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A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
William Burr, Editor
May 18, 2001
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The National Security Archive publishes here for the first time President
Dwight D. Eisenhower's instructions to commanders providing advance authorization
("predelegation") for the use of nuclear weapons under specific emergency
conditions, what political scientist Peter Roman has called "Ike's Hair
Trigger."1 This document and several
related ones were declassified on 4 April 2001 by the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) in response to an appeal by the National
Security Archive, which first requested the documents in 1993.2
Eisenhower began making decisions on predelegation
in the mid-1950s when he approved instructions for the use of nuclear weapons
for the air defense of U.S. territory. Soon he came to support broader
instructions that would allow a quick reaction to other kinds of nuclear
attacks when there was not enough time, or it was not possible, to communicate
with higher authorities. For example, if the Soviets suddenly attacked
major U.S. forces in Europe or if they launched missiles against U.S. territory
and the president could not be reached, top commanders would have the authority
to use nuclear weapons in response. Authorized commanders would include
the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), Commander-in-Chief,
European Command (CINCEUR), and Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT),
among others.
That Eisenhower authorized and approved predelegation
instructions has been disclosed in declassified documents published in
earlier National Security Archive electronic briefing books during 1998.3
Those documents were also released by ISCAP in response to mandatory review
appeals filed by Archive staff. One of the most important items released
in 1998 was a presidential authorization, dated 22 May 1957, that provided
guidelines for the preparation of specific instructions to the Defense
Department and authorized commanders on the "expenditure of nuclear weapons"
in emergency circumstances, for example, if a nuclear attack upon U.S.
territory had begun and the president could not be reached.
While important documents on Eisenhower's decisionmaking
on predelegation have been declassified, significant material remained
unavailable until ISCAP's recent actions. The most prominent was
the "implementing instructions" prepared in response to Eisenhower's May
1957 authorization. ISCAP also declassified two documents that illustrate
Eisenhower's important supervisory role during 1958-1959 when State Department
and Pentagon officials prepared drafts of the instructions. Eisenhower
played a central role in the review process in order to avoid imprecisely
worded instructions that could permit the reckless or accidental use of
nuclear weapons. Thus, at various stages he acted to tighten up the
language to ensure that authority to use nuclear weapons was not "assumed
through accident or misinformation."
Even though ISCAP released significant information,
the "Instructions" remain partly classified. Apparently, the Defense
representative to ISCAP objected to complete declassification on the grounds
that some of the text relates to war plans currently in effect. Whether
the withheld language would shed further light on risky elements in predelegation
policy remains to be seen. Certainly Peter Roman's question as to
why "civilian leaders willingly reduced their control on such a critical
area and accepted increased dangers" remains a challenging one for students
of Cold War national security policy.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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Document
1 |
| Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with
the President, June 27, 1958 - 11:05 AM," 30 June 1958, Top Secret, 4 pp. |
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| Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Records of the White House Office of the Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, box 1, file "Atomic
Weapons, Corresp. & Background for Pres. Approval & Instructions
for Use of," (2) |
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This record of an Eisenhower meeting with senior State and
Defense Department officials was selected for publication in the State
Department's Foreign Relations series but it was not declassified, presumably
because of Defense Department objections.4
Goodpaster's account depicts one of the moments in Eisenhower's review
of a draft of the instructions to commanders. Apparently the
draft included some imprecise language because he argued that delegating
authority to a "local commander would be getting pretty far out."
Nevertheless, Eisenhower's approach did not preclude risks because he acknowledged
that the need for a rapid response could require "greater delegation."
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles saw other risks: the possibility
that the instructions might lead to restrictions on U.S. freedom of action;
they were bound to leak to allied governments; and U.S. allies would try
to impose restrictions on nuclear weapons use or even try to expel U.S.
forces. This did not seem to worry Eisenhower because he insisted
on tight controls over the instructions: only six or seven top commanders
would read them and they "would have to certify that they have not shown
[them] to anyone else."
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Document
2 |
| Letter from President Eisenhower to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Thomas Gates, 2 November 1959, Top Secret, 2 pp. |
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| Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Records of the White House Office of the Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, box 1, file "Atomic
Weapons, Corresp. & Background for Pres. Approval & Instructions
for Use of," (4) |
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This letter illustrates Eisenhower's considerable interest
and involvement in the preparation of the predelegation instructions.
Significantly, it shows his determination to ensure that the language narrowed
the risks of "giving license" to the Pentagon and authorized commanders
to "expend" nuclear weapons. Consistent with that, Eisenhower also
wanted to approve the language of any supplementary guidance to commanders
on procedures for obtaining U.S. government consent for nuclear weapons
use. Also to prevent misunderstandings, Eisenhower wanted Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who would soon become Secretary of Defense,
to meet with the authorized commanders to ensure that they were of "one
mind" as to the "letter and spirit" of the instructions.
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Document
3 |
| "Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in
Accordance with the Presidential Authorization Dated May 22, 1957," revised
between 28 January 1959 and 12 May 1960, Top Secret, Excised Copy, 23 pp. |
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| Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Records of the White House Office of the Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, box 1, file "Atomic
Weapons, Corresp. & Background for Pres. Approval & Instructions
for Use of," (1) |
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The various dates on this document, from 28 January 1959 to
12 May 1960, show Eisenhower's continuous effort to ensure that the instructions
conformed to his wishes, so that top commanders would understand the circumstances
under which the "expenditure" of nuclear weapons would be permissible without
direct approval by civilian authorities. Thus, to prevent a nuclear
response to minor military encounters and incursions, the instructions
described major attack scenarios by "Sino-Soviet forces" that could prompt
nuclear use decisions: launching of missiles against the U.S. by a submarine;
missile/bomber, "air-to-air" or "strafing" attacks against a "major U.S.
force", "major assault" by "Sino-Soviet" forces in an area "occupied by
major U.S. forces in foreign territory", or nuclear attack upon the United
States itself. In other words, nuclear weapons use would be permissible
only if U.S. territory or major military forces were in danger of destruction.
Moreover, assuming that there would be someone left to pick up the pieces
the authorization to use nuclear weapons was temporary, "effective only
until it is possible ... to communicate with the President, or other person
empowered to act in his stead."
Significantly, except for the reference to "missiles",
the instructions did not specifically differentiate between nuclear or
conventional attacks on U.S. forces operating overseas. For example,
if Warsaw Pact forces suddenly moved into West Germany and overwhelmed
U.S. forces there with conventional means, the CINCEUR would have the authority
to initiate a nuclear response. Although Eisenhower had reservations
about authorizing nuclear responses to conventional attacks, such an authorization
was wholly consistent with his concept of deterrence. For example,
U.S. and NATO planning during the 1950s and early 1960s emphasized early
use of nuclear weapons during a major military confrontation in Central
Europe. As much as Eisenhower deplored the possibility of nuclear
war, his estimate that the Soviets would not make decisions to destroy
themselves enabled him to tolerate any risks that inhered in the predelegation
instructions.
The "instructions to commanders" paper was worked
into a series of instructions to each unified or specified commander.
In 1998 ISCAP also declassified versions of these papers but they were
incomplete and may have been superseded by other documents.5
However the instructions at the CINC level read,
Eisenhower had great confidence that his CINCS would not transgress them
and precipitate a cataclysm. Certainly to ensure strict secrecy but
perhaps also to limit the risks, knowledge of the instructions would be
"limited to a restricted group of people" (the details of which remain
classified). These restrictive procedures were effective; the existence
of predelegation instructions came to light during the early 1980s6,
but it took nearly two decades for the Defense Department to agree to release
details on one of the deepest and riskiest Cold War military secrets.
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Document
4 |
| National Security Archive, Letter to Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel, "Eisenhower LIbrary Mandatory Review Case
NLE 89-321," 13 December 1999, 2 pp. |
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Document
5 |
| Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, Letter
to National Security Archive, includes attachment, "ISCAP Decisions on
the Twelth [sic] Appeal Filed by the National Security Archive," 4 April
2001, 2 pp. |
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Notes
1. Peter J. Roman, "Ike's Hair Trigger: U.S. Nuclear
Predelegation, 1953-60," Security Studies 7 (Summer 1998): 121-65,
written just before the 1998 ISCAP releases, remains the basic study of
Eisenhower's decisions.
2. Document pages and paragraphs with lines across
or through them indicate the information that had been withheld prior to
the Archive's final appeal to ISCAP.
3. See <http://www.nsarchive.org/news/19980319.htm>.
For press coverage of 1998 releases see Walter Pincus, "Military Got Authority
to Use Nuclear Arms in 1957," Washington Post, 21 March 1998, p.
A1, and "Eisenhower Issued Limited Nuclear Authority Absent Presidential
Order, Ibid., 2 September 1998.
4. See Foreign Relations of the United States
1958-60, III, National Security Policy (Washington, D.C., 1998), 125,
item 29.
5. Each page of the incomplete instructions had
a line across the text suggesting that they may have been superseded.
6. See David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill:
Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," in Steven E. Miller,
ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton University Press,
1984), at 153 and 159--first published in International Security
in Spring 1983--for perhaps the earliest published reference to predelegation
instructions.
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