

SECRET

RELEASED IN FULL

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002291

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EXDIS
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FOR UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW
FROM AMBASSADOR COURTNEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NTT
SUBJECT: SSD NON-PAPER

- 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
- 2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER REFLECTING THE U.S. SIDE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE END OF OUR TALKS TODAY. IT IS NOT A NEGOTIATED DOCUMENT. WE PROVIDED IT TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE TODAY AND ACCEPTED SOME OF ITS SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES; BOTH SIDES STRESSED THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS A NON-PAPER. WE ARE PROVIDING THE RUSSIAN MFA WITH A COPY OF THE FINAL VERSION.

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3. BEGIN TEXT:

- RESULTS OF THE 2ND MEETING OF THE
- SAFETY, SECURITY, AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD)
- WORKING GROUP
-
- JANUARY 15-24, 1992

IN THE INTEREST OF OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED

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STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN IMPLEMENTING THEIR COMMITMENTS TO DESTROY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH OUR LEADERS HAVE PLEDGED TO ELIMINATE, AND TO AID IN DEVELOPING SOUND PROPOSALS FOR ASSISTANCE IN EXPEDITING THE SAFE AND SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES MET IN MOSCOW FROM JANUARY 15 TO JANUARY 24.

THE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THIS MEETING WERE:

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN SIDES AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EXPERTS ON POTENTIAL RESPONSE MEASURES TO NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS WHICH MAY RELEASE SIGNIFICANT RADIATION. THE SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL AREAS WHERE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND COOPERATION MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL. A FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO HAVE EXPERTS MEETINGS WITH CLEARLY DEFINED AGENDAS.

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THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER DISCUSSIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO EXERCISE JOINTLY ANY SUCH CAPABILITY TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS.

TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS

THE RUSSIAN SIDE STATED THAT RUSSIA NEEDS APPROXIMATELY 250 TRUCKS AND 100 RAILCARS WITH ENHANCED SECURITY AND SAFETY FEATURES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS. THE U.S. SIDE STATED THAT 25 SAFE, SECURE RAILCARS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE IN THE UNITED STATES MAY POSSIBLY MEET RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS, IF APPROPRIATELY MODIFIED. THE SIDES AGREED TO EXCHANGE TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND TO WORK TOGETHER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THESE RAILCARS CAN MEET RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS AT REASONABLE EXPENSE. IF THESE CRITERIA CAN BE MET, THE UNITED STATES WILL

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EVALUATE WHETHER TO PROVIDE THESE RAILCARS TO RUSSIA.

THE U.S. SIDE ALSO OFFERED TO EXAMINE WHETHER IT IS FEASIBLE TO MODIFY A REPRESENTATIVE, STANDARD MILITARY PRODUCTION RUSSIAN RAILCAR AND TRUCK TO INCORPORATE SAFETY AND SECURITY FEATURES WHICH HAVE PROVED EFFECTIVE ON TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES. THE RUSSIAN SIDE STATED THAT RUSSIA WAS ALREADY USING MODIFIED

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TRUCKS TO TRANSPORT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WAS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF MODIFYING ARMORED SS-20 PERSONNEL VEHICLES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

CONTAINERS FOR WEAPONS

THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED INTEREST IN ENHANCING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH 250 "SUPERCONTAINERS" WHICH COULD PROTECT SEVERAL WEAPONS OF ANY TYPE SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE U.S. SIDE EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD NO SUCH GENERIC CAPABILITY. THE U.S. SIDE, HOWEVER, DESCRIBED A CONTAINER CAPABLE OF CARRYING A SINGLE SMALL WEAPON AND PROVIDING FIRE AND IMPACT PROTECTION SUITABLE FOR AIR TRANSPORT. THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED IT HAD NO INTEREST IN THIS CONTAINER, SINCE IT WAS DESIGNED FOR AIR SHIPMENT, WAS TOO SMALL FOR RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS,

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AND WAS UNPROTECTED AGAINST SMALL ARMS FIRE. THE U.S. SIDE THEN DESCRIBED A SURVIVABILITY OVERPACK CONTAINER CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SMALL ARMS FIRE, IMPACT, AND FIRE PROTECTION FOR UP TO THREE ARTILLERY SHELLS. THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED THAT THIS CONTAINER ALSO WAS TOO SMALL, BUT A LARGER CONTAINER WITH THE SAME FEATURES MIGHT BE OF INTEREST. THE U.S. SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NEED THE DIMENSIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL WEAPON CONTAINERS THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE WISHED TO PROTECT IN A SUPERCONTAINER BEFORE THE U.S.

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SIDE COULD EVALUATE WHETHER THE IDEA MERITED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. WITH THESE DIMENSIONS, THE U.S. SIDE COULD EVALUATE WHETHER IT COULD EASILY MODIFY EXISTING SUPERCONTAINER TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT THE RUSSIAN WEAPONS AND, IF POSSIBLE, PROVIDE THE DESIGN OF SUCH A SUPERCONTAINER. THE RUSSIAN SIDE INDICATED THAT RUSSIA HAD COMPLETED DESIGN OF SUCH A SUPERCONTAINER BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS PRODUCTION.

STORAGE AND TRANSPORT FOR NUCLEAR COMPONENTS AND FISSILE MATERIAL
THE RUSSIAN SIDE STATED THAT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BOTTLENECK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS CURRENT DISMANTLEMENT PLAN IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE LONG-TERM

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STORAGE FOR THE PLUTONIUM MATERIAL AND URANIUM COMPONENTS FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS. FURTHER DISCUSSION ALSO REVEALED THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE SAW A PRESSING NEED FOR ASSOCIATED STORAGE CONTAINERS.

TO BEGIN RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM, RUSSIA HAS SUGGESTED U.S. AID, IN THE AMOUNT OF \$400 MILLION, TO CONSTRUCT A 20,000-SQUARE-METER STORAGE FACILITY. WITH SUCH ASSISTANCE, THIS FACILITY COULD BE AVAILABLE IN 1995 TO ACCEPT PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM (WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE, IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN 1997). \$300 MILLION WOULD BE SPENT TO CONSTRUCT THE FACILITY AND TO BUILD STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR THE PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM, AND \$100 MILLION WOULD BE USED FOR SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE (HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS, HOUSING) IN NEARBY COMMUNITIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE

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FACILITY. THE RUSSIAN SIDE SAID RUSSIA HAS ACCELERATED ITS DISMANTLEMENT RATE, BUT SAID THIS RATE WAS LIMITED BY THE LACK OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM STORAGE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE WOULD PROVIDE ITS CURRENT DISMANTLEMENT RATE, BUT INDICATED THAT ITS DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES DID NOT LIMIT ITS DISMANTLEMENT RATE.

THE U.S. SIDE DESCRIBED ITS EXPERIENCE WITH PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM CONTAINER STORAGE AND THE DESIGN OF AN UNDERGROUND STORAGE FACILITY. THIS EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT 200 PLUTONIUM COMPONENTS CAN BE STORED IN 100 SQUARE METERS, AND THE U.S. SIDE IS REVIEWING A PLAN FOR STORAGE OF 400 COMPONENTS (IN THE SAME SPACE) IF TWO LEVELS OF STORAGE ARE USED. ON THIS BASIS, THE PLUTONIUM COMPONENTS FOR A MINIMUM OF 20,000 WEAPONS CAN BE STORED IN 10,000 SQUARE METERS. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO DESCRIBED AN UNDERGROUND STORAGE FACILITY OF APPROXIMATELY 30,000 SQUARE METERS WHICH WAS CONSTRUCTED IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS FOR A COST OF LESS THAN \$50 MILLION. A RECENT COST ESTIMATE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION OF A FACILITY OF SIMILAR SIZE, INCLUDING ROBOTIC HANDLING EQUIPMENT, WAS APPROXIMATELY \$100 MILLION. THE RUSSIAN SIDE AGREED TO EVALUATE WHETHER A FACILITY AND METHOD OF STORAGE OF THIS TYPE WOULD MEET RUSSIA'S REQUIREMENTS.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THIS

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DESIGN AS DESCRIBED DID NOT MEET RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR FACILITY HARDNESS AGAINST WARTIME CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

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THE U.S. SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE IT WAS UP TO RUSSIA TO DECIDE ON ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM MATERIALS FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS, ANOTHER CONCEPT MERITED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. SIDE STRESSED THAT THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE SLOWED IN ORDER TO WAIT FOR COMPLETION OF A LONG-TERM STORAGE FACILITY FOR PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM. UNDER THIS APPROACH, THE PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM COMPONENTS FROM DISMANTLED WEAPONS WOULD BE STORED IN EXISTING MILITARY NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES, OCCUPYING SPACE VACATED BY DISMANTLED WEAPONS. IN THIS CASE, STORAGE CONTAINERS WOULD BE NEEDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALLOW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL RELEVANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIV

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E YEARS SOONER THAN THE CURRENT RUSSIAN PLAN. ANY
PLANNING FOR LONGER-TERM STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM AND
URANIUM IN SLUG OR COMPONENT FORM COULD THEN PROCEED
INDEPENDENTLY OF AN ACCELERATED DISMANTLEMENT RATE.
THE RUSSIAN SIDE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT WHAT IT SAW
AS SERIOUS OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THIS APPROACH. THE U.S. SIDE SUGGESTED EVALUATION
OF THE SAFETY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF STORING
PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM COMPONENTS, WITHOUT HIGH
EXPLOSIVE, INSTEAD OF STORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

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NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE SPACE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE AGREED
WITH THE U.S. SIDE'S STATEMENT THAT, UNDER ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES, STORING PLUTONIUM SEPARATELY FROM HIGH
EXPLOSIVE IS SAFER THAN STORING THE TWO TOGETHER IN A
NUCLEAR WEAPON.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE SAID THAT RUSSIA NEEDS SPECIAL
CONTAINERS TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE
TRANSPORTATION OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM COMPONENTS AND
MATERIALS AMONG DISMANTLEMENT FACILITIES, STORAGE
FACILITIES, AND FACILITIES FOR CONVERTING COMPONENTS INTO
SLUGS.

THE U.S. SIDE GAVE BRIEFINGS ON COMPONENT AND MATERIAL
TRANSPORT CONTAINERS, PROVIDED DRAWINGS AND DESIGN DATA,
AND MADE CLEAR THESE CONTAINERS WERE ALSO SUITABLE FOR
STORAGE. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION ON ITS
SLUG STORAGE CONTAINERS.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE AGREED TO EVALUATE WHETHER PLUTONIUM AND

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URANIUM COMPONENTS WOULD FIT INTO THESE CONTAINERS; THEIR INITIAL REACTION WAS POSITIVE. THE RUSSIAN SIDE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF NEUTRON SHIELDING AND BALLISTIC PROTECTION ON THOSE CONTAINERS. IF THE RUSSIAN SIDE CONTINUES TO EXPRESS INTEREST, THE U.S. SIDE WILL EVALUATE WHETHER TO SUPPLY PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM STORAGE CONTAINERS OF THE TYPE DEVELOPED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM COMPONENTS TO ASSIST IN DISMANTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EARMARKED FOR DESTRUCTION.

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TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE

THE U.S. SIDE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR PLANS FOR DISABLEMENT, DISMANTLEMENT, AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR COMPONENTS AND FISSILE MATERIAL. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. SIDE SOUGHT MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION AS TO THE IDENTITY, LOCATION, AND CAPACITIES OF RUSSIAN DISMANTLEMENT AND STORAGE FACILITIES. THE U.S. SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT INFORMATION ON THESE POINTS PROVIDED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETINGS WAS VERY INCOMPLETE.

THE U.S. SIDE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND CANDOR FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE ON THESE ISSUES WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN PERMITTING THE U.S. TO JUDGE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC FORMS OF ASSISTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. SIDE APPRECIATED RUSSIAN CANDOR CONCERNING THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THREATS OF TERRORISM AND CIVIL UNREST.

THE U.S. SIDE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE, TO THE PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, OF U.S. ACCESS TO RUSSIAN TRANSPORT, DISMANTLEMENT, AND STORAGE SITES, AND PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM OPERATIONS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVING FIRSTHAND EXISTING RUSSIAN PRACTICES AND EQUIPMENT. SUCH VISITS AND OBSERVATION ARE A KEY ELEMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL OF DETAILED, CONCRETE, AND PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR ASSISTANCE, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EXPEDITING SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORT, DISMANTLEMENT AND STORAGE OF THE WEAPONS COMMITTED BY RUSSIA FOR DESTRUCTION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

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THE RUSSIAN SIDE STATED THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNDER
CONSIDERATION.

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