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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

U. S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT
STAFFINST C3490.1E
Ser J5/C9-85
28 OCT 1985



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USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT STAFF INSTRUCTION C3490.1E

Subj: DECEPTION PLANNING ORGANIZATION (U)

- Ref: (a) ANNEX K to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-85)
(b) JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 116, Military Deception
(c) ANNEX T to the Navy Capabilities Plan (NCP)
(d) NWP 34D, U.S. Navy Operational Deception
(e) OPNAVINST C3490.1C
(f) Appendix 7 to ANNEX C to USCINCLANT Operations Order 2000
(g) Appendix 7 to ANNEX C to CINCLANTFLT Operations Order 2000

1. (U) Purpose. To establish within the staffs of USCINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT the organization necessary to plan, implement, conduct, control, review and evaluate deception operations.
2. (U) Cancellation. CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT STAFFINST C3490.1D.
3. (U) Background
 - a. (C)
 - b. (C)
 - c. (C)

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d. (C)

4. (U) USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Staff Organization

a. (C) Focal Point Officers (FPO). Primary point of contact at USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Headquarters for coordination of deception activities are called Focal Point Officers (FPO).

b. (C) Staff Deception Contact Officers. Deception contact officers,

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t

5. (U) Special Handling Measures

a. (C) Special Handling:

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b. (C)

c. (C)

6. (U) Planning Considerations

a. (U) To be successful, deceptions must be planned concurrently with operational planning, as an integral part of the initial concept and follow-on planning. Deception activity conceived as an after-thought is seldom effective.

b. (C)

c. (U) With the exception of exercises designed to test deception equipment or special techniques, deception must support the objectives of the operations, and is not normally undertaken as an end in itself. Peacetime deception operations, however, may be conducted strictly to assess or demonstrate our capability to execute them. Any operation planned primarily as a deception operation (e.g., covert transit) must be carefully assessed in terms of what is gained and lost. A demonstration of capability may ultimately lead to loss of that capability if an adversary gains appreciation of it and develops counter tactics. However, there is no assurance that the capability really exists if it is never exercised.

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7. (U) Action. Deception operations are employed to keep enemy forces confused and misinformed as to the true nature, mission, intentions, or objectives of U.S. forces, and represent a very economical means of gaining military advantage. The ability to employ military deception is no different than any other military skill; as a result, it must be exercised. Deception operations will be considered for all military operations, and will be employed in exercises at every opportunity.

A) 8. (U) Special Means and Feed Material

A) a. (C)

A) b. (C)

A) c. (C) The following responsibilities and procedures apply to the processing of Special Means and feed material actions:

A)

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(A)

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
(A)

(A)

(A)

(A)

d. (C) It is USCINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT policy to maintain a single point of contact for deception operations. (A)


JOHN H. FETTERMAN, JR.
Deputy and Chief of Staff
Acting

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