

~~STEPS TO PREVENT / KAN / 303~~

DCI DEFENSE

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CH 201
mid July

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TOP SECRET
6/22

APPROPRIATION BRIEFING

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THE PUEBLO

(says copy)

~~STEPS TO PREVENT~~

I. I know of no substantial change in the status

of the negotiations going on at Panmunjom in Korea for the release of the crew of the Pueblo.

A. The most recent meeting, the 21st in the series, was held on September 17.

1. The North Koreans stated that before there could be any discussions of whether release of the crew would occur simultaneously with any United States meeting of North Korean demands, the United States would have to agree to sign the North Korean document presented on May 8. This document, written by the North Koreans, is a United States confession of guilt and apology and guarantee against such acts in the future.

B. The most significant observation made on this meeting is that General Woodward believes the North Koreans have become convinced that the United States is now prepared to sign the May statement.

1. No date has been set for the next meeting, but General Woodward anticipates

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that the North Koreans may try rather soon to press the United States into acceding to their demands--possibly by agreeing to simultaneous release.

2. We have not detected any North Korean feelers or overtures in any other forum, and there have been no Soviet initiatives regarding release of the crew.

II. As far as we can judge, the crew has not been physically mistreated. After the seizure they were taken straight to the capital. We know that in February the crew was being held in a walled compound at the airborne training school east of Pyongyang. They probably are still there, as reported by Japanese correspondents on September 13th.

III. In mid-February the ship was moved from its initial anchorage near Wonsan, on the central part of the east coast, to Najin near the Soviet border. The North Koreans have been dismantling the antennas, and by now probably have completed their exploitation of the ship's equipment.

Washington Post Article

IV. You may have seen a Washington Post article on September 13 alleging that "the U.S Navy

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intelligence ship Pueblo at one time had been under instructions to probe well within what North Korea considers its territorial waters." This is a gross misconception.

A. A general instruction issued by CINC PAC FLEET in February 1966 for information of most Pacific Fleet unit commanders stated that, for purposes of air and shipborne reconnaissance, the United States recognized only three-mile limits in the case of North Korea and the Paracels Islands.

1. North Korea claims 12 nautical miles.
2. This was a general instruction, not a specific operation order for intelligence reconnaissance missions.

B. I call your attention to the date of February, 1966. The Pueblo at that time had not been commissioned as an intelligence ship. The Pueblo received its first sailing orders, for its maiden reconnaissance mission as a newly commissioned intelligence ship, almost two years later on January 5, 1968.

1. It was the first surface intelligence ship to be assigned North Korea as a

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specific target, and the January 5 orders specifically directed that the Pueblo's closest point of approach to North Korea was to be 13 nautical miles.

b

C. When Navy ships are commissioned, along with the silverware and other equipment they usually get a complete set of Navy regulations and instructions, and the Pueblo somewhere in these files had a copy of the general instructions of February 1966.

1. Inasmuch as the Pueblo was not an intelligence ship in 1966, however, it can hardly be said that it was ever under orders to probe within the 12 miles of territorial waters claimed by North Korea.

V. As for the present situation, there are two restrictions on peripheral reconnaissance missions against North Korea by sea and air.

A. A Joint Chiefs of Staff restriction orders that, unless specifically directed, U.S. ships and aircraft on reconnaissance missions north of lines extending due east and west from the ends of the Korean Demilitarized Zone

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will approach no closer than 40 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea.

1. The 40-mile zone in August replaced an 80-mile zone ordered last February by CINC PAC and the Joint Reconnaissance Committee in February, immediately after the Pueblo seizure.

B. The second restriction has been applied by Pacific Air Command (PACAF) to aircraft flights along the Demilitarized Zone. This states that aircraft will stay at least one to 11 miles away from the DMZ line, depending on the type of aircraft.

VI. These restrictions cover peripheral reconnaissance. Any actual overflight reconnaissance would have to be specifically authorized by a special committee of the National Security Council.

VII. All signal intelligence ships engaged in operations similar to those in which Pueblo was engaged are assigned CPA's, or closest points of approach, which vary according to the territorial waters claimed by countries adjoining operating areas. Off the west coast of Africa, for example, Ivory Coast claims 6 nautical miles and the CPA

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is six and a half, while Ghana claims 12 miles so that the CPA is twelve and a half.

B. In addition, the National Security Council committee has imposed greater restrictions in areas where a tense situation exists.

1. In the Middle East, for instance, certain types of ship and aircraft missions have been cancelled completely, while signal intelligence ships are required to operate with a destroyer or aircraft escort.

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