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Lee R. Lohman, DAS, A/RPS
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E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL NO. 143, SENT 08/23/94

1. (LOU) TO TOM LYNCH FROM BILL BURNS. WE FOUND
OUT AFTER THE FACT THAT VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKIY WAS A
MEMBER OF A DUMA DELEGATION RECENTLY INVITED TO
ATTEND A HARVARD MID-CAREER PROGRAM. (HE DECLINED
BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE BEEN A STUDENT, NOT AN
INSTRUCTOR.) OUR CONSULAR SECTION HAS ALSO HEARD
THAT THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
HAS INVITED ZHIRINOVSKIY TO SPEAK IN SAN FRANCISCO
DURING THE SUMMIT NEXT MONTH. GIVEN THE CONTROVERSY

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SURROUNDING ZHIRINOVSKIY'S BEHAVIOR AND VISA PROBLEMS
IN EUROPE, AND THE MEDIA CIRCUS THAT WOULD ACCOMPANY
ANY TRIP TO THE U.S., HAS THE DEPARTMENT GIVEN ANY
QUIET THOUGHT TO HOW TO HANDLE THE ISSUE IF IT ARISES
(ESPECIALLY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT)?

2. (LOU) TO ISCA/CAST - LESLIE DAVIDSON FROM EST -
KEN FAIRFAX: I FOUND OUT THIS MORNING THAT A CABLE
THAT I THOUGHT I SENT FIVE DAYS AGO NEVER WENT OUT.
THE TOPIC WAS POSSIBLE ORIGINS OF THE 560 GRAMS OF MOX

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SEIZED AT THE MUNICH AIRPORT. THE INFORMATION IN THE CABLE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY OBE BY NOW, BUT I THOUGHT I WOULD PASS ON JUST A FEW DETAILS JUST IN CASE THEY ARE STILL USEFUL TO ANYONE. THE RENDITION OF FACTS IN THIS OI REPEATS THE ONLY PARTS OF THE CABLE WHICH MIGHT STILL BE OF INTEREST AND INCLUDES SOME NEW INFORMATION. THE SHORT ANSWER IS THAT MY BEST GUESSES ON WHERE TO LOOK TO FIND THE ORIGIN OF THE 560 GRAMS OF PLUTONIUM/URANIUM OXIDE SEIZED IN MUNICH ARE: BELOYARSK, DMITROVGRAD, OBNINSK, AND CHELYABINSK. DETAILS FOLLOW.

THE CABLE (WHICH WAS WRITTEN BEFORE WE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT THE MATERIAL OTHER THAN THAT IT CONTAINED A MIXTURE OF LESS-THAN-WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM), REF'D SOME OF MY PREVIOUS CABLES ON MC&A AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION TO START FROM THE THESIS THAT A WELL-INFORMED THIEF FAMILIAR WITH RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL PRACTICES WOULD MOST LIKELY TARGET MATERIAL CONSIDERED TO BE

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WHILE PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT NUCLEAR FINGERPRINTING CONTAINS A LARGE DEGREE OF PURE HOKUM, IT IS TRUE THAT ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR PLUTONIUM IS A SYSTEM OF RULES GOVERNING WHAT INSTITUTES/FACILITIES AND WHO WITHIN THEM IS ALLOWED ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM. IN ADDITION, WHILE ACCESS TO HEU IS FAIRLY WIDESPREAD, ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM IS VERY RESTRICTED. BECAUSE ONLY A HANDFUL OF PLACES HAVE ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM AND EACH LOCATION GENERALLY HAS ACCESS TO IT IN ONLY A LIMITED

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NUMBER OF FORMS, KNOWLEDGE BY RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES OF THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF A SAMPLE COULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD PINPOINTING ITS SOURCE. WHILE FSK CONTROLS OVER PLUTONIUM AT MILITARY FACILITIES (INCLUDING MINATOM'S MILITARY NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES) ARE STRICT AND TIGHT ENOUGH TO ALLOW THE FSK TO ZOOM IN ON A SOURCE GIVEN THE CONTENT OF A SAMPLE, THE FSK DOES NOT CONTROL ALL NON-MILITARY SITES. AS NOTED ABOVE,

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THE 560 GRAM SAMPLE PROBABLY CAME FROM A NON-MILITARY SITE.

SITES WITH ACCESS TO MOX: RUSSIA DOES NOT CURRENTLY USE MOX AS A STANDARD FUEL IN CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY OTHER CABLES, HOWEVER, MIKHAYLOV IS ACTIVELY WORKING ON PLANS TO INCREASE THE USE OF PLUTONIUM AS A FUEL. THE "SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS" (NIIAR) IS ONE OF TWO PRIMARY CENTERS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIXED PLUTONIUM/URANIUM OXIDE (MOX) FUEL ELEMENTS FOR VVER REACTORS. NIIAR, WHICH IS LOCATED IN DMITROVGRAD, OPERATES A NUMBER OF RESEARCH REACTORS WHICH UTILIZE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU), PLUTONIUM AND MOX FUELS. THE OTHER PRIMARY MOX RESEARCH FACILITY IS THE MOSCOW-BASED "SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INORGANIC MATERIALS" (VNIINM),

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WHICH CONDUCTS RESEARCH ON MOX FUEL ASSEMBLIES FOR THE
PLANNED BN-800 BREEDER REACTOR AND CURRENT VVER-1000
REACTORS. SCIENTISTS TELL ME, HOWEVER, THAT VNIINM
DOES ENGINEERING RESEARCH ON PAPER ONLY AND DOES NOT
HAVE PLUTONIUM ON HAND.

TWO OTHER INSTITUTES -- THE INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS
AND POWER ENGINEERING IN OBNINSK AND THE INSTITUTE OF
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AT DUBNA -- ALSO CONDUCT RESEARCH
INVOLVING THE USE OF PLUTONIUM AS A FUEL SOURCE,
ALTHOUGH SCIENTISTS HAVE TOLD ME THAT THEY BELIEVE THE
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RESEARCH AT DUBNA IS THEORETICAL ONLY AND THE FACILITY
DOES NOT KEEP PLUTONIUM ON HAND. (BECAUSE DUBNA IS AN
"INTERNATIONAL" FACILITY, KEEPING PLUTONIUM OUT OF
DUBNA WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL RUSSIAN
POLICY OF RESTRICTING ACCESS TO PLUTONIUM.)

THE BN-600 REACTOR AT THE BELOYARSKY NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT (NEAR YEKATERINBERG) IS RUSSIA'S ONLY
OPERATING "FAST BREEDER" CIVILIAN REACTOR. THE BN-600
IS CAPABLE OF USING A VARIETY OF FUELS, INCLUDING MOX,
AND PRODUCES A FAIRLY LARGE QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM WITH
A PU-240 CONTENT IN THE ABOVE 10 PERCENT RANGE.
ACCORDING TO SCIENTISTS IN MOSCOW, THE ENGINEERING LAB
AT BELOYARSKY HAS FACILITIES FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM

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AND WORKING ON EXPERIMENTAL MOX FUEL MIXTURES.

RUSSIA'S BIGGEST CENTER FOR NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION OF ALL TYPES IS THE MAYAK COMPLEX (CHELYABINSK-65 PLUS MANY OTHER RELATED FACILITIES). RUSSIA'S PRIMARY FUEL REPROCESSING FACILITY (KNOWN AS RT-1) IS LOCATED AT C-65. UNLIKE THE MILITARY REPROCESSING FACILITY AT TOMSK-7, RT-1 WOULD ROUTINELY PRODUCE PLUTONIUM -- LIKE THE PLUTONIUM PORTION OF THE 560 GRAM SAMPLE SEIZED IN MUNICH -- WITH A PU-240 CONTENT ABOVE THE LEVELS NORMALLY DESIRED FOR BOMB MAKING. WHILE MAYAK IS PART OF THE MILITARY-RELATED COMPLEX AND IS THUS SUBJECT TO FSK SECURITY,

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THE GAS TURBINE MODULAR HELIUM REACTOR (GT-MHR) THAT MIKHAYLOV HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR THE LAST 10 MONTHS IS DESIGNED TO USE A VARIETY OF FUELS, INCLUDING PLUTONIUM. ACCORDING TO ITS PROPONENTS, HOWEVER, THE REACTOR WILL USE PURE PLUTONIUM, NOT MOX. NONETHELESS, I THOUGHT I SHOULD NOTE THAT THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH AT DUBNA IS THE PRIMARY SITE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE GT-MHR, ALTHOUGH RESEARCH ON FUEL FABRICATION IS ALSO TAKING PLACE AT TOMSK-7 AND THE NOVOSIBIRSK CHEMICAL CONCENTRATES PLANT. ALTHOUGH THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE IN MOSCOW IS ALSO INVOLVED IN RESEARCH ON GT-MHR, KURCHATOV MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS NUCLEAR SAFETY INSPECTORS CONFIRM THAT THE INSTITUTE DOES NOT ROUTINELY HANDLE PLUTONIUM AND HAS ONLY A VERY SMALL QUANTITY ON HAND FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH PURPOSES.

(C) FOR JOHN HERBST FROM BILL BURNS: WE DELIVERED THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN LETTER ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROLS TO THE PM'S STAFF ON 8/22 (CHERNOMYRDIN HIMSELF WAS IN YAROSLVAL YESTERDAY).

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DELIVERY ALSO CONFIRMED TO WHITE HOUSE VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL.

4. (LOU) FOR JOHN HERBST AND NERISSA COOK FROM DICK
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MILES, BILL BURNS, JEANNIE BOURGALT, AND MASHA YOVANOVITCH PER O-I 164 SENT 8/19, WE CHECKED INTO THE RETURN FLIGHTS FROM NIZHNIY TO MOSCOW FOR JIM COLLINS. ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, THERE IS A FLIGHT THAT DEPARTS NIZHNIY AT 6:30PM AND ARRIVES MOSCOW AT 7:55PM. THIS IS THE ONLY FLIGHT IN THE AFTERNOON/EVENING. THE TRAIN OPTION IS NOT FEASIBLE: THE ONLY TRAIN THAT FITS THE TIME CONSTRAINTS TAKES EIGHT HOURS AND GETS INTO MOSCOW AT 4:00AM. THANKS FOR THE HEADS-UP ON THE FISCAL DATA FOR AN EMBASSY ADVANCE TEAM. JEANNIE HAD A CONVERSATION WITH JAN PAULK ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, DURING WHICH JAN AGREED TO SEND FISCAL DATA FOR A STATE OFFICER TO ADVANCE NIZHNIY (TOTAL COST SHOULD BE ABOUT \$300.) THE AID FOLKS HAVE MONEY THAT CAN BE USED TO FINANCE THEIR PORTION OF THE TRAVEL. ONE AID OFFICER IS OUT THERE NOW TO DETERMINE THE BEST PROJECT SITES. TONIGHT, TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, WE ARE SENDING A POLITICAL OFFICER

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AND THE AID ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER TO HANDLE THE MEETINGS AND LOGISTICS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE FISCAL DATA. JAN MENTIONED THAT SHE MIGHT WANT TO DISCUSS THE EMBASSY'S REQUEST FOR FISCAL DATA WITH THE AMBASSADOR; HE HAS BEEN FULLY BRIEFED. O-I 141 SENT 8/19 INDICATED MOST MEMBERS OF THE CODEL WOULD WANT ACCESS TO THE EMBASSY. DOES THIS MEAN ACCESS TO THE EOB CORE OR ACCESS TO THE NEC? AS YOU KNOW, ANYONE NEEDING ACCESS TO THE CORE MUST SEND A FRONT CHANNEL DS CABLE WITH THEIR CLEARANCES IN ADVANCE. AT THIS POINT, WE HAVE NO ACTIVITIES PLANNED

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FOR THE CODEL AT EITHER THE NEC OR THE EOB, EXCEPT FOR THE SPOUSE LUNCHEON AND ACCESS FOR THIS EVENT WILL NOT BE A PROBLEM. IF POSSIBLE, WE WOULD DISCOURAGE THE DELEGATION MEMBERS FROM VISITING THE NEC, AS THEY WOULD EITHER NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY ESCORTED OR A BADGE SYSTEM WOULD NEED TO BE INSTITUTED. DID THEY HAVE A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY OR MEETING IN MIND? LAST POINT: WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD ENCOURAGE THE CODEL TO SEND IN THE FLIGHT PLAN. GIVEN THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE HAD IN THE PAST AND THE NUMBER OF USG PLANES IN RUSSIA THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER, SOONER IS DEFINITELY BETTER.

5. (U) TO GLADYS BOLUDA AND SEBASTIAN LIBERATORE FROM AMB. PICKERING. THANKS FOR YOUR HELP WITH THE GUEST OF EMBASSY VISA YESTERDAY. ALL'S WELL.

6. (UNCLAS) TO NERISSA COOK FROM PENNIS CURRY. PER

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8/18 CURRY/PAULK TELCON. JAN PAULK INDICATED THAT MRS. LEAHY WANTED TO BRING MEDICINES WITH HER TO DONATE TO THE HOSPITAL SHE PLANS TO VISIT. RACHEL MAYS, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE HOSPITAL PROJECT SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING: CHILDREN'S TYLENOL, OXYTOCIN (A LABOR-INDUCING DRUG), IRON PILLS-FOLLIC ACID PILLS FOR PREGNANT WOMEN/NURSING MOTHERS, VITAMINS FOR PREGNANT WOMEN/POSTNATAL VITAMINS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED TO LET SUCH THINGS IN WITH NO SPECIAL PROCEDURES. VACCINES, HOWEVER, ARE REQUIRED TO BE TESTED, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR A SIMPLE HAND-OVER. LIKEWISE, RACHEL MAYS SAID THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF ANTI-BIOTICS IS ALSO DIFFERENT ENOUGH FROM US

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PRACTICE AS TO MAKE US ANTIBIOTICS HIGHLY
PROBLEMATIC. ELIZABETH KQUITASHVILI OF USAID ALSO
SAID THE CHILDREN'S WARD NEEDS ALL SORTS OF THINGS LIKE
COLORING BOOKS, CRAYONS, ETC. FOR THE CHILDREN INTERNED
THERE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU FORWARDED THIS
INFORMATION TO MRS. LEAHY.

PICKERING

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