST OF CDJ, WAS GUNNED DOWN BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS WIFE AND CHILD AT HIS HOME IN CDJ. MAYOR JESUS MANUEL LARA RODRIGUEZ ALLEGEDLY MOVED TO CDJ BECAUSE DEATH THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF HIS COUNCIL STAFF IN GUADALUPE WERE INCREASING. (b)(7)(E)

8. ON JUNE 30, 2010, THE DEPUTY PROSECUTOR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR THE STATE OF CHIHUAHUA, SANDRA IVONNE SALAS-GARICA, WAS ASSASSINATED ALLEGEDLY (b)(7)(C) HITMEN AS SHE RODE IN HER DODGE DURANGO IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ASSIGNED BODY GUARDS. ONE BODY GUARD WAS KILLED ALONG WITH SALAS-GARCIA AND THE OTHER WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK. SALAS-GARCIA WAS THE RIGHT ARM OF CHIHUAHUA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL (b)(7)(C)

9. ON JULY 15, 2010, PARAMEDICS AND FEDERAL POLICE RESPONDED TO AN EMERGENCY CALL INDICATING A MUNICIPAL POLICE WAS SHOT. UPON ARRIVING AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT, A PARKED VEHICLE IN THE VICINITY OF THE INCIDENT EXPLODED SCATTERING DEBRIS THROUGHOUT A TWO TO THREE BLOCK RADIUS. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

TWO FEDERAL OFFICERS AND ONE MEDICAL DOCTOR WERE KILLED. APPROXIMATELY SIX FEDERAL OFFICERS AND THREE PARAMEDICS WERE REPORTED INJURED. SEVERAL HOMES AND BUILDINGS WERE ALSO DAMAGED BY THE EXPLOSION. THIS BRAZEN ATTACK AGAINST THE FEDERAL POLICE OCCURRED IN THE HEART OF DOWNTOWN CDJ AT THE INTERSECTION OF BOLIVIA AND 16 DE SEPTIEMBRE. (b)(7)(C) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT IN RETALIATION FOR THE ARREST OF (b)(7)(C) HIT SQUAD LEADER (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

ON JULY 14, 2010. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

FURTHERMORE, REPORTING INDICATED THAT THE CAR BOMB WAS REMOTELY DETONATED WITH THE USE OF A CELL PHONE. A NARCOMANTA WAS FOUND IN CDJ ON JULY 19, 2010, WHICH WARNED OF MORE BOMB ATTACKS, THIS TIME USING 100 KILOS C-4 EXPLOSIVES. IF US LAW ENFORCEMENT FAILED TO PURSUE MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT WHO SUPPORT THE (b)(7)(C) WITHIN A 15 DAY DEADLINE.) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

ENFORCEMENT ARM OF THE (b)(7)(C) COMPRISED OF FORMER MEXICAN POLICE OFFICERS. AT THIS TIME IT IS BELIEVED (b)(7)(C) WAS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

GANG ON GANG:

10. TO REITERATE, THE (b)(7)(C) OPERATES SEMI-AUTONOMOUSLY UNDER THE OVERALL UMBRELLA OF AUTHORITY OF THE (b)(7)(C) THE (b)(7)(C) HOWEVER, IS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION OF NUMEROUS LOCAL DRUG SALES POINTS IN CDJ AS A MEANS TO GENERATE REVENUE FOR THE GANG'S OWN OPERATIONS. REFERENCE (A) DOCUMENTED THE HIGH LEVEL OF KILLINGS STEMMING FROM DRUG SALES POINTS THAT HAVE BEEN INFRINGED UPON BY BOTH (b)(7)(C) AND RIVAL GANG MEMBERS. DEA EPFD STRONGLY ASSESSES THAT THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE IS EXTREMELY PREVALENT AND OCCURS MULTIPLE TIMES ON A DAILY BASIS IN CDJ AS GANGS RESORT TO VIOLENCE TO CONTROL AND PROTECT THEIR DRUG SALES POINTS. (b)(7)(E)

11. THE (b)(7)(C) HIT SQUAD LACKS THE PROFESSIONALISM AND COORDINATION IN COMPARISON TO OTHER (b)(7)(C) HIT SQUADS, (b)(7)(C) THE (b)(7)(C) HIT SQUADS PRIMARILY TARGET THEIR GANG RIVALS, THE (b)(7)(C) BUT HAVE BEEN UTILIZED BY THE (b)(7)(C) FOR ATTACKS AGAINST THE (b)(7)(C) THE (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN EXECUTING SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE US CONSULATE IN CDJ IN MARCH 2010. (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(E)

OPPORTUNISTS:

13. THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS BECAUSE IT CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF EXTORTIONS, VIOLENT ROBBERIES AND KIDNAPPINGS PERPETRATED BY BOTH DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND NON-DRUG TRAFFICKERS ALIKE AND THEREFORE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN THE BACKGROUND OF PERPETRATORS OF THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE. AS THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE WITH CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE, COPY CATS AND THE INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL ELEMENT RAPIDLY INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THIS TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. THUS, THE KIDNAPPINGS, ASSAULTS AND ROBBERIES HAVE EXPLODED IN CDJ. EXTORTED BUSINESSES RUN THE GAMUT FROM LARGE STORES, JUNKYARDS, FUNERAL HOMES, RESTAURANTS AND BARS TO BUS DRIVERS AND STREET VENDORS. PERPETRATORS OF THIS TYPE OF VIOLENCE HAVE EVEN VICTIMIZED TEACHERS IN CDJ WHO HAVE BEEN EXTORTED FOR THEIR CHRISTMAS BONUSES. (b)(7)(E)

DEATH TOLL:


14. THE STATE OF CHIHUAHUA CURRENTLY LEADS MEXICO IN DRUG RELATED HOMICIDES. IN CDJ ALONE, THERE WERE 1,457 DRUG-RELATED HOMICIDES IN CY2008; 2,284 IN CY2009; AND 1,419 AS OF JULY 28, 2010. OPEN SOURCE REPORTING INDICATES THE FOLLOWING DRUG-RELATED HOMICIDES: 1,607 IN CY2008; 2,657 IN CY 2009; AND 2,900+ THUS FAR IN 2010. (ANALYST NOTE: DRUG RELATED HOMICIDE RATES PROVIDED BY WEST TEXAS HIDTA.) (b)(7)(E)

NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON CDJ ECONOMY

15. THE RAMPANT VIOLENCE AND EXTORTIONS OF BUSINESSES HAVE BEEN CATASTROPHIC TO THE CDJ ECONOMY. OVER 6,000 CDJ BUSINESSES HAVE CLOSED THEIR DOORS SINCE 2008 IN RESPONSE TO THE VIOLENCE

AND EXTORTIONS. MANY OF THOSE BUSINESSES HAVE RELOCATED TO EL PASO. IN 2009, THE EL PASO HISPANIC CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COUNSELED MORE THAN 200 CDJ BUSINESS PEOPLE LOOKING TO START OPERATIONS IN EL PASO. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(C)



(b)(7)(C)

