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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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UNAMIR

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1994

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF RGF/RPF
 INTENTIONS AS OF 20 FEB 1994

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Please find attached a memorandum prepared by the Force Commander on the military situation, including an assessment of RGF/RPF intentions as of 20 Feb 1994.

Regards.

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UNAMIR
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

2/7

File No. 1990

To: Special Representative to the Secretary-General
From: Force Commander
Date: 2 February 1994
Subject: The Military Situation and Assessment of RGF/RPF Intentions as of 20 Feb 1994
Reference: Our code cable MIR-267 of 3 Feb 1994

1. Attached to the reference was the FC military assessment as of 31 Jan 94. At that time, the security situation in the country in general was quite calm, except for the noticeable rise in banditry, illegal demonstrations, reported arms distribution, and subversive activities including coercion of RPF sympathizers by political militia in the Kigali Weapons Secure Area.

2. During the first week of February, a noticeable change of attitude was evidenced in the various political and military governmental (RGF) leaders regarding the degenerating security situation in and around Kigali. The Ministers of Defense and the Interior (both MRND party) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (also presidential supporter) expressed a strong desire to curb the banditry and the illegal, dangerous activities, through offensive actions by the Gendarmerie, the communal police and the Army, with the intimate support of UNAMIR Forces and UNCIVPOL. This radical change of attitude was most surprising as it was even expressed by the Ministers involved and the Prefect of Kigali (MRND) in a public debate with full media coverage and in the presence of the Police Commissioner and the Force Commander of UNAMIR. This positive attitude has prevailed since early February and although words are much easier than concrete action, the security authorities have remained attentive and concerned, overtly curbing the banditry and the illegal activities in the area. They even organized a meeting between UNAMIR and the MRND "INTERHAMWE" political militia in order to show their good faith.

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3. On the weekend of 5 to 6 February, the whole of the RPF leadership held a series of meetings at their HQ in MULINDI. All of the major VIPs at the CND complex in Kigali attended. Since that time, you will notice on the attached INTSUM FEB 94 that a number of incidents have occurred reportedly by the RPF in and on the edges of the DMZ. The investigations are well under way and the FC has already raised a formal complaint to MGen Kagame (Chairman RFA High Command) on these breaches of the cease-fire and incursions in the DMZ.
4. Detailed analysis of the above incidents reflect a possible preparation of offensive operations by the RPF through the DMZ. The deduced RPF concept of operations would be to conduct a faint or put pressure on the extreme East and West flanks of their zone in order to hold RGF units in place. Simultaneously, they would hold the left and right sides of the BYUMBA pocket by battalion-size incursions thus bottling up the seven RGF Bns in the BYUMBA pocket. Then they would thrust a force down the left side of the DMZ bulge south west of BYUMBA after securing a start line at the most southern tip of the DMZ. They would then pursue an aggressive march to Kigali (less than 25 Kms away) to link up in two to three days maximum with the RPF Bn in the CND complex in Kigali, that has all the while pinned down RGF forces around Kigali due to their strong presence.
5. This scenario is possible only if we believe that the RPF have the capability of concentrating enough forces and logistics to break out of their zone, through the DMZ and on to Kigali. This assumption is not held by this HQ as we believe, from the assessment of our MILOBs on the ground, that the RPF do not possess that much offensive capability. We believe, and are confirming on the ground, that they are anywhere from 30 to 40% less than their advertised strength.
6. Furthermore, the extremely blatant alleged incursions of the RPF into the DMZ (during broad daylight) reflects a possible other intention entirely. They (RPF) may be wanting to show the RGF that they still possess an offensive capability and as such may be attempting to intimidate the RGF by having them put pressure on their political leaders to settle the impasse soonest.
7. Another possible scenario, is that the incursions may be RGF sympathizers and Forces dressed as RPF and acting in such a way as to discredit the RPF political position because these cease fire violations demonstrate bad faith at the negotiation table on their part. This is possible when one couples these acts in the DMZ with the significant change of heart shown by the Government Ministers and the MRND in regard to calming of the situation in Kigali.

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8. A significant RGF event occurred in early February 1994 when the Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the Commando Bn in the north be permitted to move into the Kigali Weapons Secure Area, splitting its coys between three local camps. The request was based on a difficulty in logistic support to them in their northern camp. We refused this move categorically and have been observing the camp. The request was repeated verbally on 17 February by the Chief of Staff of the Army stating that their normal place of garrison is in the Kigali area. We are investigating this last request but this whole affair does seem to indicate that the RGF wants to boost the strength, and also the moral or possibly the fighting will in certain units deployed around Kigali by the presence of the elite RGF Commando Bn.
9. The desire of the Chief of Staff of the Army to move RGF troops in and around Kigali was also suspected when on 9 February 1994, nearly 200 supposedly recruits were clandestinely moved from some southern refugee camps to the north in two government buses. Two buses were subsequently found in the GABIRO (North-East) Sector (Brigade) Camp, as we had suspected might be the destination. We have not yet been able to prove that these people are now RGF reinforcements as such.
10. In order to better assess the situation, the DMZ Sector Comd is deploying the advance party of the Ghanaian Bn now (in advance of the main body's arrival) so as to get a first-hand feel of the situation in the left bulge of the DMZ. UNMOs and loaned Belgian light helicopters are screening the DMZ in order to get all the information possible on the violations and any other possible incursions or trends developing. Vehicle/radio limitations are still hampering us but this should be solved in a couple of weeks at most.
11. We have moved UNMOs into the RPF sector but logistics limitations are still preventing us from to maximizing their effectiveness. The UNMOs are trying to monitor (at all the RPF Bn locations) any significant movement or operational planning. The UNOMUR forces are on the alert but have not been able to fully maximise their effectiveness due to occasional NRA interference and the lack of helicopters for night patrols. The spontaneous Ugandan (ex-Rwandan) refugees in the North-East of the RPF zone are of military age but show no signs being militarily trained nor equipped.
12. You will find attached a small map reflecting the possible RPF scenario described above. Although not reflected on the map and not elaborated in this assessment, tensions in the southern Burundi refugee camps could possibly spill over into local or cross-border clashes that would require redeployment of RGF troops from the north into that area and thus weaken the Kigali and the front lines below the DMZ.

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be using the DMZ incursions as a military bluff to put pressure on the other side to settle the political impasse. We are daily improving our position to provide better monitoring of the RPF Sector, the DMZ (finally) and the RGF Sector. UNOMUR is vigilant but has not been maximised as yet. The Kigali Sector is still quiet but tense as information regarding weapons distribution, death squad target lists, planning of civil unrest and demonstrations abound. Time does seem to be running out for political discussions, as any spark on the security side could possibly have catastrophic consequences.

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 UNOMUR
 MONITORING

INTSUM FEB 94

| DATE | OUEST | CENTRE | EST |
|----------|---|--|---|
| | RPF: Secteur BYUMBA RGF: Secteurs RUHENGERRI / RULINDO | RPF: Secteur BYUMBA RGF: Secteurs BYUMBA / RULINDO | RPF: Secteur MUTARA RGF: Secteur MUTARA |
| 03 | | | REFUGIES → NYAGATARE RGF REFUGIES → TABAGUYE RGF → RPF |
| 04 | PAT RPF (PI) A KINONI PAT RPF (Sec) EN CIVIL A KINONI/MUSANJU/KINONI | | |
| 05 | | RPF (25 SDT ARMES) A TUMBA | RPF (25 SDT ARMES) A KARAMA |
| 06 | RPF KIDNAPPING A NKUMBA, KIGOMBE, RUHENGERRI 10 FEB DEPORTE VERS GISORO | RGF CHECKPOINT A RULINDO: DEUX TAXI REVENAIENT DE GAKUBO AYANT DELIVRES DES RECRUES | |
| WE 05/06 | | REUNION VIPs RPF A MULINDI ? | |
| 07 | | PAT RPF (Sec) A TUMBA DE 12.30 Hr à 14.30 Hr | |
| 08 | | DUMP MUNITIONS RPF KABINGO → NYANKENKE | |
| 09 | | | 200 REFUGIES RECRUTES MOV SUD → GABIRO (?) |
| 10 | | PAT RPF (Sec) A TUMBA DE 12.30 Hr à 14.30 Hr | |
| 11 | | Secteur BYUMBA (KISARO) UN PI RPF: - Tirs de 10.00 Hrs à 12.00 Hrs; - Trous Fus à MURAMBA | VIOLATION CEESEZ LE FEU. RGF → RPF NYAMIREMBE / MUVUMBA / MIMULI |
| 13 | INFILTRATION RPF à KINIGI | | |
| 14 | | UNE CIE RPF à MURAMA UNE CIE RPF à NYANKENKE | |
| ? | | UNE CIE RPF à RUTETE UNE CIE RPF à KIGOGO (?) ELEMENTS RPF à MUSEKE KARWANIRA NYARURAMBE MYOVE (*) | ELEMENTS RPF à KARAMBI (*) LYARUGANZU (*) SOMMET 1941 (*) GAHENGELI CYAMUKANYA |

