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DRAFT CABLE TO USNATO FOR NOVEMBER 27 NAC

To: USNATO
Info: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev
NATO Collective

Action for USNATO only

Following is guidance for the November 27 NAC session on Ukrainian independence. Ambassador is requested to use these points with NATO Permreps and to report immediately on results of the session. If it would be helpful to enlist effective NATO coordination on this issue, we would also encourage you to distribute these points as a non-paper.

Begin Talking Points

NATO's Response to Change in the former USSR

- The U.S. wants to work closely with NATO allies to develop a coordinated response to the fundamental changes occurring in the former USSR.
- At the Rome Summit, our leaders endorsed a statement on "Developments in the Soviet Union." As discussed in Rome, we viewed the purpose of that statement as two-fold:
 - First, to lay out the principles by which we as an alliance of democratic nations stand prepared to build a new relationship with the Union and Republics.
 - Second, "to consult actively on developments in the Soviet Union, with a view toward harmonizing our approach to unfolding events there."
- Developments since Rome confirm our belief that rapidly changing events there require all of us to chart a steady course to protect western interests, specifically in encouraging peaceful change and in consolidating new and productive working relationships with the increasingly powerful republics.
- It is clear that we are in a transition period between the old Soviet order and new institutions which, at least in the case of Russia, Ukraine and several other republics, hold out the promise of a new order based on democratic and market economic reform.

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- We intend to build stronger relationships with the Russian, Ukrainian and other reform republics during this period, and will also continue ties with effective organs of the center.
- The U.S. believes this transition period will be characterized by instability, uncertainty about the course of a union and the individual republics, a danger of violence and disorder and the problem that reform may be hampered by the ineffectiveness of the new governments taking power in the republics.
- This process of fundamental change poses great opportunities and great risks for NATO members.
- The U.S. believes that allies should consult frequently in NATO about the political and security issues that arise from the transfer of power to republics and the possibility that several new states may emerge from the disintegration of the old union in the months and years ahead.
- We strongly believe that NATO should be clear about its support for a process of peaceful change and be united in protecting its members' security interests, as we were in issuing the Rome Declaration.

UKRAINIAN RECOGNITION

- It is in the context of our Rome statement, and our common interests, that we meet today to take up the issue of the December 1 independence referendum in Ukraine.
- The question for us is not whether to recognize Ukraine, but how and when.
- We must be careful that our response does not contribute to accelerated disintegration and disorder in the former USSR. We must also be true to our long-standing general view that independence should both reflect the wishes of the people and result from a consensual process.
- We believe the vote will be solidly pro-independence, that the new Ukrainian government will assert its independence in the days following the vote and request western diplomatic recognition.
- While this likely development will require individual responses from each of our governments, we believe our interests will be served best by agreement on a common approach in NATO.
- We are mindful that whatever decision we reach on Ukrainian independence will strongly influence our position on

recognition for other republics which have also declared their independence and held valid referendums expressing popular will for separation from the union--specifically Armenia and Georgia, with others likely to follow soon.

- We should also be clear in our public and private remarks that while our approach is consistent with our general norms, it is tailored to the special case of the former USSR. The same approach may not be suitable in different circumstances.
- The U.S. will respect the will of the Ukrainian people and has no intention of standing in the way of Ukrainian independence.
- We intend to expand our relations with the new Ukrainian government with a view toward recognition and diplomatic relations once Ukraine has accepted certain basic political and security responsibilities in both areas.
- We do not favor imposing conditions on Ukraine that it must meet before we are willing to grant recognition and diplomatic relations.
- Instead, we believe NATO collectively and each of us individually should communicate certain factors to Ukraine which we will take into consideration in making our individual decisions.
- This will permit us to express what is important to us without imposing insuperable barriers for Ukraine.
- In this way, NATO can use the period following the December 1 vote to encourage Ukrainian policies that coincide with our basic security interests.
- We would therefore propose that NATO communicate the following factors to the new Ukrainian government as important in our ability to move forward toward recognition:
 - 1) Ratification and implementation of CFE, START, NPT and the BWC;
 - 2) Acceptance of their objective to be a nuclear free state, of a unitary, collective operational control over nuclear weapons belonging to the former USSR, and of full and immediate IAEA safeguards;
 - 3) Formal commitment to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and specifically the rule of law, basic human rights, the protection of minorities on their national

territory, respect for internal borders, and democratic principles;

4) Respect for international legal obligations.

- In addition to these factors, each of us should also focus our ongoing discussions with Ukraine and other republics on other important issues such as international economic obligations, debt, inter-republic trade barriers and conventional force levels.

NATO COORDINATION STEPS

- We propose that we all take this approach in our discussions with the new Ukrainian government and in public.
- Following today's meeting, we suggest that a reinforced NAC be held the week of December 2 to continue our consultations based on the results of the December 1 referendum. At that meeting, we can accomplish three objectives:
 - First, we can continue our consultations on the Ukrainian referendum, giving us a chance to assess the meaning of the referendum vote, the likely policies of the new Ukrainian government, and the reactions of the Russian and center governments.
 - Second, in keeping with the broad mandate of the Rome Summit for the Alliance to deal with change in the USSR, we would welcome an exchange on where we are on PNI implementation. We just had a Bartholomew-Obukhov session and want to share the results.
 - Third, we can exchange views on other unfolding events in the Union and the republics, and prepare the groundwork for further discussions at the mid-December DPC and NAC meetings.
- The U.S. would be represented at the December 2 reinforced NAC by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Robert Zoellick and Under Secretary for Security Assistance Reginald Bartholomew.
- This process will allow us to stay in touch on a weekly basis. Working together, we will have a greater impact.
- The U.S. intends to make a public statement in the days following the referendum which will voice support for the wishes of the Ukrainian people but stop short of a definitive statement on recognition.

- We will want to consult at the reinforced NAC and possibly the follow-on Ministerials before making an announcement on recognition.